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ABSTRACT 
West Asia is a developing region and water scarcity is not a new 
phenomenon in the region. It is one of the most important basic 
resources of our world. It is a life sustaining resource and without it no 
living thing, plant or animal, can exist. It is required in abundance not 
only to quench our thirst and meet our domestic needs but to maintain 
the socio-economic development. While demand for water is rapidly 
increasing in West Asia; the supply of fresh water is fmite. As a result, 
in West Asia it is one of the most sensitive political issue, the situation 
is getting worse and the shortage of water is approaching crisis levels. 
The problem is further exacerbated by the fact that most of the 
waters in West Asia are transboundary that crosses or spans an 
international border. Indeed, the lack of water, or access to it, has often 
led to serious armed conflicts. 
It is clear that differences of opinion over the use of river water in 
West Asia is one of the most important active issues in regional politics, 
both overtly and covertly. Overtly, we can see the issue clearly when 
agreements are signed or complaints filed with the United Nations or 
when a military threat is felt. Covertly, the river waters can be seen as an 
important strategic factor when states in the region consider political 
water as a natural security factor and this political maneuver influence 
the development of the river systems. The major rivers of the region are: 
the Jordan, the Euphrates-Tigris, and the Nile. 
West Asia is generally known as a water deficit region in the 
world. The problem attendant to water scarcity is particularly acute in 
the West Asia, as the region has one of the fastest growing populations. 
Water may be more important than either oil or politics, where as 
proven oil reserves in the area are estimated to last at least 100 years, 
water supplies are already insufficient throughout the region, and 
competition for it is inevitably going to increase in the years ahead. In 
addition, there are number of rivers in this region that traverse 
international boundaries established during the twentieth century, and 
that have become a focus of interstate tension. 
The factors that determine the fair division of International River 
Water are the Geography of the drainage basin; its climate and 
hydrology; past and present use of basin water; economic and social 
needs of the basin riparian states; the degree of dependency on the river 
water; the cost of alternative projects for water use; the existence of 
resources other than water; the no wasteful use of basin water; and the 
possibility of providing compensation for damage caused. 
The most regions of the world hydrograph are largely controlled 
by rainfall, with landforms and geological structure as subsidiary 
factors. As the result of a generally deficient rainfall, however, the West 
Asia shows to an unusual degree of the influence of topography and 
structure in the development of its river systems. The climatic condition 
of West Asia varies as the region is large extends over many latitudes, 
and exhibits great physical diversity. In most of the West Asian states 
climate is harsh and arid with scanty rainfall and very high potential of 
evaporation except in the coastal and mountainous regions. 
At the most basic level, actual scarcity may be said to exist when 
real demand exceeds real supply. Although the maxims of supply and 
demand may determine actual shortages, the concept of water scarcity 
encompasses many discrete but interrelated factors that govern supply 
for any given demand: climate, perceived and real need, quality, 
location and reliability of source, consumption, technical capacity, 
accessibility, demographic growth patterns, distribution of population 
and water resources, efficiency, organization and management, use of 
fertilizers, loss and waste, stocks of water and policy decisions on the 
rate of consumption and distribution. Perceptions of the amount and 
quality and availability of water are usually a part of a people's attitude 
toward the environment. 
The region has very little margin of safety where water supply is 
concerned, especially given a population that is projected to double 
within the next quarter century. Unless this situation is reversed without 
further delay, several key actors in the major River Basins- Jordan, 
Israel, the Occupied Territories, Egypt, Turkey Syria, and Iraq- face a 
series of destabilizing economic and political crises with the foreseeable 
future, the consequences of which will reverberate throughout the region 
and in much of the western world. Scarcity, especially mismanaged 
scarcity combined with uneven distribution contributes significantly to 
the creation of an environment of uncertainty and instability in the basic 
political, economic, and social institutions of society, most destructively 
in situations where the reciprocal factors of ecological marginality and 
rising poverty obtain-a condition that characterizes most Arab countries. 
The most limiting characteristic in the agriculture of the region is 
the lack of water. Throughout most of the region rainfall is seasonal, 
mostly in the winter although in southern Arabia and the Sudan there is 
summer monsoon rainfall. Only in northern Turkey and northern Iran is 
there year round precipitation. 
Several of the states in West Asia have become entirely 
dependent upon imported food, a situation from which they would 
prefer to be freed by means of planned agricultural development. One 
result has been that food imports have increased government control 
over strategic urban food supplies. 
Disputes over the distribution of the waters of International 
Rivers are a frequent phenomenon of the present century, and stem from 
efforts by riparian countries to control the natural flow of water with the 
help of modern technology. They also arise from endeavours to secure 
greater exploitation of water resources. There have been bilateral and 
even multilateral treaties to resolve such disputes, but so far no set 
system of International Law on water resources has been evolved. 
The use of joint river systems and the utilization of their waters is 
particularly complex from a legal standpoint. International Law with 
respect to water provides a poorly developed framework for international 
discourse and for the foreseeable future the legal arguments will be 
subordinate to political considerations. International Law is also 
ambiguous, in for example the interpretation of the principle of 'no 
harm'. A state's territory undoubtedly includes the water flowing 
through it, "national waters", but national waters, flowing in rivers, may 
reach the territory of another state, becoming the national waters of that 
state. Water, being part of the territory, but temporary and flowing, 
makes the definition of the concept "territor)'" problematic, and raises 
complex questions in international law. When "unfair" use of river water 
is made by other states, International Law refers to this as "destructive 
use". "Destructive use" can be caused by a change in the flow of the 
river in such a way that the water is not returned to the existing system 
for the use of others. 
The Jordan River is the major source of water in Jordan basin. It 
is the third largest perennial river in West Asia. The Jordan River is a 
multinational river. It has four riparian states: Israel, Jordan, Syria and 
Lebanon. The length of the Jordan River is 320 kilometer of which 73 
kilometer is under Israeli occupied territory and the remainder in Syria, 
Lebanon and Jordan. 
It is also the most frequently cited case among all the water 
system in West Asia as a source of serious conflict. The Jordan basin 
includes Israel and the occupied territories-West Bank, Gaza Strip and 
Golan Height-Jordan and south western Syria. This region faces the 
most serious water deficit in West Asia and there is an urgent need to 
define a mutually acceptable framework of water management. 
The disputes relates to the sharing of the surface water of the 
Jordan River basin between Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the 
Palestinians of the West Bank. In addition on the already complicated 
issues in any transboundary water dispute, these disputes also involve 
extremely complex political and territorial issues. The history of these 
disputes involves, not surprisingly, both armed conflict and peaceful 
negotiation. 
The Jordan River system has witnessed more severe international 
conflict over water than any other river system in the West Asia. While 
one can expect gradually increasing tension over the Euphrates and 
perhaps even the Nile, by far the most likely flashpoint for water 
conflict in the West Asia, today and in the near future, remains the 
Jordan. The fundamental reasons for this are two. There has been no 
significant reduction in the extremely high level of general international 
tension and hostility in the area- if any thing, probably the contrary. The 
water situation has progressively deteriorated as both Israel and Jordan 
are moving into full use and then into shortage conditions. Slack in the 
system has almost disappeared, with the result that conflicts over water 
resources become increasingly zero-sum and exacerbated. 
History and experience in this water-scarce basin demonstrate 
that sustainable solutions to water problems, whether domestic or 
international, always require cooperation, equitable sharing, and 
efficient utilization among involved parties. 
However, the complex environmental and hydrological issues 
cannot be resolved by political formulas negotiated by diplomats alone. 
The tasks of environmental rehabilitation and particularly of water 
resource development and efficient utilization require a considerable 
investment of capital. 
The case of the river Jordan is unique in words hydropolitis and 
geopolitics owing to the combination of a small quantity of water and a 
large number of partners among whom there exists a prolonged and very 
serious conflict. Failure to find a solution to this problem could be a 
cause of internal stability or under mind international agreements that 
have been achieved by the countries of the area. Hence there is an urgent 
need to enhance water supply in the region. There are many ways of 
increasing a countries water supply, a part from building more dams 
digging more wells or bring waters from other river basins. The 
increasing environmental avemess in the region has highlighted the fact 
that since war can not change the ecological givens, it could not increase 
the water supply in real terms and in the long runs the cost of war would 
far exceed the possible return. Further more the historical background of 
water management policies in the region indicates that the indigenous 
inhabitant of the West Asia have always been aware that cooperation 
between riparian parties over shared water resources is the only way to 
create a win situation in which all parties are better off The scarcity of 
water therefore though it might cause periodic tensions does not 
encourage states of the region to employ violence to resolve the 
problem. Indeed there is considerable evidence indicating that 
hydrilopolitic in West Asia is a contest for cooperation in which the 
development of common water resources will create a network of 
collective interest and a platform for a common perceptions that will 
finally breed more regional instigations and peace full coexistence. 
Of the three riparian in the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin-Turkey, 
Syria and Iraq-Turkey is in the most advantageous position. It has 
several relatively abundant rivers and enjoys the greatest waters 
endowment relative to demand. It is economically and militarily the 
most powerful state in the basin region and enjoys the status of being the 
upstream state. Both downstream states have extensive desert and semi-
desert composing about one half the land area of Syria and two third of 
Iraq. The Euphrates accounts for the major source of surface water to 
Syria, the midstream riparian. As for Iraq, the furthest downstream. 
agriculture in all but the northern portion of the country is heavily 
dependent on water from both the Euphrates-Tigris River. 
The water resources have never been the root cause of military 
conflict in Mesopotamia and, second, since antiquity, hydraulic 
civilizations which flourished in the Euphrates-Tigris basin have been 
forced to cooperate and coordinate their collective efforts in a systematic 
way in order to control the two mighty rivers for the sake of all 
beneficiaries. This argument is supported by several hydrological and 
historical facts. 
• First the annual discharge of the two rivers has been more than 
enough to provide for the needs of all riparian communities. 
• Second according to archaeological evidence, the hydraulic 
civilizations of Mesopotamia not only invented the most suitable 
tools for efficient water utilization such as the wheel, windmill, 
and pipe, but also developed a remarkable water management 
system, through extensive networks of dikes, canals and 
reservoirs. 
• Third these civilizations had the social prowess and well-
established legal institutions required for maintaining the 
functionality of their organized water systems and preventing 
conflict. 
Despite recent alarmist warnings by commentators and their 
conflict representation of hydro politics in the Euphrates-Tigris basin, in 
marked contrast to the Jordan River basin, none of the riparian countries 
is facing an imminent water shortage. 
There has been no military conflict between the three riparian 
states of the Euphrates-Tigris basin and no violent water conflict has 
marked their relationship. Indeed, the three parties have been engaged in 
a continuous, active, and critical dialogue and technical consultations 
since the early 1960s. 
Analysis of water diplomacy in Mesopotamia indicates that there 
are several factors which strongly militate against the outbreak of 
conflict in the future. 
« First, the actual water demand of all three riparian countries in 
the foreseeable future will be less than originally projected. 
• Second, the desire to solve the problems of water logging and 
saline deposit will encourage the adoption of more efficient 
patterns of water utilization and new water-saving irrigation 
techniques and technologies. 
• Third, the ability of Iraq to transfer the Tigris water to relieve any 
contingent shortage in the Euphrates is a comforting alternative. 
• Fourth, consultations are continuing among the riparian states in 
the Joint Technical Committees, reflects a cooperative trends 
among the three riparian states. 
• Last but not least, as a result of the UN Convention on the Law 
of the Non-navigational uses of International Watercourses, the 
parties have recognized that they have to shift their water 
disputes from contests of power to considerations of fair rights 
and mutual obligations. 
These considerations effectively undermine the likelihood of 
military conflict between Turkey, Iraq, and Syria over water issues and 
nullify the fanciful scenarios of water war in this basin posed by many 
writers. We must now turn our attention to the Arabian Peninsula, in 
which hydro politics has a very different setting, not least because the 
scarcity of water is a major fact of life. 
GAP, initiated in 1965, is Turkey's largest and most ambitious 
development project in the south-eastern part of the states. It has been 
conceived and implemented as a means of integrating water resources 
development with overall human development in one of the backward 
regions of Turkey. The project area lies in south eastern Turkey, 
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covering nine provinces corresponding to approximately 10 percent of 
Turkey's total population and an equivalent surface area. The project 
area includes the watersheds of the lower Euphrates and Tigris rivers 
and the upper Mesopotamian plains. The water resources development 
program of GAP includes 13 groups of irrigation and energy projects, 
seven of which are on the Euphrates River and six on the Tigris. The 
project includes 22 dams, 19 hydropower plants, and irrigation 
networks, on the Euphrates and Tigris river basins, to irrigate 1.7 million 
hectares of land. 
The Nile is an important West Asian river although all its waters 
come from tropical equatorial Africa. The provenance of the water 
means that an understanding of the past, current and future water 
resources of Egypt and the northern Sudan require that the hydrology of 
the southern, water generating part of the system. The Nile is the longest 
river in the world, has shaped the culture of Egypt over the millennia. 
By the time its major tributaries join at Khartoum the flow is about 84 
cubic kilometers per year. The Nile River is 6,825 kilometer long over 
35 degrees of latitude until it reaches the Mediterranean and its 
catchments basin covers over three million cubic kilometer. The Nile 
and its tributaries bring to gather ten riparian states: Burundi, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Eritera, Ethiopia, Kenya, the 
Sudan, Rawanda, Tanzania and Uganda. 
Egypt has historical rights to use Nile water since the start of 
human civilization. Sudan also has historical rights, less than Egypt but 
more than the upstream states, which began using Nile water only 
recently. Egypt and Sudan are the only users of the river water. The 
beginnings of a crisis have materialized along the Nile as well. Ethiopia, 
making movements toward state building for the first time in a 
generation following the overthrow of the communist Mengistu regime 
in 1991, has focused upon water distribution as an issue of paramount 
concern. The North African country, currently ravaged by conflict with 
Eritrea, possesses neither the economic stability nor the investor 
confidence to facihtate desalination efforts. Consequently, Ethiopia has 
increasingly objected to the water use of neighboring Egypt, claiming 
present allocation-regulated by a 1959 agreement over Nile and Sudan 
as arbitary, Ethiopia has hinted it may resort to a unilateral exercise of 
sovereignty or a military confrontation with Egypt. All the basin states 
of the Nile are dependent on agriculture, which is their principal source 
of income. Egypt is less dependent on agriculture than the others 
because it has other sources of income, but it is more dependent on river 
v^ater than the other. 
All the countries in the region are considered to be developing 
states in socioeconomic terms. In all of them the natural growth rate 
population is high and they cannot match it with agricultural 
development, and they all import a large part of their food. The accords 
signed by Ethiopia and Sudan in 1991 and by Ethiopia and Egypt in 
1993 also suggest that discussion and negotiation are more likely than 
war. Of course, there is a great distance to travel between these general 
declarations of intent and a new apportionment of the Nile waters that 
take Ethiopian requirements into account, let alone the cooperative 
management of the basin as a whole. The current hostility between 
Egypt and Sudan is a major obstacle to progress. 
In the case of international law, water of common interest, the 
most helpful evidence of this practice is to be found in a number of 
bilateral treaties and certain multilateral treaties and conventions. In 
international Law, a distinction is normally drawn between national and 
international rivers. A river, which passes through or along the territory 
of two or more states is described as International River and is governed 
by the rules of the International River Law. 
The utilization of the waters of an international drainage basin 
raises many problems with respect to both International Relations and 
International Law. Water rights have been the subject of state concern 
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ever since the earliest appearance of any form of state organization. In 
the light of the most recent research it may not even be going too far to 
organization. 
It is an assumption of International Law that the allocation of 
scarce resources requires legal adjudication if conflict is to be avoided. 
International Law recognizes the community of property among riparian 
states as a customary rule of law, that is, each of them is entitled to use a 
share of the river so long as unreasonable injury to another riparian does 
not ensue. Although this principle has been upheld in the courts, it 
contains an inherent weakness and has also been challenged by 
countervailing legal arguments. The flaw slies in the fact that customary 
rules tend to be highly unstable unless all involved parties have 
compatible interests, preferably guaranteed by formal agreement. 
International law has recognized that a river is the property of the 
community of all riparian states and this has been followed by 
recognition of the existence of certain limitations to territorial 
sovereignty in favour of the international community in general. 
However, the first step toward translation legal theory into institutional 
application is the production of political agreements. Such facts are 
essential to the creation of a broader array of legal instruments for 
solving international disputes over shared water resources. 
11 
DISPUTES OVER SHARING OF 
TRANSBORDER RIVERS IN WEST ASIA 
THESIS 
SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF 
doctor o! $I)tlos!0|)I)p 
IN 
WEST ASIAN STUDIES 
(GEOGRAPHY) 
BY 
GHAZZALA SHABBANA 
UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF 
Dr. FAZAL MAHMOOD 
(Associate Professor) 
CENTRE OF WEST ASIAN STUDIES 
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY 
ALIGARH (INDIA) 
2010 
J . jLi' L<t i4 
T8490 
."^ 
\<. V ^ !m S-9-l 
CENTRE OF WEST ASIAN STUDIES 
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY, 
ALIGARH-202002 (INDIA) 
Date:iaOMOlO 
Certificate 
This is to certify that the Ph.D. thesis on ''Disputes Over 
Sharing of Tramborder Rivers in West Asia" submitted by 
Miss. Ghazzala Shabbana is her own original contribution and 
suitable for submission for the award of the degree of Ph.D. 
Further certified that Miss. Ghazzala Shabbana has been 
engaged in full-time research and that she has put in required 
attenidance as prescribed by the University. 
(Dr. Fazal Mahmood) 
Supervisor 
(Prof. Mohammad Gulrez) 
Chairman 
declaration 
I solemnly declare that the research work incorporated in this 
thesis entitled "Disputes Over Sharing of Transborder Rivers in West 
Asia" for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in West Asian 
Studies (Geography) submitted to the Centre of West Asian 
Studies, AHgarh Muslim University, Aligarh is an original work 
and has been undertaken by me under the supervision of 
Dr. Fazal Mahmood (Associate Professor). 
I also declare that neither full nor a part of this work is 
published anywhere in any form. 
(Ghazzala Shabbana) 
Centre of West Asian Studies 
Aligarh Muslim University 
Aligarh 

CONTENTS 
Page No. 
Preface i-iv 
Acknowledgements v-vi 
List of Abbreviation vii-viii 
List of Tables ix-x 
List of Graph xi 
List of Maps xii 
List of Photos xiii 
Transboundary Rivers at A-Glance xiv-xv 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 1-18 
LI: Overview 
1.2: Significance of the study 
L3: Statement of the Problem 
1.4: Rationale and Hypothesis 
1.5: Objective of the Study 
1.6: Methodology 
1.7: Literature Review 
1.8: Limitations of the Study 
1.9: Information Sources 
1.10: Water: A Global Problem 
CHAPTER II: 
SIGNIFICANCE AND DEMAND OF WATER 19-50 
(A). The Basic Importance of Water 
(B). V/ater in West Asia: An Overview 
2.1: Water Demand in West Asia 
2.2: Water Endowment of the Countries of the Region 
2.3: Domestic Water Use in Urban Areas 
2.4: Irrigation and Water Requirement 
2.5: Industrialization and Industrial Water Use 
2.6: Dimensions of the West Asia Water Problems 
(C). Water Sharing Disputes 
2.7: Competing Water Demand in West Asia 
2.8: The Role of Water in Regional Relations 
CHAPTER III 
THE JORDAN RIVER BASIN 51-105 
(A). Introduction 
(B). The Jordan River 
(C). Climatic and Hydropolitical Features 
(D). Hydrology of Riparian States 
3.1: Syria 
3.2: Lebanon 
3.3: The Jordanian Kingdom 
3.4: Israel 
3.5: Palestine 
(E). Geopoliticsof Jordan River Basin 
3.6: The Early Period 
3.7: The Various Plan 
3.8: The National Water Carrier 
3.9: The 1967 War 
3.10: The Jordan Syrian Efforts 
3.11: The Water and Peace Talks 
(F). Water in the Madrid Peace Process 
3.12: The Israel-Jordan Water Peace Treaty 26 October 1994 
(G). Conclusion 
CHAPTER IV 
THE EUPHRATES-TIGRIS RIVERS BASIN 106-174 
(A). Introduction 
(B). Hydrological Features of the Euphrates-Tigris Rivers Basin 
(C). Disputes and Agreements over the Euphrates-Tigris Rivers Basin 
4.1: Emerging Conflicts over the Euphrates-Tigris Rivers 
(D). Irrigation Development Projects 
4.2: Turkey 
4.3: Syria 
4.4: Iraq 
(E). Geopolitics of the Euphrates-Tigris Rivers Basins 
4.5: Disputes between Turkey and Syria 
4.6: Tensions between Turkey and Iraq 
4.7: Hostility between Syria and Iraq 
(F). The Water Crisis of 1989-90 
4.8: Possible Water Allocation Approach 
(G). South-East Anatolian Project GAP (Guneydogu Anadolu Projesi) A Paradigm 
Shift Water Resources Development 
(H). Utilization: The Three Stage Plan 
(I), Recent Developments 
(J), Ttie Joint Technical Committee 
(K). Conclusion 
CHAPTER V 
THE NILE RIVER BASIN 175-237 
(A). Introduction 
(B). Hydrological Features of the Nile River Basin 
(C). Geopolitical Development in the Nile River Basin 
(D). International Agreements on the Nile Water Utilization 
5.1: Status of Colonial Agreement 
(E). Egypt and Sudan Conflict Over the Nile River Basin 
(F). 1959 Agreement between Egypt and the Sudan 
5.2: Egyptian Position 
5.3; Sudanese Position 
5.4: Provisions 
5.5: The Attitudes of the other Riparian States 
(G). Sudan and Ethiopia 
5.6: The Sudan and Ethiopian Agreement of 1991 
(H). Egypt and Ethiopia 
5.7; Frame Work for General Cooperation July 1993 
(I). Nile Basin Initiative 
(J). Natural and Historical Rights Claim 
(K). Challenges 
(L). The Aswan High Dam 
(M). Major Impact of the High Dam 
(N). The .longlei Canal Project 
(0). Technical and Legal Capability of the Nile States to deal with the 
management of the Nile 
5.8: Egypt 
5.9: The Sudan 
5.10: Ethiopia 
5.11: Uganda 
(P). Recent Cooperation and Capacity Building 
(Q). Creative outcomes resulting from resolution process 
(R). Conclusion 
CHAPTER VI 
INTER?JATIONAL LAW 238-268 
(A). The Nature of International Law 
6.1: The Law of International Water Resources 
6.2: The Riparian Approach to International Law 
(B). International Water Treaties 
6.3: Water Treaties on European Continent 
6.4: The American Continent 
6.5: Afro-Asian Continent 
6.6: The Indus River Basin Agreement 
6.7; The Ganges Water Agreement 
(C). International Water Treaties in West Asia 
CHAPTER Vn 
SUGGESTION AND CONCLUSION 269-307 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 308-340 
APPENDICES 1-78 
PREFACE 
Water is the most precious and limited natural resource in West Asia. 
Water is one of the most important basic natural resources for socio-
economic. Without it no living thing, plant or animal, can exist. Some times 
during the year, it is in plenty and at other times becomes scarce. 
West Asia is a developing region and water scarcity is not a new 
phenomenon in the arid region. In most of the West Asian region climate is 
harsh and arid with scanty rainfall and very high potential evaporation 
except in the coastal and mountainous region. While demand for water is 
rapidly growing in West Asia, the supply of fresh water is limited. As far as 
an arid region is concerned typical war is generated by increasing 
competition for water combined with problems of water shortage during the 
dry with problems of water shortage during the dry seasons. 
The situation is likely to deteriorate even fiirther in the future for 
important reasons. The global population is increasing rapidly, and is likely 
to continue to do so still about the year 2050, or even beyond. This means 
more and more water would be required for domestic and industrial uses, 
agricultural production and hydropower generation for this expanding 
population. As more and more people attain a higher standard of living, per 
capita water demand would continue to increase as well. Current analyses 
indicate that the total global water consumption during the period 2010-2050 
is likely to increase fifteen fold and this trend is likely to extend well into 
the second half of the present century. There are numerous reasons for water 
scarcity such as climate variations, degradation of water quality by human 
activity at a rate faster than the source can be renewed, depletion of a source, 
such as an aquifer, at a rate faster than it can be replenished, out of basin 
diversion or storage of surface water, redistribution for other uses or to 
anothier place, and consumption. They all tend to the variations, which taken 
together, will delimit supply and demand. 
Disputes over the distribution of the waters of international rivers are 
frequent phenomenon of the present century and stem from efforts by 
riparian countries to control the natural flow of water with the help of 
modem technology. The use of river water in West Asia is one of the most 
important active issues in regional politics, both overtly and covertly. 
Overtly, we can see the issue clearly when agreements are signed or 
complaints filed with the United National or when a military threat is felt. 
The recent studies and reports describe a grim picture of fresh 
water availability in the West Asia, indicating that there is a significant risk 
of imminent conflicts and wars over water in this region. 
The purpose of this study is an inquiry into the conduct of 
riparian states in transnational river basins of the West Asia, based on an 
analysis of the actual needs of the countries bordering these basins and the 
political implications of the unevenly distributed region's water resources. It 
seeks to find out the obstacles which have prevented the countries of the 
region reaching a cooperative basin-wide arrangement, which is the optimal 
method for development and exploitation of their common water resources. 
The scope of concern includes both the transnational rivers and the cross-
border aquifers in the West Asia where, because of the aridity of the climate 
and the high rate of population growth, unimpeded access to freshwater 
resources is linked to national survival. 
The significance of this study lies in its endeavour to define the 
limitations and opportunities for the achievement of cooperation solutions to 
the problem of managing a common property resource and to avoid both the 
'tragedy of the commons' and regional violence. The main objective is to 
put forward an interpretation of water, politics in which water is seen as a 
critical factor in many countries toward cooperation rather than military 
conflict with their co-riparian neighbours. It will show that although water 
has occasionally provoked dispute in the west Asia, it has much more often 
promoted coexistence between adversaries. The main hypothesis is that, 
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contrary to the most frequently mentioned scenario in the literature that 
suggest that dispute over water supplies will lead to interstate war, it is 
unlikely that the quest for more water will cause a new war in the West 
Asia. Rather, water shortage should be seen as a platform for regional 
cooperation that promises development and exploitation of the region's 
water supplies in ways that all riparian nations can achieve optimal 
solutions. Moreover, joint cooperative development of common water 
resources will actually reinforce peace. 
The primary concern in the present in the present study is to develop a 
conceptual frame-work in connection with rivers water allocation among 
riparian states. The focus of this study is on three rivers. These rivers are the 
Jordan, the Euphrates, and the Nile rivers. It is these three rivers which have 
been the centre of acute controversy since the Second World War. All rivers 
have perennial water course in semi desert land and as such they assume 
imiportance far out of proportion to their modest discharges. Dispute over 
allocation of water has blocked cooperative efforts to solve the problem and 
the perpetual interference of great powers in the region has made these 
issues more complex and intractable. 
The Thesis is divided into seven chapters : 
The first chapter deals with the significance of the study and 
literature review. It also explains the objective of study and methodology of 
the work. 
The second chapter begins with discussion of the geography of the 
West Asian region as a whole, including a brief historical review of the 
backg,round to and origin of the disputes and domestic water use in urban 
areas, irrigation and water requirement and what is water sharing Disputes? 
The third chapter highlights the Trans-boundarj^  regional disputes 
over the Jordan River, it's climatic and hydroiopolitical features. The 
chapter also explains the disputes related to the sharing of the surface water 
HI 
of the Jordan River Basin between Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and 
Palestine. In the end the chapter provides some negotiations and treaties to 
settle down these disputes. 
The fourth chapter deals with the Disputes and agreement over the 
Euphrates-Tigris Rivers. The study provides a review of the hydrology of 
the river and the river's relevance to the economies of its three riparians. 
This resources profile is the basis of the analysis of the strategic role of the 
river in the relations between Turkey, Syria and Iraq, The three riparians 
began to plan and carry out extensive development programmers for the 
Euphrates river water by constructing dams whose main purpose was to 
control the flow of its water, for the production of hydroelectric power and 
for agricultural purposes. These programmers caused tension in the foreign 
relations between the countries. 
The fifth chapter discusses the conflicts relating to the sharing of the 
Nile River between Egypt, the Sudan and Ethiopia. The building of the 
Aswan High Dam, in Egypt and its epicureans on the utilization of water on 
the riparian states in the focus of this chapter. 
The sixth chapter analyses the role of International Laws and treaties 
and the extent of their applicability to the problem of water sharing of 
tTiuisnational rivers in West Asia. 
The last chapter is suggestion and conclusion of the entire study. It 
also highlights solution proposals in consonance with the situation obtaining 
at present. 
IV 
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1.1: OVERVIEW 
Water is the most precious life sustaining resource. The shortage of 
water imposes severe restraints on socio-economic development and 
consequently on political stability. At present about 40 percent of the 
world's population is facing serious water shortage. It is estimated that by 
the middle of 21st century nearly 68 percentage of the world population 
may suffer from water shortage. 
The greater part of the West Asian territories fall in arid and semi-
arid zones of the world which makes water a scarce, limited and exhaustible 
commodity. Almost all the states of West Asia are suffering from 
insufficient supply of fresh water which heightens the ambient tension 
among all the states of West Asia. Hence its control in the region is 
regarded as legitimate "hydraulic imperative". It is anticipated that scarcity 
and rapid diminution of fresh water in the region may prove to be 
catastrophic in future. 
Many of the states in West Asia depend heavily on imported surface 
water, which comes through internationally shared river system. That in 
why the issue of water resources does undoubtedly play prominent role in 
the regional relations. In West Asia surface water is concentrated in three 
major rivers- the Jordan, the Euphrates-Tigris and the Nile River Basin 
(Map-1). These rivers basin, illustrate different aspects of the water crisis 
and have witnessed a high level of both conflict and cooperation. It is 
importance to note that one state in each river basin area has demonstrably 
identified itself as the key player Israel, Turkey, and Egypt in controlling 
over the water resources. They operate on the assumption that their water 
needs are more important and essential than their co-riparian. 
The Jordan River basin has a long history of conflict between Israel 
and the Arabs. Competition for water has been strongest in the Jordan 
basin. It is generally believed that rumors of Jordanian and Syrian plans to 
divert the headwaters of the River Jordan were the principal cause of the 
1967 Arab-Israeli war. Some have suggested that Israeli's systemic 
exploitation of the water resources of the occupied territories has been the 
main factor for its reluctance to consider a peace agreement based on the 
exchange of land for peace. Israeli occupation of the southern Lebanon is 
too considered as its intention to control the flow of Litani River. Many 
attempts to draw up a region-wide water management plan and a system of 
water allocation, which is acceptable to all parties, have failed. 
Thie Nile is an important river system of West Asia as it plays a vital 
role in regional relations. The regional stability and economic survival of 
the riparian countries particularly Egypt, the Sudan and Ethiopia, are 
depend on the Nile waters. Egypt and Sudan are the two main largest 
consumers of the Nile's water. Egypt has only one major source of water 
supply the Nile to all the domestic, industrial and agricultural demands of 
its rapidly rising population. Egypt in 1991 was prepared to use force to 
protect the headwater of the Nile for reasons of national security. Obviously 
the warning was aimed at Ethiopia, which controls the 85 percent of the 
Niles higher flow, and the Sudan with which it has disputes over sharing of 
the Nile waters. Until 1920s Egypt was the only basin state who made use 
of water of the Nile. All the international and multilateral agreements had 
given priority to Egypt's hydraulic need as paramount. The Nile water 
Agreements of 1929 and 1959 between Egypt and the Sudan reflect the 
water sharing dispute between them. The Sudan share of the Nile increased 
from four percent in 1929 to twenty five percent in 1959. 
The draught in Ethiopia and the rising demand for water from its 
growing population, however, are changing the equation and forcing it to 
consider the sharing of the Nile water with Egypt and the Sudan. At present 
Ethiopia has launched various Agricultural development programmers with 
the purpose of achieving self-sufficiency in food production. It is moving 
gradually to implement the water projects on the headwaters of the Blue 
Nile. These developments have threatened existing entente and also 
political stability. 
The Euphrates-Tigris is imports are important international rivers 
which have tremendous regional importance. Control of these rivers has 
become increasingly contentious, as the demand for water increasing every 
year in this basin region. However, since the 1960s, with ambitious 
development plans in all the riparian states, the potential for conflict over 
the distribution of water has been growing. The three major riparian 
countries of the Euphrates-Tigris Basin-Turkey, Syria and Iraq-have rapidly 
growing population and are at same time pursuing development strategies 
that are heavily dependent on water resources. Therefore any disruption in 
water flow could constitute one of the strategically important security issues 
of these states. 
The headwaters of the Euphrates-Tigris Rivers are in Turkey. 
Turkey, as the upstream state on the Tigris and Euphrates has sought to 
exploit water as its sovereign right in its territory, a right which its 
downstream neighbours strenuously dispute. The 1970s witnessed 
interstates tension between the riparian states of the Euphrates-Tigris basins 
due to their inability to reach formal agreement or working arrangements on 
allocations of water. In 1973 Turkey finished the building of the Keban 
Dam on the Euphrates which provoked Syrian anxiety and official protest. 
The construction of Tabqa Dam in 1973-74 by Syria and filling of the Lake 
Asad reservoir brought serious worries to Iraq about the reduction in the 
availability of water since it depends primarily on the Tigris system for the 
irrigation of its agricultural fields. Economic and political relations 
deteriorated and both Syria and Iraq came to the brink of war. However, 
mediation efforts of Saudi Arabia and the Soviet Union prevented the 
military confrontation between the two countries. 
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Turkey's decision to develop South-eastern Anatolia created tension 
in the basin region. The scheme, known as GAP, consists of 13 main 
projects; seven on the Euphrates and six on the Tigris and 19 hydropower 
generating stations. The centre pieces of the project are the Ataturk Dam. 
Syria and Iraq protested vociferously and the former threatened to go to 
war. After negotiation a joint technical committee was formed. Since 1980 
the committee has met many times but so far failed to reach any long-term 
Agreement. Thus GAP is a source of common concern for Syria and Iraq 
and to face the situation, they may forge an alliance against Turkey on the 
use of the Euphrates resources. However, amicable solution regarding the 
Tigris-Euphrates basin is not insight because of intransigence positions. 
Water deficit is a function of supply and demand. In West Asia 
growing number of people and their increasing demand for food have added 
tremendous pressures on limited water resources. Consequently supply-
demand disparities are growing in the region. However cooperation rather 
controls is needed to get the best use of scarce water supply. 
1.2: SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
West Asia is one of the water poorest regions in the world. Water 
resources are limited in quantity and vulnerable in quality. Present uses are 
exceeding renewable supplies and the difference is being met by 
unsustjiinable practices. Costs of water delivery to different users are 
regulai'ly increasing. Water resource management practices are neither 
financially sustainable nor environmentally sound. Water is a major issue in 
West Asia as it plays a prominent role in directing policies and defining 
strategies. The major driving force that will lead to transformation and 
reform of water policy and management in West Asia region is progressive 
socio-economic development. Fair allocation of limited water resources in 
the basin is a major issue. Water resources of West Asia consist primary of 
surface water and ground water. Surface water has throughout history has 
been a significant source of water in West Asia region outstripping the 
rainfed water in soil profiles. There is little or no naturally occurring soil 
water even in the winter when parts of the region do receive rainfall. By 
contrast in temperate zone crop production is almost totally based on soil 
water which occurs naturally. Soil water tends to be taken for granted in the 
economics located in the humid temperate zone. The huge volumes of water 
utilized by agriculture are not counted as part of the national water budget. 
Soil water is a free good. In the semi-arid and arid region like West Asia 
agricultural water is expensively obtained because of the costs of storage 
and distribution. Storage is needed to ensure timely availability and to 
reduce the loss of water for the economic activities of a political economy. 
Mobilizing such water can be politically stressful both nationally through 
enviromnental impacts, and internationally through riparian conflict. 
The growth of population and their increasing demand for food have 
added tremendous pressure on water resources. Many West Asian countries 
motivated by fears of growing dependence on food imports are actively 
promoting a policy of food security and self-reliance as a national economic 
goal. However, food security is primarily a political and social policy 
objective which is pursued despite poor economic returns. Water used in 
the agricultural sector exceeds by ten times the water used by the industrial 
and municipal sector combined. In West Asia the dominance of the 
agricultural water demand is posing challenge to national water budget. At 
the national level over 80 percent of all national water budgets are devoted 
to the agricultural sector. As a result all economies in West Asia are coping 
with serious water deficits. The major indicator of the scale of the water 
deficit of an economy is the level of its food imports. Water is required to 
raise food to insure subsistence. The raising of food is integral to society. 
Almost all the states of West Asia are critically dependent on food imports 
to meet the increasing demand for food as population in all states of the 
region are expanding rapidly at an average annual rate of 2.2 to 3.7 percent. 
Consequently, the limited water resources of the region can not keep pace 
with demand. 
The lack of adequate rainfall restricts the plenty of fresh water 
supply. Throughout most of the West Asia, rainfall varies between 250 mm 
to 400 mm per annum with 50 mm in extensive desert plains. The 
exceptions are the higher mountains of Lebanon, certain parts of Turkey 
and Iran. This variation in annual amount of rainfall has imposed limitation 
on the level and type of socio-economic and political development 
throughout the region. In such circumstances water control becomes socio-
political imperative and disputes over shared water resources inevitable. 
The principal river basin areas of West Asia - the Jordan, the Euphrates-
Tigris amd the Nile- illustrate different facets of the water crisis. Tension is 
inevitable if upstream on international rivers embark on projects which 
reduce the flow of water downstream. Turkish relations with Iraq and Syria 
are strained over Turkey's southeast Anatolia Project. Egypt is concerned 
about the water developmental activities of the upstream users of the Nile. 
At present, Israel has control over the major part of the Jordan Basin water, 
giving it precedence over Arab states. Hence this study tackles the issue of 
water sharing and problem of water management and conservation. In 
addition, the study touches the growing supply-demand disparities and 
introduction of more efficient water delivery systems that can make 
extraordinary impact on national water budgets of riparian states. 
1.3: STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Since antiquity water in West Asia has been a dominant concern for 
the growth of economic activity and human settlement. Being the water 
deficit region of the world, socio-economic value of water has always been 
appreciated by the people of West Asia. It has been considered as a 
valuable finite resource for survival and well-being in the region. 
Consequently perennial water sources have played crucial role in shaping 
social, cultural, economic and political structure of the region. The rate of 
water consumption in West Asia has surged many folds with the increase of 
population, rapid growth of urbanization and socio-economic development. 
Moreover, agro-industrial expansion and aspiration for greater economic 
development has further increased the pressure on limited fresh water 
supplies, bringing the region at the edge of water crisis. 
The present and expanding water uses in West Asia have increased 
transnational dependencies on shared water resources. The management and 
development of these shared water resources pose special challenges which 
sometimes turn into explosive political issue. Geopolitically, the entire 
major v/ater resources of West Asia-both rivers and aquifers-are shared by 
several countries and are classified as international water resources. These 
transborder water resources particularly rivers have been the source of 
mistrust and conflict between the riparian states. 
There are very few international agreements over water sharing in 
the region. This has deeply influenced the course of social, economic and 
political development in many countries of the region. As a result the need 
for safe water becomes a dominant concern. The problem becomes more 
complicated when water management and sharing of surface and ground 
water resources are over shadowed by political issues. The absence of 
multilateral or comprehensive bilateral agreements on water allocation in 
West Asia illustrates the political mistrust in a wider sense and relative lack 
of economic cooperation in the region. Moreover, most of the states have 
linked the water sharing issue with the national security and also its control 
as an effective bargaining tool in the political process. 
The major river basins of West Asia-the Jordan, the Euphrates-Tigris 
and tlie Nile-exhibit the different types of the water sharing problem. These 
river basins have diverse hydrological endowments and very diverse pattern 
of individual national demography, resource utilization and economic 
performance. The profiles of riparian rhetoric of water right assertion, 
recognition and attainment have also evolved in very different ways. The 
hydropolitical dynamics of these three basins explain the degree of mistrust 
and lack of mutual cooperation and understanding between riparian states. 
It may be assumed that when water resource management is handled 
properly it can provide the basis for economic growth, improvements in 
living standards and socio-political stability. The experience of the past, 
however, shows that these benefits are undermined by poor management of 
water resources. The present study focuses on the water sharing problems 
and issues of the transborder river basin. 
1.4: R\TIONALE AND HYPOTHESES 
Water is a strategic resource vital for human well-being, for 
economic development and for state security. In West Asia, fresh water 
supply is relatively fixed and limited. Consequently, most of the countries 
of West Asia are experiencing conditions of water stress and water scarcity. 
Moreover, uneven precipitation, recurrent severe floods and droughts, and 
the extreme fluctuations of the rivers and water tables have made annual 
water supply in the region erratic and precarious. Thus, its control is 
considered paramount for the economic and political survival of the state 
and people. What makes the crisis even more complicated is the fact that 
water is not just a scarce resource but a shared one as well. Lack of basic 
agreement on an equitable distribution of water resources has led to 
political mistrust and mutual suspicion between states of West Asia. A 
number of recent studies suggest that water shortage in West Asia will 
intensify and aggravate competition between states and will lead to the 
unprecedented upheavals. In fact, the water crisis relates fundamentally to 
the nature of water allocation and use within states rather than to water 
allocation between states. It may be asserted that efficient water resource 
management on national and international level and proper use of water in 
various sectors of economy can inevitably provide certain level of water 
security. Disputes over shared water resources, which attract attention and 
present a sensational image of instability, is widely tipped as the next cause 
of conflict in the region. However, the historical evidence suggests that the 
indigenous inhabitants of the region deliberately set out to cooperate and 
coordinate their collective efforts in a systematic way to control the 
hydrological chaos of the region for the sake of all riparian parties. Cisterns 
in the Jordan Basin, Qanat systems in the Arabian Peninsula and hydraulic 
projects in Mesopotamia are symbols of these cooperative efforts. A 
reasonable assertion seems to be that water scarcity in the region has 
invariable been a platform for cooperation, through which all riparian states 
have achieve greater gains. However, the study of water sharing as a factor 
for cooperation and co-existence has not been under taken to a great extent. 
Hence we asked the following questions for this research. 
1. The political stability in the region depends to a greater extent, on 
the socio-economic development. Water is a crucial element in this 
equation. 
2. Uncertainties regarding population growth, agricultural needs, 
industrial requirements, and possible global warming have made 
long-term assessments of water resources difficult. 
3. In a river flow shared by several countries unchecked upstream 
developments could prove a matter of serious concern to down 
stream users. This is why water security is one of the most crucial 
elements in the national security considerations of many countries. 
4. The management and development of shared water resources pose 
challenges, which sometimes turn into explosive political issue. 
5. Water resources management can provide the basis for economic 
growth, improvement in living standards and socio-political stability. 
Poor management of water resources can undermine these benefits. 
6. Tlie main hypothesis is that contrary to most frequently mentioned 
scenario in the literature which suggests that disputes over water 
supplies will lead interstate war. It is unlikely that the quest for more 
water will cause a new war in the region. 
7. Water shortage should be seen as a platform for regional cooperation 
that promises development and exploitation of the regions water 
supplies in ways that all riparian nations can achieve optimal 
solutions. However joint cooperative development of common water 
resources will actually reinforce peace. 
1.5: OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
This study seeks to achieve the following objectives: 
1. Inquiry into the conduct of riparian states transnational river basins 
of West Asia. 
2. vVnalysis of the actual needs of the countries bordering these basins 
fmd the political implications of the unevenly distributed regions 
water resources. 
3. Find out the obstacles which have prevented the countries of the 
region reaching a cooperative basin-wide arrangement, which is the 
optimal method for development and exploitation of their common 
water resources. 
4. Define the limitations and opportunities for the achievement of 
cooperative solutions to the problem of managing a common 
property resource and to avoid both the tragedy of the commons and 
regional violence. 
5. Put forward an interpretation of water politics in which water is seen 
as a critical factor in moving countries towards cooperation rather 
than military conflict with their co-riparian neighbours. 
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6. Review the hydrology of the principal transborder river basins of 
West Asia, and investigate the strategic dimensions of water 
problems and their implications for the future. 
7. Present water resources management practices and provide an 
overview and recommendations on surface water management 
practices. 
8. Provide recommendations for future studies or appropriate actions. 
9. The objectives of the study are to find the dynamic properties of the 
water issue and to understand the mechanisms and feedbacks in the 
system. Further, it is also important to be able to set the problems 
with water supply in the context of the whole geo-political situation 
in the Trans National River system of crucial importance is to 
understand the system of water usage, decision mechanisms and 
actions of different population groups. The utilimate expected out 
come would be to find a stable, fair and equal supply of water, which 
would be sustainable in a long term perspective. 
1.6: METHODOLOGY 
The methodology of the proposed research work is a descriptive 
analysis with a combination of empirical data. The emphasis of the study is 
on dispute over water sharing of Trans border Rivers and its role in the 
regional relations. The data and other materials obtained would be 
thoroughly checked and cross-checked to eliminate discrepancies wherever 
existed before embarking on building up the thesis. With regard to adopting 
analytical approach, simple mathematical techniques are to be relied upon. 
The entire research work has to be seen under a theoretical background. 
Computer will be used to analyze the data and materials. Maximum effort 
will be made to complete the necessary data and its interpretation through 
whatever means available such as archival research, case studies of 
international experiences of similar projects, and the use of internet for 
11 
research, communication, and transfer of knowledge. Being an exploratory 
study all possible means will be tapped to draw relevant information. 
A general model of decision making involves an analytical effort 
aimed at identifying and understanding problems, the design and 
representation of alternative solutions, the evaluation of these and the 
choice of one of them as the most desirable. This methodology consists of 
three separate but interrelated phases: intelligence, policy, and choice. The 
goal of the intelligence phase is to identify and understand the situation 
addressed. It involves the identification and elucidation of the current 
problem situation, identification of constraints the formulation of goal and 
the development of some guidelines on which the proposed policy is to be 
based upon. The second step is the generation of alternative solutions to the 
problems identified with the situation being addressed. The choice phase of 
the methodology involves the evaluation of possible scenarios or alternative 
policies. 
1.7: LITERATURE REVIEW 
The water crisis facing different parts of the globe, embraces both 
developed and developing countries. These facts suggest that the growing 
problems in the water domain need to be better understood if they are to be 
solved. The literature on this issue reflects a realization of this need. The 
UN has long been stimulating research into the water crisis, and according 
to Falkenmark's assessment (1990: 188), 20 UN bodies are now involved 
with v a^ter issues. In addition, many academic institutions, centers, 
corporations, consulting firms, foundations, national and international 
agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) non-profit and private 
organizations have also recently become interested in hydro politics and 
water-related issues. As a result, there are scores of published studies, as 
well as a burgeoning literature on water issues available on the internet. 
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A view of world politics suggests a positive relationship between 
resource scarcity and conflict. Applying this analysis to fresh water 
resources, (Falkenmark & Widstrand, 1992: 4) argue that 'access to water 
has generated political and military conflicts throughout world history'. 
Military' analysts such as (Thompson, 1978: 62-71) claim that 'fresh water 
is similar in many respects to other of the world's scarce resources' and 
since 'iresh water is becoming increasingly scarce'. It is thus becoming 
'increasingly a source for future conflict'. 
Falkenmark sees the fresh water issue as a present and future focus 
of international disputes and as a factor in conflict formation. She argues 
that frustrations over scarcity of water and over dependence for water upon 
upstream countries may develop into disputes. 'Water can be a strong 
contributing factor to armed conflict', she believes 'even if this is not often 
recognized (1986a: 109). From a similar perspective, (Gleick, 1993a: 79) 
argues that, as the twenty first century approaches, water and water-supply 
systems are increasingly likely to be objectives of military action, 
instruments of war, and a salient element of interstate politics. Emphasising 
the role of resource security as a crucial factor which affects both national 
and international security, Gleick asserts that' the focus of security analysts 
must now be when and where resource-related conflicts are most likely to 
arise, not whether environmental concerns can contribute to instability and 
conflict' (Gleick, 1993a: 82-4). 
Water scarcity is a very critical issue that affects the national security 
and survival of each society. To substantiate this argument, it has frequently 
been claimed that water disputes were the principal cause, or at least one of 
the main causes, of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. A systematic examination of 
the 1967 War however, reveals that the water issue was only a contributory 
factor in that conflict, not a causal determinant of it. Moreover these writers 
typically overlook the fact that many countries in which water is the most 
critical resource constraint, quite often cooperate actively in increasing their 
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shared water resources. Egypt and Sudan have long cooperated on the Nile 
River, based on the Aswan Dam and Lake Nasser, and on the Jonglei Canal 
Project. Their agreement not only governs the sharing of the Nile's waters, 
but also contains an instrument for settling controversies by negotiation 
(Howell & Allan, 1994). Mauritania and Senegal have cooperated for 
nearly a quarter of a century in building dams and managing the Senegal 
River through. 
Fore case-studies by Cano (1986), Chomchai (1986), LeMarquand 
(1986) and Mehta (1986) demonstrate that established agreements on 
transboundary water resources in Third World countries exhibit a general 
spirit of non-confrontational approaches to water issues and a willingness to 
accommodate variations within a carefully designed system of rules and 
regulations. In fact, there is even a history of tactical cooperation over 
water, albeit limited in scope, between antagonistic neighbours such as 
India and Pakistan (Alam 1998; Mehta 1986; Kirmani 1990, Biswas 1992), 
Iraq and Syria Israel and Jordan have demonstrated confrontational 
approaches to water issues. 
All water-resources disputes lead to violent conflict; indeed most 
lead to discussions, negotiations, mediations, and non-violent resolutions. 
Moreover, given the general atmosphere of tension in the West Asia, it is 
remarkable that so little open conflict over water has erupted in this volatile 
region. Paradoxically, complexities and tensions raised by hydrological 
problems have often tended to compel cooperation where other non-water 
antagonisms have degenerated into warfare (Naff & Matson, 1984: 4). 
Therefore, it can be argued that there is no iron law determining that water 
scarcity per se must inevitably lead to destruction, competition, or violent 
conflict. This argument has been briefly advanced by Joseph Dellapennna, 
Arun Elhance & Daniel Deudney. For instance, (Dellapemia, 1995: 89) 
argues that the very importance of water makes co-operation over water 
more likely than conflict'. He maintains that 'as in ancient times, the shared 
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need for optimum management of this scarce resource can become a source 
of regional unity rather than regional discord'. Similarly (Deudney, 1991: 
26) contest the idea of 'water war arguing that, it seems less likely that 
conflicts over water will lead to interstate war than that the development of 
jointly owned water resources will reinforce peace. 
Falkenmark argues that since many river systems and large aquifers 
are shared by several countries, this geographical fact 'adds to the risk of 
international disputes or even confrontations, especially in view of sharply 
divergent interests in the shared resources of the upstream and down stream 
countries' (Falkenmark, 1990: 177). Accordingly, the highest levels of 
fhistration that will arise from increasing water scarcities can be expected to 
develop in countries where populations are increasing dramatically and 
where most of the water sources are transnational (Falkermiark, 1986a: 109; 
Gleick, 1993c: 108-10). 
1.8: LIMITATION OF THE STUDY 
As the water issue has become a high security priority, compared 
with other issues in West Asia, so water-related data have become 
politically sensitive. Most of the data related to water resource management 
and allocation are after inadequate or unreliable or both. Several factors 
account for the general paucity of statistical information. Water is not like 
other commodities in that because it flows both on the surface and 
underground hence it is difficult to own. Secondly water rights are difficult 
to an-ange precisely because water ownership is not easy to vest, and 
usually impossible to operationalise. Moreover information on basic feature 
of hydrology viz. diversion, depletion, control of water resources percapita 
consumption, water discharge and rate of evaporation are hard or tough to 
measure precisely. It is, therefore, recognized that data limitations preclude 
the evaluation of a more comprehensive study of the water right and water 
management. 
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1.9: IMFORMATION SOURCES 
The main sources of information for the study are: 
1. Data and statistics issued by governmental and non-governmental 
institutions. 
2. Studies, resources and reports issued by specialized institution. 
3. UN publication 
4. Information available on the interne 
The study also will be benefited from research and reports on 
transborder river waters dispute conducted by local and foreign institutions 
particularly the UN. 
The geographical approach of study is field oriented. But the extent 
and dimension of the proposed work is so vast and related to several 
countries, field-oriented study is not possible due to many retarding and 
compelling factors. Hence the study is primarily based on secondary data. 
1.10: WATER: A GLOBAL PROBLEM 
Water is a global problem. Many countries in the world at present 
are facing shortage of fresh water supply. It has always been the principal 
challenge for humanity from the early days of civilization. Today, several 
of the major issues confronting humanity are still related to water: including 
pollution, desertification, water logging of agricultural lands, flooding and 
water scarcity related problems (World Bank, 1995: 5). Expanding water 
usage in various sectors of economy has increased transnational 
dependencies at a global level. The competing and inflicting demands for 
good water are a universal problem rather than an issue confined to arid and 
semi arid regions as North Africa and the West Asia (Postel, 1992: 20-22). 
The rapid rise of population, agricultural needs, industrial 
requirements, and possible global warming have made long-term 
assessments of water resources difficult. However, we can be sure that 
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water use will continue to increase, water pollution will continue to put 
pressure on usable water supplies, and water will continue to be the 
principal resource problem of the world (Folkenmark, 1990: 189). 
While there is no substitute for the supply of water, unlike most 
resource the world's total water consumption has quadrupled during the last 
fifty years (Clarke, 1991: 66). In 1940 total water use was about 1000 cubic 
kilometer per year. By 1960, it had doubled and by 1990 it had doubled 
again. This rate of increased water consumption is not expected to decline, 
yet today's global per capita water availability is predicate d to fall by one 
third over the next generation (World Bank, 1995: 5). It is important to 
note, however, that water resource management is not just the domain of 
engineers, it presents a multitude of complex challenges derived from the 
interaction between human behaviour and the water cycle (Falkenmark, 
1990: 190). 
Indeed, many studies, reports, and assessment suggest that a loaming 
world wide water crisis is on the horizon. These studies indicate that present 
and expanding water uses will increase transnational dependencies on 
shared water resources in different parts of the world. Infect the extent of 
water interdependency in already very extensive. Over 240 river basins are 
shared between two or more states (Blake et. al., 1995: XIV), comprising 
about 50 percent of the land and more than 40 percent of the world's 
population (Vlachos el.al., 1986: 1-2). It is estimated that nearly 50 
countries on four continents have more than 75 percent of their total land in 
such basins; more than 250 basins are multinational, including 57 in Africa 
and about 50 in Europe. Out of the world's 214 shared rivers 148 flow 
through two countries, 31 through three countries and the rest shared by 
four more countries (Butter, 1995: 34). 
The management and development of these shared water resources 
pose special challenges, which sometimes turn into explosive political 
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issues. As the demand for water increase, and as exclusively indigenous 
sources of water are fiilly developed, the only other sources are likely to be 
international. But, in the absence of explicit regulations, international 
sources often breed tension. For example, in river flow shared by several 
countries, unchecked up-stream developments could prove a matter of 
serious concern to downstream users (UNWC, 1977). 
In West Asia water resources are declining, while representing 5 
percent of the total world population. West Asia countries only 0.9 percent 
of global water resources. The number of water-scarce countries in West 
Asia has rise from three in 1955 to eleven by 1990. Another seven are 
anticipated to give the list by 2025. In addition to its scarcity, much of West 
Asia water stems from there major water ways: the Nile, the Jordan and the 
Eupbirates-Tigris River Basins (Mostafa, 1999: 23-18). 
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(A). THE BASIC IMPORTANCE OF WA TER 
Water is the most abundant chemical substance on the earth's crust, 
covering more than half of the five kilometers deep outer shell of the earth. 
Water and air are vital to the existence of both man and life itself. Water and 
watery solutions play an important role in the physical biological and 
geological processes, which take place on the earth. Population centers have 
evolved on the shores of water bodies, creating economic development along 
sea-shores and in major river valleys such as the Jordan, the Euphrates-Tigris 
and the Nile, (Gustafsson, 1985: 130). 
The problem of water scarcity is a growing worldwide phenomenon. 
Net renewable water resources per capita have declined dramatically over a 
single generation and in little more than thirty years from now would reach 
dangerously low levels. By the year 2025 the average net water resources in 
the West Asia are expected to be less than 700 cubic meters per person per 
year, half of what they are today. The sharp growth in global population and 
development has badly depleted and polluted the world's water sources. This 
situation is already keenly felt in India, China and Mexico, and even in the 
United States there is a problem of deteriorating water quality (Gleick, 2001: 
45). 
More and more dilemma arises between water use for industry and 
agriculture and use for domestic household purposes. Of the 5.5 billion 
people in the world today, 3.5 billion are forced to live with less than 50 
liters of water per person per day, one-seventh the quantity used by the 
average American. Agriculture uses 73 percent of the world's fresh water and 
the world needs more agriculture because of increasing food needs. Water 
consumption in several countries already exceeds renewable supply; others 
are at or close to the limits. In many poor countries, famine is prevented only 
by grains and cereals taken from global grain stocks. Lately, however, these 
stocks have dropped sharply. In 1987 they were sufficient for 101 days but 
by 1989 stocks had dropped to only 54 days (Gleick, 2001: 65). 
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Furthermore, experience showed available water resources drop to 
betv^ een 1,000 and 2,000 cubic meters per capita per year, large investments 
are generally required to meet ongoing water demand. However, when 
resources fall below 1,000 cubic meters per capita per year, difficult socio-
economic adjustments are then required to cope with such scarcity (Bouwer, 
2002: 2). 
Water conflict exists in many places around the globe, such as 
between India and Bangladesh, Israel and its neighbours, Egypt and 
Ethiopia, Turkey and Syria, Turkey and Iraq. At the same time the 
distriibution of water sources is highly uneven. Many countries with small 
populations possess large amount of water whereas many populous countries 
face acute shortages. Yet there is a limit to man's ability to bring water from 
one place to another by building dams, tunnels and hydroelectric projects 
without causing irreversible ecological damage and in circumstances where 
such damage is probable, the financial assistance usually available from 
organizations such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund will 
likely be denied. Additionally, the worldwide tendency to utilize fresh river 
water just before it reaches the sea has proved disastrous because a river's 
most biologically productive part is the brackish zone where fresh and salt 
water meets (Shiklomanov, 1990: 34). 
The global shift from raifed to irrigated agriculture has increased the 
saliniity of the earth in many areas and evaporation of fresh water has left 
chemical pesticides and fertilizers in the ground. In addition, experience has 
shown that attempts to dam flood waters have prevented the normal drainage 
of destructive salts out of the soil to the sea, thereby rendering the soil 
unusable. Furthermore, there is a proven link between deforestation and a 
reduction in the amount of rainfall. In Western Africa, deforestation has 
already contributed to shorter rainy seasons. In Florida, the reduction of 
vegetation has led to a 10 percent drop in rainfall over the past 30 years. 
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Once exposed, land reflects more sunlight, producing atmospheric processes 
that reduce rainfall by drawing dry air into a given area (Allan, 1996a: 82). 
A prevailing scientific consensus agreed upon at the United Nations 
Water Conference in 1977 placed the world's total volume of fresh water at 
less than one thirteenth of all the water on the globe with the water moving 
in streams each year estimated at 40 to 47 trillion cubic meters. Ahogether, 
at any one time, about 22 percent of the fresh water is in the soil and in the 
ground water storage and flows, 0.35 percent in the lakes and wetlands, 0.04 
percent in the atmosphere, less than 0.001 percent in the streams and about 
77 percent in snow and ice. There is some doubt about how much of the 
ground water is within economic pumping depth: perhaps only one-third at 
the most (Shiklomanov, 1990: 34-35). It is also relevant to note the very 
unequal per capita distribution of the available water resources in the world. 
Relative per capita water availability has been classified into seven 
categories (Table no-2.1). 
Table No-2.1 
Relative water availability (cubic meter per year capita) 
Extremely low 
Very low 
Low 
Medium 
Above Medium 
High 
Very High 
below 1,000 
1,000 to 2,000 
2,100 to 5,000 
5,100 to 10,000 
10,000 to 20,000 
20,000 to 50,000 
Over 50,000 
Sources: Shiklomanov, 1990:40 
Individual users depend on the availability of a relatively small 
volume of one cubic meter per year as a minimum supply of potable water 
and an additional volume of safe water which increases with economic and 
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social development and advancing technology. In modem society, water is 
used in all sector of economy such as, agriculture, industrial transportation, 
recreation, domestic human consumption, general sanitation etc. In 1940 the 
world's average percapita water use, including water diverted for irrigation 
was below 400 cubic meters a year reflecting the increased use of water in 
all sectors especially in agriculture (Clarke, 1991: 32). 
Irrigation is, by far, the biggest and most rapidly expanding user of 
water since plants use large quantities of water during their growth. Under 
dry conditions, it takes about 1000 cubic meters of water to produce one 
tonne of plant growth. Where rainfall alone is insufficient to meet plant 
needs, irrigation is required and the volume of water needed rises 
dramatically. The amount of water used for irrigation has increased ten times 
this century and elaborate plans are still being made to extend irrigation to 
more and more areas (Clarke, 1991: 27). 
Why does water cause so much conflict? Generally, because it is 
essential to life "There is virtually no human artifact or commodity that is 
produced in the absence of water. Agriculture is impossible without it and so 
are most manufacturing processes". But specifically, because water flows: 
"Their unregulated flows are likely to be erratic and in an arid 
country, the consequences for any user unable to capture water the moment it 
is needed are likely to be dire (Maas & Anderson, 1978: 2). In West Asia, 
water exhibits all of these elements of conflict. 
As a contemporary issue of security and International Relations, water 
displays certain distinguishing characteristics: 
• Water as an issue is pervasive, highly complex, and utterly vital. 
• Because of its complexity, water is fragmented as a strategic and 
foreign affairs issue, tending to be dealt with piecemeal, problem by 
problem, rather than comprehensively, both domestically and 
internationally. 
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• Water is always a terrain security issue, especially when scarce, since 
all concerned parties feel compelled to control the ground on or under 
which water flows. 
• The relationship between water dependency and security is perceived 
as vital and often absolute. Water issues are seen as zero-sum, 
especially where two or more mutually antagonistic actors compete 
for the same water source. 
• As a zero-sum security issue, water carries a constant potential for 
conflict. 
• International Law as a means of settling and regulating fresh water 
issues remains rudimentary and relatively ineffectual without prior 
treaty arrangements in place. 
• Water is a highly symbolic, contagious, aggregated, intense, salient, 
complicated zero-sum power and prestige-packed crisis issue; it is 
highly prone to conflict and extremely difficult to resolve (Frey & 
Naff, 1985: 77, Naff & Matson, 1984: 8). 
(B). WATER IN WEST ASIA: AN OVERVIEW 
Water is the most precious and limited natural resource in West Asia. 
West Asia is a developing region and water scarcity is not a new 
phenomenon in the region (Murakabmi, 1995: 1). It is one of the most 
important basic resources of our world. It is a life sustaining resource and 
without it no living thing, plant or animal, can exist. It is required in 
abundance not only to quench our thirst and meet our domestic needs but to 
maintain the socio-economic development (Lepawsky, 1963: 533). While 
demand for water is rapidly increasing in West Asia; the supply of fresh 
water is finite. As a result, the situation is getting worse and the shortage of 
water is approaching at crisis levels. The major rivers of the region are: the 
Jordan, the Euphrates-Tigris the Shatt al-Arab, and the Nile (Murakabmi, 
1995:1). 
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West Asia is generally known as a water deficit region in the world. 
The attendant problem to water scarcity is particularly acute in the West 
Asia, as the region has one of the fastest growing populations (Lowi, 1995: 
124-126). Water may be more important than other politics, where as proven 
oil reserves in the area are estimated to last at least 100 years, water supplies 
are already insufficient throughout the region, and competition for it is 
inevitably going to increase in the years ahead. In addition, there are number 
of rivers in this region that traverse international boundaries established 
during the twentieth century, and that have become a focus of interstate 
tension (Lowi, 1995: 124). 
While the Geography prescribes the unitary development of the river 
basin, the contingent ties of history may prevent the process. Furthermore, 
the concern to maximize individual benefits provides powerful incentives to 
exploit resources unilaterally. States are constrained in their behaviour by 
structural factors as well (Lowi, 1993: 1). 
The most regions of the world hydrograph are largely controlled by 
rainfall, with landforms and geological structure as subsidiary factors. As the 
result of a generally deficient rainfall, however, the West Asia shows to an 
unusual degree of the influence of topography and structure in the 
development of its river systems (Fisher, 1971: 32). 
Table No- 2.2 
Water Balance in West Asia 
West Asia region 
Available water resources 
Total water resources 
Water balance 
% W. balance/demand 
1995 
113.76 
96.07 
17.69 
18.40 
2000 
113.76 
106.78 
6.98 
6.50 
2005 
113.76 
117.87 
-4.11 
-3.50 
2010 
113.76 
130.03 
-16.27 
-12.50 
2015 
113.76 
143.20 
-29.44 
-20.55 
Volume in multiples of a thousand million cubic meters 
Source: GEO-2000 
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West Asia is large and diverse region of the world. Water balance of 
West Asia is very delicate and shows the descending of the resource (Table 
No-2.2). A topographical condition of West Asia is complex and difficult to 
describe in a simple way. For convenience the region may be divided into 
two separate units. The northern mountain zone overlying the states of 
Turkey, northern Iraq, Syria and Iran, which consists of Lofty Mountain 
ranges. The Southern zone consists of plains and dissected plateau 
(Beaumont, 1976: 17). A characteristic feature of the region is that plateaus 
are situated in between most of the mountains. It is almost everywhere 500 
meters in height. The Anatolia plateau stands between the two major 
mountain belts (Pontus and Taurus). The Pontus Mountains lie in the north 
along Black sea with the highest peak, Kalar Dagi, 3870 meters above sea 
level. The Taurus range is a great formidable mountain chain. The highest 
peak is Mor Dagi, 3147 meters located in the eastern Taurus (Stephen, 1970: 
19; Fisher, 1971: 344). The Pontus and Taurus ranges consolidate near 
Mount Ararat (5,165 meter) in a complex massif From here eastwards 
mountain chains enter into Iran and once more divide into two distinct 
mountain belts. The Northern belt known as Elburz Mountain goes along the 
southern share of the Caspian Sea. Mount Damauand (5,610 meter) is the 
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highest peak of the Elburz mountain range. The southern belt overlooking 
the Euphrates-Tigris low land and the Gulf enters Iran from Mount Ararat. 
The southern ranges are known as Zagros Mountains which attain maximum 
height of 4,548 meter in Zard kuh. A very complex pattern of mountain 
ranges, reaching only 2,500 meters in altitude, usually named as eastern 
Iranian highlands, are located in eastern Iran on the borders of Afghanistan, 
surrounded by these highlands in the central Plateau of Iran. The plateaus 
have an important place in the physical features of the region. The central 
plateau of Iran is occupied by a series of closed basin with no outward 
drainage of any sort. Plains also play a significant role in the physical 
features of the region. This is almost every where above 500 meter in height 
and is subdivided into two major basins, Dasht-e-Kavir in the north and 
Dash-e-Lut in the south (Beaumont, 1985: 34) 
In the southern region at the southeastern comer of the Arabian 
Peninsula highest land is found. Highlands also are located along the whole 
of the Western part of Arabia, with a general level of the land declining to 
the north and east. The upland areas exist along the western cost in the 
Levant region. South of these uplands Mount Hermon attains the height of 
3000 meter. A broad low land valley, know as the Beqaa, drained by the 
Litany River in the south and the Orontes in the north, between the Lebanon 
Mountains and Anti-Lebanon mountains. Further south exists the north-south 
fault zone of the Dead Sea lowlands. The fault zone has dissected the upland 
belt its form a trough like region descending to 390 meter below Sea-level. 
The valley of the River Jordan is the main zone with a high degree of 
intensive agriculture. The Jordan River draws its headwaters from streams 
rising in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and the occupied territory. The largest low 
land belt extends from northern Iraq to the west of the Indian Ocean in 
Oman, Iraq is a country largely dominated by two of the world's greatest 
rivers the Euphrates-Tigris both of which rise in eastern Turkey. To the west 
and south of this river-Valley, the desert plateau rises gradually to merge 
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with that of Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Both the rivers merge to form a 
single stream, the Shatt al-Arab at Quma, 185 kilometer from the Sea (Held, 
1989: 207-223). 
The Gulf lowlands lie in the south eastern part of the Arabian 
Peninsula. Still fiirther east the land rises steeply to or belt of uplands called 
as Gebel al Akhdar (Green Mountain). The western shore of the Gulf 
expands into an extensive plain. This zone is well known for its arid and 
barren land and the largest sand sea of the world, the Rub 'Al Khali, is 
located in Central Arabia can be described as a plateau tilted down to the 
east. The whole of plateau in corrugated with deep Wadis caused by the 
erosive process of rivers. Many of these Wadis are still entered with layers of 
clay deposits left behind by this fluvial action in the past. The largest sound-
filled dry Wadi is that of Hadhra Mount in Yemen. Wadi Sirhan in the Naflid 
region in Saudi Arabia is another example. There are no perennial rivers in 
the Arabian Peninsula. Egypt part of the southern region has the Red Sea 
Hills on the eastern coast while the Nile delta forms the major lowland. On 
both the sides of the Nile River lie the vast deserts, with Oases in artesian 
depressions here and there, where water is near to the surface (Held, 1989: 
31-45). 
The climatic condition of West Asia varies as the region is large 
extends over many latitudes, and exhibits great physical diversity. In most of 
the West Asian states climate is harsh and arid with scanty rainfall and very 
high potential of evaporation except in the coastal and mountainous regions. 
Cyclones come from the west, cross over the Mediterranean Sea and enter 
West y\sia. Some areas of the region which are nearer the Mediterranean Sea 
experience a special type of climate called the Mediterranean climate. The 
winter is mild, summers are warm and there rainfall is during the winter 
season (Beaumont, 1976: 55-60). Through-out the region there is a shortage 
of water. Only in parts of north-eastern Turkey and north-western Iran there 
is suqjlus water supply. Smaller areas of surplus water supply occur along 
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the highland regions of Turkey, the higher parts of the Elburz Mountain in 
Iran, along the Coastal Strip of Syria and the Lebanon and the Black Sea 
coast of Turkey. Water surplus areas permit river system to exist in the 
region. They are also responsible for replenishing the ground water resources 
(Fisher, 1981:35-45). 
The surplus water of northern region is transported through very great 
distances into areas experiencing water scarcity by river systems and ground 
water reservoirs. For example, the Euphrates-Tigris Rivers transport the 
surplus water to the intensively arid regions of southern Iraq (Fisher, 1981: 
41). The type of water resources development which has been most common 
in the West Asia since the second World War has been the construction of 
large dams with the objective of serving a number of purposes. There have 
usually included the provision of irrigation water, domestic and industrial 
water supply, hydro-electric power generation and flood control (Fisher, 
1981:41-45). 
A recent assessment of water resources in the Arab League countries 
by Inter Islamic Network Water Resources Development (INWARD) has 
assumed a basic demand for water of 55 cubic meters per head per year for 
domestic water use, plus 1150 cubic meter needed to provide an average 
daily diet of 3000-3500 kilo calories. The total of 1205 cubic meter of water 
per head per year was called the lower limit of water requirements. It is 
estimated that as a result of population growth overall availability of water 
by the year 2025, will lag far behind demand and only 536 cubic meter will 
be available of water by then only a few countries in the region will be able 
to meet even the lower limits of water requirement (Clarke, 1991: 88). 
At the most basic level, actual scarcity may be said to exist when real 
demand exceeds real supply. Although the maxims of supply and demand 
may determine actual shortages the concept of water scarcity encompasses 
many discrete but interrelated factors that govern supply for any given 
demajid, climate, perceived and real need, quality, location and reliability of 
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source, consumption, technical capacity, accessibility, demographic growth 
patterns, distribution of population and water resources, efficiency, 
organization and management, use of fertilizers, loss and waste, stocks of 
water and policy decisions on the rate of consumption and distribution. 
Perceptions of the amount and quality and availability of water are usually a 
part of a people's attitude toward the environment (Cotgrove, 1982; Whyte, 
1986:52). 
i^Vhile there are numerous reasons for water scarcity, they all tend to 
be varied on six basic causes, which taken together, will delimit supply and 
demand: climate variations, degradation of water quality by human activity 
at a rate faster than the source can be renewed, depletion of a source, such as 
an aquifer, at a rate faster than it can be replenished, out-of-basin diversion 
or storage of surface water, redistribution for other uses or to another place, 
and consumption. In West Asia these causes stem in one way or another, 
from a single overriding, immutable determinant of scarcity that accounts for 
the region's aridity and for that matter of the aridity of other parts of the 
globe ais well (Kolars, 1990: 59). 
In West Asia, the composite effects of climate, poor supply, uneven 
distribution and escalating populations are revealed in exponential 
discrepancies of water supply per person across the region, ranging from a 
per capita supply of 115 cubic meter in Libya to as much as 5000 cubic 
meter in Iraq in rainy years. A disturbing related trend has emerged in recent 
decades, over the last 30 years; the average available supply of water for the 
entire West Asia has fallen rapidly from somewhat more than 2000 cubic 
meter per capita to less than 1500 cubic meter per capita (Kolars, 1992: 103-
6; Tvedt, 1992: 14-13). 
The region has very little margin of safety where water supply is 
concerned, especially given a population that is projected to double within 
the next quarter century. Unless this situation is reversed without further 
delay, several key actors in the major river basins- Jordan, Israel, the 
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occupied territories, Egypt, Turkey Syria, and Iraq would face a series of 
destabilizing economic and political crises with the foreseeable future, the 
consequences of which will reverberate throughout the region. Scarcity, 
especially mismanaged scarcity combined with uneven distribution 
contributes significantly to the creation of an environment of uncertainty and 
instability in the basic political, economic, and social institutions of society, 
most destructively in situations where the reciprocal factors of ecological 
marginality and rising poverty obtain-a condition that characterizes most 
Arab Countries (Al-Rahbi, 1973: 651). 
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Arabian Peninsula sub-region 
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-
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-
3 210 
150 
3 500 
(4)8 310 
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10 500 
2 500 
84 000 
20 000 
13 500 
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-
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955 
50 
2 340 
125 
1550 
5 020 
239 
255 
1223 
286 
17 000 
1615 
2 930 
23 548 
56 
240 
34 
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385 
9 
1645 
55 
103 
26 
103 
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6 
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0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
111 
343 
60 
229 
1321 
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15 
2 566 
Sources: ACS AD, 1997, UNSPD, 1997 
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2.1: WATER DEMAND IN WEST ASIA 
The major cause of the increasing demand for water is rapid 
population growth. The region's population increased from 37.3 million in 
1972 to 97.7 million in 2000 (United Nations Population Division 2001). A 
high annual population growth rate of more than 3 per cent in the Mashriq 
sub-region has seen the annual per capita share of available water resources 
decreasing from 6,057 cubic meter in 1950 (Khouri, 2000: 25) to 1 574 cubic 
meter in 2000 (Table no-2.4 ) . 
Table No-2.4 
Water stress index: West Asia 
Population (millions, 2000) 
Avaihible water (km /^year) 
Water used (km /^year) 
Water stress index (%) 
Per capita available 
Mashriq 
50.7 
79.9 
66.5 
83.3 
1574 
Arabian 
Peninsula 
47.0 
15.3 
29.6 
>100 
326 
West Asia 
region 
97.7 
95.2 
96.1 
>100 
974 
Source: ACSAD 2000 & United Nations Population Division 2001 
Domestic water demand has also been rising due to an increase in per 
capita consumption. In many countries, water rationing is used to limit 
demand. For example, Jordan restricts water supplies in Amman to only 
three days a week. In Damascus, water can be used for less than 12 hours a 
day. 
Agriculture is the main user of water in West Asia, accounting for 
nearly 82 per cent of the total water consumed compared to 10 per cent and 8 
per cent for the domestic and industrial sectors, respectively. In the Arabian 
Peninsula, agriculture utilizes about 86 per cent of the available water 
resources, and about 80 per cent in the Mashriq (Khouri, 2000: 21-23). To 
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satisfy water demand, especially for irrigation, groundwater abstraction has 
increased dramatically during the past three decades. 
In the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, the total annual 
water supply increased from 6 cubic kilometer in 1980 to 26 cubic kilometer 
in 1995, with 85 per cent of the water used for agricultural purposes (Zubari, 
1997: 18-22), In 1995, the GCC countries had water resources equivalent to 
466 cubic meter year per capita and a per capita water use of 1 020 cubic 
kilometer per year, producing an average annual water deficit of about 554 
cubic meter per capita, provided mainly by mining groundwater reserves 
(Zubari, 1997: 17-20). 
The water stress index in West Asia (expressed as a percentage of 
water used to available water resources) is more than 100 per cent in five of 
the seven countries in the Arabian Peninsula, and is critical in the remaining 
two. These countries have already exhausted their renewable water resources 
and arc now exploiting non-renewable reserves. In the Mashriq, except in 
Jordan, the water stress index is lower (Table no-2.4 above). While per 
capita water resources in 9 of the 12 countries in West Asia are below 1 000 
cubic meter per year, they are also below 500 cubic meter per year in seven 
countries. The overall value of the water stress index for West Asia is more 
than 100 per cent (Table no-2.4 above). 
Over the past three decades, the adoption of food self-sufficiency 
policies has encouraged agricultural expansion. Governments offered 
subsidies and incentives which resulted in a large-scale expansion of 
farming, increasing water demand which was satisfied mainly by mining 
deep aquifers. Furthermore, unregulated pumping, absence or minimal 
irrigation water tariffs, lack of enforcement measures against unlawful 
drilling, poor irrigation practices and lack of farmer awareness have resulted 
in excessive water usage (Zubari, 1997:17-20). 
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Intensive agriculture and heavy application of agrochemicals have 
also contributed to the contamination of water resources. For example, the 
concentration of nitrates in Gaza's tap water exceeds WHO guidelines 
(10 mj^litre) and nitrate concentrations are increasing at a rate of 0.2-1.0 
mg/litre per year in the country's coastal wells. Adherence to WHO standards 
would place half of these coastal wells off limits as drinking water (PNA 
2000: 4-7). 
2.2: WATER ENDOWMENT OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION 
Rainfall constitutes an important part of the water budget of most 
countries in West Asia. However evaluating rainfall is a difficult task. A 
proportion of such precipitation infiltrates the soil profile and is retained 
there. Such water, occurring naturally in soil profiles, is among the most 
precious of all renewable natural resources as it provides the essential 
starting point in the food chains of both natural and agro-ecologies. Naturally 
occurrimg water coming as a free good does not fall equally in volume or 
reliability on the populations residing on the Earth's surface and the 
countries and communities of the West Asia are particularly ill-provided 
(Conway, 1993: 49-62). 
The element of National Water Budgets that is most reliably 
monitored in Arab Countries is gross surface run-off. Surface run-off data 
can, however provide misleading impressions of the water security of a 
country. This is because the capability of a water resource to support 
economic activity and under grid further economic multiplication depends 
on a birge number of associated geographical and economic variables. It is 
becoming increasingly clear that successful and economically effective 
development of such surface resources depends on social and political 
circumstances as much as natural endowment (Allan, 1989b: 47-49). 
Geography plays a role, but by no means a determining one. The 
shape of the terrain and the location and seasonality of rainfall and surface 
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run-off determine whether water can be stored, and together with 
technology, whether its distribution can be economical. Some of these waters 
were for a period in the mid-1960s destined for use by Jordan, until the 
project to transfer the water to the Yarmuk River was interrupted by Israel. 
Many countries in the region have water in relatively low-lying surface water 
systems while their main populations prefer to live in high and otherwise 
more habitable tracts. Jordan's surface water in the Yarmuk and the Jordan 
rivers represent the majority of national water, but it flows at elevations 1000 
meters below Jordan's large concentrations of urban population (Allan, 
1989b: 47-55). 
Groundwater plays an important role in the provision of water for the 
countries of the West Asia, but it is a very limited resource. The main feature 
of groundwater systems is that major aquifers in the West Asia are carbonate 
aquifers, which are highly fissured and certified. Their main advantage is 
that infiltration is high in remote areas that receive high amounts of 
precipitation. However their drawbacks are numerous: high vulnerability to 
pollution, irregular flow, high losses to the sea, and an intricate surface-
groundwater interrelationship. The latter feature favors a joint surface-
groundwater development and management. With the exception of the Gaza 
where absolute supplies are at a dangerous low, Jordan faces the most severe 
problem. Jordan has renewable ground-water resources of 275 million cubic 
meters per year, while mining of nonrenewable aquifers amounted to an 
estimated 190 million cubic metes in 1990 (Salameh & Garber, 1990: 
10-14). This situation in combination with the limited supplies of surface 
water available from the Yarmuk and other streams means that Jordan faces 
critical water situation within this decade. Its present budget totals about 730 
million cubic meter annually, with an estimated need of 1.02 billion cubic 
meter by the year 2005 (Kolars, 1992:115). 
Lebanon falls at the opposite extreme regarding water supply and 
demand. Groundwater consumption in 2004 amounted to 487 million cubic 
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meter, and surface water to 637 million cubic meters. Available surface 
water in major rivers amounts to 3.7 million cubic meters per year. The 
situation is complicated somewhat by the Orontes, which flows from 
Lebanon into Syria and thence into Turkey. 
Syria, with a 2004 population of 22.1 million people, growing at 4.8 
percent per year, faces acute and immediate shortages of water for domestic 
use in its large cities. It also must provide water for village use and to expand 
its irrigated lands in order to meet the needs of its growing population. Thus, 
the problems of water in West Asia come to a focus here (Ellysar, 2005; 3). 
Syria retrieves approximately 3.5 billion cubic meters of groundwater 
from pumped wells and another 2.1 billion cubic meters from natural 
springs. At present, pumping of ground water is from upper strata and the 
question of water deep usable reserves exist remains open (Tvedt, 1992: 14-
19). 
'^ rhe sharing of the Yarmuk's water has a long history, including the 
agreement related to the yet to be realized construction of the dam called "Al 
Wahda" Jordan depends upon the river to supply its East Ghor Canal, vital to 
Jordanian agriculture. Israel diverts between 50 and 125 million cubic meters 
annually into Lake Tiberius. Syria in recent years has built a series of 
retaining dams on the upstream tributaries of the Yarmuk and may be 
extracting more than 200 million cubic meters armually for its uses. 
Certainly, the issue of this stream needs to be resolved, despite its small size. 
Difficulty regarding the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers has developed 
with the creation of Turkey's Southeast Anatolia Development project, 
which may deplete the flow of the Euphrates at the point it leaves Turkey by 
half wilJiin the next 50 years. Recent negotiations between Syria and Turkey 
have ensured a cross-border Euphrates flow of 500 cumecs, which would 
suffice for Syria, but would leave far to small an amount to be passed on to 
Iraq, which also demand at least 500 cumes in the Euphrates as it enters Iraq. 
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Iraq's population has increased from 18, 8 million in 1990 to nearly 
31 million by 2008. Among the three riparian, it has the largest number of 
people actually living in the Tigris-Euphrates basin (Tvedt, 1992: 14-19). 
Mention has scarcely been made of the crisis facing Palestine vis-a-
vis Israel, and Israeli use of shared waters. All the nations of the West Asia 
are involved in that confrontation, and will continue to be influenced by it. 
Numerous suggestions have been made to bring Turkish water to either 
Jordan, or to the entire West Asia and the Arabian Peninsula, or to Israel, in 
the latter case, by sea- bom Medusa bags (Fox & Marquand, 1978: 76-98). 
2.3: DOMESTIC WATER USE IN URBAN AREAS 
West Asia has long dominated by cities which control their rural 
hinterlands and were the focal of the extensive international trade system 
linking Europe to Asia. Urbanization has concentrated large numbers of 
people in relatively small areas, while the rising standard of living of urban 
dwellers has meant that per capita water consumption has increased rapidly. 
The net result has been to put severe strains on the water-resource base and 
especially on the water resource infrastructure in many regions, besides 
causing other environmental problems (Beaumont, 1981: 63). 
During 20th century most cities have grown rapidly through both 
immigi-ation and natural increase and their morphologies have been 
transformed. Generally, the growth of large cities has been more rapid than 
that of smaller cities, but not without exception, and particularly rapid 
growth has been experienced by ports and capitals (Clarke & Fisher, 1972: 
31). 
The diverse significance of cities for populations within the region 
ranges from a low of around 20 percent in Sudan and Yemen, to about 90 
percent in Kuwait and Israel. The higher the per capita income, the higher 
the percentage of the population that is urban. It is therefore, plausible that 
increased urbanization and rising per capita incomes are both the result of 
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the economic growth processes and industriaUzation. West Asian countries 
have some of the highest birth-rates in the world as well as disruptive rural-
to-urban migration, both of which require constantly increasing domestic 
water provision. The natural growth of the urban population is not the same 
as is in rural areas since both fertility and mortality rates are lower in urban 
areas. Thus, since general mortality is also lower in urban areas, it is 
uncertain whether overall rates of natural growth are lower in the cities than 
in the villages (Richards & Waterbury, 1990: 266). 
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One of the most important characteristics of West Asia is 
undoubtedly, the small amount of precipitation, and the most limiting 
characteristic in the agriculture of the region is the lack of water. Throughout 
most of the region rainfall is seasonal, mostly in the winter although in 
southern Arabia and the Sudan there is summer monsoon rainfall. Only in 
northern Turkey and northern Iran there is year round precipitation. The 
heaviest precipitation, 1,500 mm annually, falls along the Black Sea and 
Mediterranean coasts of Turkey while in most of the upland areas of the 
region; the average annual precipitation is around 400 mm. In the Arabian 
Peninsula, southern Iran, Iraq and Egypt, the annual Precipitation is less than 
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100 mm. In most cases, the rain falling in the mountainous areas is not 
utilized for agriculture in the areas in which it falls due to the steep 
topography and low temperatures which cause the precipitation of snow in 
these areas, thus the water flows in rivers over hundreds of kilometers 
towards the arid regions of the West Asia (Beaumont, 1985a: 16). Over fifty 
percent of all the population in West Asia and North Africa either depend 
upon water from rivers which cross an international boundary before 
reaching them, or upon desalinized water and water drawn from deep wells 
(Kokrs, 1990: 57). 
Agriculture, the largest user of water, is the most important economic 
activity in the region. On an average, some 30 percent of employed people in 
the region make their living directly from agricuhure, and there is an 
additional population which is dependent upon agricultural production as a 
source of raw material for their industrial production. This is still the case, 
even though the contribution of agriculture of the Gross National Product in 
all the states of the West Asia has been in constant decline, as has the 
proportion of the total population employed in agriculture (World Bank, 
1992), Most of the states in the region base their agriculture on ground water 
or water from rivers, the sources of which are outside the state or even 
outside the region (Allan, 1985: 52). Only relatively small areas such as the 
valley of the Nile in Egypt and the Sudan, and the Tigris and Euphrates 
region of Syria and Iraq are irrigated (Underwood, 1981: 53). 
In the past 40 years an agricultural revolution has taken place in the 
West Asia originating in the transition from a traditionally agricultural 
societ)' to one based on modem agriculture using water on ever-increasing 
areas. Additional substantial changes in water usage in the region have 
stemmed from the rapid population growth, in particular since the Second 
World War (Beaumont, 1980b: 315). 
Contrary to this, the shortage of water in the region has been 
exacerbated by the development of modem irrigation systems which can 
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only be operated with the aid of considerable energy, a feature which reduces 
the quantity of water in the rivers and leads to an increase in the subsidies to 
the ag;ricultural sector and especially in the provision of water. The energy 
subsidies to the agricultural sector especially high due to the enormous costs 
of transferring the irrigation water to the most fertile soils which are not 
necessarily found in the areas closest to the sources of water. The model for 
the development of new irrigated agricultural areas is based on the transfer 
of irrigation water to previously uncultivated areas or on the improvement of 
agriculture in areas which once used dry-farming methods. The transfer of 
river water for irrigation has been made possible through advanced 
technology introduced over the past 40 years, especially water pumps 
operated by electricity or diesel engines which have replaced the traditional 
methods based on manpower or animal power (Beaumont, 1981: 59). 
In several instances, the development projects have caused a decline 
in the amount of water reaching states further downstream because of water 
utilization for irrigation purposes and the considerable evaporation which 
occurs in the reservoirs behind the dams, especially in dams built for the sole 
purpose of creating electricity (Adams, 1985: 72). 
Further damage is caused by a rise in water salinity as a result of the 
increased evaporation and the return of polluted water to the rivers, 
preventing downstream states from cultivating salt-sensitive crops. The 
implementation of development plans is in turn greatly influenced by the 
damage caused to the irrigation systems by inadequate drainage and the 
increased salinity of agricultural soils (Naff & Matson, 1984: 160). The 
states must significantly increase cultivated areas and enhance the amount of 
water to irrigate these additional regions. There is no doubt that adding water 
for tliis purpose to the amounts of water currently in use, is not possible 
(Beaumont, 1985:318). 
The natural growth rates in the region and the significant rise in the 
standard of living, the food shortage, has continued to grow since the growth 
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rate in the agriculture sector during the last decade has remained at a low 
level of only two percent. Demand for food products, on the other hand, has 
increased at the very rapid pace of five percent per annum causing the West 
Asia to now be one of the world's largest food deficit areas (Fahmi, 1988: 8). 
The food imports in the Arab world as a whole, increased during the eighties 
by 700 percent and the annual food imports reached 35 percent of the world 
total (Underwood, 1981: 53). In this way several of the states in the West 
Asia have become entirely dependent upon imported food, a situation from 
which they would prefer to be freed with the aid of development plans 
(Lawless, 1985: 102). 
2.4: IRRIGATION AND WATER REQUIREMENT 
West Asia has a rapidly escalating demand for food and a sluggish 
supply response to the region is considered to be the least food self-sufficient 
region in the world. Egypt already would need almost twice as many water 
for its agricultural sector than currently available to be food self sufficient 
(Richards & Waterbury, 1990:143). 
In most countries of the West Asia the food deficit between domestic 
production and consumption has increased over the last two decades. Syria 
was a net exporter of basic food commodities and food stuff in 1960s but in 
the 1970s, although it still reached self sufficient in barley production it was 
only 72 percent self-sufficient in wheat production. In the 1980s production 
lost ground again, and Syria slipped to 84 percent self sufficiency in barley 
and 60 percent in wheat production. If current level of productivity, 
continues not only Syria, but most of the countries of the region, will have a 
deficit in wheat production of 55 percent of domestic needs (Perrier & 
Salkini, 1991:279). 
Several of the states in West Asia have become entirely dependent 
upon imported food, a situation from which they would prefer to be freed by 
means of planned agricultural development. One result has been that food 
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imports have increased government control over strategic urban food 
supplies (Richards & Waterbury, 1990: 144). 
Expansion of food production in water-short areas and in marginal 
land has made rapid development of irrigation and land reclamation 
necessary to the degree that water and land resources have often been 
exploited to their limits. Although agriculture continues to be the largest 
single user of water, the growth of domestic and industrial water 
consumption has also increased sharply (Beaumont, 1981: 67). Motivated by 
fears of growing dependence on food imports, the states would like to 
increase their cultivated areas significantly and add large amounts of water to 
irrigate additional regions. However, locating and developing sufficient new 
water for this purpose is not possible (Beaumont, 1985b: 318). 
Subsidies and incentives have led to a large expansion of the private 
agricultural sector in West Asia, and to the extension of supplementary 
irrigation into some rainfed farming areas. For example, the total irrigated 
area in Syria has nearly doubled over the past three decades, increasing from 
625 000 ha (10.9 per cent arable land) in 1972 to 1 186 000 ha (25.2 per cent 
of arable land) in 1999 (FAOSTAT, 2001). In Iraq, the percentage of 
irrigated land increased from 30.3 per cent in 1972 to 67.8 per cent in 1999 
(FAOSTAT, 2001). Irrigation efficiency-the percentage of water that 
actually reaches the crop-does not exceed 50 per cent in the region, and 
sometimes falls as low as 30 per cent, leading to high water losses (ACSAD 
1997). The water used in wheat farming in Saudi Arabia during 1980-95 was 
about 254 cubic kilometer (Al-Qunaibet, 1997), equivalent to 13 per cent of 
the country's total fossil groundwater reserves of 1 919 cubic kilometer (Al 
Alawi & Razzak, 1994 : 57-73). 
2.5: INDUSTRIALIZATION AND INDUSTRIAL WATER USE 
Household and even municipal water needs are only a small part of 
the water supply problem. Globally, industrial water usage is at least twice 
that of domestic use. Industrial uses associated with the generation of 
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hydroelectric power, the production of steel, chemical and allied products, 
paper and allied products, mining and petroleum refining (Clarke, 1991: 3). 
We need at least three litres of water to produce a tin of vegetables, 
100 liters to produce one kilogram of paper, 4,500 liters to produce one 
tonne of cement, 4.3 tonnes to manufacture one tonne of steel, 50 tonnes to 
manufacture a torme of leather and no less than 2700 tonnes to make a torme 
of worsted suiting (Clarke, 1991: 3). 
The move towards industrialization has enjoyed high priority in 
government planned expenditure in the West Asia. Ahematively they may 
be traditional and state capitalist economies, where the state owns or controls 
most of the natural resources and carries responsibility for large sectors of 
the economy (Tuma, 1987: 138). The other six countries devoted from 21 
percent to 49 percent of their investment budget to industry and 
manufacturing. This trend continues and is generally expressed as a joint 
venture between the public and private sectors, with the public sector 
controlling a majority of the shares (Tuma, 1987: 131). 
Energy is considered to be a crucial factor for rapid development and 
the welfare of society and, as the pace of economic growth increases, energy 
derives critical importance through the development of energy intensive 
industries. The bulk of water is used focus for the production of electricity. 
This use is generally not a problem because there is little consumptive loss 
and there is usually only the disposal of hot water to worry about. A power 
station must have a reliable supply of cooling water (a condition that in 
increasingly hard to meet is some areas) which means that the water power 
station use cannot be diverted upstream for other purposes, making cooling 
water a drain on water resources. Taken together, these two uses-industrial 
use and cooling-amount to more than four times domestic water use and they 
must be supplied from reliable sources of run-off water (Clarke, 1991:22). 
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Table 2.5 
Water use in West Asia (million cubic metres) 
Country Domestic Industry Agriculture Total Water 
Use(2) 
Populatio 
n(3) 
Arabian Peninsula sub-region 
Bahrain 
Kuwait 
Oman 
Qatar 
Saudi Arabia 
UAE 
Yemen 
Sub-totJil 
Water use rate(5) 
% of water use 
107 
297 
85 
85 
2 387 
600 
470 
4 031 
273 
13.7 
19 
13 
6 
17 
193 
73 
69 
390 
26 
1.3 
161 
323 
1 150 
337 
18 575 
1539 
3 280 
25 365 
1701 
85 
287 
633 
1241 
439 
21 155 
2212 
3 819 
29 786 
2 000 
100 
515 
374 
562 
801 
1 159 
1001 
254 
4 666 
557 
1691 
2 207 
548 
18 255 
2 210 
15 027 
40 495 
Mashriq sub-region 
Iraq 
Jordan 
Lebanon 
NPA(4) 
Syria 
Sub-totiii 
Water use rate(5) 
% of water use 
1 179 
245 
415 
64 
773 
2 676 
163 
4 
344 
50 
60 
0 
175 
629 
38 
1 
47 584 
1088 
750 
155 
13618 
63 195 
3 840 
95 
49 107 
1383 
1225 
219 
14 566 
66 500 
4 041 
100 
2 444 
257 
407 
91 
1026 
4 225 
20 095 
5 377 
3 009 
2 400 
14 203 
45 084 
Regiomil total 
Water use rate(5) 
% of water use 
6 707 
215 
7 
1019 
32 
1 
88 560 
2 828 
92 
96 286 
3 075 
100 
8 891 85 579 
Source. GCC 1996, UNSPD 1997) 
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2.6: DIMENSIONS OF THE WEST ASIA WATER PROBLEMS 
Water supplies in the West Asia are facing enormous pressures and 
all are already at maximal or near-maximal use. Egypt's population is 
growing by one million every nine months. Many Jordanian towns get 
water only once a week. Immigration into Israel is increasing the stress on 
that country's already taxed water sources. In the Gaza Strip the salination 
of agricultural lands and fresh-water wells has reached up to catastrophic 
levels. In Syria, the low level of the Euphrates together with pollution 
from pesticides, chemicals and salt has forced the Syrian government to 
cut back on the supply of drinking water and electricity in Damascus, 
Aleppo and several other cities. Damascus is without water most nights 
which is estimated to lose as much as 30 percent of its water from old 
leaking pipes. In Jordanian cities water losses from leaking pipes may 
have reached to 60 percent (MacMeli, 1991: 56-57). 
Over 50 percent of the populations of the West Asia depends either 
on water from rivers that cross an international boundary or on 
desalinized water or water drawn from deep wells. Two-third of Arabic-
speaking peoples in this region depends on river water which flow from 
non-Arabic-speaking countries and another 24 percent people live in such 
areas where there is no perennial surface streams. The latter rely either on 
well water from rapidly depleting sources or seawater which is expensive 
both to purify in sufficient quantities and to pump to its places of use 
(Kolar, 1990: 59). 
The size of water-dependent populations in West Asia is rapidly 
increasing. In 1983 the population of this area was 217.4 million, while in 
2000 a 119.6 million people would be added to about with figure, an 
increase of 55 percent. Water will be needed not only for these people as 
individuals but also for industry and all other urban uses. Irrigation water 
will also be needed to prevent, as far as possible, dependence on imported 
food. 
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(C). WA TER SHARING DISPUTES 
Disputes over the distribution of the waters of international rivers are 
a frequent phenomenon of the present century and stem from efforts by 
riparian countries to control the natural flow of water with the help of 
modem technology. They also arise from endeavours to secure greater 
exploitation of water resources. There have been bilateral and even 
multilateral treaties to resolve such disputes but so far no set system of 
international law on water resources has been evolved. 
As a number of varied factors human, economic and even political are 
involved in these disputes and the practices of the various states differ. It is 
especially difficult to solve water sharing disputes unless bilateral 
considerations are taken into due account and a greater understanding of the 
interests involved in these should be brought to bear (Bari, 1977: 16-227). 
Water has been a problematic issue for centuries in West Asia. This is 
explained by the fact that water has always been a scarce commodity in this 
region. The problem is further exacerbated by the fact that most of the waters 
in West Asia are transboundary that crosses or spans an international border. 
Indeed, the lack of water or access to it has often led to serious armed 
conflicts. This is reflected in the Arabic literary legend, "War of the Basoos" 
a long conflict over water between Arab tribes in ancient Arabia. However, 
that dispute was resolved once the parties were able to reach a settlement that 
represented an equitable utilization of the shared resource (Rose, 2006: 
63-68). 
Today, achieving an equitable and reasonable utilization of a shared 
resource is only one of the many legal principles parties attempt to achieve 
when trying to settle water disputes. Additional principles guiding settlement 
of shared water disputes include: 
• Good faith consultation 
• Cooperation and negotiation among the parties 
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• Prevention of significant harm to the water resource 
• Holistic approach to the management of surface and groundwater 
shared resources. 
While trying to achieve all these goals to avoid a potential 
disagreement or to settle an actual dispute may appear idealistic and 
unattainable. The reality is that water is a life sustaining resource that no 
person or group of people can live without it nor should be denied or access 
to this paramount resource. The nature and characteristic of water however 
present unique and challenging problems in resolving water disputes. For 
example, "the flow of water ignores political boundaries". In addition to 
legal issues, scientific, geological and environmental issues are also 
important in reaching a comprehensive solution and these create a need for 
an all inclusive approach to water dispute settlement (Rose, 2006: 63-68). 
The causes of water conflicts and the mechanisms for co-operation 
can be clustered according to how the problem of reaching co-operation is 
defined. For example, understanding this problem as a result of water 
scarcity has often resulted in technological and market solutions being 
suggested to increase availability of the resource. Among them are water and 
virtual water imports (Allan, 2002: 255-272), and an adoption of an 
integrated system of management (Feitelson, 2003: 45-153). 
While some argue that power asymmetry is required for reaching an 
agreement since the more powerful parties can forge a compromise (Spector, 
2000: 223-236) while other counter that a regional power that also holds the 
position of an upstream riparian is better placed to implement unilateral 
projects that may become flashpoints for regional conflict (Wolf, 1998: 
251-265). 
The situation is much more difficult regarding international river 
basin disputes. Institutional arrangements and precedents to solve-country 
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conflicts exist, but these are virtually lacking for international problems 
(Marquand, 1978: 45). 
It is not surprising that water conflicts develop between countries, have 
severely strained mutual relations. Many of these are yet to be resolved, like 
those between India and Bangladesh, Iraq and Syria, Brazil and Argentina 
Israel and Palestine, Israel and Syria, Egypt and Sudan, Egypt and Ethiopia. 
Such international conflicts over shared water resources will continue to 
increase, especially since some writers have already suggested that water, 
rather than land, will be the major constraint or the critical factor for 
increasing world food production during the coming decades (Brown, 
1976:21). 
2.7: COMPETING WATER DEMAND IN WEST ASIA 
In the opinion of several researches, the future of West Asia depends 
more on water sources than oil resources (Caeileigh, 1983: 22). Nesser 
Wahabi, the Minister of Social Affair and Labour of Oman, puts a common 
argument and even if it is based more on emotion than on sound economic 
evidence it is nevertheless a pervasive and for many a persuasive one: 
"Obviously agriculture cannot compete at the moment with the lure of the 
capital area where people can get a guaranteed wage for an eight hour 
working day and as a result agriculture is suffering. But it is clearly 
something that has to be sorted out because agriculture together with 
fisheries, is in the long term more important to this country than oil 
minerals" (MEED, 1977: 14) 
As long as there is joint use of river water systems in the West Asia it 
is natural for the developing system of relations in the region to be expressed 
in tenns of co-operation or conflict between the states involved. An example 
of this can be seen in the struggles directed against development works 
concerned with water resources in the region. Only a small number of 
agreements to divide the waters of a joint river system among several states 
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have been signed or otherwise settled and those that exist have proved to be 
difficult to implement, for example, Syria and Jordan signed an agreement to 
divide the water of the Yarmuk River in 1987 but about 30 million cubic 
meter of the Yarmuk water reaches Lake Kinneret in Israel annually. It can 
be assumed that Israel will probably not permit any change in the quantity of 
water reaching Kinneret, and that Syria will probably not in the event be 
prepaired to give up water to Jordan (Naff & Matson, 1984: 32-36). 
The Orontes River rises in Lebanon and flows through Syria to the 
Sea in the Hatay region of Turkey. Syria and Lebanon reached an agreement 
over die use of water from this river in 1972 but there is no similar 
agreement between Syria and Turkey. The Syrians claim that the Hatay 
region is an integral part of their state which was illegally transferred by the 
French Mandate to Turkey in 1938. The Syrian's demand for a water 
division of the Euphrates is countered by the Turks demands for an 
agreement to divide the water of the Orontes which is used almost entirely 
by the Syrians. However, such an agreement would bring about de facto 
Syrian recognition of the area as belonging to Turkey, something that the 
Syrians are not prepared to acknowledge (Naff & Matson, 1984: 32-36). 
Israel and Jordan, both of which currently over utilize their water 
potential (Frey & Naff, 1985: 67-72) are examples of states whose future 
development of agriculture will be retarded. In this respect, (Cooley, 1983; 
Naff, 1991: 17) have presented the external relations strategy of Israel as one 
which is directed, first and foremost, at answering the country's water needs. 
These researchers claim that Israel annexed the Golan Heights because it 
controls part of the Jordan's sources and aims to retain control over this area 
in the future. Similarly the same researchers claim that, to a large extent the 
Lebanon War of 1982 was designed to assure Israel's control of the source 
of the Litani River. These statements, supported by insufficient evidence, 
indicEite the need for more all encompassing research which will examine 
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both the influence of water on regional geopolitics and the influence of 
regional geopolitics on the development of the river systems. 
2.8: THE ROLE OF WATER IN REGIONAL RELATIONS 
From the above discussion, it is clear that differences of opinion over 
the use of river water in the West Asia is one of the most important active 
issues in regional politics, both overtly and covertly. Overtly, we can see the 
issue clearly when agreements are signed or complaints filed with the United 
Nationals or when a military threat is felt. Covertly, the river waters can be 
seen as an important strategic factor when states in the region consider 
political manoeuvres and these political manoeuvres influence the 
development of the river systems (Berber, 1959: 4). 
The use of joint river systems and the utilization of their waters is 
particularly complex from a legal standpoint. International law with respect 
to water provides a poorly developed framework for international discourse 
and for the foreseeable future the legal arguments will be subordinate to 
political considerations. International law is also ambiguous, in for example 
the interpretation of the principle of 'no harm'. A state's territory 
undoubtedly includes the water flowing through it "national waters" but 
national waters flowing in rivers, may reach the territory of another state, 
becoming the national waters of that state. Water being part of the territory, 
weather temporary or flowing, makes the definition of the concept "territary" 
problematic, and raises complex questions in international law (Berber, 
1959: 4). 
When "unfair" use of river water is made by other states, international 
law refers to this as "destructive use". "Destructive use" can be caused by a 
change in the flow of the river in such a way that the water is not returned to 
the e:dsting system for the use of others, or brought about if an upstream 
sates uses more than an agreed amount of water. Although some of the water 
may return to the river system, it may do so in marginal amounts and be of 
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such poor quality, that it cannot be used by the other partners (Naff & 
Matson, 1984: 158). 
Typical of the views held by states which share water systems with 
others is the claim by an upstream state that its sovereignty is fiiU thus 
allowing it to use the water within its borders in any way it sees fit without 
taking into consideration the ensuing effect upon the downstream states. In 
many instances, the downstream states are those which begin the 
confrontation, demanding that the historical river flow into their territories 
continue without any change. The principle guiding international law in such 
issues is "use your own water so that you do not undermine the use of those 
using it after you" (Berber, 1959: 13). 
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(A). INTRODUCTION 
The study discusses the context of water issue between Israel and 
Arabs and focuses on disputes in particular relating to the Jordan River 
Basin. Water is a major issue in West Asia as it plays a prominent role in 
directing political and defining strategies. Four allocations of limited water 
resouirces in the Jordan basin region is a major issue. The dispute relates to 
the sharing of the surface water of the Jordan River Basin among Israel, 
Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. In addition to the already complicated issues in 
any transboundary water dispute, these disputes also involve extremely 
complex political and territorial issues. The history of these disputes 
involves, not surprisingly, both armed conflict and peaceful negotiation 
(Rose, 2006: 63-64). 
The Jordan River and its major tributary, the Yarmuk, is the clearest 
manifestation of hydro politics and the dangers it presents for international 
river basins. However, since the co-riparian states to the rivers are Syria, 
Lebanon, the Kingdom of Jordan, the Palestinians and Israel and since all of 
them have been in a state of war before and since Israel became independent 
states in 1948. The pressure of the co-riparian states for the limited waters of 
the Jordan River is enormous, and this has led to over-utilization of the 
drainage basin. There is no all-inclusive agreement common to all the co-
riparijin states over the division of the water from the Jordan River System, 
but there are partial agreements and quasi agreements between pairs of states 
such as Syria and Jordan and Israel and Jordan. The conflict over the 
Jordan's water is not one that is in the process of developing, as are the 
conflicts which are presumed to be inevitable for the Nile or Euphrates-
Tigris basins-here the conflict has determined the behaviour of the co-
ripariaji states for almost forty years. The worsening situation of water 
supply among all the co-riparian states-the result of consecutive droughts 
and an accelerated population growth-is only going to increase the 
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magnitude of the conflicting interests of the co-riparian sates (Naff & 
Matson, 1990: 12-27) 
The first section of this study will describe climatic and hydro 
political feature in Jordan River and describe previous efforts to resolve 
these disputes, including a brief historical review of the background and 
origin of, disputes. The following section will outline relevant principles of 
international water Law, which up to now have not played a significant role 
in efforts to settle down these disputes. The study will suggest all possible 
inclusive water settlement strategies to resolve these conflicts peacefully 
(Rose, 2006: 63-64). 
(B). THE JORDAN RIVER 
The Jordan River is geologically a young river which was formed 
some 20,000 years ago during the Pleistocene period. The river is incised in 
the Jordan graben which constitutes an important component of the Syrian-
Africim Rift Valley. The rift valley within Israel is 400 km long extending 
from Lebanon in the north to the Gulf of Aqaba in the south (Cressey, 1960: 
130; Fisher, 1978:413). 
The Jordan River is the major source of water in Jordan basin. It is 
the tliird largest perennial river in West Asia. The Jordan River is a 
multinational river. It has four riparian states: Israel, Jordan, Syria and 
Lebanon. The length of the Jordan River is 156 kilometer of which 73 
kilometer is under Israeli occupied territory and the remaining in Syria, 
Lebanon and Jordan (Omar, 1961: 279). 
The Jordan River, which flows southward within the rift, rises in the 
slopes of Mount Hermon and ends in the Dead Sea. The Jordan is made up 
of the Hasbani Aan spring River and the Banias River which arises in 
Lebanon and Syria respectively and converges above Lake Huleh to form 
the headwaters of the Jordan. These two rivers are later joined by the Dan 
River which arises in Israel. The confluence of these three headwaters forms 
the Jordan River, which flows into Lake Tiberias. By the time the rivers 
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BOUNDARIES BETWEEN ISRAEL, JORDAN, 
LEBANON, AND SYRIA. 
Source: http://www.idrc.cayopenebooks/287-2/jro035-01.gif 
reaches Lake Tiberias it has been augmented by additional flow from the 
Golan Heights. The total surface catchment area of the upper Jordan River 
basin is approximately 18,300 square kilometer (Saliba, 1968: 32). 
The Yarmuk is the Jordan's main tributary, its flow coming from a 
watershed divided between Syria and the Kingdom of Jordan, with four -
fifths in Syria. After its outflow from Lake Tiberias, in addition to the water 
which it receives from the Yarmuk, the Jordan also gets water from Wadis 
on botlti sides of the Valley. The greater part of this flood water comes from 
the eastern side; the most important of these tributaries is the Zerqa (Naff & 
Matson, 1984: 20). 
In terms of flow, the largest of the head waters of the upper Jordan is 
the Dan: on an average, it contributes about 40 percent of the water which 
flows into lake. It is also the least variable of the headwaters from years to 
year. The Hasbani and the Banias account for around 20 percent each 
(Shapland, 1997: 9). Water availability in the Jordan basin region is 
extremely limited. The Jordan River is the main axis of the system, and its 
total annual discharge into the Dead Sea is approximately 1,300 million 
cubic meters. The headwaters of the Upper Jordan 550-600 million cubic 
meters per year are the Hasbani 117-140 million cubic meter rivers and Dam 
spring 245-260 million cubic meters per year in Lebanon, and the Banias 
River 122 million cubic meters in the Golan Heights (Soffer &, Kliot, 1991: 
10-205). The bulk of the Upper Jordan water is stored in Lake Tiberias (also 
know as the sea of Galiee or Lake Kinneret), and diverted into Israel's 
National Water Carrier. The Yarmuk River 450-475 million cubic meters, 
whose headwaters are in Syria, flows along the Syrian-Jordanian border and 
througli the Adisiyeh triangle which borders Israel, before joining the Jordan 
River 10 kilometer below Lake Tiberias. Springs, ephemeral Rivers and 
minor tributaries on the eastern and western rims of the Jordan basin 
contribute a ftirther 220 and 54 million cubic meters per year respectively 
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(Soffer & Kliot, 1991: 25-195). The lower Jordan is saline, because of high 
rates of evaporation in Lake Tiberias which is partially fed by saline springs. 
Water is one of the scarcest natural resources in Jordan; only 8.6 
percent of the country receives more than 200 mm annual rainfall. This has 
led to considerable anxiety among Jordanian technocrats about the country's 
dwindling water supplies. Jordan's population of 4,740 million 2002 and 
148 cubic meters per year freshwater and 35,000 migrant workers returning 
or expelled from the Gulf after the Gulf war, is expected to reach 8.5 m by 
the year 2015. In additional, Jordan shares its principal water sources with 
its neighbours on what it regards as unfavorable terms: the Jordan and 
Yarmuk river with Syria and Israel and ground-water reserves with Syria, 
Iraq and more problems ethically, Saudi Arabia (Ellysar, 2005: 3). 
Jordan's aimual water supply is approximately 800 million cubic 
meter per year 320 million cubic meter of this is from surface water, 270 
million cubic meter are from renewable ground water and 210 million cubic 
meter from non-renewable, the latter being Jordan's strategic resource, 
abstracted at a rate of 50 million cubic meter per year (Beschomer, 1992-93: 
16-17). 
Besides this, Jordan has large reserves of fossil brackish water, up to 
30,000 years old, which could yield up to 70 million cubic meters per year. 
In the year 2005 Jordan consumed a total of 1,120 million cubic meters, of 
which 300 million cubic meters was in the domestic sector, 70 in industry 
and 750 million cubic meters for irrigation. Jordan's ground water is being 
abstracted at a rate of 170 million cubic meter beyond its safe yield, which 
has precipitated the decline of water tables, notably at the Al-Azraq oasis, 
the main supplier of drinking water to Amman pumping began at a rate of 25 
million cubic meter per year but has increased to 250 million cubic meter per 
year; 50 kilometer from the Jordanian border. At this rate, the reserve will be 
exhausted after 25 years (Abu, 1988:148-150). 
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Per capita annual water consumption in Jordan is one of tlie lowest in 
the world, approximately 205 cubic meters, but despite this, water demand 
began to outpace supply in 1987 and municipal rationing was introduced. 
Jordan's water deficit in summer 1991 was 210 million cubic meter and 680 
million cubic meters in 2015 (Beschomer, 1992-93: 16-17). 
Jordan's need for more dams and reservoirs was dramatically 
illustraited by the winter floods of 1991-92. Existing Dams were overfilled 
and flooding destroyed the bulk of Jordan's rain-fed crops in the north and 
60 percent of crops in the Jordan valley. Plans are under way to raise 
existing dams and proposals for 15 new storage dams are under study, but 
much depends on the availability of funds. Jordan is trying to implement an 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment programme that 
was severely hit by the Gulf crisis (Libiszewski, 1995: 3-42). 
Various options are being explored for increasing the use of marginal 
water resources: recycled waste water currently yields 35 million cubic 
meters, the target is 100 million cubic meters by the year 2010 and the 
establishment of more sophisticated tertiary waste treatment plants. 
Jordan eventually hopes to increase exploitation of brackish and sea 
water, although sea-water desalination is not economically feasible at 
present, given the high energy and transport network requirements. As 
Jordan maintained a neutral position towards Iraq during the Gulf war it has 
been denied aid and low-price energy from the Gulf States (Libiszewski, 
1995: 3-22). 
(C). CLIMATIC AND HYDROPOLITICAL FEATURES 
Mountains, dry plateaus, and deserts dominate the landscape of the 
West Asia. Except for a mountainous belt which stretches across the 
nortiiem part of the region, the region is generally characterized by aridity 
and contains large desert and semi-desert areas with small islands of well-
watered land (Fisher, 1978:46). , . .- a .,, 
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The rainfall through out the Jordan valley region is rheager and highly 
irregular in distribution. Heaviest totals occur in the northern part of the 
region and on the more exposed windward slopes. Toward the south the 
amount of rainfall declines sharply and the seasonal variability increases. In 
most desert or semi desert regions the rainfall occurs in torrential 
thunderstorms with the total fall in a single storm often exceeding the 
average for that month (Blake & Wagstaff, 1988: 83). 
'^ rhe Jordan River is a zone in the West Asia which has two kinds of 
very different climatic characteristics. First, the environment shared by the 
riparian countries of the Jordan River experiences a sharply varying seasonal 
rainfall two distinct seasons predominate in the basin, a rainy period from 
November through March; and a dry season which extends over the next 
seven months. Second, there is a marked spatial disparity in the distribution 
of precipitation over the basin-annual precipitation ranges from less than 
25mm per year in the southern part of Israel to more than 1400 mm per year 
in the mountainous areas of Lebanon and Syria (Murakami & Musiake, 
1994: 112-118). This climatologically feature confines about 60 percent of 
Israel, 50-60 percent of Syria, and more than 85 percent of Jordan to the arid 
or hyper-arid desert which receives negligible amounts of rainfall, and 
restricts the main recharge areas of the basin to its northern belt and hills of 
the West Bank (Beaumount, 1981: 41). 
The Jordan River consists of four principal tributaries originating in 
four countries. Three spring-fed tributaries generate the Upper Jordan: the 
Dan in Israel, the Hasbani in Lebanon, and the Banias in Syria. The Dan, 
which is the largest tributary, has a relatively steady flow of around 245 
million cubic meter per year, nearly 50 percent of the discharge of the Upper 
Jordan. The Hasbani, which on average contributes about 138 million cubic 
meters each year to the river flow, is subject to sharp seasonal and aimual 
variation between 52 and 236 million cubic meter per year. The Banias, 
which is the smallest River, originates in Syria, less than 2 kilometers from 
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the Israeli border. Its average contribution to the Upper Jordan is 121 million 
cubic meters per year and, like the Hasbani, It is subject to extreme 
irregularity (Naff & Matson, 1984: 17-19). The Upper Jordan flows 
southward into the Sea of Galilee, the only natural freshwater reservoir 
within the basin. Not more than 10 kilometers down from the Sea of Galilee, 
the Jordan is reached by the Yarmuk. This is its most important tributary, 
and contributes 400-500 million cubic meter of water to the basin (Naff & 
Matson 1984: 20; Lowi, 1993a: 28; Gleick, 1994a: 9). While the quality of 
water in the Upper Jordan River is very good, the Lower Jordan is mostly 
saline and by the time it enters the Dead Sea the water, if any, is too salty to 
use. 
The Jordan basin includes Syria, Lebanon, Israel, the Kingdom of 
Jordan, and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Among these countries, 
Israel, Jordan, and Palestinians are suffering from an accumulating water 
deficit and they are the most dependent riparian on the Jordan River waters. 
These three states make up the core of the basin for three reasons. First, they 
incorporate the major part of the catchments area (Libiszewski, 1995: 3). 
Second, they do not have other surface water resources, and only limited 
groundwater sources, a fact that make them particularly interested in the 
waters of the Jordan River basin. 
Table No- 3.1 
Major tributaries of the Jordan River 
Tributary 
Dan 
Husbani 
Banias 
Hullah springs and local run off 
Yarmuk 
Headwaters 
Israel 
Lebanon 
Syria 
Israel 
Syria 
Annual discharge 
245-260 
117-138 
121-125 
180 
400-500 
Sources: Naff & Mastson (1984:17-21); Lowi (1993a: 28); Kliot (1994: 175-80) 
Note: a Lowi (400mcm), Naff & Matson (500 mem) 
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And, third, they are historically the primary users of the basin's 
waters- according to (Naff & Matson, 1984: 27), only about 5 percent of the 
total water demand of Lebanon and Syria is satisfied from the Jordan basin, 
while the Upper Jordan proper supplies Israel with about one-third of its 
total water consumption. The Kingdom of Jordan historically satisfied its 
major water needs from the River Jordan and its tributary Yarmuk. Although 
after the six day war in 1967, Jordan lost much of its share to Israel, it still 
uses the river to provide for about 50 percent of its water requirements 
(Lowi, 1993a: 20). 
Syria and Lebanon, because of their claim on two headwaters of the 
Jordan River, are an integral part of the basin, yet the main part of their 
territories, and their most important agricultural areas, are fed by other river 
systems of far more importance. Syria is relatively well endowed with both 
surface and sub-surface water resources (Gischler, 1979: 113). Syria's total 
water supply is about 36 billion cubic meters, sufficient for its immediate 
and foreseeable needs. The bulk of Syria's water demand is covered by the 
Euphrates, which crosses the country from north to east, and by the Orontes 
which nourishes the northwest of the country. Currently, the River Yarmuk 
provides for only seven percent of Syria's total water needs and irrigates 
about six percent of its agricultural land. Lebanon, for its part, is a 
mountainous country and almost all of its territory receives adequate 
precipitation. Moreover, there are several rich internal rivers which create a 
significant water surplus for the time being and for Lebanon's anticipated 
needs (Lowi, 1984: 4). 
Though Lebanon and Syria may have more water than they require 
for current uses and at least for the next few decades, Jordan, Israel, and the 
Palestinians overall water resources is extremely limited, unevenly 
distributed, and highly subject to climatic fluctuations. It is in these 
territories that the biblical prediction of seven years of drought followed by 
seven years of plenty' originated. And this is why in this region small 
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rivulets such as the Jordan and the Yarmuk assume importance out of all 
proportion to their modest discharges (Shahin, 1989; Gischler, 1979: 103). 
Based on the current consumption trend, indigenous water resources 
are unable to meet the growing demand. Further, Jordan shares its principal 
water sources with its neighbours on terms: the Jordan and Yarmuk rivers 
with Syria and Israel, and ground-water reserved with Syria, Iraq and more, 
problematically, Saudi Arabia (Saliba, 1968: 34). 
Decades of over pumping have caused sea water to invade Israel's 
coastal aquifer, a key freshwater source. The degradation of the coastal 
aquifer greatly deepens Israeli dependence on the aquifers underlying the 
West Bank. To protect this important source, since 1967 the Israeli 
government has strictly limited water use by Arabs on the West Bank, while 
overdrawing the aquifer for its own uses-an inequity that has greatly angered 
the Arab population (Postel, 1992: 76). Palestinian's quota of 130 million 
cubic meters per year represents only 20 percent of the rechargeable 
groundwater reserves of the West Bank, estimated as ranging from 560 to 
710 million cubic meters (Naff & Matson, 1984: 47; Kliot, 1994: 247). 
The Palestinians demand an equitable share in the water resources of 
the area. However, the West Bank's main water potential is already fully 
exploited and Israel cannot increase the amount of water available to it 
within its pre-1967 borders except by desalination of sea water or importing 
fresh water from outside the basin (Kliot, 1994: 244). 
(D), HYDROLOGY OF RIPARIAN STA TES 
3.1: SYRIA 
Syria with an area of 185,180 square kilometer, about three-fourths 
and site of the United Kingdom, is the largest of the countries under 
consideration. While less than a third of its area is cultivable, Syria cannot 
be said to be densely populated. Hence, land in Syria is plentiful but water 
supply severely limits its utilization. The area which can support rain-fed 
cultivation is limited because of the location of the country or rainfall 
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distribution. The country is divided into several rain-fall zones. Because of 
its typically Mediterranean climate, Syria is characterized by winter rainfall 
and summer drought. Generally speaking, the rainfall decreases from north 
to south and from the coastal region to the interior. The heaviest rainfall 
occurs along the western exposures of the mountains paralleling the eastern 
shore of the Mediterranean (Saliba, 1968: 34-35). 
In Syria the climate and economic activities are very closely related 
and dependent on each other. The rainfall in the west is up to 1000 mm in a 
year. Though most of Syria has an annual rainfall of 250 MMY, rainfall is 
fairly abundant in the west, where the height of the land tends to determine 
the amount received (Murakami, 1995: 79). 
A third zone affected somewhat by a rain-shadow location parallels 
the moist arable land to the south and east. Winter rainfall, through slight, is 
sufficient to support some pastoral activities but is inadequate for crop 
production. The remainder of Syria falls into the sub-humid or desert 
classification. 
Thus the area which can support rainfed cultivation is confined to a 
rather narrow belt extending roughly like a crescent from the Hauran in the 
south northward to Aleppo and then eastward along the Turkish frontier 
(Saliba, 1968: 35-36). 
A major source of water to Syria is the Yarmuk River with an 
estimated flow of 500 million cubic meters annually. This river is a major 
tributary of the Jordan basin and therefore of special significance in this 
study. It is estimated that of the total flow of the Yarmuk, Syria's 
requirements in that region do not exceed 90 million cubic meter of water to 
irrigate 18,000 acres in the Yarmuk Plateau, and the Yarmuk valley between 
Maqarim and Adasiaya (Ghobashy, 1961: 47). 
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3.2: LEBANON 
Lebanon is one of the smallest independent republics with an area of 
only about 10,400 square kilometer and a population of five million. 
Compared with the larger Arab countries, it is densely populated, with an 
average of nearly 945 inhabitants per square kilometer of arable land. It is a 
mountainous country in which, only a quarter of the land is cultivable. 
Unlike its neighbouring countries, nature provides for the country as a whole 
a greater amount of rainfall. This is especially true of the coastal region and 
the Beqaa valley where the average annual rainfall is about 33 inches 
(Economic survey Mission, 1994: 28). 
Although blessed with abundant water resources, either as rainfall or 
from rivers and streams, Lebanon, like most of the neighboring countries, 
experiences recurrent drought problems. This has caused considerable 
concern in government circles and has resulted in a policy of maximum 
effort to stabilize and expand agricultural production, through various 
irrigation and land improvement projects. Today most of the cultivable area 
is being utilized through the development of various water projects. The 
most important of these and the key to agricultural as well as industrial 
development of Lebanon is the multi-purpose Litani River project 
(Economic survey Mission, 1997: 8). 
Lebanese water supplies are seasonal and storage facilities are 
practically nonexistent. The total water supply of water in Lebanon is 
approximately 4,800 million cubic meters. There are 15 permanent rivers, of 
which three are shared by other countries: the Kabir and the Asia draining 
into Syria and the Hasbani which flows into Israel. The climatic conditions 
of Lebanon v£iries according to elevation and distance from the sea. The 
coastal lowlands are moderately hot in summer and warm in winter and 
completely free from frost (Beschomer, 1992: 17-19). 
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It proposes is to develop and irrigate an additional 46,500 acres of 
land in the Beqaa plain, the coastal plain, and along the intermediate stretch 
of the river. It is estimated that only 80 percent of its annual flow would be 
required to irrigate all the cuhivable land within the river basin. The 
remaining 20 percent would be surplus waters (Schmidt, 1955: 6). At the 
same time the project envisages the development of hydro-electric energy 
amounting to 626 million Kilowatt-hours annually. Other important 
irrigation developments under way include the Kasmieh, Ahkar, 
Yammouneh, and Orontes projects which bring under irrigation an 
additional 61,000 acres of land (Economic Development in the Middle East, 
1945-54: 175-176). 
Litani is the most important river of Lebanon, flowing, and the 
Southern part of the Beqaa Valley along the whole length of the valley until 
its waters finally turn westwards and enter the Mediterranean near Tyre. The 
Litani River is about 196 kilometers long and it discharges about 755 million 
cubic meter of water per year. It rises in the Bekaa Valley, a short distance 
west of Baalbek and flows south down arise of the Bekaa Valley between 
the Lebanon Mountains to the west and the Anti-Lebanon Mountains to the 
east. Unlike the Jordan, Euphrates-Tigris and the Nile, Basins, the Litani 
basin has almost entirely within the Lebanon. About 80 square kilometers of 
Syria territory could be considered within the basin and might contribute an 
unsubstantial amount of winter flood water to the Litani. Nevertheless, there 
have been numerous discussions regarding possible diversions involving the 
Litani. In the early 1960s, the Arab states proposed to divert a portion of the 
Jordan headwaters to the Litani. The most persistent plans have involved 
Israel. After World War I, the Zionist wished to have the Palestine Mandate 
extended to or beyond the lower Litani. They have also proposed the 
diversion of Litani water to the upper Jordan. The purpose was to generate 
hydro-electricity and Litani water made available for fiirther use. The 
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traditional Israel position has been that the Litani is part of the Jordan River 
system (Saliba, 1968:34-117). 
3.3: THE JORDANIAN KINGDOM 
The water reservoirs in the highlands of the Jordanian kingdom north 
of the Dead Sea form an integral part of the Jordan basin. The water that 
rises in the Zarqa springs and other streams is included in the river's water 
balance. 
The Arava aquifers lie in the southern part of the Jordanian kingdom 
and are not connected to the Jordan basin. The Arava aquifer extends from 
the Dead Sea to the Eilat-Aqaba region. It is divided into: northern and 
southern aquifers. The total amount of usable water is estimated at 40-70 
million cubic meters (Zohar & Schwartz, 1991; Gvirtzman & Benvenisti, 
1993:45-65). 
East of Aqaba is another international aquifer, the al Disi basin. This 
basin may be part of a large underground water body, called the Saq, which 
reaches as far as Kuwait, and is perhaps connected to the Tabuq aquifer in 
Saudi Arabia. The potential of this reserve is estimated at 280 million, a 
cubic meter and it is used by Jordan and Saudi Arabia. The Jordanian 
Kingdom uses about 100 cubic meter of it annually. Of this, 12 million cubic 
meters are carried to Aqaba and the rest is pumped for irrigation of Bedouin 
lands in the Wadi Ram area and to supply Amman. Saudi Arabia pumps 
about 3 million cubic meter of this water annually (Murakami, 1995: 184-
194; Gross & Soffer, 1996: 123-131). 
The Jordanian kingdom also has national aquifers: the Azraq basin, in 
the northeast, which supplies water to Amman, and the al Jafar basin in the 
southeast. 
It is estimated that the potential of kingdom's groundwater reaches 
530 million cubic meters of these, 300 million cubic meters of these, 300 
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million cubic meters are replenish able and 230 million cubic meters are 
fossil water (Murakami, 1995; Shatanawi & Jayousi, 1995; Gross & Soffer 
1996:119-208). 
Table 3.2 
Aquifer and Basin Water Status in Jordan (Mm3/year). 
Basin 
Yarmouk 
Jordan River tributaries 
Jordan River plains 
Amman and Zarqa 
Dead Sea 
Diesa 
North Wadi Araba 
South Wadi Araba 
Jaffar 
Azraq 
Sarhan 
Hamad 
Used 
59 
6.3 
21.7 
153.8 
68.6 
56 
1.75 
4 
23 
32 
0.8 
1.8 
Available 
40 
15 
21 
87.5 
57 
100 
3.5 
5.5 
27(18) 
28 
5 
8 
Sources: 
The Kingdom of Jordan, one of the driest countries in the world, with 
about 90 percent of its land receiving less than 200 mm of annual rainfall, 
has average renewable water supply of 850-900 million cubic meter per 
year, including groundwater, the Yarmuk, and a few other small surface 
sources. Being deprived to the opportunity to develop its water storage 
capacity on the Yarmuk River, this country has been over-utilizing its 
underground water resources for many years (Soffer, 1999: 132). 
3.4: ISRAEL 
The state of Israel was established in 1948. It is located at the eastern 
end of the Mediterranean Sea and covers an area of some 8,200 kilometer. It 
is an irregular narrow strip about 260 miles long, extendmg from the hills of 
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Galilee in the North to the Red Sea port at Eilat in the South. To the north, it 
is bounded by Syria and Lebanon, to the east by Syria and Jordan, and to the 
south-west by Egypt (Saliba, 1968: 42). 
Agriculturally and topographically, Israel may be divided into three 
main regions, from north to south: 
• The Jordan valley region which contains the Jordan River and its three 
lakes: Lake Huleh, Lake Tiberias, and the Dead Sea, 
• The central coastal plain, which stretches from a point south of the 
Lebanese border all the way down to the Gaza strip and 
• The southern area of the Negev which extends from Beersheba to the 
Gulf of Eilat and which comprises more than half of the territory of 
Israel (Saliba, 1968:42). 
Israel's climate is typically Mediterranean, somewhat similar to 
southern California. Rainfall is seasonal and is received entirely between 
November and April. It is heaviest in the north, ranging from 42.5 inches at 
Upper Galilee to 0.8 inches at Eilat (Tel-Aviv: July 1959: 6). 
Thus, as in other countries in the region, irrigation is a limiting factor 
in agricultural development. In spite of the small size of Israel, there is a 
great variation in its soils. According to the Soil conservation service of the 
Ministry of Agricultural, the territory of Israel included seven soil classes, of 
which 1,320,000 acres were considered suitable for irrigation (Gil & 
Rosensaft, 1955: 1). The population of Israel increased from 717,000 in 
1948 to 4.5 million today (Safran, 1963: 71-83). 
Israel transfers water from the Jordan basin via the National Water 
Carrier to western portions of the country. Israel is already using 95 percent 
(of an estimated total of 1755 million cubic meters per annum) of its 
renewable resources and consumes five times more water per capita than its 
neighbors. According to the lowest estimate Israel requires about 1750 
million cubic meters per annum of fresh water supply. 
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Although Israel has managed to reduce the amount of water used in 
agriculture by 15 percent over the last two year, this reduction has not 
appreciably eased the strain on existing water sources. If estimates are 
correct Israel by the year 2010 will face shortages up to 800 million cubic 
meters per annum almost half of its present consumption. Because 
approximately 75 percent of the water Israel currently consumes is used for 
agriculture substantial future reductions in water use by the agricultural 
sector could avert the crisis (U.S. Foreign policy, D.C., December 1987: 12-
16). 
The agricultural sector has increasingly come to understand that fresh 
water is a scarce resource that will be largely replaced by treated wastewater 
and desalination. At the some time, the growing of certain crops may 
become prohibitively expensive or impossible due to the salinity levels in 
effluents and available brackish waters (Schwartz, 2001: 39). The transition 
to drip irrigation for many crops from the 1970s onward has allowed many 
Israelis farmers to maintain productivity even as actual allocations were cur 
periodically (Lipchin, 2003: 58-108). 
Located on the edge of a desert belt, Israel not only suffers from 
scarcity of water, but also from its uneven of water resources distribution 
(Beschomer, 1992: 10). The north of the country provides 80 percent of 
Israel's water resources, while 65 percent of its agricultural land and the 
largest cities lie in the south. Its total annual supply of renewable freshwater 
resources amount to some 1.6-1.9 billion cubic meters, of which about 75 
percent is used for irrigation and the balance for urban and industrial 
purposes. The country's water sources include the Jordan River, natural 
springs, aquifers, and seasonal local runoff (Murakami & Musiake, 1994: 
117). All freshwater sources are already overexploited, including the 
aquifers of the West Bank; new ways are being developed to exploit 
marginal water resources through wastewater recycling, cloud-seeding and 
desalination of brackish water (Feitelson, 1996: 17; Homer-Dixon, 1994a: 
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67). According to Israel's state comptroller, water utilization has exceeded 
the level of renewable water sources by 200-300 million cubic meters per 
year and a disastrous deficit of 2 billion cubic meters has accumulated (Kliot 
1994: 232). 
3.5: PALESTINE 
The central highland aquifer stretches from the foot of the Carmel in 
the north to the Beer Sheba region in the South. It is about 81 miles long and 
about 22 miles wide, and its depth is 1, 40-3,298 feet below surface. The 
rock structure that allows water to seep and collect in its is a mixture of 
limestone and dolomite that geologists Cali "Judean composite". Penetration 
of water is possible wherever this structure is found on the surface. About 
25-30 percent of the rainwater falling on the Judean Mountains infiltrates in 
to the aquifer, 3-5 percent flow off in streams, and the rest evaporates 
(Gvirtzman, 1993: 51-56). Over this aquifer lives a population crowded into 
the cities of Nablus, Jenin, Jerusalem, Hebron Ramallah, and hundreds of 
smaller settlements. Their sewage, if not treated properly, is easily liable to 
penetrate into the Central highland aquifer and pollute it. 
There are separate water bodies making up the central highland 
aquifer. The western aquifer, also know as the Yarkon-Taninm, Yields 340-
360, million cubic meter of water annually. This is the best water in all 
Palestine. At present all this water is pumped in a system of springs on both 
sides of the Green Line. In the past most of this, water rose in Israel 
(Gvirtzman, 1993: 88). 
The northern aquifer, also called Nablus-Gilboa yields a total of about 
140 million cubic meter of water. Pumping takes place on two stories, the 
lower story gives about 70 million cubic meter and the upper about 68 
million cubic meters. In the past, before dozens of wells were drilled down 
to this aquifer, the water emerged in a series of springs in the Bet She'an 
valley in Israel, and only a small amount of water, 18 million cubic meter, 
drained to the Wadi Fara' spring on the West Bank (Gvirtzman, 1994: 88). 
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The third aquifer is the eastern. At present about 100 million cubic 
meter of water are pumped from it. A considerable part of its water rises as 
springs, including those of Wadi Kelt, Jericho, Ujah (10 million cubic 
meter), Fashha (40 million cubic meter of salty water), Ein Gedi, etc. it is 
estimated that the potential of this aquifer is greater than then amount drawn 
from it today. 
Those three water bodies constituting the central highland aquifer are 
the most important water source in all Palestine, accounting for about 40 
percent of the entire water potential and yielding the best quality water in the 
countrji'. This aquifer is on both sides of the Gree Line, so its water is 
international, claimed by Israel and by the Palestinians. The prevention of 
pollution are of great importance and carry geopolitical implications. The 
source of the water of this aquifer is largely in West Bank territory Drilling 
to pump it may be done only in places of water accumulation, and these are 
not to be found everywhere on the West bank (Gvirtzman, 1995: 95). The 
estimated average annual ground water recharge in Palestine is 698 to 708 
meter per year (648 million cubic meter per year in the West Bank and 50 to 
60 million cubic meters per year in the Gaza strip. 
(E). GEOPOLITICS OF JORDAN RIVER BASIN 
Water is the most prominent issue in West Asia. And among all the 
water basin of West Asia, the Jordan River basin has been the focus of the 
most intensive attention. It is also the most frequently cited case among all 
the water system, in West Asia as a source of serious conflict. The Jordan 
basin includes Israel and the occupied Territories-West bank, Gaza Strip and 
Golan Height-Jordan and south western Syria. This region faces the most 
serious water deficit in West Asia and there is an urgent need to define a 
mutually acceptable framework of water management (Kolars, 1992a: 82) 
Conflict over the Jordan River system has been unmanageable 
because of two factors: 
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(1) The system has a complex hydrological structure shared by four 
riparian. 
(2) The Jordan-River involves four hostile riparian states-Israel, Jordan, 
Lebanon, and Syria. The Arab Israeli conflict has over shadowed 
efforts to reach agreement on cooperative utilization of the water 
system (Saliba, 1968:34). 
In the Jordan River basin, water related tension or dispute revolves 
around the following issues: 
• Israel control over all the headwater of the river Jordan 
• Jordanian and Palestinian claims to "historic water right" on the 
Jordan River 
• Syrian plans to build Dams on the Yarmuk River for its own 
exclusive use. 
Water has played a prominent role in directing Israel's policies and 
defines its strategies. The earliest Zionist leaders of the mid-nineteenth 
century realigned full well that they could get millions of Jews to immigrate 
to Palestine unless they expanded their control over the land, which in turn 
depended on irrigate that land and controlling its resources (Gvirtzman, 
1993: 56-88). 
3.6: THE EARLY PERIOD 
Cooperation between British imperialism and the world Zionist 
movement regarding this very question can be traced as far back as 1887, 
when the Palestine exploration fund sent a group of experts and engineers 
under Sir Charles Warren to Palestine to survey its natural resources, 
including water. The report published by the group upon its return in 1871 
contained the first reference to the Jewish claim that Palestine and the Negev 
were capable of absorbing millions of people and that water available in 
northern Palestine could be diverted south for that purpose. 
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WATER PROJECTS ON THE JORDAN RIVER 
Source : Soffer, 1999 : \22 
Early Jewish immigration, in the first years of the 20* century, was 
concentrated in the northern areas of Palestine near the sources of the Jordan 
River, Lake Tiberias and Beisan. In fact northern water bearing region was 
the choice of Jews to set up some of their first colonies in Palestine. Since 
then the Zionist movement has laid down care plans and exploited every 
opportunity to wrest effective control over the sources of water in the Holy 
land from its rightful owners. Later after the World War I and during the 
Paris peace conference, Zionist leaders made efforts to obtain favour for the 
extension of the northern border of Palestine to the point where it would 
embrace all the tributaries of the Jordan River as well as the territories 
bordering the Litani River (Feitelson, 1996: 18). Although they failed to 
incorporate most of these territories into the frontiers of Palestine, at that 
time, they were able to utilize their close relations with the British 
mandatory authorities to develop their water policy with two objectives in 
mind: 
• To obtain all such water concessions for projects, which they planned 
to exploit in the fiiture and 
• To thwart any Arab attempt in Palestine or Jordan exploit water 
resources that would affect their own future schemes in Palestine 
(Nimrod, 1966:26). 
They obtained the concessions from to mandatory authorities which 
show the practical implementation of the policy, which included, among 
other the following: 
(1) The Mandatory authorities granted the 70 year company in 1926 to 
exploit the water of the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers at the point of their 
confluence for generating electric power and placed restrictions, on the 
Emirate of Jordan barring it from making use of the Yarmuk River water for 
irrigating the Ghor areas with out prior permission from the company. 
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(2) Concessions granted to Jewish companies to exploit inland rivers in 
Palestine such as the Yarkon (Awja) River north of Jaffa-Tel Aviv and the 
Kishon (Muqatta) River north of Haifa. 
(3) The concession to drain and exploit Lake Huleh lands. The 
mandatory authorities and Zionist organizations joined together in 
pressuring the original Lebanese concessionaries to abandon the scheme and 
sell their right in 1934 to the Jews so that it could later be exploited to the 
advantage of the latter. 
This brief survey of the measures taken by world Zionism shows 
clearly the paramount importance the Zionists attached to this issue and 
underlines their methods of long-range planning to hold such resources in 
reserve for large-scale settlement schemes, to be exploited fully when the 
right opportunity arose. 
Severe problems cropped up in the aftermath of war as a large 
number of Jewish immigrants started to arrive in Palestine. The arrival of 
Jewish immigrants led to an increase in demand for water. In order to meet 
this growing demand various revised proposal for the utilization of Jordan 
River were put forth. In 1920 a survey was conducted for the utilization of 
Jordiin's water and its main branch Yarmuk for irrigation and electricity 
purposes by the British colonial government (Naff & Maston, 1985: 30). But 
due to increasing tension between the Arab and Jewish people no action 
could be taken by the mandatory Government (Georgine, 1956; 234). 
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3.7: THE VARIOUS PLAN 
Table No-3.3 
Development Schemes for Jordan River System 
Year 
1913 
1922 
1928 
1935 
1939 
1944 
1946 
1948 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1953 
1954 
1954 
1955 
1955 
1956 
1956 
1957 
1964 
Plan 
Franghia plan 
Mavromatis plan 
Henriques Report 
Palestine Land Development 
Company 
lonides Survey 
Lowdermilk plan 
Survey of Palestine 
Hays-Savage plan 
MacDonald Report 
All Israel Plan 
Hunger plan 
Main plan 
Israeli seven-year plan 
Cotton plan 
Arab plan 
Baker-Harza plan 
Unified (Johnston) plan 
Israeli Ten-Year plan 
Israeli National Water plan 
Greater Yarmuk project 
(East Ghor Canal) 
Jordan Headwaters Diversion 
Sponsor 
Ottoman Empire 
Great Britain 
Great Britain 
World Zionist Organization 
Transjordan 
Transjordan 
U.S.A 
Anglo-American committee of 
Inquiry 
World Zionist Organization 
Jordan 
Israel 
Jordan/U.S.A. 
UNRWA 
Israel 
Israel 
Arab League Technical 
committee 
Jordan 
U.S.A. 
Israel 
Israel 
Jordan 
Arab League 
Sources: Abtel Majid Farid & Hussein Sirriyh, 1985:15 
Two years later in 1922 Mavromatis plan proposed an elaborate 
scheme to irrigate the areas of Huleh and drain the marshes. Two dams were 
visualized for generating electric power and the construction of a canal on 
both banks of the Jordan. However, like the earlier plan the Movromatis 
Plan also could not be implemented. A subsequent plan known as the 
Henrique plan (1928) which proposed irrigating the Yarmuk triangle was 
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also not approved. As Jewish immigration to Palestine increased rapidly in 
1930's, the issue became more complicated (Naff & Maston, 1985: 44). 
In 1939 MG. lonides, Director of Development in the transjordan 
government, for the first time submitted a report on the water resources of 
transjordan and their development, and irrigable land in the Jordan Valley. It 
supported the Arab claim that the region's water resources were inadequate 
to sustain a Jewish state. lonides suggested conservation measures in the 
side Wadis to improve existing irrigation schemes. The report recommended 
the construction of an irrigation canal on the eastern part of the Jordan 
valley. It was to use the water of Yarmuk. In the Jordan valley lonides Plan 
was the first hydrographic survey. For the flood waters of Yarmuk the report 
proposed Lake Tiberias as a storage reservoir (Georgina, 1956: 227-283). It 
also suggested the use of Jordan waters in the Jordan's own drainage basin. 
3.7.1: THE LOWDERMILK PLAN 
The Lowdermilk plan published in 1944 visualized the irrigation of 
the £irid lands in the Jordan Valley and the utilization of the channel for 
development of hydroelectric power. This could be accomplished through 
the diversion of the waters of the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers. The plan also 
envisioned the development of hundred million kilowatt hours of 
hydroelectric facilities annually (Lowdermilk, 1944: 170-175). The low 
dermilk plan rein forced the Jewish argument that proper water management 
would generate resources for four million Jewish refuges in addition to the 
nearly 1.8 million Arabs and Jews who were already residing in Palestine. 
To justify this high estimate of water resources, Lowdermilk included the 
high estimate of water resources, Lowdermilk included the Litani River in 
his regional management scheme for a Jordan Valley Authority patterned on 
the Tennessee Valley Authority. He proposed use of Jordan and Litani 
waters to irrigate the Negev desert, a camel connecting the Mediterranean 
and the Great Rift Valley to replenish the Dead Sea and generate power, 
diversion of the Yarmuk River into Lake Tiberias, and gravity flow canals 
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down the slopes of the Jordan valley for irrigation (Cooley, 1983: 2-3; 
Stauffer, 1984: 12-13). 
3.7.2: THE HAYS-SAVAGE PLAN 
The Hays-Savage plan of 1948 was prepared by two American 
engineers at the request of the world Zionist organization to provide the 
engineering details for implementation of the Lowdermilk Plan. 
The Palestinian Royal commission survey of 1946 and the British 
Colonial Survey of 1945-46 were more in line with the Arab estimates. The 
British were highly skeptical of the possibility for the cooperation between 
Arabs and Jews which was deemed necessary for the creation of the Jordan 
Valley Authority (Lowdermilk, 1944: 180-197). 
The Arab-Israeli War of 1948, however, changed the parameters of 
the debate on Palestine and the UN partition proposal of 1947 ignored the 
water problem. Once the state of Israel came into expense, the Israeli moved 
to imiplement the development of water resources with noticeable speed. The 
comprehensive All Israel plan was completed in 1951. It included the 
draining of the Huleh swamp, the diversion of the Jordan River, and the 
construction of a carrier system. Subsequently consolidation into the 
National Water Carrier, this plan was to become the keystone of Israel's 
water development, diverting the Jordan water to the coastal plains and the 
Negev Desert. The plans define objective was to increase Israel's total water 
production from 810 million cubic meter of water to 1730 million cubic 
meter by 1960. Of this 340 million cubic meter were to come by diverting 
the Jordan River water from Jisr Bount Yaqub in the North to the Negev 
lands in the (Georgina, 1956: 246). 
3.7.3: THE MACDONALD PLAN 
The McDoanld Report was submitted by the Jordanian Government 
with the help of British firm in 1951. It was prepared by Sir MaDonald, It 
aimed at providing perennial irrigation for the 19.048ha (188,200dunams) 
on the east of the Jordan from the Yarmuk to Wadi Zerka. The main aim of 
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this plan was the construction of a diversion canal which would flow over 
the Jordan's plain in the eastern side (MacDonald, 1951: 1-34). 
By the early 1950, both the Jordanian government and the United 
National Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
(UNRWA) tried to improve the irrigation schemes of Jordan and resettle the 
Palestinian refugees. In 1951 Jordanian government submitted a 
commissioned study from British consultant sir Murdoch Macdonald which 
proposed diverting the Yarmuk into Lake Tiberias and constructing 
irrigation canal down both side of the Jordan valley. The McDonald plan has 
crystallized a basic issue in the conflict relating to use of the Jordan waters; 
whether or not these should be used within the water shed or outside of it 
(MacDonald, 1951: 1-34). The McDonald report made apparent the 
conflicting positions on out-of-basin transfers held by Israel and the Jordan. 
In the McDonald plan, all water developed would remain in the Jordan 
valley (David, 1990: 537). 
3.7.4: THE HUNGER PLAN 
In 1952, the Bunger plan was submitted by United States engineer. 
Mills E. Bunger. He visualized a dam on the Yarmuk at Maqarin dam with 
storage capacity of 480 million cubic meters, 65 million cubic meter of 
which would be used to irrigate land in Syria and surplus of this would be 
used in Jordan (Ghobashy, 1961: 14). A new proposal was also included in 
which a canal to lead from the dam on the south bank of the Yarmuk to 
Adasiya, where a diversion dam would conduct water directly from the 
Yarmuk river and Maqarin southward into the East Ghor canal and almost to 
the Dead Sea (Bunger, 1953: 317). Both the United States Technical 
Cooperation Administration in Jordan and UNRWA evinced great interests 
in the project. 
At this point however, political difficulties came into existence. 
Spokesmen for Israel in Washington and at United Nation point out that 
unilateral development of the Yarmuk would diminish the chances for any 
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JORDAN RIVER BASIN (WATER BALANCE AND USE) 
Source : Adapted from the Johnston Plan 
regional development of the Yarmuk River system (UNRWA, 85: 11). They 
claimed that Israel as the lower riparian state on the Yarmuk, had a right to 
use these waters As a result of these Israeli representations, work over the 
Yarmuk scheme was delayed. 
3.7.5: THE JOHNSTON PLAN (THE MAIN CLAP) 
On October 16, 1953 President Eisenhower appointed Eric Johnston 
as a special Ambassador to mediate a comprehensive plan for regional 
development of the Jordan River system. The plan known as the Unified 
Plan, based on the Marshall plan in Europe, sought to resolve the conflict by 
promoting cooperation and economic stability was prepared (David, 1990: 
578). 
The Unified Plan or base plan was prepared by Charles T. Main on 
the request of UNRWA and the US state Department and carried and under 
the supervision of the Tenaessce Valley Authority (Charles, 1953: 4-43). 
The technical features of the unified plan were as follow: 
• A Dam on the Hasbani to provide power and irrigation the Galilee 
area; 
• Dams on the Dan and Banias rivers to irrigate the Galilee; 
• Drainage of the Huleh swamps; 
• A Dam at Maqarin with 175 million cubic meter storage capacity to 
be used for power generation; 
• A Dam at Addassiyah to divert water to Lake Tiberias and into the 
East Ghor area; 
• A small Dam at the out let to Lake Tiberias to increase the Lake's 
storage capacity; 
• Gravity-flow canal down the east and west side of the Jordan Valley 
to irrigate the area between the Yarmuk and the Dead Sea; 
• Control works and canals to utilize perennial flow from the Wadis; 
(Doherty, 1965; Stevens, 1965; Saliba;Naff &Matson, 1984). 
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The main plan favoured primary in basin use of the Jordan water and 
ruled out integration of the Litani (Cooley, 1983: 2-3; Stauffer, 1984: 
12-13). 
It was calculated that the area of land that could be irrigated under the 
plan would be 44,534 ha of which 42,105 ha was in Israel, 49595 ha in 
Jordan and 3,036 ha in Syria. The quantity of water available for the 
irrigation purpose of these areas was estimated at 1305 million cubic meter 
per ye£ir, of which 879 million cubic meter of water would based for 
irrigation in Arab States, and 426 million cubic meters in Israel (Charles, 
1953:4-43). 
However the "base plan" of Johnston did face opposition both from 
Arabs and Israel. They, prepared alternative schemes keeping there interest 
and requirement. The Arabs responded to the main "base plan" with a 
scheme known as they Arab plan of 1954. It was prepared by an Arab 
Technical committee delegated by the Arab League. It reaffirmed the 
lonides, Macdonald and Bunger principle of exclusive in-base use of the 
water, rejected storage in Lake Tiberias, and integration of the Litani, 
Because 77 percent of the water of the Jordan water system originates in 
Arab countries, they objected to the quota allocations proposed in the Main 
plan. The Arab committee proposed that 132 million cubic meter of the total 
Jordan basin would go to Syria, 35 million cubic meter to Lebanon, 977 
million cubic meter to Jordan and 285 million cubic meter to Israel. The 
Arab plan recognized Lebanon as a riparian of the Jordan River system 
(Faridi& Hussein, 1985:15-19). 
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Table No-3.4: 
Water Allocations to Riparian states of Jordan River System 
Plan/source 
Main plan 
Arab plan 
Cotton plan 
Unified (Johnston )Plan 
Hasbani 
Banias 
Jordan (main stream) 
Yarmuk 
Side wadis 
Total Unified plan 
Lebanon 
Nil 
35 
450.7 
35 
35 
Syria 
45 
132 
30 
20 
22 
90 
132 
Jordan 
774 
698 
575 
100 
377 
243 
720 
Israel 
394 
182 
1290 
375* 
25 
— 
400* 
Total 
1213 
1047 
2345.7 
35 
20 
497* 
492 
243 
Sources: Abtel Majid Farid & Hussein Sirriyh, 1985: 15 
Note: the Cotton plan included the Litani as part of the Jordan River 
System. Different plans allocated different amounts in accordance with 
differing estimates of the resources of the system. One major variable in the 
reporting of the planned allocation is the amount of ground water included in 
the estimates. 
• According to the compromise "gardiner Formula" the share to Israel 
from the main stream of the Jordan was defined as the "residue" after the 
other co-riparian states had received their shares. This would vary from year 
to year, but was expected to average 375 million cubic meters. 
(In million cubic meters per year) 
3.7.6: THE COTTON PLAN 
Israel counter-proposal was elaborated in the plan prepared by the US 
engineer Joseph Cotton in 1959. The so-called cotton plan reflected Israel's 
litter indifference to Arab rights and its disdain of any proposal that did not 
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supply in full the needs of it expansionist settlement schemes. The combined 
annual Litani-Jordan water resources were estimated at 2345 million cubic 
meter cotton plan also recommended that no less than 1290 million cubic 
meters be allotted to Israel. The Arab share of 1,055 million cubic meters 
was to be divided by allocating 575 million cubic meters to Jordan, 450 
million cubic meters to Lebanon and 30 million cubic meters to Syria (Faridi 
& Hussein, 1985:15-19). 
It was evident that Israel was exaggerating its demands in order to 
pressure Johnston to allot it a greater share; this was what in fact happened. 
Johnston enhanced Israeli's share from the 394 million cubic meters allotted 
in his initial scheme to 525 million cubic meters. He again raised the quota 
to 565 million cubic meter in and 1955, that is, more than the 540 million 
cubic meters which Israel itself had adopted in its original seven year plan. 
On the other hand he reduced Jordan's shore from 774 million cubic meters 
to 720 million cubic meters. Despite Johnston's efforts to convince all sides 
of the merits of his proposals and despite the inducement of financial and for 
the schemes he proposed to the states concerned, he failed to obtain the 
agreement he sought for a joint scheme to exploit the waters of the Jordan 
valley (Faridi & Hussein, 1985: 25-29). 
3.7.7: THE BAKER-HARZA PLAN 
In 1955 the Baker-Harza plan for the Irrigation of the Jordan River 
basin was submitted to the Jordanian Government by two private American 
Engineering firms Michael Baker, Jr. of Rochester, Pennsylvania, who 
prepared a land and soil analysis, and the Harza Company of Chicago which 
made a study of the hydrological conditions during 1953 and 1954. The plan 
recommended utilization of the Yarmuk and Jordan River water to irrigate 
15, 3238 ha in the Jordan Ghor and to provide 167 million kw of power at 
total cost of $116,874,000. The main intention of the plan was increased 
agricultural production and futuristic betterment of the Valley. The plan 
gave 760 million cubic meter water for the development of Jordan, 605 
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million cubic meter of which was to come from the Yarmuk River and 
Wadis in Jordan. 155 million cubic meter water was to be diverted from the 
Lake Tiberias. The plan also proposed the irrigation features construction 
would cost $216 per dunams or $864 per acre, and operation, maintenance 
as well as replacement would cost $1.86 per dunums annually. The irrigation 
scheme would increase net farm income in the Jordan valley by an estimated 
average $674,000 per armum in the first 20 years. Thus, the ratio of annual 
increased income to annual costs showed that the project was justified 
economically (Naff & Maston, 1985: 40-41). 
Unified Plan: as negotiations progressed, disagreements were 
gradually reduced. Israel gave up on integration of the Litani, the Arabs 
removed there objection to out-of-basin use of waters. Lake Tiberius was 
rejected by the Arabs as reserves for Yarmuk River. An ahemative Arab 
proposal to treat Lake Tiberias, without diversion of the Yarmuk, as a 
regional storage center benefits all riparian was rejected by Israel. The Arab 
demanded and Israel opposed international supervision over with drawls. 
Allocation of water quotas was the most difficult issue. After 
extremely hard barging, the so-called "Gardiver formula" was adopted as the 
final version of the Unified Plan. The Unified Plan was accepted by the 
technical committee from both Israel and the Arab League. The Israel 
cabinet discussed the plan in July 1955 without taking rote (Don, 1955: 
409). In 1955 the US once again did not seek to revive Eric Johnston's 
Unified Plan as the Cotton Plan nor the Baker-Harza plan found acceptance 
by all the states party to settle the dispute. In July 1955 the plan was 
discussed by the Israeli Cabinet. The plan was approved by the Arab experts 
committee in September 1955 and was handed over for final approval to the 
Arab League Council. In October 1955, the Arab League decided not the 
ratify tiie plan because of its serious potential implications sent it back to the 
technical committee for fiirther consideration (Don, 1955:409). 
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Jordan had the following major issues to resolve: the exact amount of 
water each basin was to receive: 
The degree and type of neutral supervision needed for the 
implementation and the overseeing of the operating of the river system; 
Johnston, however, was very confident that these issues could be resolved. 
He submitted a revised version of the Unified Plan which called for the 
construction of a dam on the Upper Yarmuk River. The 300 million cubic 
meter of stored water would generate 150 million kwh of electric energy per 
year (Don, 1955:402-411). 
In October 1955, it was reported that the Arab technical experts had 
approved the Unified Plan as revised, which, in its final form very much 
resembled the Arab Plan. Under the revised plan, Lebanon was to receive 35 
million cubic meter of water from Hasbani, Syria 132 million cubic meter 
Jordan of water. As for Israel, except for the above withdrawals and 
deliveries, the water of the Jordan River would be available for Israel's 
unconditional use (Don, 1955: 409). 
The future to develop a multilateral approach to water management 
reinforced unilateral development. Though the Unified plan failed to be 
rectified, both Jordan and Israel ewder took to operate within their 
allocations. The two major projects under taken were the Israeli National 
Water Carrier and Jordan's east Ghor canal. The seven-year plan adopted for 
1953 was modified and a ten-year plan was introduced in its place. 
3.7.8: THE ISRAELI PLAN 
The Ten Year Plan of 1956 was sponsored by Israel. The main 
intention of this plan was to increase availability of water during a ten year 
period for its 3 million people. It was based on the Hays-Lowdermilk 
scheme, Israel's Ten Year Plan aimed at exploitation of 700 million cubic 
meters of waters of Jordan River by Israel through the diversion of Jordan 
River resources. It would give Israel 56 percent of the river basin's 
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discharge. The main feature of this plan was the diversion of 500 million 
cubic meters of upper Jordan and Tiberias waters out of the watershed to 
Negev in the south. Initially, Israel had planned to carryout this diversion 
through a canal Banat Yaccub, near Lake Huleh. This scheme, the Tiberias-
Negev project, consists of a 65 miles long conduit with intermediate 
reservoir and pumping and booster stations (Edward, 1964: 28). 
Israel kept its work on the various sector of this project a well hidden 
secret. This secrecy was maintained until October 1959, when the Jerusalem 
post published some details of the project and the work in progress. The 
Arab reaction was immediate and tension mounted in the early 1960 in the 
region. This unilateral action alarmed the Arab States and they decided to 
counter the Israeli attempts to divert the river waters. The Arab League 
Council met in February 1960 and decided that if Israel went ahead with its 
plan to divert the Jordan River waters, the Arab would go to ahead and 
divert its tributaries. 
The storm broke once again early in 1964 with the Israel 
announcement that the first stage of their scheme to convey the Jordan water 
to the Negev was near completion. In November 1960, the Technical 
Committee of the Arab League decided the following: 
• East Ghor canal would be completed and the Yarmuk water would 
also be stored in the river valley. 
• Diversion of the Baniyas River by canal for irrigation lands of Syria 
lying to the west, south of the river as far as the Yarmuk (Saliba, 
1968: 109). 
3.7.9: THE ARAB PLAN 
An Arab Summit meeting was held in Cairo in 1964 in order to 
coordinate a policy aimed at counteracting Israel's action of diverting the 
water of Jordan River for irrigation. The Jordan River's headwaters originate 
in Lebanon from the Wazzani and Hasbani rivers (Saliba, 1976: 23-25). 
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THE ARAB DIVERSION PLAN 
Source : Soffer, 1999 : 168 
Members of the Arab Summit, therefore, recommended that these waters be 
diverted to Jordan and Syria. The conference participants under took to 
finance the scheme and set up a high-level Arab military command to take 
all necessary measures to protect the project (Saliba, 1976: 23-25). 
After a second Summit Conference the Arab states finally decided to 
divert the sources of the Jordan River. This was to be done by the two 
storage dams on the main tributary of Jordan, the Yarmuk which originates 
in Syria. This would divert waters into Syria and Jordan, thus preventing 
Israel a lower riparian state, from receiving any of the Yarmuk waters 
(Saliba, 1968: 109-110). The Arabs started work on the Headwater 
Diversion in 1965. Israel declared that it would regard such diversion as an 
infringement of its sovereign right. In a series of military strikes, Israel hit 
the diversion work. The attacks culminated in April 1967 in air strikes deep 
inside Syria. The increase in water related Arab-Israeli hosfility was a major 
factor leading to the 1967 June was finally work on the project of diverting 
River Hasbani came to a hall. Israel succeeded in foiling the Arabs diversion 
plan and going total control over all the Arab water feeding the Jordan River 
and Lake Tiberias (Don, 1964: 293). 
The impact of Arab-Israeli politics on the Jordan River conflict 
reveals only in part of some of the reasons for Arab rejection of any 
cooperation with Israel in developing the Jordan waters. The waters of the 
Jordan are vital to Jordan, the West Bank, Israel and the areas in Syria and 
Lebanon where some of the rivers of the basin rise (Saliba, 1968: 23-24). 
Dividing these waters, estimated at about 1,500 million cubic meter per year 
and fluctuating from one year to the next, has been a nettlesome issue from 
the onset of Zionist colonization of Palestine. 
A major feature of Israeli water project was irrigation of the Negev 
and its articulated policy in the context of water. Yet Israel feels that water 
resources for it requirements are insufficient. The Jordan Negev water line 
constitutes the back bone of Israeli defense plans and thereby represents the 
83 
hydropolitical nature of Israeli water project (Saliba, 1968: 26). As the 
Israeli bureaucrats suggested, "the main controlling factors in the planning 
of the Israeli National Water Project are the dispersal of settlements 
throughout the length and breadth of the state for political and security 
reasons" (Israel Government Year Book, 1958:6). Israel persisted in the 
plans to irrigate the Negev by diverting the Jordan River out of the 
watershed area to the desert. This was the major feature of the National 
Water carrier Project. The first stage of this project was started almost 
immediately after the Armistice agreement of 1949 and it gave Israel a 
partial access to the headwaters of the Jordan (New York Times, 6th 
October, 1956). 
In September 1953, Syria brought the case to the United Nations 
Security Council and the seriousness of the matter was soon apparent to the 
world body. Consequently, the United Nation in cooperation with the United 
States decided that the unilateral plan of each party should be rejected, in 
favour of regional development of the Jordan River basin (Dulies, 1953: 
674-675). During the period of Eisenhower in 1953, Jordan River water 
development became an important aspect of US foreign policy in West Asia 
(Khoury, 1964: 20). The US presented a proposal to both the Arabs and 
Israel for the development of the Jordan basin. This proposal came to be 
known as the Unified Plan. In 1955 Eric Johnston special envoy of the US 
set out on his visit to West Asia to help the Arabs and Israelis achieve an 
understanding on sharing the waters of the Jordan. The Kingdom of Jordan 
was the first country Johnston visited between 25 to 30 August, 1955 
because he saw it as the key Arab country which stood to benefit most from 
the project (Reguer, 1955: 28). After several rounds of discussion the 
American finally managed to persuade the Jordanians to agree to the 
compromise plan. By the end of September 1955 the individual Arab League 
Technical Committee recommended it to the Arab League's political 
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Committee. After four days of deliberation the Arab League's political 
committee decided not to ratify the Unified Plan. 
The Arab rejection was basically a political decision and not a 
technical one. In Syria a new radical government had just come to office and 
it feared that the opposition groups would force it out of office if it showed 
the slightest softening of attitude toward Israel. Damascus, also, had little 
economic incentive to develop the Jordan Valley as it had access to the 
waters of Euphrates River. Egypt too, under Nasir, was not willing to give 
any concessions to Israel as this could be interpreted as weakness on the part 
of the Arab resolve to eradicate the Jewish State (Reguer, 1950-80: 66-69). 
3.8: THE NATIONAL WATER CARRIER 
With the Arab rejection of the Johnston plan a multilateral approach 
to Jordan water development and management thus failed. Meanwhile the 
Israeli Water Authorities, Tahal Engineers and Directors, Mekorot 
engineers, and special consultants acted together to plan and later execute 
the National Water Carrier Project. The project consists of a main conduit 
105 kilometers long, beginning at Eshed Kinrot on the north western shore 
of Lake Tiberias, where the water is lifted over 250 meters by pumping. The 
water then travels over 65 kilometer via canal and tunnel to the Izalmon 
pumping station and from there to the operational reservoir at Beit Netofa in 
the Lower Galilee and Menashe Hills. From there the water travels 80 
kilomieter via 108 inch diameter pipeline, also the coast, to interconnect with 
the entire smaller reservoir especially that of the Yarmuk, at Tel Aviv until it 
ends in the northern Negev (Reguer, 1991:65). The total amount of water to 
be diverted from the Jordan Yarmuk system, according to Israeli authorities 
will not exceed the amount of water allocated to Israel under the Unified 
Plan. 
Israel remained determined, with or without Arab cooperation, to 
divert part of the Jordan River waters for irrigation. Consequently in 1956 
the National Water Carrier project for irrigating the Negev was approved 
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and work began in 1958 (Kahhaleh, 1981: 30-31). In early 1958 the east 
Ghor Canal project was announced, and the United States-after satisfying 
herself that Jordan would tacitly adhere to the Johnston formula-granted the 
kingdom a $4 million grant through the agency for International 
Development to complete it. In the early 1960's the Technical Committee of 
the Arab league formalized a plan to build a dam on the Hasbani relaying its 
water to the Litani via a tunnel, and to divert the Baniyas southwards to the 
Yanriuk(Rizk, 1964:29-30). 
In 1964, the construction was finally started for a dam on the Yarmuk 
and for diversion of the headwaters of Jordan. After Israel started test 
pumping in May, a second Arab Summit Conference was called at 
Alexiindria in September 1964 at which it was decided to build a dam on the 
Yarmuk at Mukheiba to store water diverted from the Baniyas and Hasbani 
(Naff & Maston, 1984: 43). With the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli War of 
June 1967, work on the project of diverting River Hasbani and on 
implementing the proposed for irrigation came to a halt (Hoff, 1985: 35-39). 
3.9: THE 1967 WAR 
The 1967 War increased the trend towards competition unilateral 
utilization of the Jordan River system Israel improved its hydro strategic 
position through the occupation of the Golan Heights and the West Bank. The 
occupation of the Golan Heights made it impossible for the Arab states to 
divert the Jordan headwaters. The 1967 ceasefire line gave Israel control of 
half the length of the Yarmuk River compared to 10 kilometer before the war. 
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Table No-3.5: 
Water-Related Ceasefire Violations in Jordan River System from 
1951 To 1967 
Date 
Spring 
1951 
9/3/53 
12/12/55 
1/31/62 
11/13 64 
1/1/65 
Spring 
1965 
7/14/66 
8/15/66 
4/2/67 
4/7/67 
Incident 
Shooting in DMZ, both sides 
invade, Israel expols Arab 
villagers from DMZ, Isrel air 
force bombs al-Himmah 
Shooting in DMZ 
Israel hit Arab villages NE of 
L. Tiberias, lill 50 (follows 
by two days firefight on lake) 
Israel destroys Lower 
Tawafiq in DMZ 
Patrols, exchange of fire, 
bombing of Tell el-Qadi 
(source of Dan R) 
Fatah hits pump station (first 
in series of attacks on Israel) 
Patrols firing on Israel-Syria 
boder 
Israeli airforce bombs Syrian 
constriction vehicles, air 
battle at Banias 
Exchange of fire on Lake 
Tiberias 
Firefight in DMZ 
Israeli airforce bombs Golan, 
seen over Damascus 
Immediate Issue 
Arab resistance to 
Israeli land 
seizure, expulsion 
from DMZ 
Water diversion 
by Israel in DMZ 
Fishing rights 
Israeli drainage 
ditch in Arab 
Road building by 
Israel in disputed 
territory 
Israeli existence 
Road building by 
Syria in Golan 
Heights 
Alleged Syrian 
provocation 
Patrolling, fishing 
Arab water 
diversion 
Arab water 
diversion 
Underlyind 
issue 
Huleh 
drainage in 
DMZ 
Sovereignity 
over DMZ 
Israeli 
saboteurs 
captured 
(1954) inside 
Syria 
Use of land 
Sovereignty 
over source 
ofdan R. 
Palestinian 
self 
determination 
Arab water 
diversion 
Arab water 
diversion 
Land use in 
DMZ 
Arab water 
diversion 
Arab water 
diversion 
Resolution 
Security Council orders 
return of Arabs, but villages 
had been razed 
UN order work halt, US 
threatens to end aid, Israel 
moves intake out of DMZ 
Security Council condemns 
Israel, Syria says no to 
Johnston plan, prisoners 
return two months later 
Syria complains to MAC 
Israel boycotts 
Both parties complain to 
security Council, Soviets 
veto 
None 
None 
Security Council discusses, 
takes no action 
Syrian note to Security 
Council 
None 
MAC reconvened, no action 
Sources: Abtel Majid Farid & Hussein Sirriyh, 1985:18 
During the 1967 War, Israel captured the Golan Height from Syria. 
The Golan Heights, itself has little water resources to offer except the 
Baniyas river a small tributary of the Jordan. Israeli water strategy has been 
at the heart of its campaign to retain permanent control of the Golan, since it 
would assure protection of Israel's Lake Tiberias pumping works. More 
important, control of the Golan Heights enables Israel to preempt any Syria 
or multilateral Arab effort to divert the upper Jordan back to Arab territory 
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or to develop Yarmuk (Majeed, 1985: 54-55). In addition Israel has 
occupied the northern bank to the Yarmuk River boundary between Syria 
and Jordan, opposite the intake tunnels to Jordan's East Ghor Canal. Had 
Israel seized the Hasbani in 1967 it would have completed the job of 
securing the source of Jordan River. With the Dan River inside Israel proper, 
and the Baniyas captured in June 1967 by Israeli, only the Hasbani lay 
beyond Israel's grasp (Star, 1973: 289). 
3.10: THE JORDAN-SYRIA EFFORTS 
In the changed scenario, and early in 1972 the Jordanian government 
formed a committee composed of representatives from various related 
ministries and departments, to formulate a comprehensive three year plan for 
the rehgibilitation and development of the area. To coordinate and implement 
various schemes envisaged, a special law was passed early in 1973 setting 
up the Jordan Valley commission which was soon elevated to the Jordan 
Valley Authority (JVA) headed by a president of ministerial rank (Reguer, 
1991 :76). 
In 1987, Jordan and Syria decided on a project to share the run off 
waters of the Yarmuk River. The plan was initiated by Jordan for which the 
West bank was expected to provide funds from Israel. The Israel demand 
was to participate in the planning, construction and administration of the 
dam. Basically Israel wanted a share of any additional water that would 
come as a result of the project. Israel also wanted to prevent the Jordanians 
from doing any thing that would block off water to Israel (Rodan, 1995:2). 
3.11: THE WATER AND PEACE TALKS 
Water was a prominent factor at the West Asian Peace talks which 
began, in Madrid in 1991. In subsequent rounds of peace negotiation among 
different parties, held in Moscow, Vienna and Washington, little headway 
could be made over the problem of sharing water resources of the region. 
Syria and Lebanon were unwilling to discuss any issue relating to water until 
Israel withdrew from the occupied territories. As water is crucial to the 
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survival of the Jewish state, Israel needs to control the Yarkon-Taninim 
reservoirs which are located on the West Bank. If these sources are handed 
over to Palestine, it would sharply reduce the water availability in Israel and 
would make the latter dependent on the emerging Palestine entity (Dadwal 
Roy, 1996: 472). When negotiation began the Palestinians started claiming 
their right to water, and reallocation of supplies. The Israeli government was 
unwilling to give major concessions. While it agreed that the Palestinians 
could use little more water, it refused to give up over all control. The Israeli 
water commissioner was in favour of cooperative use of unused resources 
and the production of additional water by building desalination plant and 
coordination of effort to control water degradation problem. Israel stated, if a 
Palestinian state comes into existence, Israel must control the 2-6 kilometer 
wide hill ridge in the Anabta region since most of the source of ground water 
are found in the region (Beschomer, 1992-93: 23). 
In the Vienna round of muhilateral negotiations held in May 1992, 
the Jordanians, Palestinians and Israelis agreed to cooperate and exchange 
data on water resources. The Jordanian condition was such that, water 
utilization must be user-related and accord should seek to move from a 
position of disparity to equitable allocation of water (Beschomer, 1992-93: 
24). In May 1993 the third round of multilateral negotiation were held in 
Washington. A working group on water resources has met seven times, since 
then which was set up in Washington. In September 1995 an interim 
agreement was signed wherein, for the first time, the Palestinians were 
accorded a right to west Bank ground water. The accords also setup a joint 
Israeli-Palestinian committee to manage water affairs in West Bank (Rodam, 
1995:2-3). 
The absence of Syria and Lebanon from the talks has effectively 
limited the number of areas of potential cooperation and thwarted hopes that 
full ajid all encompassing cooperation among the riparian state of the Jordan 
basin would be developed. In addition, the varying concerns of the regional 
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participants and their differing expectation of this process have burdened the 
discussion and impeded greater break through. In particular, much of the 
discussion, especially in the early rounds, flounced over the inclusion of 
water ri£;hts as an agenda item. Israel has sought to separate the technical 
and political aspects of the water issue, regarding the primary object of this 
working group as to focus solely on technical issue and joint water 
management, with the aim of increasing the overall supply of water within 
region. The formulation of solution to the problems of water supply, in the 
Israeli view, requires the development of a range of functional and technical 
links between regional experts and officials. The construction of these links 
should not be impeded by the discussion of water rights and shares which, 
for Israel, is essentially political issue and therefore should be confined to 
the bilateral negofiations (Prters, 1996: 17). 
Some progress has been achieved despite fundamental differences, 
essentially because the Israeli position on the appropriate for a for the 
discussion of water rights has prevailed. The water working group has 
confined its activities to developing strategies for managing and increasing 
the supply of water in the region, and has concentrated its efforts an 
identifying the appropriate methods to supply adequate water to growing 
population at an affordable cost? To this end, the parties have focused upon 
four broad themes, adopted at the first plenary meeting in Vienna, as the 
starting points for discussion and potential cooperation; 
• enhancement of data availability 
• water management and conservation; 
• enhancement of water supply; and 
Concepts of regional cooperation and management. 
In the course of these talks, the parties have become increasingly the 
aware of need to translate their deliberation into identifiable achievements 
and move towards the implementation of specific projects (Prters, 1996:18). 
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The disputes relates to the sharing of the surface water of the Jordan 
River basin between Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the Palestinians of 
the West Bank. In addition on the already complicated issues in any 
transboundary water dispute, these disputes also involve extremely complex 
political and territorial issues. The history of these disputes involves, not 
surprisingly, both armed conflict and peaceful negotiation (Lowi, 1993: 
193). 
At the end of World War I, the League of Nations entrusted Great 
Britain with the Mandate for Palestine, which was comprised of the areas 
now referred to as the West Bank, Gaza, Israel and Jordan (United Nation, 
1917-1988:48). 
After the creation of the state, the Israeli government began the 
elaboration of a national water plan, along the lines of schemes drawn up 
during the Mandate. The Israeli plan was development towns and 
agricultural settlements were built. Over 250 of the new settlements which 
were established within five years of Israel's independence and promote a 
closely interlocked rural and urban economy, industry and services were 
brought into previously unpopulated areas (Feitelson, 1996: 18). 
Ifhe effect of Arab-Israeli politics on the Jordan River dispute 
explains only in part some of the reasons for Arab rejection of any 
cooperation with Israel in developing the Jordan waters. Equally important 
is the role Played by inter-Arab politics and rivalries and the relation of the 
Arab refiigees to the problem (Saliba, 1968: 78). So water had now gained a 
securitj^  dimension. Having acquired and ideological, demographic, and 
economic significance, the water question had now become a strategic issue-
a matter of national security and foreign policy. The failure of several 
proposals concerning the regional water-sharing arrangements in this period 
confirms the fact that water was involved in foreign policy considerations of 
both Arabs and Israelis (Dolatyar, 1995: 35-43). 
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The political, social and economic, impact of the Arab refugees on 
the Arab host countries which could result from Arab acceptance of the 
Unified Plan. One of the implications of an Arab acceptance of the Unified 
Plan would be the implied Arab acquiescence to the fact that the Arab 
refugees are to be settled in the Arab host countries instead of being 
repatriated to their homeland (Don, 1958: 24). 
It was reported that the Arab technical experts had approved the 
Unified Plan as revised, which, in its final from very much resembled the 
Arab Plan under the revised Plan, Lebanon was to receive 35 million cubic 
meter of water from Hasbani, Syria 132 million cubic meter Jordan of water 
(Don, 1955: 409). 
ITie fact that the engineers on both side of the conflict agreed that the 
Unified Plan was the most economical and efficient plan ever to be proposed 
for the Jordan, and the fact that these engineers agreed on the amount of 
water to be allocated to each of the riparian states, amounted to an assertion 
by the United states that the Unified Plan was also the most equitable 
(Saliba, 1968: 87). 
In northern Israel, the National Water Project was linked to 
development and settlement plans in the Huleh swamps, reclaimed by Israel 
in 1951. According to the Syrian view, Israel was not allowed to foster any 
major changes in these areas. Tensions between the two countries 
exacerbated as Israel kept insisting on her right to engage in agriculture in 
the entire Hulh area (Yaniv, 1987b: 163). 
Table No-3.6 
Water allocations according to Johnston's Unified Plan of 1955 
Country 
Israel 
Jordan 
Syria 
Upper Jordan River 
375* 
100 
35 
Yarmuk River 
25 
377* 
~ 
Total 
400 
477 
35 
Source: Libscewski, 1997 
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* According to the "Gardiner Formula" Israel's share of the main 
stream of the Jordan River and Jordan's share of the Yarmuk were defined 
as the "residue" after the other co-riparian states had received their fixed 
share. This would vary from year to year, but was expected to average 375 
million cubic meter of Israel and 377 for Jordan. Jordan would also get 243 
million cubic meter from side Wadis in the lower Jordan valley which were 
not shared resources in the proper sense at the time, since Jordan itself was 
the sole and last riparian on that track of the river. 
Graph - 3.3: Water Allocations According to Johnston's 
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The Johnston Plan was the first attempt at drawing up a development 
Plan for all of the Jordan River basin. Israel, Jordan and Lebanon approved 
of it, but Syria did not, which in turn hindered Jordan and Lebanon from 
endorsing it. Neither did the Arab League come out in favour of the 
American proposal. Although the Johnston Plan was never fully 
implemented, owing to political disagreements the proposed allocafion has 
served as a guideline for the affected states and, in fact, many of the 
principles stipulated in the Plan have been followed by Israel as well as the 
Arab states (Anderson, 1988: 10). 
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After the establishment of the Jewish state, Israel asserted state 
ownership of all natural resources under its control. This legislation 
abolished de facto ownership and control by landowners or villagers over 
local wells (Feitelson, 1996: 18) in order to provide the legal framework for 
the operation of a national water system and there by over come the extreme 
imbalances in water availability across the country. It central artery, the 
National Water Carrier, completed in 1964, brought water from the north 
and central regions, through a network of giant pipes, aqueducts, open 
canals, reservoirs, tunnels, dams and pumping stations, to the country's 
urban centers and to the agricultural settlements as far as the Negev Desert. 
To the Arabs, Israel's National Water Carrier became a symbol of 
aggressive expansionism, to which they responded with their own diversion 
plans (Cooley, 1984: 14-18). This Israeli overreaction to the water issue led 
Arabs to presume that they had found the Achilles heel of their enemy. The 
first military action of the Palestinian National Liberation Movement 
targeted the Israeli National Water Carrier (Zarour & Isaac, 1993: 41). The 
project, decided in 1964, was part of a broader anti-Israeli campaign which 
had been provoked by Israel's announcement that the beginning of pumping 
into the National Water Carrier was imminent. Technically difficult, with 
water to be pumped as high as 350 meters, and economically inefficient, the 
Arab Plan was clearly politically motivated. The diversion would have cut 
the installed capacity of the Israeli carrier by one third and increased the 
salinity of Lake Tiberias, thus collapsing Israel's water supply system (Wolf 
& Ross, 1992:937). 
Israeli leaders repeatedly warned the Arabs that the Jewish regarded 
the continuity of the water flow as a matter of vital interest, and the Israeli 
army and air force attacked the work sites of the project several time 
between 1965 and 1967 (Lowi, 1993:125). 
Israel's control of the West Bank was the most important new 
element introduced by the war of June 1967 into the Arab-Israel hydro-
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political equation. In the case of the Banias, Israel had already shown before 
the that it was capable of using military force to prevent neighbouring 
countries from constructing diversionary work to deprive it of water (Pearce, 
1991:21). 
Immediately after the end of the 1967 War, Israel destroyed 140 
Palestinian water pumps in the Jordan Valley and made it difficult to obtain 
permits for new wells. After this destruction, the Israeli army declared the 
area in the West Bank near the Jordan River a military-security zone and 
thus prevented many Palestinians to get to their farm land (OSLO, 
1995: 17). 
• The Israeli policy in the occupied Palestinian Territories consists of 
• Limiting Palestinian economic development through limiting the 
water available of Palestinians and 
• Closing all doors to a just and real peace with acceptable and 
implementable political solutions. These policies have left the 
Palestinians without hope. It has also forced them to leave their land 
and migrate to neighboring Arabic countries or work as cheap 
unskilled labour in Israel (OSLO, 1995: 1-4). 
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza strip have an intermittent 
water supply system, namely they get water in the system only twice a week 
only and then for only 2-3 hours. Water quality has been altered by such a 
water supply system. Based on Israeli military orders a Palestinian cannot 
build any type or size of water infrastructure without the written permission 
of Israeli authorities (OSLO, 1995:1-17). 
The issue boiled down to the question: who had the ultimate 
sovereignty over the West bank and the River Jordan? Jordan and Syria 
argued that the quotas in the Johnston plan were linked to 'specific 
destinations', that is, related to state sovereignty; while Israel maintained 
that it was she who now administered the western Jordan valley, and that by 
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virtue of the occupation and the Jewish settlements, Israel had a right to 
pursue claims on the Yarmuk and the West Bank waters, and the right to 
higher ^^ a^ter quotas because she now administered the Golan and the West 
Bank (Nijim, 1990:321). 
The Israeli authorities pointed to the inefficiency of the traditional 
forms of irrigation in the West Bank, suggested that the Palestinians could 
increase their agricultural production without using more water by adopting 
modem methods and argued that the Palestinians had no ground for 
complaint, since there was no increase in the volume of water allocated to 
agricultiare on the Israeli side either (Shapland, 1997: 23). 
The equalization of occupation with state sovereignty, as well as the 
historic use' argument Israel has claimed a right to be a party in, for 
example, the Jordanian water project of the Maqarein Dam as well as the 
irrigation plans for the Ghor (Nijim, 1990: 24). 
i^Vhat is perceived as a greater security threat to Israel is not the 
territorial claims of Palestinians on West Bank but the already over drawn 
water resources which could further worsen in case West Bank goes to 
Palestinian control. This explains the reason why Israel is not willing to 
reason why Israel is not willing to relinquish its suzerainty over West Bank. 
As a result, the Israeli could be denied access to the portion of water supply 
which it is till data dependent on, and intensive pumping of aquifers flow 
into Israel beyond the Green line (Lowi, 1999: 385). 
Jordanian Plans were also a danger to Israeli industries using bromine 
and potassium plants. These industries depended on Dead Sea minerals, but 
with Jordanian and Israeli exploitation of the River Jordan, the level of the 
Dead Sea has decreased, adversely affecting the industrial complex. Israeli 
and Jordanian development projects, the lower Jordan River has become a 
drainage ditch with very little water flowing into the Dead Sea (Reuger, 
1993: 79). 
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The Canal Project heightened Jordan's fears that pumping water from 
the Mediterranean to the Dead Sea would damage Jordanian agriculture, 
which is irrigated with water from the East Ghor Canal. So Jordanian and 
Israeli interests conflicted, highlighting their joint dependency on the, same 
water resources. 
King Hussein's hostile statements against Israel in 1990 were related 
to a Jordanian application to the World Bank for financial support for the 
Wahda Dam on the Upper Yarmuk River. The Dam would be of the utmost 
importance to the water supply in the Jordan Valley, which suffers severely 
from ck'onic water shortage. The policy of the World Bank, however, is not 
to grant such funding unless all riparian to a water project approve the plan. 
Israel feared that the Wahda Project would affect her ability to cope with 
increasing water needs, and thus refused to approve it, while Syria agreed 
(Starr, 1991: 23f). 
In the period 1983-85, agriculture amounted to 15.9 percent of Gaza's 
total GDP, a decrease from 28.8 percent in 1968-70 (Kahan, 1987: 14). 
Furthermore, Gaza's agriculture is based to a large extent upon citrus fiiiit, 
with a high demand for water (Kahan, 1987: 26). 
In the late 1970's and early 1980's efforts were made, once again, to 
reach a cooperative solution for developing water resources in the regions. 
This time, damming of Yarmuk River was objective. The Maquarin Dam 
project was planned as a Jordanian-Syrian irrigation and hydro-electric 
scheme based on joint exploration of Yarmuk waters for the benefit of both 
sides of the common border. The US government under the carter 
Administration immediately took an interest in the Maquarin Dam project. 
The US made condition to help Jordan with financial assistance for Dam, if 
Jordan, got approval of the Syria and Israel. Israel negotiated for larger 
allocation of Yarmuk water than what Jordan was prepared to offer. But 
Syria was not agreed on trilateral water sharing plan with Israel. Thus, 
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regional conflict hindered in resolving the international river basin disputes 
(Lowi, 1995: 131-132). 
The June 1967 Arab-Israeli war, caused in large measure by tension 
arising from the water crisis, put a Sudden and final end to the Arab 
League's diversion plan. In a period of six days the amount of territory 
controlled by the Jewish state tripled. The Golan Heights, the balance of 
Mandatory Palestine and the Sinai peninsula all the come under Israeli 
occupation with the seizure of Baniyas stream by Israel in 1967 the water 
crises itself lost much of its urgency (Leslie, 1970: 16). 
Two of these parties, Syria and Lebanon have been unwilling to date 
to participate in any multilateral or bilateral talks to address the possibility of 
peace let alone a joint management water project. In addition to these serious 
obstacles, there is no single agreement between all the riparian that covers 
the basin as a whole. 
In essence, the dispute concerns the amounts of water taken out of the 
basin by the riparian. Israel controls the vast majority of the waters of the 
Jordan River basin and utilizes the largest share. The other riparian also 
utilize water from the basin, but essentially complain that Israel's 
consumption is not equitable. In addition nearly all the parties are engaged 
in hydro-projects that have or will have impacts on the basin (McCaffrey, 
2002: 45). 
For example, Lebanon is currently diverting water fi"om the Jordan 
River basin via the Wazzani springs between Lebanon and Israel. Lebanon 
claims that it is entitled to continue pumping water from the springs under 
international law, and that the diversion supplies from the Wazzani springs 
adversely impacts Israel's water supply, and in 2002, Israeli prime Minister 
Ariel Sharon announced that the Lebanon's diversions represented a" cabus 
belli. Needless to say, tensions are high over these waters (McCaffrey, 
2002: 55). 
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In 1951, Syria and Lebanon considered a scheme to divert the flow of 
the Hasbani and Banyas tributaries to the Litani in the Beqa'a Valley of 
Lebanon. In the early 1950's, both the Jordanian Government and the U.N. 
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
(UNWRA) began working on separate irrigation schemes to improve 
Jordanian agriculture and to resettle the Palestinian refugees (Rouger, 2000: 
111-112). 
Table No-3.7 
Jordan and Yarmuk River distribution before and after the Israel-
Jordanian peace Treaty of 1994 (in million cubic meters) 
Jordan River 
Johnston Plan 1955 
Early 1990 (defacto) 
After the Peace 
Treaty 
Israel 
375 
550 
550 
Jordan 
100 
0 
+10 
+20 
(+40) 
Source/Effective Data 
Pesalinatedsprings (Lake Tiberias) / 
immediate 
Dam on Lower Jordan/Long term 
From Lower Jordan, brackish/long term, 
insecure 
Yarmuk River 
Johnston 
Plan 1955 
Early 1990 
(defacto) 
After the 
Peace Treaty 
Israel 
25 
70 
25-70** 
Jordan 
377 
130 
130 
+20 
(+25) 
(+50) 
Source/Effective Data 
Existent 
Lake Tiberias(exchange)/immediate 
Byexistingfacilities/immediate,amount,insecure 
From Planned Dam/ longterm, amount insecure 
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Additional Sources 
After the Peace 
Treaty 
Israel 
Not referred to 
Jordan 
+50 
Source/Effective Data 
Sources to be yet 
defined/very long, highly 
insecure 
Sources: Libszewski, 1997: 80 
** As long as the planned Jordanian dam on the Yarmuk is not 
realized, Israel will presumable be able to catch more than the allocated 25 
million cubic meter per year, and may be even approach current 70 million 
cubic meters. 
In 1952, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
(UNRWA) requested that the Tennessee valley Authority, through the 
United States Development of state, prepare a regional plan for the 
development of the Jordan Valley. The Tennessee Valley Authority hired 
the Boston firm of Charles T. Main to prepare a desk study and to synthesize 
the essential features of the unilateral plans previously proposed for the 
Jordan system. The result was the so-called "Unified plan" to develop the 
Jordan Valley (UNRWA, 1953: 1-2). 
The Israelis and Prime Minister Moshe Sharett in Particular, feet that 
the advantage to be gained by agreement on unified development of the 
Jordan would justify considerable sacrifices. Israel would be without fear of 
further Arab obstructionism. More important, resettlement of the Arab 
refugees would begin, presumably taking a great deal of heat out of Israel-
Arab relations. Some Israeli a agree with Johnston that a settlement of the 
Jordan River problem might well be the first big step towards a more general 
settlement (Schmidt, 1955:10). 
When the final U.N. case-fire was imposed just 6 days later, Israeli 
forces had captured all the territories which had constituted Palestine under 
the proposed partition plan, including the West Bank and East Jerusalem 
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from Jordan, the Gaza Strip and Sinai peninsula from Egypt, and the Golan 
Heights from Syria. All these lands were strategic for their natural water 
resources. Despite numerous U.N. resolutions, including Security Council 
Resolution 242, which emphasized the "inadmissibility of acquisition of 
territory by war (Security Council Resolution, 1967: 2). 
The Jordan River basin changed importance after the 1967, so did the 
interest of the parties when considering cooperation. As earlier, Israel is no 
longer interested in basin-wide accord, largely because such an agreement 
would impinge upon advantages it reaps as a result of its superior riparian 
position on the main trunk of the Jordan River, its sovereignty over Lake 
Tiberias- the natural reservoir within the river system and its control over the 
West Bank groundwater reserves (Lowi, 1995: 134-135). 
(F). WATER IN THE MADRID PEACE PROCESS 
The Madrid peace process started in 1991, for the first time 
recogni;5ed the water question and discussed the water issue in detail. The 
conference adopted bilateral and multilateral tracks to find ways for wider 
regional cooperation between Israel and its Arab neighbours. The conference 
established five working groups to discuss the various issues existed 
between Arab and Israel. Of these groups, Water Resources Working 
Groups is one (Wolf, 1995b: 12-20). This group has examined ways in 
which more water could be provided including its efficient use and 
management of surface water. The group deliberately left the question of 
water rights to the respective bilateral talks. The group has an achieved and 
unprecedented degree of cooperation among participating countries for the 
region and beyond. Valuable work has been done on a number of important 
maters, such as the development and conservation of water supplies, the 
reuse of water and sharing of data. The bilateral talks have reached different 
stages as for as water is concerned. Jordan and Israel have signed a fiiU 
fledge peace treaty that contains a detail arrangement of shared sources of 
water. The Israeli Palestinian Interim Agreement singed on 28 September 
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1995 postpones the question of Palestinian water rights to the final status 
negotiations (Soffar, 1999: 172-178). 
3.12: THE ISRAEL-JORDAN WATER PEACE TREATY, 26 
OCTOBER 1994 
The peace Treaty between Israel and Jordan signed on October 26, 
1994, aims at a "comprehensive and lasting settlement of all the water 
problems" between the two countries through mutual recognition of their 
rightful allocations" in the Jordan River, the Yarmuk River and groundwater 
in Wadi Araba, and cooperation in the development of existing the 
additional Water Resources. Details are stipulated in Annex II. In principle, 
the agreement maintains existing uses, with some qualifications with regard 
to Israel's extractions from the Yarmuk River (Edig, 2001: 145). In 
additional, the annex outlines a number of joint projects for the mobilization 
of additional waters of which Jordan shall be the main beneficiary. This 
includes are storage of 20 million cubic meters per year of Yarmuk water in 
Lake Tiberias in the winter for the Jordanian use in the summer; the transfer 
of or million cubic meters per year of desalinated water from Israel to 
Jordan; the extension of the diversion from the Yarmuk to the King 
Abdullah Canal; additional dams on the lower Jordan River system and 
other agreed locations; as well as Israel's provision of 50 million cubic 
meters per year of water of drinking water quality from yet to be identified 
sources. In addition, the agreement allows for additional Israeli pumping of 
up to 10 million cubic meters per year of ground water in Wadi Araba, 
subject to respective studies. The details of the implementation are to be 
determined by a Joint Water Committee (J WC). 
The agreement does not specify the exact amounts of waters that shall 
be supplied to Jordan. Jordanian government officials have argued that a 
total of 215 million cubic meters per year could be provided in the context of 
the treaty (GTZ, 1997: 2-8). The agreement also remains incomplete with 
regard to the technical and financial details of the various projects, such as 
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GEOPOLITICAL CIRCLES IN THE JORDAN 
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location, implementation schedules, and funding modalities (Edig, 2001: 
143). It also lacks provisions on drought management, so important in this 
region, as well as for conflict resolution (Allan, 2001: 219). At a more 
fundamental level, it does not contain provisions for the inclusion of other 
co-riparian (Haddadin, 2000: 279). 
Implementation proved to be slow and difficult. Still, over time, a 
number of the provisions of the agreement were implemented. The Joint 
Water Committee was set up in 1994 and started to meet regularly. In July 
1995, Jordan started to store winter flows in Lake Tiberian 20 million cubic 
meters per year. In May 1997, Israel agreed to provide additional 25-30 
million cubic meters per year, apparently as part of the 50 million cubic 
meters per year. To be identified water (Haddadin, 2000: 287). In December 
1999, the new diversion dam at Adassiya became operational (Haddadin 
2000: 282). Five years after signing of the treaty, Jordan received estimated 
additional 50-80 million cubic meters per year of water, less than 60 percent 
of its total water consumption, and not more than a third of the water it had 
originally hoped for, but something. Serious controversies surrounded 
financial issues, such as the 0 and M costs for the water transfer from Lake 
Tiberias or the financial of the desalination plants from which Jordan was to 
receive 10 million cubic meters per year of water (Kliot & Shumueli, 1998: 
221). 
The Jordanian kingdom reached a peace agreement when it was 
thirsty for water, especially drinking water in the large cities. A future 
concern for the Jordanians arises on account of the use of Yarmuk water by 
the Syrians in the Upper Yarmuk basin and the use of Jordan water by Israel. 
Even in the absence of drought this combination of circumstances is liable to 
desiccate the Jordanian kingdom. At present Jordan is trying to overcome 
the water shortage by pumping fossil groundwater in the eastern desert, an 
operation that cannot continue for long. In the summer of 1994 in the 
discussions between Israel and Jordan, Israel took into consideration the 
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gravity of the kingdom's situation and decided to transfer drinking water to 
Amman for humanitarian reasons (Gur, 1992: 1-2). 
From Jordanian perspective, the changes in the political scene in 
Israel, which brought Likud to power in 1996, affected its water relations 
with Israel (Mahadin,9 March 2002). The meeting became intermittent and 
less productive, although some studies were implemented on technical 
matters. However, the working relation between Israel and Jordan still 
functioned reasonably well (Alem, 10 March, 2002). Having noted the 
problematic aspects of the implementation process, it is also important to 
discuss the positive aspects. For example, the canal for storage of Yarmuk 
water from Jordan in Lake Tiberias was built quickly and was inaugurated 
by King Hussein at the beginning of July 1995. Apart from the problems of 
1999 v^ hen Israel did not want to supply Jordan with what was stipulated, 
there has been no problem in the transfer of water from Israel to Jordan 
(Allan, 2002: 176; Mahadin, 2002: 9-10) 
(G). CONCLUSION 
Historically, the Jordan River system has witnessed more severe 
international conflict over water than any other river system in the West 
Asia. While one can expect gradually increasing tension over the Euphrates 
and perhaps even the Nile, by far the most likely flashpoint for water 
conflict in the West Asia, today and in the near future, remains the Jordan. 
The fundamental reasons for this are two. There has been no significant 
reduction in the extremely high level of general international tension and 
hostility in the area- if any thing, probably the contrary. The water situation 
has progressively deteriorated as both Israel and Jordan are moving into full 
use and then into shortage conditions Slack in the system has almost 
disappeared, with the result that conflicts over water resources become 
increasingly zero-sum and exacerbated. 
History and experience in this water-scarce basin demonstrate that 
sustainable solutions to water problems, whether domestic or international. 
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always require cooperation, equitable sharing, and efficient utilization 
among involved parties. 
However, the complex environmental and hydrological issues cannot 
be resolved by political formulas negotiated by diplomats alone. The tasks of 
environmental rehabilitation and particularly of water resource development 
and efficient utilization require a considerable investment of capita. 
The case of the river Jordan is unique in words hydropolitis and 
geopolitics owing to the combination of a small quantity of water and a large 
number of partners among whom there exists a prolonged and very serious 
conflict. Failure to find a solution to this problem could be a cause of 
internal stability or under mind international agreements that have been 
achieved by the countries of the area. Hence there is an urgent need to 
enhance water supply in the region. There are many ways of increasing a 
countries water supply, a part from building more dams digging more wells 
or bring waters from other river basins. The increasing environmental aver 
ness in the region has highlighted the fact that since were can not change the 
ecological givens, it could not increase the water supply in real terms and in 
the long runs the cost of war would far exceed the possible return. Further 
more the historical background of water management policies in the region 
indicates that the indigenous inhabitant of the West Asia have always been 
aware that cooperation between riparian parties over there shared water 
resources is the only way to create a win situation in which all parties are 
better off The scarcity of water there fore thought it might cause periodic 
tensions does not encourage states of the region to employ violence to 
resolve the problem. Indeed there is considerable evidence indicating that 
hydrilopolitic in West Asia is a contest for cooperation in which the 
develo]3ment of common water resources will create a network of collective 
interest and a platform for a common perceptions that will finally breed 
more regional instigations and peace full coexistence. 
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(A). INTRODUCTION 
The next flash-point where water wars are claimed to be most likely 
is the Euphrates-Tigris basin. Being one of the vital water resources, in West 
Asia, Euphrates-Tigris constitutes a single transboundary water course 
system. The Euphrates-Tigris have entirely separate drainage basin, but 
because their last sector is united it is usual to discuss the two rivers as a 
single system. Historically the Euphrates-Tigris basin has been one of the 
centres of the oldest civilizations of the world. The civilization of this basin 
is generally known as Mesopotamian civilization (land between the two 
rivers). Several ancient civilizations in Mesopotamia were supported by 
irrigation from the Euphrates-Tigris basin. Thousands of year ago, water 
from these two great rivers helped to create the" fertile crescent" giving rise 
to the first civilization of West Asia. Throughout history water has been 
used to establish hegemony by the successive rulers in the course of waging 
strategic warfare against the rival power or enemy. Over the course of 
human history different factors have come together many times to produce a 
wide range of disputes over access to shared fresh water resources in 
Mesopotamia (Peter, 1998: 125-128). 
In Mesopotamia (Iraq) were those of the Sumerians, Akkadians, 
Babylonians and Assyrians. They organized an efficient hydraulic 
civilization which, at its peak supported some 20 million (Cressey, 1960: 
108-122). They were based on wise use of the river water, including control 
of the flood water and efficient irrigation practices. The control and 
appropriation of water resources has been the prevalent feature of water 
management policy in the basin from olden times-a feature which 
characterised then as hydraulic civilisation. These civilisations had the 
engineering skills necessary for an efficient water-management system; they 
had also the social and legal institutions required for maintaining the 
functionality of such a system. Hence, although water has sometimes been 
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used as a defensive barrier or a destructive weapon, water imperative 
conflicts have never occurred in this region (lonides, 1937: 147). 
The Euphrates is an international river that flows in Turkey, Syria 
and Iraq. The Tigris is an international river flowing though Turkey, Iran 
and Iraq and forming the border between Syria and Turkey and between 
Syria and Iraq for a short distance. The Euphrates-Tigris have almost 
completely separate basins which unity only in their last 190 km at the Shatt 
al-Arab; but as Iraq, Syria and Turkey share both rivers, it is customary to 
treat the two separate basins as one unit (lonides, 1937: 18-115). 
Of the three riparian in the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin-Turkey, 
Syria and Iraq-Turkey is in the most advantageous position. It has several 
relatively abundant rivers and enjoys the greatest waters endowment relative 
to demand. It is economically and militarily the most powerful state in the 
basin region and enjoys the status of being the upstream state. Both 
downstream states have extensive desert and semi-desert composing about 
one half the land area of Syria and two third of Iraq. The Euphrates accounts 
for the major source of surface water to Syria, the midstream riparian. As 
for Iraq, the furthest downstream, agriculture in all but the northern portion 
of the country is heavily dependent on water from both the Euphrates- Tigris 
River (Lowi, 1955:56-61). 
The water question emerged on the regional agenda when the three 
riparian initiated major development projects. It is only since the 1960s that 
Turkey and Syria have launched ambitions plans to develop the waters of 
the Euphrates-Tigris river system for energy and irrigation purposes. At the 
same time, Iraq too announced new schemes for an extension of its irrigated 
area. The uncoordinated nature of these supply by developments as well as 
inefficient and ineffective demand management parities with in the 
framework of national water policy and management by the co-riparian 
continue to be the principal causes of water imbalance in the Euphrates-
Tigris River Basin (Tekeli, 1990: 208). 
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The GAP or Southeast Anatolia Development Project is a massive 
water management scheme that involves dam building, diversion, and the 
extension of irrigated agriculture in the south eastern region of Turkey. 
Today, work on the project is well under way, and the planned withdrawal 
of 14 to 17 billion cubic meters of the total 32 billion cubic meters, promises 
much hardship downstream. Syria's ability to generate hydropower will be 
curtailed by the depleted water levels. Its ability to extend irrigation 
agriculture will be hampered by both the depleted water levels and the 
inferior quality of water that is introduced into the system (NewSport 19 
July, 1988: 5). Iraq will have to forfeit part of its intake from the Euphrates 
and settle for water of inferior quality as well. The country will no longer 
have the large volumes of fresh water with which to reclaim its already 
highly saline soil. Indeed, the key environmental effect of the GAP project 
is not so the reduced flow-a distributional issue-as most of the water will be 
introduced into the system but rather the inferior quality of that flow. 
Because much of the water released downstream will have akeady been 
used for irrigation, it will have a relatively high content salts and 
contaminants that will render it unusable for the growth of certain crops and 
will degrade the quality of soils along the river banks and surrounding areas 
(Lowi, 1995: 75-80). 
This chapter is largely devoted to discussions of the origins and the 
evolution of water disputes in the Euphrates-Tigris basin. The chapter 
incorporates recent developments and prospects for cooperation in the 
Euphrates-Tigris river basin. It will analyse the limitations and shortcomings 
of existing water allocation mechanism. The chapter will also examined 
merits of the principle of equitable utilization and the "needs-based 
approach" regarding the water sharing. 
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(B). HYDROLOGICAL FEATURES OF THE EUPHRATES -TIGRIS 
RIVERS BASIN 
The Euphrates-Tigris basins drains an area of around 90,0000 square 
kilometres. From its headwaters to the sea, the Euphrates traverses a 
distance of 2700 kilometre, covering an area of 444000 square kilometre 
which includes surface tributaries, Wadis, and areas of purely subsurface 
recharge. Its twin, the Tigris, has a total length of 1900 kilometre and 
embraces an overall area of 470,000 square kilometres though its effective 
catchments area is estimated to be between 217843 and 373000 square 
kilometre (Grolier, 1993; Hillel, 1994: 92). 
The Euphrates-Tigris, rise in the mountains of eastern Turkey, the 
Euphrates flows through Syria to Iraq before emptying into the Gulf The 
Tigris flows to Iraq and joins with Euphrates in Iraq before reaching the 
Gulf to Shatt al-Arab. Until the end of the World War I these river were 
under the control of Ottoman Empire, and little international importance was 
attached to the river basin. 
The Euphrates consists of two tributaries, the Karasu and Murat 
Rivers both originating in Armenian mountains of eastern turkey. The 
Karasu, which rises close to the city of Erzurum, and the Murat, rising close 
to Mt. Ararat. The river flows through the Anti-Taurus Mountains before 
exciting into the Jezra plain in Syria (Soffer, 1999: 75). In this stretch the 
Euphrates is joined by two major tributaries, the Balikh and the Khabur near 
the town of Raqqah and Dayraz Zawr, From there to the Gulf no water is 
added to the river. The Euphrates and its tributaries drain an enormous area 
in, of which 28 percent lies in Turkey, 17 percent in Syria, 40 percent in Iraq 
and 15 percent in Saudi Arabia. Approximately 88 percent of the mean 
annual flow is generated within Turkey and almost all of the reaming 12 
percent within Syria (Hillel, 1994: 92). Table indicates the three riparian 
countries contribution and demands respectively. Except in years of 
exceptional rainfall, Iraq's contribution to the water of the Euphrates is 
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virtually nil. The Euphrates is joined by the Tigris just above Basro near the 
town of Quma only 100 kilometre from the head of the Gulf to form the 
Shatt al-Arab water way. In Iraq, the Euphrates 'receives no further 
discharge from any source (Hardan, 1993: 76). 
The Euphrates drains an enormous basin. Besides its two wings in 
Turkey, the Karasu 21,500 square kilometer and the Murat Suyu 39,700 
square kilometer, whose confluence at Keban forms the Euphrates, it drains 
an area of 96,000 square kilometer between Keban and Jarablus, the place 
were it enters Syria. From Jarablus to Anah, where it enters Iraq, it drains 
229,000 square kilometer, and from Anah to the point where it enters the 
Gulf, it drains 444,000 square kilometer. The area from which the Euphrates 
is fed is confined to the mountains in the north, which consist of 82,330 
square kilometer only, i.e. some 20 percent of the total area of the basin. 80 
percent of the area is made up of steppe and desert (Al-Furat, 1965, Vol.2: 
947). 
The mountainous Mediterranean climate zone-climate determines the 
flow regime of the River. Temperatures in the mountains frequently fall 
bellow 0"C during the winter and the Euphrates is largely fed by 
precipitation falling over the uplands of Eastern Turkey, where the annual 
total precipitation often exceeds 1,000 mm. As most of this precipitation 
occurs during the winter months as snow, it tends to be locked up as snow 
and ice, but with rising temperatures in spring and early summer, the snow 
fields melt. The rainy season starts in October and ends in April (Beaumont, 
1978: 35). 
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The Tigris River also rises in the mountains of southeast Turkey from 
Lake Hazer. It forms the border between Turkey and Syria for distance of 40 
kilometres and border between Turkey and Iraq 7 kilometres, as it flows 
directly into Iraq. The Tigris flow parallel to the Zagros Mountains and 
collects many tributaries on the way, which drop down into it 
perpendicularly from the hills. In Iraq Tigris river joined by few tributaries 
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viz Botan, Batmansu, Karpansu and the Greater Zab rivers emerging from 
turkey, the lesser Zab, the Adhaim and the Diyala, which originate in Iran, 
and finally Uzayam whose source is in Iraq's northern mountains. Close to 
where the Shatt al-Arab empties into the Sea it is joined by its largest 
tributary, the Karun emerging from Iran. The Tigris receives virtually 50 
percent of the water in Iraq the tributaries, which join the Tigris in Iraq add a 
significant amount of water to the Tigris below Baghdad. As a result, Iraqis 
supply of water from the Tigris is much less vulnerable to developments 
upstream than is its supply from the Euphrates. Iraq also has an opportunity 
to obtain water from Tigris. Iraq has the Physical means to do so, having 
constructed canals linking the two rivers. However like the Euphrates the 
volume of the Tigris also varies greatly from year to year and season to 
season. This may limit Iraq's opportunities for substituting waters from the 
Tigris for that of the Euphrates, or vice-versa, when the flow in one river is 
low (Dolatyar & Gray 1999: 119-122). The following table explains the 
water potential of the Tigris basin and consumptions targets of the riparian 
countries. The Tigris drains an area of 470,000 square kilometres, of which 
12 percent lies in turkey, 0.2 percent in Syria, 54 percent in Iraq, and the rest 
in Iran (Hillel, 1994:92). 
Rainfall in the plain is characterized by a low average precipitation, 
of 150-200 mm per annum which occurs mainly in the November- April 
winter season. The rainfall is not reliable in any part of the plains, and the 
records show large fluctuations from year to year. Summer in this region is 
intensely hot, with day shade temperatures frequently reaching a maximum 
of 45*^ C in July and August and from 30'^ C to 35°C in the Al-Jazira sub 
region. Throughout the entire basin, the winter season (December, January 
and February) is the most humid, with over half of the annual precipitation 
in the valley falling during these months, while the summer season is very 
dry and brings little precipitation. The average annual temperature in Turkey 
is \fC, in Syria 20°C, and in Iraq 23"C (McLachlan, 1976: 41). 
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Turkey is the richest country in West Asia in terms of both ground 
and surface water resources. According to data obtained from Turkish 
sources average annual precipitation in Turkey is 50 billion cubic meters but 
owing to excessive in filtration, transpiration and evaporation, only 186.05 
billion cubic meter ends up as surface runoff. Considering percent 
technological, topographical, and geological constraints, an estimated 95 
billion cubic meter per year of Turkey's surface water runoff plus an 
additional 11.6 billion cubic meter of ground water can be used. So far, how 
ever only 40 billion cubic meters of these resources have been armually 
appropriated by turkey (Tomanbay, 1993: 53). 
Table No-4.1 
Annual surface water and withdrawal in the Euphrates-Tigris basin 
Annual river flow 
Turke 
y 
Syria 
Iraq 
Intern 
a flow 
(bcm) 
196 
7.6 
34 
In 
flow 
(bcm 
) 
7 
27.9 
66 
Out 
flow 
(bcm) 
69 
30 
n.a. 
Annual withdrawal 
Total 
(bcm) 
15.6 
3.34 
42.8 
Per 
capit 
a 
(cm) 
317 
449 
4575 
%of 
total 
water 
resources 
8 
9 
43 
Sources: World Resources Institute, 1990: 33 
In contrast to Turkey's relative water abundance, more that half of 
Syrian and almost two-third of Iraqi territories is desert, with less than 250 
mm of rainfall per year, which is the minimum amount needed for rainfed 
agriculture. Although Syria has other water resources, the Euphrates is the 
only major river crossing its territory with reliable annual flow. 
Accordingly, Syria depends heavily on the Euphrates, whose waters account 
for as much as 86 percent of the water available to the country (Lowi, 1995: 
45). 
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In the case of Iraq, except for its mountainous north, which enjoys a 
milder climate and considerable rainfall, the climate is characterized by hot 
summers and cool winter. In the Mesopotamian plain itself, that annual 
rainfall is meagre and the summer norths are exceedingly hot and dry 
median temperatures approach 50 degree Celsius. Consequently the 
evaporative rate is very high, and agricultural production is totally reliant 
upon irrigation (Hillel, 1994: 97; Lowi, 1995). Although Iraq, like Syria, is 
heavily reliant upon the Euphrates water, it is fortunate in having an 
alternate's source of water in the Tigris River, whose headwaters are slightly 
tapped (Starr, 1991: 30; Gleick, 1994: 12). 
The Tigris discharge is greater than that of the Euphrates. The 
headwaters of both the Euphrates-Tigris generate a water supply of around 
40 biUion cubic meters annually. Both the rivers provide Iraq with around 
50 billion cubic meter annually be fore uniting into the Shatt al Arab at 
Quma, with the Euphrates providing 57.5 percent of the flow and the Tigris 
with 42.5 percent. The average annual discharge of the Tigris near Baghdad 
is 39.5 billion cubic meter (1240 million cubic meters per second), while the 
average annual discharge of the Euphrates near 26 billion cubic meter (710 
million cubic meter per second). 
The total discharge of the Euphrates is currently between 30 and 32 
billion cubic meter (Bakour & Kolar, 1994: 128-129), but it changes from 
year to year. The Tigris also varies is its discharge from year to year. The 
averag;e armual figure at Akut is 31 billion cubic meter. It is difficult to 
determine the average annual discharge of the two rivers together because of 
the large annual variation. However, the average is about 74-81 billion cubic 
meters (Beaument, 1988: 364). Such variation makes it difficult to 
determine a fair division of the rivers water among these riparian. Another 
difficulty in such a decision is that in the Tigris and Euphrates basins, unlike 
basin, the discharge of water has not been satisfactorily measured and the 
behaviours of the rivers and their tributaries is not yet entirely clear. The 
113 
many dawns on the two rivers make it difficult to calculate the amount of 
water available in each state (lonides, 1973: 147). 
Table No-4.2 
Population in millions: 1996,2010, 2030 estimates 
Country 
Turkey 
Syria 
Iraq 
1996 
62.48 
15.61 
21.42 
2010 
76.57 
23.33 
34.55 
2030 
85.56 
28.93 
46.26 
Sources: The World Almanac and Book of fact, 1997, Mahrab, New 
Jersey: World Almanc book, pp. 838-839. 
Future Population pressure in the Basin States 
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Population growth is one of the primary factors putting the utmost pressure 
upon the availability of water for the co-riparian states. The largest 
population increase in the West Asian countries has been observed since 
1985 (UNDP, 2002:38). According to various estimates, the region's total 
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population may reach 390 million in 2010, and 475 million in 2030 (World 
Bank, 2000: 38-44; Laipson, 2002: 177). 
The total population of the Euphrates-Tigris basin countries is around 
115 million, 19 million of which live in Syria, almost 26 million in Iraq and 
more than 70 million in Turkey (UNESCO, 2006: 133-135; Turkish 
Statistical Institute, 2008: 2). The rates of population growth are 2.3%, 2.9% 
and 2.2% in Syria, Iraq and Turkey respectively while the world average is 
around 1.3%. The population growth in the riparian countries increases the 
pressure on the carrying capacity. Therefore, access to sufficient water by 
those countries becomes more important each day as the agricultural areas 
open to irrigation need to be enlarged to nourish the increasing number of 
people. When coupled with other political and socio-economic problems, the 
downstream states seek two ways to externalize these problems to the 
upstream states, leading to deterioration of the hydropolitical relations 
among them (Libiszewski, 1999: 27). 
(C). DISPUTES AND AGREEMENTS OVER THE EUPHRATES -
TIGRIS RIVERS BASIN 
4.1: EMERGING CONFLICTS OVER THE EUPHRATES-TIGRIS 
RIVERS 
The waters of the Euphrates-Tigers have been diverted by human 
action to irrigate agriculture land since ancient time. Centrally controlled 
irrigation was practice for the time of the Sumerian civilization over 4000 
years ago. However the system falls increasingly into disrepair during the 
later years of the Abbasid Caliphate, partly because of the declining 
effectiveness of the government and partially because of physical causes 
such as the silting up of the major canals. One of the wonders of 
Mesopotamian Civilizations is the Naharwan Canal, built in the six century 
BC. The Nanamrod Dam built on the Tigris blocked the natural flow of the 
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river and diverted the water into tiie canal (lonides, 1973: 147). During the 
same period regulatory and divergence dams were built on the Diyala and 
the Adhaim. 
The Mangol invasion of 12, 58 virtually destroyed the irrigation 
system in Mesopotamia. Rival effect to rehabilitate irrigation system in the 
Mesopotamia plans began only in the 20* century, with the construction of 
the Hindia Dam on the Euphrates in 1911-1914. After that Dam was also 
built on the Tigris to produce Hydropower and barrage constructed on the 
Euphrates at Ramadi to protect area further down stream from flooding 
(Shapland, 1997: 107). 
One of the most conspicuous structures of this civilization was 
the Natirawan Canal built during the sixth century AD. The Canal, which 
was 300 km in length and more than 30 m wide, drew water from the River 
Tigris near Samarra and transported it southeast to the lower plains of the 
River Diyalah where it was used for irrigation purposes. It was the ancient 
10 m high Nimrod Dam that moved waters to the Nahrawan Canal by 
closing off the old course of the Tigris and diverting the waters to it 
(lonides, 1937: 147); but there were also ancient barrages on the Adhaim 
and Diyalah. 
'^ fhe period of Ancient Mesopotamia was the last time that some from 
of integ;rated planning took place in the Tigris-Euphrates basin for the basin 
as a whole. Yet this did not constitute a problem, as the demand for Tigris-
Euphrates water was only local and did not create any difficulties for the 
various users. Although the Habbaniya and Abu-Dibbis Lakes were used for 
flood control purposes in Iraq for thousands of years, modem engineering 
work in Iraq only began with the construction of the Hindiya Barrage on the 
Euphrates during the years 1911-14 when embankments and levees were 
constructed on both sides of the river channels to prevent flooding. This 
system allows water to be transferred to secondary feeders and carried to the 
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fields all year round. Table-4.3 presents the patterns of utilization of waters 
in the Euphrates-Tigris system. The table presents simple water projects 
whose sole purpose is flood control and water diversion to the irrigation 
canals. It is not surprising that all the barrages, regulators and lakes in Table 
4.3 are located in Iraq. Iraq was the first country in the basin to begin 
utilizing the Tigris-Euphrates waters in modem times because of its 
traditional use, especially of the ancient Habbaiya and Abu-Dibbis Lake for 
thousand of years. The Iraqi system of water management reflects a 
combination of 'old and new' and the real and urgent need to prevent floods. 
It is also interesting to note that Iraq has accumulated a significant storage 
capacit)' in Habbaniya and Abu-Dibbis-a total of 46.0 billion cubic meters. 
Not all of it is available for irrigation, but some of it is, and Iraq uses this 
water extensively when there is not enough water m the Euphrates (lonides, 
1937: 18-115). 
In Turkey about 20 more dams are under construction or in planning 
on botli rivers. In Syria 10 more dams are under construction on the 
Euphrates and tributaries. In Iraq 9 more dams are under construction or in 
planning on both rivers. 
In 1984 the Iraqi Government was able to release water stored in the 
Lake Habbaniya reservoir to local farmers to offset the low level of the 
Euphrates (Hindley, 1989: 5). The same is true for the depression of 
Tharthiir which has become Lake Tharthar with a storage capacity of 30.0 
billion cubic meters. More than $300 million has been invested in the lake 
Tharthar project in order to turn this natural depression into an artificial is to 
alleviate water shortages within the Euphrates basin, to control flooding and 
to drain salts from the irrigated areas between the two rivers. But perhaps 
the greatest significance of the Tharthar link is that it connects the 
Euphrates- Tigris and makes them one river system (lonides, 1937:18-115). 
The Tharthar Lake and Samara Barrage have succeeded in preventing 
floods in Baghdad since 1958, but most of the aforementioned water control 
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projects have played a major role in providing irrigation water to a complex 
network of canals in central and lower Iraq, in areas already cultivated for 
thousands of years. Table 4.3 shows that most of the above single-purpose 
water control projects were completed by the 1950s and thus established 
Iraq's prior rights to the Euphrates-Tigris waters. The present system of 
barrages, regulators and Lakes reflects the continuity of the hydraulic 
Mesopotamian civilization and, more specifically, the continuity of the 
hydraulic Mesopotamian civilization and, more specifically, the continuity 
of Iraq's utilization of the Euphrates-Tigris waters of irrigation. A more 
modem project included in Table 4.3 is the Main Outfall Drain, which is a 
500km long drain whose task is to drain some 2 million ha of irrigation 
water and which empties into the Shatt al-Basrah (Peter, 1998: 121-125). 
The use of Euphrates-Tigris water in Iraqi territory from the start of 
the civilization the flourished there until today give Iraq historic rights over 
the water. In 1958, a canal was constructed to direct excess water from the 
Tigris to the Tharthar depression and prevents flooding in the low line area 
of Baghdad. Presently Iraq has many dams and lakes to store the water of 
the Euphrates-Tigris. 
l^ rom 1950 onward many water projects were founded on the Tigris 
and Euphrates. However there are no cooperation among the states and the 
project of the upstream states have upset the plans of the downstream states, 
which have been obliged to adjust accordingly. In fact some of the projects 
initiated by the down stream states in the mid 1980s were undertaken to 
solve problems of over use of the river water in its upper sections. A vicious 
circle was there by crated in which the damage caused was greater than 
advantages gained (Aranon, 1999: 84). 
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TabIe-4.3 
Water projects in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin (Technical Data) 
Project 
Barrages in Iraq 
Habbaniya Lake 
Abu Dibis lake 
and barrage 
Hindiya barrage 
Diyala barrage 
Kut barrage 
Lake Tharthar 
Ramadi barrage 
Sam£ira barrage 
Falluja barrage 
Dams 
Dokan Dam 
Darbandikhan 
Dam 
Kaban Dam 
River 
and 
Country 
Iraq 
E, Iraq 
E, Iraq 
Diyala 
Iraq 
T, Iraq 
T, Iraq 
E, Iraq 
T, Iraq 
E, Iraq 
Little 
Zab, Iraq 
Diyala 
Iraq 
E, Turkey 
Years of 
construction 
Natural 
depression 
Natural 
depression 
Barrage built 
in the 1950s 
1911-1914 
1927-1928 
1934-1943 
1950s 
1954 
1958 
1985 
1959 
1961 
1965-1935 
Storage 
Capacity 
(billion cubic 
meter) 
32 
14.4 
None 
None 
None 
30 
None 
None 
None 
0.63-0.75 
5 
30 
Sizes of 
Dam 
C166 
A 46 
B1968 
C70 
A 25 
B 817 
A 40 
B1400 
A 34 
B 227,0 
A 23 
B1650 
C1042 
A 33 
B685 
A 33 
B826 
— 
~ 
A 393 
B429 
A 6923 
B3598 
C262 
• • • 
Purposes 
Flood control, 
irrigation in the dry 
season 
Flood control, 
irrigation in the dry 
season, connected to 
Habbaniya Lake 
ft Raising water to feed 
the Hilla, Musaib, 
Elhosaniya, and Beni 
Hassen canal 
Diversion of water to 
irrigation canal 
Diversion of water to 
shatteljaref 
To prevent floods in 
Tigris transfer from 
Tigris to Euphrates 
(second stage) 
Flood control and 
direct water to 
habbaniya Lake 
Diversion of water to 
lake Tharthar 
Diversion of water to 
irrigation canals 
400MW hydropower, 
water storage, and 
irrigation 
Hydropower, flood 
control, and storage 
120 MW hydropower 
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Tabqa Dam 
Karakaya Dam 
Haditha 
(Kadisiya) 
Dam 
Eski Mosul 
(Saddam)Dam 
Al-Ba'ath Dam 
Ataturk Dam 
Batama Dam 
Tishrin Dam 
New Canals 
"Third" River 
"Fourth" River 
E, Syria 
E, turkey 
E, Iraq 
T, Iraq 
E, Syria 
E, Turkey 
Little Zab 
Iraq 
E, Syria 
E, T, Iraq 
E,Iraq 
1965-1973 
1976-1988 
1979-1990s 
1983 
1983-1986 
1983-1990 
1989 
Under 
construction 
1992 
1992 
12 
9.6 
17 
30 
0.9 
49 
1.3 
A 197 
B15088 
C247 
A 482 
C116 
"~~ 
A 154 
B11808 
A 49 
B2460 
A 577 
C2680 
A 689 
A 164 
B3280 
800 MW hydropower, 
irrigation 
1800 MW hydropower 
600 MW hydropower, 
storages, and irrigation 
750MW hydropower, 
storage, and irrigation 
81 MW hydropower, 
storage, and irrigation, 
improvement of fishing 
2400MW storage, and 
irrigation 
Hydropower and 
storage 
630 MW hydropower 
and control 
Drain marshes, 
irrigation, drainage 
Drain marshes, 
irrigation, drainage 
Sources: lonides, 1937; Cressey, 1960; Beaumount, 1978; Naff and Matson, 1984; 
Ockerman and Samano, 1985; Saleh, 1985; Kolars, 1986; Beaumont et al., 1988; 
Kolars, 1994; Middle East and North Africa, 1996; North, 1993. 
E-Euphrates 
T-Tigris 
A=heiglit (ft) B eq length (ft); C= size of Lake (square mile). 
Since the early 1960s there were attempts to faster dialogue and 
information exchange in the region through a series of technical water 
negotiations. One could observe that the riparian had adhered to stringent 
position, which hardly changes during the course of the negotiations in three 
decades time until the suspension of the negotiation in the early 1990s. Thus 
Iraq showed great anxiety toward the progress of the water development 
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projects in Turkey in Syria. Iraq, later, joint by Syria in the early 1990s kept 
insisting on concluding immediate water sharing agreements. Turkey as the 
new user had presented the exigency of its planned major an offered a joint 
study to find out the irrigations needs of the riparian before any basin wide 
allocation agreed in the river basin (Kibaroglu, 2000: 311-315). 
The three riparian entered the new face of there relationship over 
water upon the decision by Turkey to construct that Keban Dam of the 
Euphi'ates. The down stream riparian, particularly Iraq, insisted on 
guaranteed flows to be released by Turkey during the impounding of the 
Dam. The real problem emerged when the midstream and upstream country, 
Syria and Turkey respectively initiated projects for the developing the 
waters of the Euphrates in the 1960s (Helal, 1994: 3). 
Hence a first meeting was held in June 1964 with the participation of 
Turkish and Iraqi experts. The meeting started with dissent, but letter and 
the end of the negotiation Turkey agreed to all necessary steps to maintain a 
discharge of 350 cubic meters per second immediately downstream from 
the dam, provided that the natural flow of the river was adequate to supply 
the above discharge. During the meeting a Joint Technical Committee was 
proposed the established but due to disagreement among the riparian 
committee could not be found. In 1968 Syria started to build Tabqa Dam of 
the Euphrates with the Soviet assistance. Iraq, too had under taken the 
Gharraf Project between the lower reaches of the Euphrates-Tigris Rivers 
Tabqa and Keban Dam were completed in between 1973-75. The operation 
of both the Dams created crisis in the regions. Iraq accused Syria of 
reducing the rivers flow to intolerable levels, while Syria transferred blame 
to Turkey. The water brought Iraq and Syria to the brink of armed conflict 
(Naff & Matson, 1984: 42). In 1974 Iraq threatened to bomb the Keban 
Dam in Syria and massed troops along the Syrian border, alleging that dam 
had reduce the flow of water to Iraq. However a water war was averted 
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through the frantic efforts of Saudi Arabia and Soviet Union. An agreement 
was singed between Iraq and Syria. According to the agreement Syria will 
keep 40 percent of water and will allow 60 percent to pass through to Iraq 
(Bilen, 1994: 75). 
It should be noted that there are two distinct phases in the growth of 
water resources management in the basin. In the first phases from the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire 1918 to the 1960s, flood control was the 
main concern to riparian party particularly of Iraq. In the second phase from 
the 1960s until now, all riparian countries, especially Turkey, with the help 
of modem technology embarked on massive water development schemes 
including hydropower generation. It is in this second phase that the question 
of water is becoming a more explosive issue then that of oil. During the first 
phase there were no signs of water conflict noticed rather cooperative 
majors (Kliot, 1994: 136). 
The water resources began to change in the when, 1960s, both 
Turkey and Syria started to draw up plans from large scale exploitation of 
the Euphrates and to a lesser extend the Tigris. Iraq the major user of water 
in the basin perceived it as a emergence strategic challenge that both Syria 
and Turkey worked determined to raise there claim on there shares. A series 
of trilateral bilateral diplomatic discussion were held without reaching on 
any formal agreement. The failure of the party during these negotiations to 
reach a formal and comprehensive water allocations agreement impelled 
each countries to embark on its own development plans on the portion of 
the rivers in its territory (Gleick, 1994: 13). 
In the 1970s Turkey embarked on the rapid development of the east, 
with the south east Anatolia Project. Turkish government has many reasons 
for undertaking this projects which will use large quantities of water from 
the Euphrates-Tigris water. In the beginning of the 1970s Turkey dependent 
. heavily on imported oil for energy. The oil price shocked of that decades 
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added greatly import bill and course the government to place even greater 
phases on hydropower. The South East Anatolia Projects known as GAP 
was to increased hydroelectric production and to irrigate an additional two 
million hector of land. The projects areas include the watersheds of the 
lower Euphrates-Tigris River and the upper Mesopotamian plans. The water 
resources development programmed of GAP includes 13 groups of 
irrigations and energy projects, seven on which are in the Euphrates River 
and six on the Tigris. The project includes 22 dams 19 hydropower plants 
and irrigations networks on the Euphrates-Tigris river basins. The centre 
peace of the GAP is the Ataturk Dam. It is a huge pace of engineering by 
any standard and has storage capacity of 48.7 billion cubic meters-over four 
times the volume of Lake Asad (map) (Shapland, 1997: 111-114). 
Table no-4.4 
Potential water-use along the Euphrates (million cubic meters) 
Mean total discharge at Hit 
Turkey 
Evaporation from reservoir above Keban Dam 
Evaporation from reservoir above GAP project 
Potential water withdrawal for irrigation 
Syria 
Evaporation from reservoir above Tabqa Dam 
Potential water withdrawal for irrigation 
Iraq 
Water use (1960-1969) 
Evaporation from reservoir above Haditha Dam 
Total 
31,820 
476 (max.) 
606 (max.) 
3,500-7,000 
630 (max.) 
5,000-10,00 
17,213 
602 (max.) 
Min= 28,028 
Max= 36,538 
Sources: Beaumont, 1978: 41 
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Unlike the Keban and Karakaya Dams, the Ataturk dam is design to 
store Vk^ ater or large scale irrigations and for production of hydroelectric-27 
billion KWH with an installed capacity of 75000 MW for that reason it is 
regarded by Syria and Iraq as a more threatening project than its to 
predecessors on the Euphrates (Keban and Karakaya) (Kliot, 1994: 136). 
Before the construction of the Keban Dam Turkey use only 3 percent 
water only and, only three percent of the Euphrates water, and the first two 
dams of the GAP caused only miner water loss from the river. Infect these 
two dams simply regulated the fluctuation of Euphrates discharge. How 
ever the total water withdrawal for irrigation associated with the Euphrates 
portion of the GAP was projected in the master plan to amount to 10.5 
billion cubic meter billion. This rang alarm bells in both Syria and Iraq how 
relive heavily on the Euphrates river for drinking water, irrigation, 
industrial use, and hydroelectric, view any upstream development with 
concern (Kolars, 1994: 74-75). 
The implantation of the GAP and exaggerated production suggesting 
that Turkish water extraction would exceed 17 BC per year, as created 
anxiet>' in Syria and Iraq. It was clearly to the advantage of Syria and Iraq 
to reach agreements with Turkey that would grantee them a fix quantity of 
water each year or a fix percentage of available flow. However, adopting 
the legal doctoring of absolute sovereignty, Turkey was reluctant to give its 
resentfol neighbour and established easement with would affect it most 
important national development plan-GAP. Neither Turkey was ready to 
give Syria and Iraq a role in the GAP, nor were they likely to respond to 
Turkish call for regional coordination with any explicit agreement insuring 
that the management and sharing of rivers was equally in the hand of all the 
riparian involved (Kolars & Mitchell, 1991: 31). 
The Turks claim that since there was no international regulation 
which governs the rights of riparian states nor any specific treaty which 
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regulate the sharing or common exploitation of the Euphrates-Tigris, the 
status quo was in Turkey's favour. However Syria and Iraq insisted on there 
write to share the water of the rivers. There major argument was that 
intemiational president, if not enforce law, warrants that the management 
and sharing of international rivers be equally in the hands of all the riparian 
countries involved (Kolars, 1994: 88). Referring to there ancient "acquired 
rights, because they made the prior use of the water sources, Iraq claimed 
59 percent of the natural flow of the Euphrates at the Syrian Iraqi border 
and Syria claimed 40 percent of the flow at the Turkish Syrian border 
(Wakil, 1993: 64). 
Turkey's response was fourfold: 
• Adopting the legal doctrine of absolutes sovereignty Turkish sources 
argued that the Euphrates-Tigers both originate on Turkish soil and are 
Turkish rivers while they flow over Turkish territory, concluding that 
Turkey is not obliged to share its waters with it Arab neighbours 
• Turkey claimed the Euphrates-Tigris Rivers as Trans Boundary 
Rivers were as Syria and Iraq consider them to be international. 
• Third it maintained that Euphrates-Tigris Rivers must be considered 
together as a signal transboundary water course system. 
• Turkish officials declared that Turkey would agree to shared 
transboundary waters if they included the river Orontes as well as the Tigris 
rivers in short Turkey claimed and undisputed rights to use the water within 
its tenritories without the consent the other riparian in the same way that 
Arab states regard oil as a natural resources which is subject only to there 
sovereignty. The controversial argument brought up the question of the 
legal status of water and the legitimacy of drawing a parallel between the 
legal status of oil and water. Responding to this that Turkish attitude Syria 
adhered to doctrine of limited territorial sovereignty and called for a fair 
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sharing of the Euphrates-Tigris water. For its part Iraq held to the doctrine 
of absolute territorial integrity insisting on its ancient or prior rights of 
usage of water from the Euphrates-Tigris water (Chalabi & Majzoub, 1995: 
208). 
(D). IRRIGA TIONAND DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS 
In the period between the two world wars no conflict existed among 
the thi'ee countries over the use of the Euphrates water at that time. Turkey 
was engaged in one boundary dispute with Iraq over the Mosul province 
but, despite its seriousness, after there conflicts were resolved it did not 
affect the water issue (Abbas, 1984:172). 
Until the mid-1960s, the only country which made large-scale use of 
the waters of the Euphrates was Iraq. In Syria limited irrigation was 
practiced alongside the river, while in Turkey the waters of the Euphrates 
were used even less (Beaumont, 1978: 35). 
An important feature of the rivers system which had a favorable effect 
on agriculture is that the bed of the Euphrates, from north of Falluja south 
wards until the two rivers meet at Quma, is slightly higher than that of the 
Tigris. In modem time, as in the past, this difference of elevation has been 
utilized to build a network of gravity flow canals from West to East to 
irrigate large area of land (Qubain, 1960: 70). 
4.2: TURKEY 
Under the leadership of Kemal Ataturk, Turkey became the first state 
in West Asia to draw up a five- year development plan and, within a few 
years of the announcement of this initiative, Turkey embarked upon an 
economic experiment that was to be emulated in several countries following 
Second World War (Richards & Waterbury, 1990: 188). Since 1963, when 
the first five year development plan was launched, the economic 
development policy of Turkey has centered on state enterprise initiative and 
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imports substitution through industrialization. An agriculture and water 
development, however, have received relatively little attention, with the 
exception of power generation projects that were needed to provide energy 
for new industry. This emphasis on power generation has led to the 
development of a number of multipurpose water projects, particularly on the 
Euphrates River (Turkey 1958: 5). 
Throughout this period of economic development agriculture has 
remained the main source of employment despite the rapid growth of 
industiy averaging 11 percent per annum (Wilson, 1979: 95). Given the 
current average annual population growth rate of 2.2 percent and an 
increajie in per capita demand for food of around 1.2 percent per annum, 
Turkey needs to maintain an annual growth rate in food production of 
around 3.5 percent to meet the requirements of domestic demand (Bilen & 
Uskay, 1991:4-1). 
The high rate of growth in total population and the even higher rates 
of increase in urban population, together with changing household 
structures and social preferences, have led to an increased demand for water 
with the total water supplied for drinking and utility purposes increasing 
almost 2.5 times throughout Turkey. In 1980 the total amount reached about 
1.6 cubic kilometer per year, increased to 2.8 cubic kilometer annually by 
the end of 1985, and rose to 4.0 cubic kilometer by the end of 1990. 
With current available water resources it would be economically 
feasible to irrigate an estimated 8.5 million hectares with major and minor 
irrigation works and a further 16.8 million hectares using advanced 
technology. At present both groundwater and surface flow are used to 
irrigate 3.2 million hectares (Gulbahar, 1991: 531). By the beginning of the 
1990s, about 2.5 million hectares of irrigation infrastructure was developed 
in the public sector and an area of about 1.3 million hectares was provided 
with supplementary water by small scale, privately owned irrigation 
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schemes, making the total area under irrigation about 3.8 milUon hectares or 
45 percent of potential total (Bilen & Uskay, 1991: 4). 
A major response to the increasing food and fiber demand in Turkey 
has been the expansion of irrigated agriculture sponsored largely by 
government agencies. In contrast to other developing countries, Turkish 
agriculture has undergone a complete land reform program, in which more 
than 80 percent of the farmers in Turkey own and work small farms of less 
then 10 ha. of land (Morvaridi, 1990: 304). 
Because of the Mediterranean and semi-arid conditions, with a hot 
and diy summer, the critical growing period for most crops is during the 
months of June, July, and August and, during this period, most of the rivers 
carry base flow only. Water storage, therefore, is indispensable. At present 
141 dams are in operation and 57 dams are under construction making 
about 70 percent of major irrigation projects fed with water from reservoirs 
or lakes (Bilen & Uskay, 1991:4-2). 
The Turkish government, realizing the crucial importance of a 
sufficient energy supply for a sustained and balanced economic 
development, has given priority to the energy sector in its economic policies 
and adjustment particularly since 1980 (Bagis, 1989: 61). Turkey is steadily 
increasing its energy consumption, much of which must come fi-om 
hydrocarbon sources beyond its border. In order to balance the regional 
deficiencies 220 Gwh of energy was imported in 1990 and 917 Gwh of 
energy was exported in the same year. In the early 1970's, the high level of 
dependence on imported oil was a dominant factor in the pattern of energy 
consumption in Turkey (Bilen & Uskay, 1991: 4-7). Nearly 39 percent of 
the energy consumed in the nation in 1983 was derived firom imported 
petroleum and, when imports of coal and electricity are also considered, this 
makes for two- fifths of the all the energy used in Turkey originating fi-om 
foreign sources. Petroleum imports currently amount to some four billion 
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dollars per year, an amount the equals approximately one third of total 
impor1;s (Kolars, 1986: 53). 
The share of hydro-sources has increased substantially from 30 
percent at the beginning of 1970's to more than 40 percent of the total 
supply recently. In order to maintain this percentage, there needs to be an 
increase of about eight per cent annum (Kolars, 1986: 53). 
The country is water rich and receives about 509 billion cubic meter 
of precipitation annually, and 38 percent of this ends up as surface runoff, 
much of which into the USSR, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and the surrounding seas. 
Turkish estimates indicate that only a little over half of this surface runoff 
and a billion cubic meter of groundwater can technically be used for 
domestic, irrigation, and industrial purposes within Turkey. The actual 
consumption of surface water is 25.2 billion cubic meter per year indicating 
that only 26.5 percent of surface water development potential is consumed 
presently while the actual annual consumption of groundwater is 5.4 billion 
cubic meter (Bilen & Uskay, 1991: 13). 
Driven by its need for new sources of energy and because only 20 
percent of the hydropower potential has been developed so far, Turkey has 
turned to the hydroelectric potential of its many rivers, the greatest of which 
is the Euphrates. With this end in mind Turkey has undertaken a gigantic 
development project on the river (Kolars, 1990: 59). 
As expected, it seems that Turkey, as the upstream state, is the least 
dependent upon the Euphrates. Even with the development of the GAP 
project, the great bulk of Turkey's agricultural production will take place 
outsid(2 the Euphrates river system. Politically, however, the GAP is very 
important to the Turkish government, since, not only is southeast Anatolia 
Turkey's poorest region but it also contains the bulk of Turkey's Kurdish 
population, and has been the object of cross-border terrorist attacks by 
militant Kurds from Iraq and Syria. Turkey hopes that this difficult political 
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situation can be stabilized by improving the local standard of living and 
ending the support of the local population for Kurdish separatist movement 
(Briefing, 27 January, 1992, 7; Kolars, 1991a, 4). 
This Dam was built for Siberian conditions, where the melting of the 
snows provides a plentiful water supply, but it is not suited to the conditions 
prevalent in the Euphrates basin because the turbines are built too high, 
which means that a small drop in the water level put these turbines out of 
action (Briefing, 26 March, 1990: 18). 
The GAP abstraction from the Euphrates might represent from a 
thu-d to more than one half of the Euphrates "natural flow", but the lowest 
total amount of water used is estimated at about 10.4 billion cubic meter per 
annum, according to the GAP mater plan (Bagis, 1989: 52-70). This also 
assumes that no more than 1.1 million hectares will be irrigated it seems 
that these figures do not include evaporation from the reservoir, domestic 
usage and industrial use, so the total water utilization plus losses in Turkey 
could reach up to 14 billion cubic meter per annum. 
It is clear that the river development plan is vital to Turkey from 
many points of view. It, however, appears that the Turks themselves do not 
yet know what the total volume of water they will need is. The sizes of the 
agricultural area which will actually be irrigated as opposed to that plan is 
not yet know, nor is the required amount of water for each agricultural 
hectare. Which relates to the method used and crop rotation which has not 
yet been decided upon? It does not appear that Turkey will use more than 
14,5 billion cubic meters annually by 2025 on the basis of evaluation levels 
of water affected on irrigated land. These estimates range from 10.1 billion 
cubic meters to the unrealistic 16.9 billion cubic meter of pessimistic Iraqi 
scientists and journalists (Turan, 1993: 24). 
Turkey is petroleum poor but rich in rain fed agriculture and surplus 
water. If hopes to harness the Euphrates in order to generate electrical 
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energy and to profit from the export of irrigated crops grown with their 
waters. The total amount of precipitation that Turkey receives is 501 billion 
cubic meters per year, however only 186 billion cubic meters (37 percent) 
finds its way into the rivers. Of this amount, 95 billion cubic meters (51 
percent) is available as a potentially usable resource but currently, 25.6 
billion cubic meters (27 percent) of available water is being used. The 
Euphreites River contributes 17 percent of Turkey's river water potential 
(Turan, 1993:24). 
Turkey received 18.5 percent of its GNP from agriculture and the 
nation is, for all practical purposes, self-sufficient in food. Nevertheless, its 
government has undertaken a major regional development project the GAP, 
based upon the utilization of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. The GAP 
programmed is the most ambitious development ever undertaken in Turkey 
and it has profound implications for south-eastern Anatolia which has long 
been tlie least developed region within Turkey. The population growth of 
this region has remained higher then the national average despite the fact 
that emigration from the region continues. The area referred to as "south-
eastern Anatolia" takes up 9.5 percent of the total area of Turkey and 70 
percent of the economically active population in the region is employed in 
the agricultural sector (Kolars, 1991a: 4). 
In addition to growth in agricultural population, 7,561 megawatts of 
hydroelectric power generation capacity will also be created, of which 5,346 
megawatts will be on the Euphrates and 2,215 megawatts on the Tigris. In 
total, the GAP'S hydroelectric generating capacity will increase Turkey's 
present total generating capacity by 70 percent (NewSpot, 28 June 1990: 7). 
Turkey also sees a great opportunity for electricity exports and the Turkish 
government has been negotiating with four West Asian countries to export 
electricity (Parker, 1991: 17). 
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The Keban Dam and reservoir and the smaller projects upstream 
from the site were among the first developments to be completed on the 
Turkish Euphrates. The average annual runoff volume of the Euphrates at 
Keban is about 20,627 million cubic meters (GAP, 1990, Vol, 4: 30). 
Depletion of water though, evaporation will be about 985 million cubic 
meter per year when the 675 square kilometer reservoir is full. The irrigated 
area was about 35,000 hectares; in 1990, with 58,000 hectares, scheduled 
for about the year 2000. At that data, it is estimated that depletion of the 
river flow (Kolar, 1991a: 15). 
The Lower Euphrates project, which is the core of the GAP, is based 
upon the Ataturk Dam, 180 kilometer downstream from Karakaya, and its 
vast reservoir with a volume of 48,700 million cubic meters, and a surface 
area of 817 cubic kilometer. The average annual runoff volume of the 
Euphrates at Ataturk is about 26,781 million cubic meters (GAP, 1990, 
vol.4: 30). The Ataqturk reservoir when it is full may lose as much as 1,470 
million cubic meters annually to evaporation (Kolars, 1991a: 16). 
4.3: SYRIA 
Syria covers an area of 185,180 square kilometer, of which about 
nearly half is poor steppe or semi-arid land, with 30 percent agricultural 
land, and only a percent of the agricultural land is irrigated. Potential 
irrigable land is about 1.6 million hectares with greatest potential located in 
the Khabur, and the Euphrates projects (Mitchell, 1982: 4). Agriculture 
retains its position as the mainstay of the Syrian economy despite the 
existence of a traditionally strong trading sector and partially successful 
attempts at industrialization. 
Irrigation is the only strategy which can make agriculture secure in 
dry countries such as Syria. Yields from irrigated land can be five times 
those on rain fed tracts, and a secure water supply enables more flexibility 
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in cropping as well as enabling an effective high input and high output 
system of farming (Allan, 1987: 28). 
The irrigation area was estimated at about 280,000 hectares or one 
eighth of the land under cultivation. Most of the water was derived from 
river supplies while wells and springs made only a small contribution 
(United Nation 1949: 22). The 1950s and 1960s saw a considerable increase 
in irrigated farming with the greatest change during this period occurring 
along the Euphrates where the use of river pumps enabled large areas of 
land to be brought under irrigation (Manners & Nejad, 1985: 259). 
Since the mid 1980s, there has been a new expansion of irrigated land 
but, more than 30,000 hectares of old irrigated land were flooded in the 
reservoir area between 1973 and 1975, and some 4,000 hectares went out of 
production every year because of increasing salinity in the lower Euphrates 
valley (Meyer, 1987: 44). 
Syria suffers from a shortage of agricultural products, which forces 
the authorities to increase import of food products from foreign markets 
(Syria & Arabe, 1988, No-408: 1). This situation was caused by a sharp 
growth in population and it is predicted that the demand for food will 
increase by 3.1 percent annually, a figure that is higher than the annual rate 
of aclnal increase in food production which amounted in the past two 
decades to 2.8 per cent (Syria & Arabe, 1988, No-408: 2). 
Syria has the potential to feed its increasing population and even 
export basic food staples such as wheat the barley, but over the last thirty 
years, the picture in the agricultural sector, despite the bright prospects, has 
been one of stagnation. Some of the blame for this can be leveled at the 
adverse climatic conditions that have occurred from time to time, but the 
problem is also political (Mitchell, 1982: 22). 
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With population rising at a rate of well over three percent per year for 
several decades and with changes and improvements in domestic food 
consumption taking place, at the same time the need to increase food output 
has been inescapable. As a result policies to improve land, as well as the 
rureil infrastructure and rural institutions associated with agricultural 
production, have been basic elements in national policy and planning for 
almost three decades. An increase in production is immediately required to 
meet the national demand for grain which has resulted from the rapid rise in 
population (Allan, 1987a: 22). 
The storage capacity of the present water projects of the Euphrates 
River in Syria is about 13.8 billion cubic meters with the Tabqa Dam 
having a capacity of 11.6 billion cubic meter and all other dams having a 
total capacity of about 2.2 billion cubic meters. The Water Resources 
Ministry introduced a policy that aimed at setting up an extensive network 
of small to medium sized, low cost surface dams throughout the country. 
These dams collect rainwater during the winter, forming small lakes which 
water is drawn during the dry summer month. The surface dams vary in 
storage capacity from 700, 00 cubic meter of water to more then 25 million 
cubic meter and are mainly used to supply water for agricultural purposes, 
such as irrigating crops watering livestock and, to a lesser extent, as a 
supply of water for human use in same of the more isolated rural villages 
(The .\rab Economist, 1982: 20). 
Although, the Euphrates accounts for around 85 percent of the 
nation's surface water resources, in the 1960s probably less than one fifth of 
the country's irrigated area was located within its basin. Horizontal 
expansion is probably the one area of greatest potential for irrigation. The 
Euphrates and Khabur projects will carry cultivation into areas formerly too 
dry to be economically viable, but, combined with this; there is the effect of 
irrigation on vertical production expansion. Certain varieties of wheat yield 
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twice as much under irrigation as under rainfed conditions and cotton 
Yieldson irrigated land is 4.6 times higher than on rainfed land. Horizontal 
expansion together with vertical expansion, as the result of not only 
irrigation but also a variety of other factors, holds the key to Syrian future 
agricultural prosperity (Mitchell, 1982: 22). 
The Euphrates project has always had a high political profile for the 
Baathist regime. Not only is it the showcase of the Ba'ath development 
drive but, by having the dam-created lake named after him self. President 
Assad's personal prestige has been attached to it. Administratively, the 
project is overseen by the High committee for the Euphrates headed by the 
prime Minister. The Ministry of the Euphrates was specially created to 
carry out the project and was generously provided with the funds to attract 
the best personnel at exceptional salaries and at the expense of the 
traditional agricultural sector (Hinne, 1989: 236). 
Syria is the most dependent of the three states upon the waters of the 
Euphrates since it is the only major river with perennial flow crossing 
Syria's territory. In contrast to Turkey, Syria relies substantially on 
Euphrates water for drinking irrigation and industry because the Euphrates 
accounts for about 85 percent of nation's surface water resources (The 
Economist, 16-22 December, 1989: 56). 
The Euphrates once seemed to offer an answer to Syria's search for 
new farm land, additional sources of domestic water, and increased supplies 
of energy. There is simply too much good water in the Euphrates for Syria 
to ignore it or to turn to inferior alternatives. Syria still remains heavily 
dependent any available agricultural resources limited as it is the aridity of 
the country's interior but ambitions plans for irrigated agriculture which are 
dependent upon the waters-of Lake Assad have been severely curtailed. 
While the Euphrates is by far the largest perennial source of water in 
Syria, its use for both irrigation and power generation has failed to meet that 
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country's expectations although access to its water remains a prime concern 
of the government and people of Syria. 
In April, 1983 Baghdad and Damascus signed an accord where by 
Syria would take 42 percent of the Euphrates flow once it had left Turkey 
(MEED, 25 January, 1991). Turkey, under a protocol singed with Syria in 
1987, committed itself to giving 500 cubic meters per second to Syria (Brief 
2.9 July, 1990: 10). This amount is equal to 15.8 billion cubic meters per 
year, but according to Syria-Iraqi agreement, Syria's share of this water is 
about 6.6 billion cubic meters per year and the amount is only 300 million 
cubic meters per year as the total water needs for Syrian agriculture. This 
calculation does not take into account the Euphrates tributaries, (the Sajur, 
Balikh and the Khabur), which have a total additional discharge of about 2 
billion cubic meters per year. According to this calculation, the annual of 
water that Syria will have available from the Euphrates river and its 
tributaries will reach 8.6 billion cubic meter and so Syria's gross budget 
will not be in deficit for the foreseeable future (Kolars & Mitchell, 1991: 
212). 
Only 30 percent of the total area is agricultural land and only 15 
percent of this irrigated (MEI, 16 April, 1993: 16). Traditionally, Syria was 
a net agricultural exporter of wheat, barley and cotton. In 1963 the value of 
agricultural import was only 27 percent of the agricultural exports but, by 
1970, the food trade balance was in deficit and big wheat import accounted 
for the bulk of the deficit (Syria & Monde Arabs, no 408, 1988: 1). 
The Syrian government has pursued several major goals for the 
agricultural sector which are framed within the context of much broader 
national development goals such as sustained economic growth, increased 
national self- sufficiency, fiill employment and greater social equity and 
economic well being. The expansion of irrigated areas was to be part of the 
strategy to reduce dependence up rain-fed cultivation through the 
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development of the water of the Euphrates. The policies have come to be 
perceived by many as the panacea for Syria's agricultural problems 
(Manners & Nejad, 1985: 257). Excluding the Euphrates and its tributaries 
(the Sajur, the Balikh and the Khabur), approximately 119,000 hectares; are 
irrigated elsewhere in the country in the Orontes, the Yarmuk, the Queik 
and the Barada river valleys and several smaller streams. These sources are 
limited and, if used to total capacity, might provide another 175,000 
hectares, of irrigated land (Kolars, 1991a: 9). 
The first withdrawal of water in Syria downstream from the Turkish 
border is on the Syrian portion of the Sajur River which rises in Turkey and 
enters the Euphrates from the right bank. The annual discharge value of the 
Sajur is about 80 million cubic meter but the small Kayacik Dam and 
reseiToir which can store 46 million cubic meters in Turkey might further 
reduce stream flow as a resuh of the irrigation of about 13,700 hectares; at 
Gaziantep (Bagi, 1989:56). 
The Lake Assad reservoir has a storage capacity, when filled to a 
height of 40 meter of n 11600 miUion and a surface area of 625 square 
kilometer (Kolars, 199la: 16). An underground aqueduct leads from a 
pumping station on Lake Assad to the city of Allepo and carries about 80 
million cubic meters for domestic demand (Kolars & Mitchell, 1991: 110). 
Lake Assad will also serve five or six proposed irrigation districts and 
200,000 hectares, recently been proposed for irrigation for areas north and 
south of Aleppo with water for these fields being taken fi-om Lake Assad as 
well. Water utilization rates of about 12,500 cubic meters per hectare which 
are anticipated with about 6,750 cubic meters per hectare return flow are 
based on values computed for similar areas nearby. 
The Ba'ath Dam, whosR construction began in 1982 and was 
completed in 1986, was built with soviet assistance, 25 kilometer 
downstream from Tabqa (An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO, 19 March, 
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1984: 20). The storage capacity of the dam is 90 million cubic meters and 
the reservoir area 2.7 square kilometer (Al-Ba'ath, 21 June, 1988; Kolars & 
Mitchell, 1991:153). 
The original Syrian plans to irrigate 640,000 hectares, of land with 
water from the Euphrates River have been revised downward drastically. 
All of these downward revisions have been the result of unexpected 
problems relating to gypsiferous soils, which dissolve upon contact with 
water leaking from the new canals, thus disrupting the entire system as it is 
being put into place. Recent estimates by the Syrian government indicate 
that between 240,000 and 260,000 hectares, of land will be irrigated in the 
main valley when the projects are completed (Kolars & Mitchell, 1991: 
274). If one adds 153,700 hectares, of irrigation land planned for the Upper 
Khabur to this amount, the potential irrigation land from the Euphrates 
River and its tributaries will be about 411,000 hectares. The total Euphrates 
river water depletion after taking into account the return flow and the 
evaporation losses will amount to about 6.9 billion cubic meters per year 
(Kolars & Mitchell, 19912: 274-275). 
4.4: IRAQ 
The alluvial soils of the Mesopotamian plain in Iraq are primarily a 
product of man's activity during the last six thousand years. They cover 
more than a third of the country, and are characterized by low elevation, 
below 100 meters, and poor natural drainage. Large areas are subject to 
widespread seasonal flooding, and there are extensive marshlands, some of 
which dry up in the summer to become salty wastelands. Most of this plain 
has been covered to a depth of several feet with sediments brought in 
suspension by irrigation water thus the soils are not pedagogically 
developed in the usual sense (Clawson, 1971: 68-75). 
i:iie total area of Iraq is 43,750,000 hectares, of which 11,800,000 
hectares, is arable. Of this area 35, 00,00 hectares are irrigated and 
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3,350,000 are rain fed on average each year. The total area under cultivation 
rose from 3.2 million hectares in 1984 to 3.6 million hectares in 1985 is the 
irrigated land that is cultivated covers 1,560,000 hectares, and the cultivated 
land in the rained area is 1,300,000 hectares (Hussain, 1990: 238). 
Two types of agricultural activity predominate in Iraq, one dependent 
upon rainfall in the north and the other dependent upon irrigation in the 
south. The rain zone which is watered by rain is also divided into two sub 
zones: the mountain area which is located along both the Iraq- Turkish and 
Iraqi- Iranian border, and the steppe zone (Al-A'ni, 1977: 422). 
The best known agricultural product is the date, of which Iraq is one 
of the world's largest producers. Other crops include barley, wheat, linseed, 
lentils, and beans, as well as rice, sesame, maize, and millet while cotton 
production is hampered by soil salinity. Total agricultural production was 
13.9 million tones in 1985, compared with 13.1 million tons in 1984. The 
total area of both forest and pasture is 1,800,000 hectares (Fisher, 1989: 
466). 
A large land area, a small rural population and a generous 
endowment of water resources appears to offer the possibility of rapid and 
rewarding expansion in agriculture. Under proper resource management, 
Iraq could offer the greatest opportunities in the region for agricultural 
growth (Clawson, 1971: 52). The expansion of irrigation has contributed to 
serious drainage problems since the additional water, combined with 
shallow gradient of the terrain from above Baghdad to the gulf, has raised 
the water table and brought salts closer to the surface, affecting plant 
growth. Some observers believe that as much as 65 percent of irrigated 
areas have had salinity problems and that 20 to 30 percent of the irrigated 
land has been abandoned over the years because of it (Nyrop, 1979: 157, 
EIU, 1989-90: 21). In fact, however despite its high agricultural potential, 
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Iraq is not self sufficient in food production and almost 25 percent of all 
Iraqi imports were taken up by food in 1990 (Hussain, 1990: 237). 
Because of the ready availability of agricultural land, wasteful, 
'extensive' farming methods which give a low yield are common; thus only 
one sixtli of potentially cultivable territory and 3 percent of the country's 
total area is in use. There can be no doubt that the mounting costs of the war 
and the increased rural-urban migration caused by it were virtually the main 
reasons for the increased deterioration of the agricultural sector (Mofid, 
1990: 50). 
Agriculture retains its position as the mainstay of the Iraqi economy, 
despite the existence of a traditionally strong trading sector and partially 
successfol attempts at industrialization (Clawson, 1971: 52). 
Iraq claims it needs 13 billion cubic meters per year from the 
Euphrates for its agriculture. As we have seen, however, the estimates of 
water consumption range between 10.2 million cubic meters per year (with 
improvement in irrigation methods used today). 
Iraq's big advantages over Syria are that it can add better quality 
Tigris waters to the depleted Euphrates and the river's headwaters have not 
been subject to major impoundment by dams in the same way as the 
Euphrates. A scheme completed in 1988, allows water from Lake Tharthar, 
north of Baghdad, to flow by canal to the Euphrates (The Economist, 16-22 
December, 1989: 56). However, Abdul Satar Salman, the Iraqi Deputy 
Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation declared in an interview for the 
Kuwaiti paper Al-Kabs (1990), that the water in the Tharthar basin was 
saline and that irrigation from would cause an increase in salinity levels, 
which would impair soil fertility and possibly cause a decrease in 
agricultural cultivation in the Euphrates basin (Al-Kabs, 27 February 1990: 
18). 
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Iraq controls the downstream and estuary areas of the Euphrates 
River so it feels particularly concerned about any projects undertaken in 
Turkey and Syria which might affect the final water flow. It seems that Iraq 
is mainly concerned about the years of drought in the Euphrates basin when 
the water volume in the river is less than the average. In such a case Iraq 
will be the first country to be affected by such shortages. Furthermore, any 
long-range Iraqi planning must consider the drought that periodically affects 
the river system, approximately every four years, and must be prepared for a 
serious reduction in available water resources. The second critical period 
began in 1970 and ended in 1975, with the lowest flow being in 1973 when 
the annual flow fell to 62 percent of the annual average flow (Bagis, 1989: 
42). 
It is estimated that the amount of water Turkey will use in the fiiture 
will reach as high as 14-14.5 billion cubic meters per year and the annual 
amount of water utilized by Syria will reach 6.9-7.5 billion cubic meter. 
Combining the potential demands of Turkey and Syria we arrive at total 
ranging from 21 to 22 billion cubic meters per year. This amount will allow 
an annual amount of about 11 billion cubic meter of water to flow into Iraqi 
territon,^ , an amount almost matching the Iraqi demand for Euphrates water. 
Eventually, this quantity of water will reach Iraq only in the years when the 
water volume in the river goes beyond 32.5 billion cubic meters. The 
amount of water Iraq is capable of transferring from the Euphrates-Tigris 
through the Tharthar Canal reaches 7.3 billion cubic meters per year, 
therefore Iraq's water potential along the Euphrates River reaches 18 billion 
cubic meters a quantity of water which all would agree is enough to supply 
the water needs of Iraq in the river basin. However, it seems that Iraq feels 
confident about fiiture water availability since it reached an agreement in 
1980 with Jordan to contract a system to divert 160 million cubic meters per 
year of the Euphrates water to northern Jordan in order to aid Jordan to 
overcome its increasingly grave water deficit (EIU, 4th Quarter, 1980: 16). 
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Although in oil-rich Iraq agriculture accounts for less than 10 percent 
of the GNP in an economy which is dominated by the petroleum industry 
elaborate plans and efforts have been made to continue to manage the river 
(EIU, July 1980, 56). The main system providing water for irrigation are 
based on the Euphrates and the Tigris and officials in Baghdad share the 
belief that, once the waters of the Euphrates and the Tigris are fully utilized 
through dams and reservoirs, the area of cultivated land in Iraq will be 
almost doubled (Briefing, 15 January, 1990: 7). 
Iraq has a relatively small population, but has the largest number of 
inhabiUmts of the three riparian living within the Euphrates valley. Iraq also 
contained the greatest area of irrigated land within basin but faced the most 
severe agricultural and water related problems of the three riparian. Iraq's 
great and water resources appear to offer the possibility of rich agricultural 
development, and its hydrocarbon endowment seems to provide the 
financial resources for investment generally and for rapid industrialization 
(EIU, July 1980: 59). 
Iraq, being a lower Euphrates riparian country, is in a very vulnerable 
position vis-a-vis Turkey and Syria. In order to estimate the average 
"Natural" River flow, it is necessary to add the amounts of water diverted 
from the flow measured at several points below all major tributaries. A 
report from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, in 
which estimates of irrigation diversions in Turkey, Syria, and Iraq were 
made, estimated "natural" river flow as follows. The measured river records 
at Hit Iraq for the period 1937-1964 showed a total average of 29.24 billion 
cubic meter per year, net diversion in Turkey plus the "return flow" from 
irrigation was 1.49 billion cubic meters per year, and the net diversion in 
Syria of 2.96 billion cubic meters per year. According to this account, the 
total "natural" amount of Euphrates river flow at Hit should be 33.69 billion 
cubic meters per year (Clawson, 1971:205). 
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(E). GEOPOLITICS OF THE EUPHRA TES-TIGRIS RIVERS BASIN 
A deep study of the conflict between the states concerning the 
sharing of Euphrates river water teaches us that the subject of water cannot 
be isolated from broader geographical historical, political and economic 
issues. Thus is needed to understand the true importance of hydro-political 
on the background of the complex of relations between states. 
The examination of the relations among the riparian states shows the 
importance of four factors. These factors include the respective policies of 
the three states toward the amount of water to be drawn from the Euphrates-
Tigris river, the Kurdish question, the rivalry between the Iraqi and Syrian 
branches of the Ba'ath party, and Syria's history of animosity towards 
Turkey. 
Table No-4.5 
Shared Water Resource in the Euphrates River Basin 
Riparian 
countries 
Iraq 
Syria 
Turkey 
Annual 
River flow 
from other 
countries 
(mcm/year) 
66.0 
27.9 
7.0 
Annual 
River flow 
to other 
countries 
(mcm/year) 
0.0 
30 
69 
Total 
Water 
Resource 
(mcm/year) 
109.2 
53.2 
19.1 
% of total 
flow 
originating 
outside the 
boundary 
66 
79 
3.5 
Sources: The World Almanac and Book of fact, 1997, Mahrab, New 
Jersey: World Almanc book, pp. 892. 
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Graph 4.5: Shared Water Resource in the Euphrates River Basin 
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4.5: DISPUTES BETWEEN TURKEY AND SYRIA 
The sources of the difficulties in achieving a real improvement in 
relations between Turkey and Syria up to 1991 undoubtedly lies in the 
dichotomy of Turkey's membership of NATO and Syria's reliance on 
support from the former soviet union. In other words, the confrontation 
between East and West is reflected in the West Asia in general and in 
Turkish-Syrian relations in particular. Even though this tension has reduced 
by the world-wide softening of the Cold War, it has not completely 
disappeared. 
Relations between the two countries have not been cordial since 
1939. when France, then the mandatory power in Syria, handed the area 
around Alexandrite over to Turkey as a bribe to enter Second World War on 
the side of the allies. Turkey accepted, but then stayed neutral. Syria has 
never accepted this territorial loss and Syrian maps still show the territory as 
part of Syria. Damascus has never been able to hide the fact that it considers 
Turkish sovereignty over the Hatay as illegitimate (Bolukbasi, 1990: 27). 
Ali Mustafa, the Syrian consul general in Istanbul, argued, in 1985, that 
Syrian maps still included Hatay region within Syrian borders because " 
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Syria does not accept the present frontiers which were drawn up in Hatay 
tlirough a referendum, because that referendum was conducted following an 
agreement between Turkey and France. In addition to this, the consul 
declared that Syria's hostility was at least partly due to Turkey's GAP 
project, aiid the construction of the giant Ataturk Dam that would harai 
Syrian interests. He added that the controversy concerning the sharing of the 
Euphrates waters should be solved according to the rules of international law 
governing the joint use of rivers and other waterways (Bolukbasi, 1990: 27). 
Until the late 1970s diplomatic relations remained "correct", yet both sides 
knew that the state of affairs could best be described as "peaceful 
coexistence". Perhaps because of this background Syria has been willing to 
permit anti-Ankara Kurds and leftist opposition groups to use its territory as 
a base for operations, and Ankara has sometimes angrily admonished 
Damascus on the issue (MEI, 16 February, 1990: 13; Balukbasi, 1990: 3). 
The subject of Syria's helping Turkish opposition groups during the 1970s 
by arming them and sending them and sending them back secretly into 
Turkey has aroused the most severe displeasure in the Turkish 
administration. Evidence has also been put forward suggesting that Syria 
had helped Armenian terrorists, and during the 1980s had similarly provided 
arms for Kurdish terrorists. 
In December 1986, Turkish police claimed that they had discovered 
Syrian-backed terrorists operating to blow up the Ataturk Dam (The Middle 
East, October 1987: 27). The Turks reported that there were three training 
camps in northern Syria housing militants belonging to the "Armenian 
Secret i\rmy for the Liberation of Armenia" (ASALA) and the PKK, and 
that Syrian agent, disguised as diplomats, had delivered arms to ASALA 
militants in various European countries. On 17 September 1986 the PKK 
Central Committee held a meeting Damascus where it decided open more 
increasing its operations, especially its crossings of the Turkey-Syrian 
border into Turkey (Bolukbasi, 1990: 24-41). The Syrian Prime Minister 
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Abed Al-Rauf Al-Kasm state in 1986, that Damascus was unable to prevent 
PKK incursions into Turkey because Syria, with a long frontier, had no 
army in the north, since it was needed to watch the enemy in the south. 
Thus, although Syria was doing its best to avoid friction with Turkey, they 
could not keep the border under strict control (Bolukbasi, 1990: 34). In July 
1987 the Turkish Prime Minister Ozal went to Damascus and two months 
later Kadurra the vice-prime Minister of Syria, went to Turkey. At these 
meeting, a protocol for "cooperation on security problems " was singed, 
bringing up a number of bilateral matters dealing with the prevention of the 
smuggling of goods across the common border, the cross-border trade in 
counterfeits money and the return of fugitives to the country from which 
they were escaping (Lewis, 1991: 73). In addition discussions were held on 
the prevention of terrorism. Particular attention was given to the important 
problem of regulating the water of the Euphrates. As a result of his visit 
Ozal proposed Turkish help in the prospecting for gas and oil in Syria, 
presented a project to supply electricity to Syria if Damascus needed it, and 
suggested that increased trade and economic cooperation would benefit both 
countries. His major proposal was, however, the installation of the peace 
pipelines (Bolukbasi, 1990: 43). 
On 21 October 1989, two Syrian MIG-21 fighter plane killing two 
pilots and three technicians. Syria argued that its pilots had disobeyed orders 
and ^Jikara accepted Damascus explanation, but many suspected that 
Damascus was in fact trying to scare Ankara so that Ozal would not dare to 
use the "water weapon". All these were perceived by Ankara as a Syrian 
attempt to build up tension between the countries in order to force Ankara to 
revise its "water policy", and agree to Damascus' demand to sign a treaty to 
formally share the water of the Euphrates (Bolukbasi, 1990: 50). 
The visit of Syrian Foreign Minister, Farouq Al Share, to Ankara in 
March 1991, marked a new phase in the relations between the two countries. 
These relations, often strained in the past because of the issues of the water 
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of the Euphrates and cross border security, have vastly improved since the 
two countries found themselves on the same side of the fence during the 
Gulf crisis; but Hafez Al-Assad, the Syrian president, ordered his soldiers in 
Lebiinon to leave the PKK base alone because he wanted the camp as a 
bargaining chip against Turkey which he feared could use the Euphrates 
dams to cutoff Syria's water (The Sunday Time ,13 October 1991: 24). 
The Turkish Interior Minister, Ismet Sezgin, visited Damascus on 17 
April 1992 and, as a result, Turkey and Syria have drawn up two protocols 
aimed at improving joint border security and removing the PKK from the 
Bekka (The Guardian, 18 April 1992: 12). There was a visible desire on 
both sides to overcome the traditional problems which had beset bilateral 
relations in the past (Briefing, 25 March. 1991:9). 
4.6: TENSIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND IRAQ 
According to the Turkish National pact adopted by the last Ottoman 
parliament on 28 January 1920, the Mosul area had to remain within the 
Turkish border. On first May 1920, Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) declared that 
this would be the case in 1925; however Britain, bearing in mind the oil 
fields in the Mosul area and the strategic importance of Iraq, decided that the 
whole of the Mosul area was to remain in Iraq. Turkey did not participate in 
the council of the League of Nations at which this decision was taken 
unanimously and was not in a position at that time to consider changing the 
fait accompli, which would have meant going against Britain, so instead, she 
re-opened of talks with Britain in 1926. In exchange for certain concessions, 
Turkey accepted the decision of League of Nations, and signed the "Treaty 
between Turkey, the United Kingdom and Iraq concerning the establishment 
of the border between Turkey and Iraq", thus putting an end to the dispute 
over this border (Lewis, 1991: 29). Since then, the two countries have been 
on fairly good terms although the Turks still say that the oil producing area 
Mosul should have been allotted to them after First World War rather than 
being incorporated into the new Arab state of Iraq, then under British 
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mandatory rule. Since the 1926 agreement, however, there has not been a 
single territorial dispute between these two states (MEI, 16 February, 1990: 
13). 
Turkish-Iraqi relations made very rapid progress from the mid 1970's 
until the end of the 1980's on both the economic and political fronts and, 
after April 1982, Turkey because the major outlet for Iraqi oil. In 1977 a 
first pipeline was laid from Kirkuk in Iraq to Yumurtalik in Turkey and, by 
the end of 1984, the Kirkuk- Yumurtalik pipeline's capacity had been 
extended from 700, 00 barrels per day to 1 million barrels per day. In 1985 
Iraq Eind Turkey began building a second pipeline through Turkey which 
was completed by June 1987 increasing oil exports via Turkey from 1 
million to 1.5 million barrels per day. Thus nearly half of Turkey's annual 
20 million tonnes of oil imports comes from Iraq as well as 280 million 
dollars in royahies per year for the oil transported via these pipelines. 
Without the Turkish outlet, Iraqi oil exports would have come to a virtual 
standstill long ago (Inan, 1999: 89-51; Bolukbasi, 1990: 22). 
Turkish-Iraqi cooperation reached its climax when both sides singed 
the security protocol in October 1984 where by Iraq granted Turkey the right 
of "hot pursuit". The protocol allowed forces from either country to pursue 
"subversive groups in the territory of the other" up to a distance of five 
kilometers, thus Turkey could continue pursuing members of the PKK into 
Iraq and, in August 1986, Turkish planes first bombed camps set up by the 
terrorist organization on the Iraqi side of the border (Lewis, 1991: 70; 
Bolukbasi, 1990: 21). During his Baghdad visit in April 1988, Ozal declared 
that tlie Turkish-Syrian agreement was a temporary one and that the real 
treaty would be reached through tripartite talks to be held by the three 
countries (Bolukbasi, 1990: 39). 
The failure of the respective governments to reach an agreement over 
oil prices has led to a drastic decline in trade between Iraq and Turkey. In 
1989, Turkish exports to Iraq were reduced to one quarter of what they had 
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been in 1987, and imports from Iraq (95 percent of which were oil), were 
halved. Turkish exports to Iraq in 1988, when the trade volume was at its 
peak, had consisted mainly of live animals, poultry and eggs, cereals, 
chemicals, and iron and steel products (Erengul, 1990: 15). 
Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2nd August 1990 and 
Turkey's compliance with the subsequent embargo resolution of the UN, the 
pipelines were closed, but the Kirkuk oil installations and the Iraq-Turkey 
pipeline survived the Gulf war undamaged (Lewis, 1991: 69). 
4.7: HOSTILITY BETWEEN SYRIA AND IRAQ 
Relations between Iraq and Syria in the 1940s and 1950s were 
characterized by asymmetry. Iraq, the stronger of the two, with significant 
economic resources, a stable leadership, and ambitions for the dominance of 
Syria,, was capable of intervening and affecting Syrian politics. Syria was 
relatively unable to affect Iraqi politics and is politicians were pleased to 
receive financial and political assistance from Iraq. Between 1955 and 1958, 
relati(3ns between the states took on an ideological dimension and the main 
moti\'e for Iraqi activity in Syria during those years became more and more 
defensive: to prevent Syria from joining the anti-Iraqi, pro-Egyptians camp. 
The rise to power of the Ba'ath parties in both Syria and Iraq intensified the 
rivalry between the two countries by adding the dispute over the legitimacy 
of their respective regimes (Eppel, 1991: 3). 
The increasing consolidation of the structure of the Syrian regime 
bilateral relations in 1972 entered a calmer period that, nonetheless, was 
marketed by serious and narrow conflicts of interest (Kienle, 1990: 170). 
Given the lack of democracy and, the inability to maintain legitimate 
opposition activity, the forces and personages opposing the regime in each 
state found asylum within the rival country. Syria persistently encouraged 
and assisted Iraqi group which opposed Saddam Hussain and his regime, 
including the Kurdish opposition operating from Damascus. Assad's 
opponents and Syria's enemies likewise received assistance fi*om Baghdad 
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and, since the early 1970s; Iraq has been granting assistance to ant- Syrian 
gropes (Eppel, 1991: 6). 
In 1975, relations between the two countries reached a crisis level 
over economic interests, involving such questions as the pipeline from Iraq 
to the Mediterranean and the division of the water from the Euphrates, and 
this led to the massing of military forces on the Iraqi-Syrian border. In April 
1976, after the breakdown in negotiations over fees for the transit of Iraqi oil 
across Syria and the price for supply of Iraqi crude. Iraq cancelled the transit 
agreements and cut off oil supplies until February 1979 when a new 
agreement was reached and supplies resumed (Drysdale, 1990: 351; EIU, 
Syria, 1991-92: 34). It is in this respect that side issues and side payments 
became especially important. One of these already manifested itself in the 
mid- 1970s, and that was the deal made between Iraq and Turkey to 
constmct an oil pipeline from northern Iraq to the Mediterranean in Turkey. 
This was seen by Syria as a hostile act, which threatened the existing, 
economically vital pipeline through Syria and part of Syria's intransigence 
towards Iraq over the Euphrates must have stemmed from this affront 
(Waterbury, 1990: 18). During the 1970s and they 1980s, Iraq frequently 
accused Syria of withholding up to 60 percent of Iraq's share of the 
Euphi-ates water but Damascus denied this. 
Ever after the loss of its Gulf ports at the Iran-Iraq war Iraq was able 
to us£! both the Turkish and Syrian pipelines. Although the Syrian pipeline 
was damaged at the beginning of the war it became operational again by 
December 1980 and, in 1981, Baghdad was exporting 500,000 barrels per 
day tlirough the Syrian pipeline. Syrian-Iraqi relations which had already 
started to deteriorate after the aborted unity attempts of 1978 and 1979, 
however, reached their lowest point during the beginning of 1982 and, by 
early 1982, the Iraqis felt that Syria was not only supporting Iran in the Gulf 
War, but was trying to bring down Sddam Hussain as well (Bolukbasi, 1990: 
18). In July 1982, when Iraq had recaptured most of the Iranian territory 
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and carried the war into Iraq, Syria also pressured Iraq by shutsting down 
the Iraqi oil pipeline which carried oil to Banyas and pressured Iraq by 
shutting down the Iraqi oil pipeline which carried oil to Banyas and Tripoli 
in Lebanon as well as closing the Syrian-Iraqi border. With the loss of the 
Syrian pipeline the only remaining outlet for Iraqi oil exports was the 
Turkish pipeline, but the closure of the Iraqi-Syrian border also forced the 
shut down of the Turk-Iraqi railway, which passed through Syria, and was 
used by Iraq to import European goods (Bolukbasi, 1990: 18). 
Before Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990 and annexed the 
Emirate there had been signs of a possible rapprochement between the two 
Ba'afhist rivals, Syria and Iraq. The two sides found common ground on 
issues such as the sharing of the Euphrates water, and the Israeli problem. 
Iraq Avas important to Syria as its strategic depth against Israel and as an 
Arab partner in its relations with Turkey in the dispute over the Euphrates 
water. The Iraqi invasion of the Arab state of Kuwait was, for the Syrians, 
clear proof that their previous suspicion regarding the nature and tendencies 
of Saddam Hussain and his regime were correct. The immediate Syrian 
response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 was a call for the 
urgent convocation of the Arab summit conference (EIU, Syria, 1991-92: 8). 
An Iraqi success in Kuwait would have tripped the balance of forces even 
further to Syria's disadvantage, endangering the status and survival of 
Assad's regime and, perhaps, that of Syria in general. The attempt to forge a 
united opposition front against the Ba'athist government in Iraq was finally 
resurrected in December 1991 (EIU, Iraq, 1992, No. 1: 8). 
(F) THE WA TER CRISIS OF 1989-1990 
Iraq and Syria have often complained that Turkey is opposed to a 
trilateral accord which would partition the Euphrates water among the three 
countiries. The fears of Syria and Iraq seemed justified when on 29 
November 1989, Turkey shocked its dovmstream neighbours, by 
announcing that it would hold back the flow of the Euphrates for one month 
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from 13 January 13 February, 1990 for essential hydraulic works at the 
resen/oir behind its newly built Ataturk Dam, (The Economist, 16-22 
December, 1989: 55; Briefing, 15 January, 1990: 4). Turkey restored the 
flow some 36 hours ahead of schedule, on the night of 12-13 February but 
the damage that this stoppage described as an act of international piracy 
would inflict on Syria and Iraq was only the beginning, for the complete 
filling of the Ataturk reservoir would still take four to five additional years 
(MEI, 16 February, 1990: 12). 
Syria and Iraq had made diplomatic attempts to get Turkey to review 
its decision and reduce the period of one month, which they considered too 
long. Syrian technicians believed that a period not ten days would be enough 
for the Ataturk Dam to carrying out the essential hydraulic works and Iraqi 
technicians also thought that ten days to two week would be sufficient. 
Almost all the Gulf newspapers launched a simuhaneous campaign to attract 
attention to the water-cut, calling for Turkey to reconsider its 'requirement', 
while some went to the extent of associating this act with Turkey's hostility 
to wards Syria over that country's support for separatist terrorism. Observers 
at the Turkish Foreign Ministry, at the begirming, stated that the campaign 
was a result of pressure exerted by Damascus and Baghdad on other Arab 
capit£ils but, later, they changed this observation, claiming that both Iraq and 
Syria "understood the technical requirements of Turkey" (Briefing, 15 
January, 1990: 5). Officials in Ankara claimed that Turkey had tried to do all 
it could to minimize the hardship to its southern neighbors (Briefing, 25 
December, 1989: 9). January and February were the months chosen by 
Turkey to hold back the flow of the Euphrates because water needed for 
irrigation in Syria and Iraq and evaporation losses are minimal during these 
montlis (Utlcan, 1990: 12). The declared that Turkey had released 3.43 
billion cubic meter of water, or an average of 780 cubic meters per second 
from the Keban and Karakaya Dam systems, over 52 days starting fi:om 23 
November 1989 to 13 January 1990, in order to compensate for the losses 
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that might accrue to these two countries during the following month. If we 
take into account the total make-up and low-flow periods of 82 days starting 
from 23 November 1989 till 13 February 1990, we can see that an average 
quantity of water passing through the Turkish-Syrian border was 531 cubic 
meters per second or 3.76 billion cubic meters. However, according to 
Turkey, Syria and Iraq got more water during the 82 days and there was 
actually an increase in the amount of water, instead of a decrease. During the 
31 days of closure, the Euphrates River was fed by the downstream 
tributaries like Goksu, Araban, and Nizip and the long term average of these 
tributaries is about 120 cubic meters per second (Utlcan, 1990: 13). 
This, officials in Ankara claimed, amounted to 500 cubic meter per 
second running across the border which, if used cautiously, could be stored 
for thrifty use in order to overcome any discomfort. They declared, however, 
that this should not be judged on a daily or weekly basis, but as a monthly 
average (Briefing, 25 March, 1991: 10). They also noted that Turkey had 
displayed good will towards its neighbors by providing an average of 500 
cubic meters per second a month during the 1989 summer months, when 
turkey itself had suffered one of the worst droughts for the past fifty years 
(Briefing, 25 December, 1989: 9). The total amount of water that passed 
throujfh the Turkish-Syrian border was 25.7 billion cubic meter, whereas the 
natural flow for the same period was calculated at 20.8 billion cubic meter. 
The difference between these figures, (4.9 billion cubic meters) was made 
up by releasing water from Keban and Karakaya reservoirs, to maintain the 
level of flow (Utlcan, 1990: 13). 
These displays of goodwill however, do not appear to have appeased 
officials in either Damascus or Baghdad. Syria's Minister for Information, 
Mohammed Salman, was quoted in the press as saying that the most 
important problem his country and Turkey concerned the sharing of the 
waters, of the Euphrates. He was also quoted as saying that he hoped this 
question would be resolved through "peacefiil means", and it was sufficient 
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for Ankara to detect an "unfriendly tone" (Briefing, 25 December, 1989: 
10). The Syrians and Iraqis had a real grievance. They thought the Turk had 
no more right to use Euphrates water than they had and were simply seizing 
what they wanted: that is the lion's share (The Economist, 16-22 December, 
1989:55). By reducing the water flowing in the Euphrates River, Ankara 
would be directly showing Baghdad and Damascus that it controlled things 
in the region. According to the MIE report (1990), Turkey, in complete 
defiance of international law, was doing it pleased simply because it was the 
strongest country involved (MEI, 16 February, 1990: 13). 
In a rare show of unanimity, both Damascus and Baghdad 
unequivocally rejected Anakara's claims. Syrian officials argued that water 
rationing had to be instituted in northern Syria and that power supplies had 
been disrupted as a direct result of the Turkish action while Iraq complained 
that 7 million of its citizens had been affected by subsequent shortages. 
The Iraqis also claimed that the reduction in the Euphrates level 
would affect 13 million hectares of rich farmland, (40 percent of Iraq's 
arable land), and would force Iraq to shut down four power plants which 
produced 40 percent of the country's electricity (MEI, 16 February, 
1990:12; MEED, 25 January, 1991:10). Shaker Bazaoua, the director-
general of Syria's Al-Thawara Dam, believes the Ataturk Dam will 
eventually cut the Euphrates's flow by two-thirds. "There is no longer a 
river, the Euphrates is dead. In the future, people will visit the Euphrates 
valley and say. There used to be a river there (Tekeli, 1990: 221). Olcay 
Unver, who is the GAP regional project director in San Liurfa, stated that 
Turkeiy was not required by law to send 500 cubic meters per second into 
Syria but claimed that this was done as an act of goodwill. "Syria was 
pleased at first but now both Syria and Iraq are demanding 700 cubic meter 
per second from Turkey, which more or less amounts to demanding the 
Sentiie supply as the total, "natural flow" is something over 900 cubic meter 
per second". In an interview with Cumhuriyet, Inan he underlined the 
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Turkish position by comparing Turkey's military situation with that of its 
neighbors putting it bluntly, he said: "we have the water and they have the 
water and they have the missiles" (Briefing, 15 January, 1990: 6). 
The ruling Ba'ath socialist party's newspaper "Al- Thawara" warned 
that Turkey's action of blocking the river for a month would seriously harm 
Iraq £ind could cause 'a real agricultural disaster' in the long term, adding 
that T i^nkara-Baghdad relations could suffer. Al-Thawara reported that seven 
provinces with 5,000 villages inhabited by about 5.5 million people would 
be thireatened by the severe water shortage caused by the Turkish action. 
Iraqi officials believed that the Euphrates flow could eventually be reduced 
fi-om its current 32 billion cubic meters per year to 11 billion cubic meters 
per year or two billion cubic meter per year less than Iraq claimed was its 
minimum requirement. Although Ankara had increased the flow of the 
Euphi-ates by 100 percent over the normal flow of 500 cubic meter per 
second into Syria to compensate for the loss of water during the cut-off 
period, it made little difference because Iraq had already filled its Al-
Qaddissiya dam to capacity to make up for shortages during the summer 
growing season claiming that villages and towns in the area north of Al-
Qaddissiya dam would not be able to make use of that water (Turkish Daily 
News, 15 January, 1990, Al; Baghdad observer, 15 January 1990:1). Turkish 
officials claimed that Turkey had given Syria 3.4 billion cubic meters since 
November, but Syria had released only 860 million cubic meters to Iraq 
during the same period (Bolukbasi, 1990: 53). 
Iraq's concern, however, led it to seek help from its partners in the 
Arab cooperation council, in the form of exerting pressure on Turkey. Both 
Baghdad and Damascus tried to find supporters among other members of the 
Arab League and the secretariat of the League actually made an 
announcement in late January 1990 calling for a just partition of the 
Euphrates waters and requesting Turkey to reconsider its decision to divert 
the river for a month. The Turkish Foreign Minister, Mesut Yilmaz, reacted 
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to these diplomatic moves by asking the Iraqi and Syrian ambassadors in 
Ankara to get their government to stop trying to internationalize the issue 
and turning other Arab states against Turkey. In addition, Ankara sent 
delegations to Arab capitals to explain why Turkey had diverted the 
Eupkates (Bolukbasi, 1990: 55; MEED, 26 January 1990: 13). 
Officials in Ankara believed that what was actually disturbing Syrian 
and Iraqi officials was the effect on their public when they observed 
Turkey's ability to cut water off at will. They felt that this would be 
interpreted in Syrian and Iraqi public opinion as a show of strength by 
Turkey and a sign of weakness by the regimes of Hafez Assad and Saddam 
Hussein (Briefinf, 25 December, 1989: 10). But, even if the cut-off were due 
to technical requirements, and had no political motivation who could 
guarantee that this would be the case in the coming years or in the case of a 
serious regional crisis? 
In April 1990, According to MEED 1991, Baghdad and Damascus 
signed an accord by which Syria would take 42 percent of the river's flow 
once it had left Turkey. However, as in all fifteen meetings of the Syrian-
Iraqi-Turkish joint commission on the Euphrates held over the past ten 
years, finding a solution has remained elusive. Here, the talks reportedly 
broke down over the volume of water to be discharged by Turkey and the 
decision to carry on with the negotiations. The Turkish side presented a 
three-phase plan at the 1990 meeting of the Technical committee, outlining 
the course that had to be followed to resolve the question. In addition, 
current projects were to be reviewed in order to conform to the principle of 
optimal usage. This plan was rejected by both Syria and Iraq who insisted 
that thiere was no need for such intricate measures and that supplying water 
on the basis of unilateral declarations of requirement would be sufficient. 
Baghdad demanded the release of 700 cubic meters per second instead of the 
500 cubic meters per second offered by Ankara and Iraq indirectly, but 
clearly, stated that they could have sorted out their problems with Syria and 
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Turkey not spoiled thing by not giving enough water (MEED, 25 January, 
1991; Brefing, 26 March, 1990, 18 &2-9, 1990: 10). Both countries are 
critically dependent on the Euphrates, and therefore wish to conclude some 
form of binding arrangement with Turkey which would involve quotas for 
the amounts of water from this for each of the three countries. 
Before further negotiations could take place, Iraq's invasion of 
Kuwait took place and the Euphrates water issue was eclipsed by other 
pressing concerns. Turkey was under pressure to cut the flow of the 
Euphrates and Tigris rivers in an attempt to drive Saddam Hussain out of 
Kuwait. Water could be viewed as Iraq's Achilles heel and the denial of 
water was a possible means of ensuring a swift and bloodless end to the 
Kuwait crisis (MEED, 25 January, 1991: 10). There were, however, clear 
threats made by Saddam's son (who was the Minister of Energy) that if 
Turkey stopped giving Iraq its required water, they would know what to do 
(Frankel, 1991: 261). The Turkish authorities have repeatedly said they do 
not intend to use the river as a political or military tool against their 
neighbours to the south and their behaviors during the gulf crisis and war of 
1990-91 appears to confirm that Turkey is pursuing a long-term policy 
which does not introduce any unnecessary increments of tension and 
resentment to relations with its downstream riparian. The Turkish press 
claimed during the Gulf war that the Ataturk Dam represented a prime 
military target (Dateline, 18 August, 1990: 1). 
4.8: POSSIBLE WATER ALLOCATION APPROACH 
The use of the Euphrates-Tigris Rivers by three respective countries 
has been the subject of diplomacy and commentary ever since the 
dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the consequent disruption of the 
political unity that had previously inhibited the conflict with respect to the 
Euphrates-Tigris basin. However, until 1970s, there was no significant 
complaint or conflict over the sharing of water in the basin region. The rapid 
growth of population and policy of food security and self-reliance as a 
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natural economic goal have surface the demand of water in the basin region. 
In viev/ of these, the three riparian have launched many water development 
projects over the year to achieve the natural economic goal of this has 
created tension in the basin region over the sharing of water. Little effort has 
been made to coordinate planning and no formal agreement has been 
reached regarding the allocation of water. Each state has built its own 
projects especially multipurpose once for electricity, irrigation, flood 
prevention, and storage (Meyer, 1987 ; 45-48). 
The portions of the Euphrates-Tigris basins located within each 
riparian state are illustrated Turkey has the major share of the discharge of 
the Tig;ris and of the Euphrates. Iraq has nothing of the Euphrates discharge, 
but has the principal share of the discharge of the Tigris tributaries. Syria has 
nothing of the Tigris discharge, but has the chief share of the discharge of 
the Euphrates tributaries (the Khabur and the Balikh), and it uses their water. 
Turkey contributes 72 percent of the total discharge. Iraq contributes 18.5 
percent, and Syria's contribution is no more than 2 percent (See table). If we 
regard the Karun as part of the Euphrates-Tigris system, then Iran is in third 
place and contributes about 7.5 percent. (Bakour & Kolar, 1994 : 128-131). 
If we fix the division of water according to the proportions of 
dischairge contributed by each state, Turkey and Iraq have the main rights to 
exploit the water of the Tigris, and Turkey and Syria have main rights to 
exploit the water of the Euphrates. However, the division is not determined 
only according to discharge; Iraq has historical rights to use the water of the 
two rivers (Lowi, 1995 : 46). 
A fair division of the water must be accomplished according to the 
needs of the states. Turkey and Syria are greatly in need of hydroelectric 
power. In Syria this situation could change because gas and oil have recently 
been discovered there, which would enable Syria to employ thermal energy 
instead. Turkey has no sources of energy apart from hydroelectric. Turkey 
and Syria need water for irrigation to reclaim large areas of land for their 
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growing populations. Until recently, Iraq needed water for irrigation, but this 
situation could soon charge because Iraq has large amounts of oil, which 
could be used to boost industry and so curtail agriculture. 
A fair division of water would allocate about 40 percent to Turkey, 
about 50 percent to Iraq, and about 10 percent to Syria. This distribution based 
on discharge, historical rights, and existence of other resources requires 
cooperation among the riparian, which would ensure not only an equitable 
division of the water but also its quality (Dolatyar & Gray 1999 :119-124). 
However, in reality the three states do not cooperate, and the up 
stream states (Turkey and Syria) make use of their advantage over the 
downstream state (Iraq). Turkey is an upstream state in the drainage of the 
two rivers. Syria is a downstream state of the Euphrates relative to Turkey, 
and an upstream state relative to Iraq. (Iran has a certain advantage in the 
two tributaries of the Tigris, the Diyala and the Little Zab, which originate in 
its territory, but has no intention of establishing water project or using these 
tributaries owing g to the very difficult topography at their sources.) Iraq is a 
downstream state of the Euphrates-Tigris. But it has another advantage; in 
case of need, it can transfer water from the Tigris to the Euphrates and back 
again. In fact, Iraq is now completing construction of a project to transfer 
water from the Tigris to the lower Euphrates (lonides, 1937 : 18-117). 
(G). SOUTH-EAST ANATOLIAN PROJECT GAP (GUNEYDOGU 
ANADOLU PROJESI) A PARADIGM SHIFT IN WATER 
RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT 
GAP, initiated in 1965, is Turkey's largest and most ambitious 
development project in the south-eastern part of the states. The development 
region covers 28,520 square miles, including six regions. Most of the 
development area borders Syria and some of it border Iraq. Five and a half 
million people inhabit the six regions as of 1991, 50 percent Kurds, about 40 
percent Turks, and 10 percent Arabs (Elhadj, 2008: 6). In 1980 about 68 
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percent were farmers and the remainder were industrial workers and service 
workers (Kolars and Mitchell, 1991; Toepfer, 1991). 
Table No-4.6 
Comparison of the GAP region and Turkey by selected indidices (1985) 
Index 
Land Area 
Total population 
Population growth 
(1965-85) 
Population density 
Urban population 
Economic structure 
Agp-iculture 
Manufacturing 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita GDP/GRP 
Source:GAP, l990,Vo\ 
Unit 
Cubic kilometre 
% p.a. 
/cubic km 
% to Total 
%inGDP/GRP 
lO'TL 
10^  TL 
.1,1 
Turkey 
779,459 
50,664,458 
2.4 
65 
53.0 
17.7 
25.2 
83,785,419 
862 
GAP 
Region 
73,863 
4,303,567 
2.9 
58 
49.9 
39.6 
11.7 
3,365,559 
862 
GAP 
Share (%) 
9.5 
8.5 
„ 
— 
~ 
(9.0) 
(1.9) 
4.0 
(47) 
The project is intended to transform the South-eastern part of 
Anatolia, an area of plains and hills with a semiarid climate, into the "bread 
basket" of Turkey by irrigation millions of hectares. Other goals are to 
advance the economically and socially weak population and bring it closer 
to the west; to lift the region out of a state of chronic developmental 
backwardness directly into twenty-first century by producing ample 
electricity, which will be used to industrialize the region; and by paving a 
new road network connect the region with the western part of the state. The 
Turkish government hopes in this way to integrate the Kurds into the 
Turkish core and to attenuate separatist processes there, which have spread 
into other parts of the country, sometimes in a violent fashion (Kolars & 
Mitchell, 1991:56). 
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GJ\P has been conceived and implemented as a means of integrating 
water resources development with overall human development in one of the 
backward regions of Turkey. The project area lies in South-eastern Turkey, 
covering nine provinces corresponding to approximately 10 percent of 
Turkey's total population and an equivalent surface area. The project area 
includes the watersheds of the lower Euphrates-Tigris Rivers and the upper 
Mesopotamian plains (Naff & Mastan, 1984: 93). The water resources 
development program of GAP includes 13 groups of irrigation and energy 
projects, seven of which are on the Euphrates River and six on the Tigris. 
The project includes 22 dams, 19 hydropower plants, and irrigation 
networks, on the Euphrates and Tigris river basins, to irrigate 1.7 million 
hectares of land. The total cost of the project is estimated as USD 32 billions 
of which have already been invested (Beschomer, 1992: 39-40). 
As an integrated regional development project based upon the 
concept of sustainability, GAP covers investments in such fields as urban 
and rural infrastructure, agriculture, transportation, industry, education, 
health, housing and tourism, as well as dams, power plants and irrigation 
schemes on the Euphrates-Tigris rivers. This massive launch for 
development has special emphasis on and priority for the economic, social 
and cultural advancement and well being of the whole country in general, 
and of the people of the region in particular. The basic objectives of the 
GAP are: to remove interregional disparities in the country by alleviating 
conditions of abject poverty and raising the income levels and living 
standards in the region; to enhance productivity and employment 
opportunities in rural areas and to improve the population absorbing capacity 
oflarger cities (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, 1995:19). 
As the GAP has shifted over the years from an infrastructure 
development project, into a project that coordinates social, cultural, 
economic and environmental efforts, its changes have followed the changes 
161 
in global thinking about development. In recent years there has been an 
increased focus on reducing poverty as a key responsibility of government 
for development. International conference such as the 1992 United Nations 
Conference on Environment and development in Rio de Janeiro and the 
1995 World Summit for social Development in Copenhagen have put 
forward ideas about sustainability, gender equity, encouraging grassroots 
involvement, protecting the environment, and so on. These initiatives were 
reinforced at the UN Millennium General Assembly when the Millennium 
Development Goal of halving the proportion of the world's population living 
in extreme poverty by 2015 was agreed by all member countries of the 
United National. Other goals and targets specific to water and poverty were 
agreed at the Millennium Assembly and at the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development 2002, (Turan & Kut, 1997: 141). 
These international attempts have generated some consensus about 
the priorities for development-reaching the poorest targeting marginalized 
groups, involving target groups at all stages in the project cycle-that has led 
to the adoption of policies in support of sustainable development in 
countries in both North and South. GAP has attempted to incorporate these 
ideas into its activities, and has learned first hand about the tension between 
how development should look, and how it is actually carried out (Olson, 
1997: 169-170). 
Water based development is a catalyst for economic, social and 
environmental changes. In the GAP, water resources development has 
enabled human-centred development in the shape of agricultural and other 
rural development, economic development and entrepreneur support 
projects, gender equality projects, participatory resettlement, and other 
activities that are based on the concepts of participation, equity, and 
environmental and social sustainability. GAP, as such is defined as a 
sustainable human development project, where water resources development 
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is not an end in itself; it is, indeed, a means to an end. The end is to alleviate 
poverty, improve quality of life, and to maintain the integrity of environment 
and the ecosystems (Unverand; Gupta & Kibaroglu eds., 2003). 
Tlie concept of sustainability is very relevant to any analysis of water 
policy. Hence, in the case of GAP, the notion of sustainability is captured in 
the large context of the sustainability of society, the economy as well as the 
environmental services provided by water in the region. Sustainable human 
development, as applied by the GAP for South-eastern Anatolia, 
encompasses such goals as reaching the poorest, gender equity, capacity 
building for local institutions, and environmental protection. It is from this 
philosophy that GAP derives its human centred focus, using the momentum 
gained from hydropower and irrigation infrastructure projects to bring 
opportunities for more sustainable livelihoods to as many in the GAP region 
as possible (Elhadj, 2008: 6). 
The main components of sustainability for GAP are: social 
sustainability, physical and spatial sustainability, environment sustainable 
development approach of GAP. Special programs and project have been 
initiated to emphasize the human dimension of development through project 
implementations concerned with basic social services, gender equity, urban 
management, irrigation facilities, agricultural and environmental 
sustainability, institutional and community capacity building, and public 
participation (Beschomer, 1992: 39-40). 
GAP case illustrates that in the field of water development and 
management the three countries in mention can exploit the potential areas 
for cooperation by benefiting from the experience and practices of one 
another, and develop these into common practice (GAP Regional 
Development Administration, 2008a: 5). 
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(H) UTILIZA TION: THE THREE-STA GE PLAN 
Lake of data on the water and land resources in transboundary basin 
areas is the major obstacle to the efficient and reasonable utilization of water 
riparian countries. The Euphrates-Tigris basin is not immune to the 
difficulties caused by this obstacle. There is not much reliable and detailed 
date on flows and water quality, the quantity and quality of agricultural 
lands, patterns of irrigation and crops and additional relevant information. 
One of the immediate effects of the lack of reliable data on water resources 
is that the total amount of water declared by all riparian states needed for 
their activities exceeds the amount of the average water flows of both rivers. 
Hence, it is nearly impossible to make reliable and appropriate decision 
concerning the efficient utilization of the basin's waters (Kibaroglu, 2002: 
253). 
In order to overcome these obstacles and to ensure basin-wide 
cooperation on the efficient utilization of the waters, Turkey proposed a plan 
called Three Stage Plan for Optimum, Equitable and reasonable Utilization 
of the Trans-boundary Watercourses of the Euphrates-Tigris basin at the 
second tripartite meeting of the ministers on June 26, 1990 in Ankara. As 
can be observed in its title, the Three Stage Plan mainly used the similar 
terminology developed by the International Law Commission of the UN 
during the codification of the 1997 framework Convention on the Non-
Navigational Uses of International watercourses. Hence, the plan was built 
on the needs-based approach versus the rights-based approach (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Turkey, 1995: 35-37). 
Indeed, the history of the Three Stage Plan dates back to 1960s. The 
outline of the plan was completely formed by the engineers of the Turkish 
General Directorate of States Hydraulic Works (DSI) in a much more 
comprehensive manner. This outline included three working groups on 
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hydrology, land resources and engineering, each composed of experts from 
the riparian states (KIbaroulu, 2002: 253; Tomanbay, 2000: 95). 
The Three Staged Plan is based on two basic principles. The first is 
that Turkey considers the Euphrates-Tigris as a single system since the two 
rivers merge in Iraq to from the Shatt al-Arab waterway and the waters of 
the two rivers can be used interchangeably because of the collection, 
interpretation and evaluation of the data, thereby leading to disparities, it is 
argued that the inventory of the basin's water resources and land resources 
should be drawn up and evaluated jointly by the three riparian states to 
realize the most optimum and reasonable utilization of water resources 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, 1995: 37). 
Three Stages of the plan are the same vein, to end the Euphrates-
Tigris dispute over the utilization of the waters of these rivers, in 1984, 
Turkey proposed a just and equitable settlement that would satisfy the 
parties not only for today but also for future generations. This proposal was 
based on actual and objective data. The proposal aimed at continuous 
cooperation to strengthen regional peace and the well-being of the people of 
all th]:ee countries. The Turkish proposal submitted to the Joint Committee 
in 1984 did not receive any response though the aim was just and equitable 
utilization taking into the aim was just and equitable utilization taking into 
account such factors and circumstances as mentioned in the UN Convention, 
like the length of a river in the territory of a riparian state and its ratio to the 
total length of the river, evaporation, lands to be irrigated and their 
efficiency, techniques to be used for irrigation and means of saving water, 
economic and social contribution of the utilization of water, economic and 
social contribution of the utilization of water to the region and to the 
country, etc.. (Umut, 2006: 8-9) A group of experts fi-om the three countries 
wouhi implement this plan which had three fundamental features; namely, 
inventory studies of water resources, inventory studies of land resources, 
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and, the evolution of water and land resources. In the resource inventory, 
data on the level of water discharge, rain and snowfall, temperature, 
evaporation etc. would be collected, exchanged and checked on a monthly, 
seasonal and annual basis. In the land resources inventory, information on 
the quality of soil and drainage criteria would be exchanged and crop 
patterns would be evaluated according to the soil quality of soil and drainage 
conditions. As to the final phase of evaluation of water and land resources, 
parties would discuss types and systems of irrigation that would minimize 
water losses and system of irrigation that would minimize water losses and 
seek ways to modernize and increase the efficiency of irrigation projects. 
The demand and supply balance of water would be analyzed and, if 
necessary, the possibilities of transferring water from Tigris to Euphrates 
would be considered to meet consumption demands. To this end, possible 
projects would also be discussed and evaluated from the point view of their 
viability. It would be observed that the Three Stage Plan is based on 
objective criteria and may be applied to settle disputes for an optimum and 
fair utilization of water with justice and equity (Umut, 2006:8-9) 
Although it might have proved successful in facilitating negotiations, 
the Three State plan was rejected by the downstream riparian sates. 
Nevertheless, it had several advantages that cannot be easily discounted. 
First, it was a promising plan to overcome the main obstacles in employing 
standeirdized data in the negotiations among the riparian states and for 
efficient utilization of the basin's waters (Turan, 1993: 25). It would have 
been reasonable to irrigate the lands of higher soil quality in order to get 
higher efficiency in water consumption. Second, the Three Staged Plan was 
offering some sort of "concealed compromise" among the riparian states 
(Kut, 1993:13). 
166 
(I). RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
The GAP project has ahenated Syria and Iraq from Turkey and left 
the two states in a relatively weak position. In simple terms, the situation can 
be chairacterized as fellows: Iraq feels it is at the mercy of Turkey and Syria, 
both of whom have the power to prevent Iraq from obtaining enough water. 
Syria shares this position because once Turkey completes the GAP it will 
have such power over both its neighbour (Cohen, 1991: 514). 
Syria and Iraq find themselves in a common position for two other 
strategic reasons. First, they continue to harbor anti-U.S. sentiments that 
have diminished among several of their neighbors in the region over the last 
decade (Seattle, 2001: 3). Jordan and Egypt, for example, have both made 
significant steps to reach out to the West in recent years. Following the Gulf 
War, Saudi Arabia and the other Arabian Peninsula states have also forged 
closer ties to the United States. Even the new regime in Iran has shown signs 
that it wishes to improve relations with the United States. Meanwhile, Iraq 
remains under a United States trade embargo and Syria has not made 
significant overtures to the West. 
Second and arguably more importantly-Syria and Iraq have become the two 
most virulently anti-Israel states in the West Asia (Seattle, 2001: 3). The 
peace process has normalized Israel's relations with Jordan and Egypt, but 
Syria still demands the return of the Golan Heights, which Israel seized in 
1967 (The Times of India, 2001: Feb. 16). 
Meanwhile, Turkey has significantly improved relations with Israel, 
fiirther alienating Syria and Iraq. Turkey and Israel have been conducting 
joint military exercises since 1996, understandably raising serious concern 
among the Arab states. Recently, Turkey's interest in these endeavors has 
cooled- the Turk pulled back on a pair of planned projects, but this along has 
not eased Arab concerns (Turkish-Israeli Military Cooperation, 2001: 
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Mar.5). Earlier this year, Israel and Turkey also agreed on a ten-year deal 
that would send Israel fifty million cubic meter of Turkish water annually. 
The water will come from the Manavgat River, which flows into the 
MediteiTanean (Metehan, 29 January, 2001.)- Although Syria and Iraq have 
no claim to this water, they see the move as an affront- and a security threat-
because they believe Turkey is using too much Euphrates and Tigris water. 
A Syriim or Iraqi official might ask Turkey why it is not using Manavgat 
water domestically instead of selling it, leaving a fair share of Euphrates and 
Tigris water for Syrian and Iraqi use (Ed Blanche, 1 February, 2001). From 
an economic perspective, however, the deal makes sense for Turkey because 
Israel can more easily afford to pay for the water than Syria or Iraq. 
For these reasons, a strategic analysis would predict that Syria and 
Iraq would begin to reconcile their differences and create a common front to 
oppose Turkey. This has, in fact, been the case in recent years, as Syria and 
Iraq have normalized relations with each other and jointly criticized 
Turkey's construction of the GAP (Agence France-Presse, 1997: 30 Sept.). 
Both countries have been actively seeking support from the Arab League by 
demanding that Turkey consult with them over water rights... the Arab 
League issued several resolutions to this effect, claiming that Turkey was 
allowing too little water to reach its neighbors and that the water coming 
from Turkey was polluted. Turkey largely disregarded these claims, citing 
the fact the Kurdish leader Abudllah Ocalan was residing in Damascus, 
(Turkish Daily News, April.1, 1996) despite Syria's 1987 promise to stop 
supporting the Kurds. 
In 2001, Syria and Iraq signed two key bilateral agreements intended 
to strengthen their alliance. On January 31, 2001, the two states reached a 
new water-sharing agreement. The details of the agreement have not been 
publicized, but according to Iraq it covers "a formula for sharing the waters 
of the Euphrates between Iraq, Syria, and Turkey and an agreement to draw 
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up a formula on sharing he Tigris waters between Iraq and Syria" It is the 
first such agreement since 1990, when Syria promised to leave fifty-eight 
percent of Euphrates water to Iraqi govemment, never replied (Reuters, 
2001: 29 Jan.). Also on January 31, Syria and Iraq signed a free-trade 
agreement reportedly worth U.S.$1 billion annually. The agreement includes 
the reopening of an oil pipeline from Iraq to Syria's Mediterranean coast and 
will likely be a huge boost to an Iraqi economy suffering from international 
trade sanctions (Christian Science monitor, 23 February, 2001). 
It should be noted, however, that recent developments have not been 
completely one-sided, as there have been signs that Turkey is willing to 
cooperate with its lower riparian neighbors. A key event occurred in 1998 
when Turkey threatened Syria with military action if Syria continued to 
shelter Kurdish rebels. Syria agreed to expel Ocalan, who was later captured 
by Turkey, and the two states signed a security agreement with Syria 
agreeing to stop supporting the Kurds (Turkish Daily News, 2001: 26). 
Following the agreement, the two states began improving relations by 
holding a series of talks on several bilateral issues including water rights. In 
August 2001, Syria and Turkey signed an agreement to cooperate on the 
GAP, although Turkey made no specific commitments regarding the amount 
of water it would release (Turkish Daily News, 2001: 26). Additionally, in 
September, the two states signed a second security agreement, which did not 
touch on water issues but will strengthen bilateral relations (Turkish Probe, 
2001: Sept). This newfound spirit of cooperation demonstrates that Turkey 
is willing to work with its neighbors, but wants to gain something in return-
in this case, Syria's expulsion of Ocalan. As a Syrian official has stated, 
"Matters are getting better and moving forward with serious steps...(but 
Syria is) still looking for a just and reasonable share of water according to 
international law (Turkish Daily News, Jan26,2001). 
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(J). THE JOINT TECHNICAL COMMITTEE 
The bilateral and trilateral talks among the riparian states could be 
interpreted as efforts to decrease the level of tension resulting from the water 
management projects that all three riparian states began to implement in the 
1960s, and as the search for accommodation among the co-riparian states. In 
these terms, the Joint Technical Committee (JTC) meeting provided an 
import£int platform to share information and view among the riparian states 
after 1980, albeit a weak one institutionally (Kibaroglu, 2002: 227). 
As mentioned before, Turkey and Iraq agreed to fonn a Joint 
Technical Committee in 1980 to discuss and finalize the water issues 
between the two sides. After the first bilateral meeting in May 1982, the JTC 
began to convene on a trilateral basis with participation of Syria in 1983. 
From then on, the main objective of the Committee was to study matters on 
the utilization of regional waters among the three riparian states. 
The JTC was authorized in defining methods and processes to 
determine reasonable amount of water needed by each riparian. For that 
reason,, the main issues on the agenda of the JTC were the exchange of basic 
hydrological and meteorological data regarding the Euphrates-Tigris Basin, 
sharing of information on ongoing construction of dams and irrigation 
schemes, and discussing the plans about the impounding of Karakaya and 
Ataturk Dams which were under the construction during that period 
(Kibaroglu, 2002: 227). 
At first sight, it could be argued that the JTC meeting has not been 
successful in resolving political and legal disputes among the riparian states. 
Syria and Iraq continuously demanded that Turkey increase the Euphrates 
flow of 500 cum/s guaranteed by the 1987 protocol up to 700 cum/s, Turkey, 
on the other hand, has been arguing that the current amount would be more 
than sufficient if the downstream riparian states adopted water-saving 
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irrigation technologies and if Iraq's transfer of water from the Tigris to the 
Euphrates were to be added into the calculations (Gruen, 1994: 267). In 
addition to these, two central issues could not be resolved during the JTC 
meeting, ultimately leading to the Committee's failure. The first one was 
whether the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers should be treated as a single system 
as Turkey argued, or whether the talks would be treated as a single system as 
turkey argued, or whether the talks would be limited to the Euphrates River 
as put forward by Iraq in particular. The second issue, more important than 
the first one, was whether the final objective of the JTC was to formulate a 
proposal for sharing the basin waters, or to set up a trilateral regime for the 
utilization of the basin water (Kut, 1993:11-110). 
The JTC failed to perform its mission after 16 technical and two 
ministerial meetings. The 17 meeting in Ankara in June 1993 was cancelled 
when Syria decided not to attend. After a long break, the three sides agreed 
to initiate technical talks among the water experts who would report to the 
related ministries during the trilateral ministerial meeting on March 22,2007 
in Antalya. Since this date, the experts of the three riparian states meet 
periodically in Trilateral Technical talks (Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
Turkey, 2007a: 2). 
Although they did not prove successfijl in resolving the 
disagreements and fostering cooperation, the JTC talks have provided some 
benefits to the riparian states. First, the Committee meeting functioned as a 
channel of communication by bringing the issues to the table and discussing 
the concerns and positions of the riparian states. Second, the three sides 
recognized that the issues on the agenda were more complex than they 
appeared. Lastly, vital hydrological data and been "more or less" discussed 
(Kut, 1993:9). 
In 2008, Turkey Iraq and Syria agreed to restart the Joint Trilateral 
Committee on water for the three national for better water resource 
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management. Turkey, Iraq and Syria signed a memorandum of 
understanding on September 3'^ '* 2009. In order to strengthen communication 
within the Euphrates-Tigris Basin and to develop Joint Water-flow-
monitoring stations. On September 19*, 2009, Turkey formally agreed to 
increase the flow of the Euphrates River to 450 to 500 cu. Cms., but only 
until October 20*, 2009, in exchange, Iraq agreed to trade petroleum with 
Turkey border region. One of Turkey's last large GAP Dams on the Tigris 
the llisu Dam is strongly opposed by Iraq and is the source of political strife 
(Turke>' to up Euphrates flow to Iraq). 
(K). CONCLUSION 
The discussions in this chapter clearly indicate that in contrast to what 
is conventionally believed, first, water resources have never been the root 
cause of military conflict in Mesopotamia and, second, since antiquity, 
hydraulic civilizations which flourished in the Euphrates-Tigris basin have 
been forced to cooperate and coordinate their collective efforts in a 
systematic way in order to control the two mighty rivers for the sake of all 
beneficiaries. This argument is supported by several hydrological and 
historical facts. 
• First the annual discharge of the two rivers has been more than 
enough to provide for the needs of all riparian communities. 
• Second according to archaeological evidence, the hydraulic 
civilizations of Mesopotamia not only invented the most suitable 
tools for efficient water utilization such as the wheel, windmill, and 
pipe, but also developed a remarkable water management system, 
through extensive networks of dikes, canals and reservoirs. 
• Third, these civilizations had the social prowess and well-established 
legal institutions required for maintaining the functionality of their 
organized water systems and preventing conflict. 
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Despite recent alarmist warnings by commentators and their conflict 
representation of hydro politics in the Euphrates-Tigris basin, in marked 
contrast to the Jordan River basin, none of the riparian countries is facing an 
imminent water shortage. 
There has been no military conflict between the three riparian states 
of the Euphrates-Tigris basin and no violent water conflict has marked their 
relationship. Indeed, the three parties have been engaged in a continuous, 
active, and critical dialogue and technical consultations since the early 
1960s. 
Analysis of water diplomacy in Mesopotamia indicates that there are 
several factors which strongly militate against the outbreak of conflict in the 
future. 
• First, the actual water demand of all three riparian countries in the 
foreseeable future will be less than originally projected. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Second, the desire to solve the problems of water logging and saline 
deposit will encourage the adoption of more efficient patterns of 
water utilization and new water-saving irrigation techniques and 
technologies. 
Third, the ability of Iraq to transfer the Tigris water to relieve any 
contingent shortage in the Euphrates is a comforting alternative. 
Fourth, consultations are continuing among the riparian states in the 
Joint Technical Committees, reflects a cooperative trends among the 
three riparian states. 
Last but not least, as a result of the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Nop-navigational uses of International Watercourses, the parties have 
recognized that they have to shift their water disputes from contests 
of power to considerations of fair rights and mutual obligations. 
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These considerations effectively undermine the Ukehhood of military 
conflict between Turkey, Iraq, and Syria over water issues and nullify the 
fanciful scenarios of water war in this basin posed by many writers such as 
Chesonoff (1988). We must now turn our attention to the Arabian Peninsula, 
in which hydro politics has a very different setting, not least because the 
scarcity of water is a major fact of life. 
Despite the failure in resolving the disputes among the co-riparian 
states in the Joint Technical Committee talks and rejection of the Three 
Staged plan by the downstream riparian states in the past, the developments 
in the last decade opened a new phase in the hydro political relations among 
the co-riparian states. When observing the course of events since the 
beginning of 2000s, it can be easily argued that cooperative efforts in 
resolving difference over water issues are more likely than previous decades. 
Increasing political, economic, cultural and social relations could create a 
certain level of interdependence among the co-riparian of the Euphrates-
Tigris basin. Once this happens, the cost of deteriorating those relations 
would be high. 
Lastly, sustainability measures at the local and national levels should 
be directed towards achieving overall sustainability at the basin level. In 
order to realize this, activities at all levels need to be coordinated and 
directed towards providing cooperation on the sustainable water resource 
management and achieving sustainable peace in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin. 
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(A). INTRODUCTION 
The Nile is the birth place of hydrology; no river provides such a 
wealth of information. Available records reach back to before 3000 BC. 
They heavy dependence of Egyptian Civilization on the siz of Nile floods, 
leading to years of famine or plenty, and the ability of Egyptian dynasty 
society to record evidence for posterity provides a unique opportunity to 
investigate historical river flows (Howell & Allan, 1994: 26-27). 
The Nile has fascinated philosophers, geographers, historians, 
engineers and politicians of all reeds and races over many centuries, since 
man first set eyes on its waters. Four thousand years ago three major 
civilizations flourished the Egyptians is the Nile Valley; the Sumerians in 
Mesopotamia, the Harappans in the Indus Valley. The emergence of the 
sophisticated Egyptian civilization at the threshold of history with its 
unique dependence on the rich annual flood from on unknown source has 
mesmerized scholars through the ages. Heradatus, "the father of history" in 
450 BC described Egypt as acquired country a gift of the Nile River in 
4000). Greek Philosophers, were so intrigued with the Nile that they 
believed its origin was not like that of other rivers but it had been created 
along with the world (Howell & Allan, 1990: 27-28). 
The River Nile is a natural system which moves water and rift from 
mountains upstream locations to particularly extensive and low-lying 
downstream tracts, on the way serving many peoples and economies. For 
the past six or more millennia it has been the unreliability of the flow of 
water which has been the preoccupying issue for the Nile water using 
communities. 
The Nile is a long river, by some meaevres the longest in the world. 
But it is comparatively not a big river in terms of the volume of water 
which it shifts each year from the humid uplands of east Africa and the 
storm of Africa to the Mediterranean. The Nile is significant not because 
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of its length and capacity but because it is aligned south to north and 
therefore crosses a number of climatic, and climatic related vegetation 
zones. For millennia it has provided lively hood for millions of people. In 
the past, and until recent industrialization, over ninety percent of the 
inhabitants of Egypt depended directly on the waters of the rivers, and 
without the river Egypt would have been as empty as the rest of the desert 
(Shapland, 1997: 3). 
The Nile has provided the basis of agricultural development in 
Egypt and the Sudan since the start of agricultural in the area about 7000 
years ago. Artificial irrigation began about 5000 years ago and continued 
largely unchanged until the early years of the 19* century when use of 
Nile water on a significant scale started. The enormous storage provided 
by the Aswan High Dam enables the variations of the Nile flows from year 
to year to be evened out and the potential of the Nile to be utilized. Egypt 
and the Sudan are now, however, faced with the prospect of continuing 
population increase but with only limited further Nile water available for 
agricultural expansion (Soffer, 1999: 31). 
The Nile includes all or parts of the territories of ten sovereign 
nation states. The allocation of its waters and the management of them 
between the competing national and using interests are inevitably 
complicated and tend to be highly charged with respect to water rights, and 
the resulting tension are likely to become of greater significance in future. 
In addition, as some countries develop and their economies grow, they are 
putting or plan to put new demands on water through the development of 
irrigation and hydroelectric projects. In response, the more developed 
countries in the region, which have used Nile waters for years with little 
competition, are becoming defensive of their water interests for fear that 
eventually there may be shortfall (Collils, 1990: 198-205). 
The present international relation and the pattern of water resource 
allocation and management are determined partly by the status that is the 
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NILE RIVER BASIN 
Source : Graphics and Map design unit, the World Bank, 2008, May 
volume and quality, of the water resource, and partly by the predictable 
attitudes of governments and people to an annually varying resource, the 
ownership of which is not clear. Because the Nile is a resource shared by 
ten states, the Nile can only be protected if all ten states cooperate on its 
management. The existing legal frame work of the Nile, however, is an 
inadequate basis for dealing with the current problems and does not reflect 
the needs and interests of all ten Nile riparian states. Egypt and the Sudan 
concluded an agreement governing the use of Nile waters after 
independence from Great Britain, but it is outdated and does not reflect the 
needs and interests of other Nile states. Most of the other Nile agreements 
are also bilateral, and all have questionable effect today because they were 
adopted in the Colonial Period. Thus, there is no post-independence 
agreement reflecting the interests of all Nile riparian states. The present 
chapter deals with this context. It analyzes the water crisis in the sub 
region covered by the Nile River Basin and its surrounding areas and 
examines the role water plays in the historical conflict among Egypt, 
Sudan and Ethiopia. Special emphasis will be given to the recent 
cooperation and capacity-Building (Adelphy 273, 1993: 47-49). 
(B). HYDROLOGICAL FEA TURES OF THE NILE RIVER BASIN 
The Nile is an important West Asian river although all its waters 
come from tropical equatorial Africa. The provenance of the water means 
that an understanding of the past, current and future water resources of 
Egypt and the northern Sudan require that the hydrology of the southern, 
water generating part of the system. The Nile is the longest river in the 
world, has shaped the culture of Egypt over the millennia. By the time its 
major tributaries join at Khartoum the flow is about 84 cubic kilometers 
per year (Allan, 1983a: 472). The Nile River is 6,825 kilometer long over 
35 degrees of latitude until it reaches the Mediterranean and its catchments 
basin covers over three million cubic kilometer. Although the Nile is the 
longest river in the world, it carries only one thirty-fifth the volume of the 
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Amazon, the second longest river in the world (Shapland, 1997: 56-57). 
The parts of these riparian states lying within the Nile catchments cover 
approximately 12 percent of the African continent. The tropical and 
equatorial south of the catchments comprises over 50 per cent of the 
catchments, including the water-tower of the Ethiopian highlands. The 
humid segment of the catchments enjoys average annual precipitation of 
over 1000 mm per year. The arid half of the basin receives no useful 
rainfall as potential evaporation ranges from two to three meters depth per 
year. The Africa the environmental and economic effectiveness of rainfall 
is low because potential evaporation and transpiration rates are high at 
over two meters depth per year. All these environmental factors conspire 
to make the Nile a long but low water volume river (Allan, 1983a: 472). Its 
basin embraces some 3,100,000 cubic kilometer of equatorial and 
northeast Africa. It flows through every natural formation from towering 
mountains and well-watered highlands of the most barren of deserts 
(Howell & Allan, 1990: 154). The Nile is an "exotic river" because it 
receives no tributary inflow or significant rainfall for the last 3,000 
kilometer before it flows into the Mediterranean Sea (Joseph, 1997: 121-
124). The Nile flows out from lakes on its two main branches. The greater, 
but shorter, Blue Nile flows out from Lake Tana in Ethiopia, over the 
Tisisat Falls, while the lesser, but longer. White Nile spills out of Lake 
Victoria over the Ripon Falls, its shores shared by Kenya, Tanzania and 
Ugnda. These two rivers unite at Khartoum in the Sudan, and flow as the 
main Nile to Egypt and the Mediterranean Sea (Colling, 2002: 154). 
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Table No-5.1 
Features of the Nile watershed 
Name 
Nile 
Riparian states(With 
% of national 
available water being 
utilized) b a 
Burundi (3.1), Congo, 
Democratic Rebublic of 
(Kinshasa), Egypt 
(111.5), Egypt , 
administered by Sudan 
(n'a), Eritrea (n/a), 
Ethiopia (7.5), Kenya 
(8.1), Rwanda (2.6), 
Sudan (37.3), Sudan, 
administered by Egypt, 
Tiinzania, United 
Republic of (1.3), 
Uganda (0.6) 
Riparian 
relations (with 
dates of most 
recent 
agreements) 
Cold to warm 
(1959 Nile 
Water 
Agreement only 
includes Egypt 
and Sudan) 
Watershed features a 
Average 
annual 
flow (km 3 
/yr.)c 
84 
Size 
(km 2) 
3,038,10 
0 
Climat 
e 
Dry to 
tropical 
Source: TFDD, 2007 
htt://wvAv.transboundarywater.orst.edu/ 
a Values for lakes under "Annual Flow" are for storage volumes. 
b Source: Kulshreshtha (1993) created in January 1993. 
c Sources: Gleick ed. (1993); UN Register of International Rivers (1978). 
Remaining data from TFDD, 2007. 
The Nile and its tributaries bring to gather ten riparian states: 
Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Eritera, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, the Sudan, Rawanda, Tanzania and Uganda (Majtenyi, 2004: 18). 
The Nile River, run through much of Africa, yet 36 percent of Africa's 
population lacks access to clean drinking water (Hobbs, 2004: 15). 
The Southern states are part of the Nile system because their rivers 
drain into equatorial lakes that feed the Nile. Fox example, the Kagera River 
in Rwanda and Burundi drains into Lake Victoria. A number of rivers in 
Tanzania and Kenya also flow into Lake Victoria. The only outlet of Lake 
Victoria is the Owen Falls Dam. From Lake Victoria, the White Nile flows 
through Lake Kyoga to Lake Albert, where it is supplemented by the waters 
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WATER PROJECT IN THE NILE BASIN 
Source : Shapland, 1997: 104 
I 
of the Semliki River from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The flow 
of the White Nile, also called the Bahr el-Jeble after leaving the lakes 
region, is significantly reduced by evaporation and transpiration in the 
southern Sudan due to the vast marshes of the Sudd region (Howell & Allan, 
1994: 15-65). After the White Nile passes the Sudd region, the Sobat River 
from Ethiopia joins the White Nile in the Sudan. From the northwest the. 
Blue Nile from Lake Tana in Ethiopia, through the Sudan, into the White 
Nile at Khartoum. The Atbara River from Ethiopia flows through the Sudan 
to the main Nile. After the Atbara River, no other rivers join the Nile 
(Shapland, 1997: 10). 
The flow of the Nile is highly variable from season to season and 
from year to year, and thus the contribution of Nile branches, tributaries, 
and states varies considerably. The Blue Nile has a much smaller basin than 
the White Nile but it contributes more to Nile flow than the White Nile. On 
average, 59 percent of the Nile flow is from the Blue Nile, 28 percent from 
the White Nile, and 13 percent from the Atbara River (Shapland, 1997: 59). 
14 percent of the White Nile flow in from the upper Nile states and the other 
14 percent is from the Sobat River (Abu-Zeid & Biswas ed.al., 1996: 67). 
The Blue Nile's contribution is the largest but is seasonal. Most of the 
flow comes in August, September and October, just after the monsoon 
season in the Ethiopian highlands. At those times the Blue Nile may account 
for up to 90 percent of Nile flow, where as in July, just prior to the wet 
season, it may account for a little as 20 percent of the main flow of the Nile. 
The White Nile's contribution, on the other hand, is small but steady. The 
contribution to Nile flow also varies considerably among countries Ethiopia 
contributes 86 percent of Nile flow, whereas Egypt contributes nothing. The 
upper White Nile states contribute a total of 14 percent of water (Shapland, 
1997: 59-60). 
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Table No—5.2 
Rate of Population Growth of major users of Nile Waters 
in the Basin Region. 
Country 
Egypt 
Sudan 
Ethiopia 
Uganda 
Total 
Populati 
on 
Growth 
(in %) 
1.7% 
2.1% 
2.8% 
3.6% 
Populatio 
n2007 
(millions) 
80.3 
39.3 
76.5 
30.2 
226 
Projecte 
d 
Populati 
on 2025 
(millions 
) 
109.2 
56.9 
114.6 
56.8 
338 
GNPper 
capita 
2006 est. 
(purchasi 
ng 
power) 
4,200 
2,300 
1,000 
1,800 
Per 
capita 
water 
availabili 
tyl990 
(cubic 
meters) 
1,123 
4,792 
2,207 
3,759 
Per capita 
water 
availabilit 
y2025 
(cubic 
meters) 
630 
1,993 
842 
1,437 
Source: TFDD, 2007 
http ://www.transboundary waters.orst.edu/ s i 
While climate change and pollution are bound to have some effect on 
the availability of fresh water in the Nile Basin, "the greatest single pressure 
has been caused by the very rapid growth of population" (Topkaya, 1 May 
2007: 18-29). i 
In the next 18 years the population of these four countries is expected 
to grow by nearly 50%. Although the population grovi^ h rate is lower than in 
the other countries, Egypt has a positive immigration rate, presumably 
because of its stable economic growth and high per capita income. Of these 
four countries Egypt is also projected to have the lowest per capita water 
availability in 2025, (Chatteri et al., 2002: 146) nearly half of what it had in 
1990. The other countries will not fair any better, as they continue to draw 
from the same limited natural resource. A shift in weather patterns, due to 
climate change or other atmospheric disturbances, may either have a slowing 
or accelerating effect on the use and availability of water, but it is unlikely to 
change the trend's momentum (Gleick, 1993: 153). 
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Domestic water use, such as for drinking, food preparation cleaning, 
laundr>', and hospitality services, accounts for only a small portion of water 
compared to agriculture in industry. Due to rising population and economic 
development, however, domestic requirements are swelling. In the Nile Basin 
today, population has risen to over 246 million and studies project an estimate 
of 800 million in 2050 (Hamilton, 1997: 6). Percapita water use also doubled 
during that time as standards of living raised, global demand for freshwater 
consequently quadrupled in 50 years (LeRoy, 1995: 15-303). 
A desert-type climate exists over most of the remainder of the area 
north to the Mediterranean. The principal characteristics of the northern 
Sudan and the desert of Egypt are aridity, a dry atmosphere, and a 
consideirable seasonal, as well as diurnal, temperature range in Upper Egypt. 
Temperatures often exceed 38°C, in Aswan, for example, the average daily 
maximum in June is 47°C. While no low temperatures are recorded anywhere 
in Sudsin or Egypt, winter temperature decrease to the north. Thus only Egypt 
has what could be called a winter season, which occurs from November to 
March when the daily maximum temperature in Cairo is 20*'C to 24°C and the 
night minimum is about 10°C. The rainfall in Egypt is of Mediterranean 
origin and falls mostly in the winter, with the amount decreasing toward the 
south. IFrom 203 mm on the coast, it falls gradually to a little over 3 mm in 
Cairo and to less than 3mm in Upper Egypt. During the spring, from March to 
June, depressions form the Sahara or along the coast travel east, causing dry 
southerly winds, which sometimes results in a condition called "Khamsin" 
(FAO, 1997: 4). Over the years Egypt has taken its full share of 55.5 billion 
cubic meters and sometimes a little more, whereas the Sudan has never got 
within 5 billion cubic meter of its allocation. By far the best land for irrigated 
agriculture is in the Delta. It has the added benefit that it enjoys a milder 
climate than other areas of Egypt. This means the evapotranspiration is lower 
and thus more crop per unit of water grown (Stoner, 1994: 2-3). 
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FLainfall varies from a high in excess of 2,000 mm a year in the 
headwaters of the Sobat in Southern Ethiopia, to a low of 10 mm around 
Aswan in Egypt. In the Equatorial Plateau, it is around 1200 mm, dropping to 
around 1000 mm over the vast tracts of southern Sudan. Potential 
evapotranspiration is at a maximum of over 2,500 mm just south of Aswan, 
falling to below 1500 mm in the Ethiopian Highlands and the Equatorial 
Plateau, a measure of the excess of run-off over the moisture deficit, the 
difference between potential and actual evapotranspiration on an annual basis. 
There is a very small region of surplus in the headwaters of the Semliki. Over 
the Ethiopian Highlands and Equatorial Plateau it is generally around 500 
mm, and rises to 2,500 mm around Aswan (Shalm, 1985; Said 1993; Sutelitte 
& Parks, 1999). 
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(C). GEOPOLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE NILE RIVER BASIN 
In the Colonial Period, Great Britain effectively controlled the entire 
Nile tlirough its military dominance in Africa and its political control of 
Egypt, the Sudan and the three upper riparian states on the White Nile. 
Colonial-era treaties ensured that no projects could be built in the Nile Basin, 
and that no upstream Nile water could be withdrawn without Egyptian and 
British consent control over the Nile was an essential part of British Colonial 
strategy. This control was also the key to Egypt's own viability, because 
Egypt, despite its military power, is vulnerable due to its heavy reliance on 
the Nile for water and position as a lower riparian (Elhance, 1999: 68-105). 
Colonial-era tensions carried over into the post Colonial period 
creating a regime in the Nile basin that was, until recently, properly 
characterized as one of open conflict. Remnants of Colonial era agreements 
compound the problems presented by already existing asymmetries in 
information, gaps in science and uncertainty about technical matters, 
ineffective means of enforcement, claims of sovereignty and superior rights, 
domestic and international conflicts in interest, and the upstream-downstream 
dynamic (Richard & Netanyahu, 1998: 1-9). 
Tension over the Nile started in Colonial time when nations with 
Colonial representation (Sudan and Egypt) were able to exploit resources of 
the other Basin Nations. At the beginning of the twentieth century, a world 
cotton shortage led Egypt (under British rule) to focus on producing cotton, 
which requires constant irrigation and high level of water (Kimberly, June 
2002: 23-28). 
The two principal elements determine the geopolitical development in 
the Nile basin are "International agreements of the water management in the 
basin and" the complex relationship among the basin states. The nature of the 
development is determined by Egypt's dominance concerning discharge 
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water exploitation, the Colonial history of the basin states and the political 
instability in most of these states. Most of the agreements among the Nile 
Basin states were signed in the Colonial Period at the initiative or under the 
influence of the Colonial powers. The governance of the Nile water resources 
based on Colonially-imposed agreements is now becoming increasingly 
outdated (Waterbury, 1992: 49). 
So far as cooperative solution are concern, the Nile basin with its ten 
riparian states and gross contrast in degrees of dependence upon the Nile 
among them, is a nightmare. Most of the agreements regarding the allocations 
of the Nile river water were completed to protect the interests of only two of 
the riparian countries Egypt and the Sudan (Shapland, 1997: 69). 
(D). INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON THE NILE WATER 
UTILIZATION 
Most of the agreements among the Nile basin states were signed in the 
Colonial period at the initiative or under the influence of the Colonial states. 
Britain which played a dominant part in these agreements protected first and 
foremost Egypt's interest and later Sudan's. The agreements do not deal with 
the development of the use of the Nile water, but rather with preventing the 
other riparian states from using it. The other Colonial powers that singed 
these agreements such as Italy, France, Belgium, did not protect the interests 
of the lands under there rule. Therefore these Colonies suffered under their 
rules especially Ethiopia, whose natural rights to use Nile water were ignored 
by the then Colonial power (Laudicina, 2007: 241). 
During the Colonial era Great Britain was the dominant power in the 
region, and controlled the major part of the basin of the Nile and the White 
Nile. The Ethiopian highlands, however, with the sources of the Blue Nile, 
were outside British control (Laudicina, 2007: 241). Britain sought to secure 
the interrupted flow of water from the Ethiopian highlands by signing 
agreements with Ethiopia or with Italy. In 1891 Britain and Italy negotiated a 
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protocol for the demarcation or their respective sphere of influence in Eastern 
Africa. Article III of the protocol established that the government of Italy not 
to do any thing that would impede the flow of the Atbara, or to construct 
other works which might effectively modify its flow into the Nile (Okdid, 
1994: 102-195). 
In 1902 Ethiopia Italy and Britain (acting for Egypt and the Sudan) 
signed a bilateral agreement known Agreement Addis Ethiopia undertook to 
seek the anent of Britain before initiation any works that might affect the flow 
of Blue Nile or Sobat River (Shapland, 1997: 70). 
In 1906 the independence state of Congo which was controlled by 
Belgium also agreed not to change the flow of the Semliki and Isangi Rivers 
into Lcike Albert without the consent of Britain and the Sudan (Okidi, 1994: 
198). 
In 1920 the Nile Project Commission was formed to asses the 
requirement of lower riparian states. The Commission estimated the Egyptian 
needs as 58 billion cubic meters per year out of his average fall of 84 billion 
cubic meters per year. The Sudan it was thought could be able to meet 
aggregation needs from the Blue Nile alone. In 1925 new water commissions 
made recommendations based on the 1920 estimate which would finally laid 
to the Nile Waters Agreement between Egypt and the Sudan on 7 May 1929. 
This agreement allocated 4 billion cubic meters per year to the Sudan and a 
total £innual amount of 48 billion cubic meters per year was reserved for 
Egypt. Thus Egypt gained overwhelming water rights in the 19029 
Agreement and also received control of hydrological studies of the Nile (Abu 
Zeid, 1992: 46). Egypt however viewed the 1929 agreement as temporary 
because the political future of the Sudan had not yet been decided (Okidi, 
1994: 327). After the abolition of the protectorate in 1922, Egyptian 
governments repeatedly asserted their aspirations concerning the Sudan. 
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From that time on wards the Sudan and the use of the Nile waters emerged as 
a serious issue in Anglo-Egyptian relations (Collins, 1990: 148f). 
The water sharing conflict has in the past been associated with a 
number of difficulties in relations between Egypt and the Sudan countries. It 
is important to note that Egypt's and the Sudan have not always been quite 
separate countries with complete separate legal identities. Originally part of 
the Turkish Empire, Egypt was occupied by Britain in 1882. In 1883, 
however, the Mahdi set up a state in the Sudan provinces until, in 1896-99, 
Joint Anglo-Egyptian military operations reconquered the provinces. In 1899 
an agreement between the British Government and the Khedive of Egypt 
created the Anglo-Egyptian the Sudan. In reality this was a condominium in 
which Britain and Egypt had joint sovereignty. Whereas Egyptian 
independence was recognized quite soon, in 1922, the Sudan did not achieve 
its own independence until 1956 (Brownlie, 1979: 54-64). 
The potential vulnerability of Egypt supply of Nile water has pre 
occupied its rulers for centuries. Indeed, according to legend, the Sultans of 
Egypt sent emissaries to Ethiopia with tribute, to persuade the emperor to 
allow the Blue Nile to continue to flow (Collins, 1990: 1-6). 
In a 1925 exchange of notes between Italy and Britain, Italy 
acknowledged the Sudan's and Egypt's "prior hydraulic rights, and thus 
agreed not to begin any projects on the Blue or White Niles or their tributaries 
which would modify the flow of the river (Carroll, 2000: 277). After the First 
World War, Egypt recognized the need to create a formal agreement on water 
allocation before further advancing any regional development plans (Lee, 
2007: 241). 
The 1929 agreement Appendix between Egypt and the Sudan 
enshrined Egypt's acquired rights to 48 billion cubic meter of water, 
sufficient to irrigate 2.19 million hectares of land. At the same time, the 
Sudan was guaranteed 4 billion cubic meters in recognition of its fiiture 
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needs. Thus the 1929 treaty embodied both of the fundamental claims 
mentioned above. It could do so because the system contained so much water 
some 84 billion cubic meters on average allowing the Sudan, as the upstream 
state, to build the Sennar Dam in order to capture its share without 
threatening Egypt's rights. Because at that time all storage facilities were 
seasonal in nature, the real issue was not water per se, but rather timely water, 
i.e., the water Egypt needed in the summer months for its cotton, sugar cane, 
and eventually rice harvests. The 1929 treaty Guaranteed Egypt's exclusive 
rights to the summer flow of the main Nile, and to enhance it, Egypt 
undertook construction of the Jebel Aulia Dam. The Sudan, by contrast, had 
to cuhivate its cotton during the winter months (Waterbury, 1979: 63-115). 
Although the Nile Waters Agreement reached in 1929 consisted only 
of an exchange of notes between the British High Commission in Cairo and 
the Egyptian Government, it provided for the regulation of the river until the 
Nile waters Agreement of 1959. The detailed 1929 arrangements 'appeared to 
work solely for the benefit of Egypt established its historic rights over the use 
of the Nile water were recognized (Collins, 1990: 157). 
This was a Landmark agreement, not only for the West Asia but for the 
world. It fixed quantitative shares in an International River. Its significance 
may have been obscured by the fact that Egypt was a sovereign state in only a 
narrov/ legal sense, and Great Britain negotiated the treaty on behalf of the 
Sudan. Nonetheless, this treaty sought to operationally the concept of fair and 
equitable use before the term was invented (Waterbury 1979: 65-114; Collins, 
1990: 198-246). 
Although one of the stated purposes of the agreement was to mobilize 
upstream developments, they served primarily to protect Egyptian 
agricultural interests, reserving a minor claim for British Sudan-generally 
ignoring other upstream riparian states rights. The 1929 agreement granted 
the vast majority of water allocation to Egypt. Of the Nile's average 84 
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billion cubic meter per year, over half was reserved for Egypt (48 billion 
cubic meter per year) and 4 billion cubic per year was allocated to Sudan, 
leaving only 32 billion cubic meter per year unallocated for the use of 
upstream riparians, or possibly for subsequent division between Egypt and 
Sudan, In addition the British government assured the Egyptian representative 
that the British government, however solicitous for the prosperity of Sudan 
has no intension of trespassing upon the natural and historic right of Egypt in 
the water of Nile (Waterbury, 1979: 110-112). 
Although the entirety of Nile water flow originates outside of Egyptian 
borders, from the Lake of Central Africa and the Blue Nile and the Atbara 
River from Ethiopia, the 1929 Agreements provided that the Sudan water 
interests would be subordinated to those of Egypt also requiring Egyptian 
oversight and approval of any irrigation, power, other water divergent project 
along the Nile. Avaire of its one vulnerable position as the farthest 
downstream state along to river, Egypt has continued the govern its, use of 
the Nile waters with the strategy of protecting and enhancing it potential 
feature claims. Since the enactment of the 1929 agreement Egypt has adhered 
to a nationalist theory of territorial water rights, according to which all 
important works on the Nile should be constructed in Egyptian territory in 
order to avoid the danger of any works build outside of the country being 
used as a political weapon against Egypt (Caponera, 1993: 653). 
5.1: STATUS OF COLONIAL AGREEMENTS 
As many of the Nile states became independent in the 1950s and 
1960s, the status of their Colonial Agreements came into question. Under the 
clean slate doctrine of International Law, successor states do not inherit the 
treaty obligations of their predecessors. A competing school of thought, 
however, contends that territorial, real, dispositive, or localized treaties pass 
from predecessor to successor state. While the clean slate doctrine in its 
absolute sense is not accepted under International Law, it is generally 
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recognized that a newly independent state starts with a clean slate with 
respect to treaties that do not contain local or real obligations (Fisseha, 1981: 
178-179). Thus, under that theory, successor states might continue to be 
bound by Colonial River treaties. 
In determining whether Colonial treaties were binding on them, newly 
independent states in the Nile region did not cite any particular School of 
International Law, but developed their own justifications for renouncing 
Colonial treaties. According to the Nyerere Doctrine of Treaty Succession 
originally asserted by the first president of Tanganyika (Tanzania) Julius, 
developed by Tanzania, treaties applying to territories under British Colonial 
Administration lapsed when the territories became independent (Okidi, 1994: 
328-3329). Under this doctrine, the Colonial treaties are not binding on the 
newly independent states because the new states never took part in the 
negotiations creating the obligations under the treaties. Thus, Tanzania, 
Uganda, and Kenya argued that the 1929 exchange of notes lapsed when they 
became independent in 1961, 1962, and 1963 respectively (Collins, 1990: 
122). Egypt, however, maintained that the 1929 exchange of notes remained 
applicable "pending further agreement". 
Ethiopia's view of the Nile Agreements signed by Colonial 
governments is not clear (Okidi, 1994: 329). Egypt and the Sudan insist that 
the 1902 treaty among Ethiopia, Britain, and Italy established that Ethiopia 
may not begin Nile water projects without the consent of Egypt and the 
Sudan (Dellapenna, 1997: 128). Ethiopia's statements about its water rights in 
1956 £Lnd 1957, however, indicate that it no longer regards the Colonial Nile 
Agreements as binding on itself or other successor states (Fisseha, 1981: 
189). Ethiopia has questioned the validity of such agreements for a number of 
reasons (Okidi, 1994: 324). For example, Ethiopia argued that it could 
denounce the Colonial Nile Agreements, not only under the clean slate 
doctrine of state succession, but based on the Egyptian and the Sudanese 
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practice of denouncing treaties signed by Britain on their behalf if they no 
longer reflect their development needs (Dellapenna, 1997: 128). Because 
Ethiopia received no benefit whatsoever from these Colonial Water 
Agreements, it could denounce them as inadequately representing its need to 
develop water resources. 
In general, Egypt has maintained that the Colonial Agreements are 
controlling, but other former Colonies have disagreed with this position. Due 
to state succession in the region and the change in economic and political 
circumstances of the Nile states, the status of the Colonial Agreements is 
unclear (Fisseha, 1981: 187). 
(E). EGYPT AND SUDAN CONFLICT OVER THE NILE RIVER BASIN 
For the states of the Nile Basin upstream of Egypt and Sudan, 
shortages of water could act as a constraint on economic development. For 
Egypt ;and the Sudan, the situation in different. Both countries already make 
extensive use of Nile water. Egypt could suffer from higher consumption by 
Sudan. Egypt is portienterly Nulnerable. It has no significant sources of water 
apart fi^ om the Nile. Are-negotiating of the Agreement to give, Egypt more 
water in out of the question. In a 1925 exchange of notes between Italy and 
Britain, Italy acknowledged the Sudan's and Egypt's "prior hydraulic rights, 
and thus agreed not to begin any projects on the Blue or White Niles or their 
tributaries which would modify the flow of the river (Carroll, 2000: 277). But 
the end of First World War, Egypt recognized the need to create a formal 
agreement on water allocation before further advancing any regional 
development plans (Lee, 2007: 241). 
Egypt acknowledged that it was willing to allocate more water for the 
Sudanese development, but only insofar as it did not "infringe Egypt's natural 
and historical rights in the waters of the Nile and its requirements of 
agricultural extension". The Egyptian government reiterated the requirement 
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of its prior consent of the Sudanese projects along the Nile (Carroll, 2000: 
277). 
The 1929 agreement between Egypt and the Sudan enshrined Egypt's 
acquired rights to 48 billion cubic meter of water, sufficient to irrigate 2.19 
million hectares of land. At the same time, the Sudan was guaranteed 4 
billion cubic meters in recognition of its future needs. Thus the 1929 treaty 
embodied both of the fundamental claims mentioned above. It could do so 
because the system contained so much water some 84 billion cubic meters on 
average allowing the Sudan, as the upstream state, to build the Sennar Dam in 
order to capture its share without threatening Egypt's rights. Because at that 
time all storage facilities were seasonal in nature, the real issue was not water 
per se, but rather timely water, i.e., the water Egypt needed in the summer 
months for its cotton, sugar cane, and eventually rice harvests. The 1929 
treaty guaranteed Egypt exclusive rights to the summer flow of the main Nile, 
and to enhance it Egypt undertook construction of the Jebel Aulia Dam. The 
Sudan, by contrast, had to cultivate its cotton during the winter months 
(Waterbury, 1979:63-115). 
This was a Landmark agreement, not only for the West Asia but for the 
world. It fixed quantitative shares in an International River, Its significance 
may have been obscured by the fact that Egypt was a sovereign state in only a 
narrow legal sense, and Great Britain negotiated the treaty on behalf of the 
Sudan. Nonetheless, this treaty sought to operationally the concept of fair and 
equitable use before the term was invented (Waterbury 1979: 65-114; Collins, 
1990:198-246). 
In 1956 the Republic of the Sudan was inaugurated, and the first prime 
Minister, Ismail al-Azhari, immediately reiterated that the 1929 Agreement 
should be revised just when Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt was contemplating 
the creation of a massive new Dam at Aswan. The year 1956-58 witnessed a 
serious dispute between the two countries over their share of the Nile waters. 
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and Egypt withdrew from a previous undertaking to help the Sudanese to 
build a reservoir at Roseires on the Blue Nile, because of their continuing 
objections to the construction of what became known as the Aswan High 
Dam. Relations deteriorated further when the Sudan declared unilaterally its 
non-adherence to the 1929 agreement, and during this period of tension, 
Egyptian army units were moved to the border as a show of force (Gabriel, 
1991:570). 
After the military take-over in Khartoum in 1958, the regime headed 
by General Ibrahim Abboud began to soften its stance towards Cairo and the 
following year an agreement between the Republic of the Sudan and the 
United Arab Republic of the Sudan and the United Arab Republic was signed 
for the fiill utilization of the Nile waters (Collins, 1990: 406-13). 
The deadlock was eventually broken. In 1958, Egypt had received a 
promise of fiinding for the High Dam from the Soviet Union-a promise that 
was not conditional on Sudanese agreements to the project. The Sudanese 
found themselves in a less favourable position as regards Rpseires: they asked 
the World Bank for finance but were told in March 1959 that this would only 
be forthcoming if they were to sign an accord with Egypt (Abdalla, 1971: 
67-80). 
The other important issue between Egypt and the Sudan arose quite 
simply and understandably from the fact that the waters of the Nile in Egypt 
originate far to the south, not only beyond its own orders but also beyond the 
borders of Sudan with Ethiopia. As the gift of the Nile', utterly dependent on 
its water, Egypt has perhaps the greatest vested interests in resolving any 
disputes with its upstream neighbour. Indeed, up to just before the Sudan's 
independence in 1956 many writers and politicians on both sides of the 
border argued strongly for some from of unity between the two countries, and 
it was the mutuality of interests over the Nile waters that initiated and 
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perpetuated such movements for Egyptian-Sudanese unity (Waterbury, 1979: 
43). 
In November 1958, the Sudanese army took over the government of 
the country and negotiations between the two governments were quickly 
resumed. Three committees were set up-for trade, financial matters and the 
Nile waters. The question of the Nile was therefore now to be linked with 
trade and financial relations between the two countries- matters of urgent 
importance to Sudan which had suffered seriously from the disruption of 
trade and financial relations during its period of dispute with Egypt 
(Megahied, 1973: 89). 
(F). 1959 AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND THE SUDAN 
After the Sudan independence it sought revisions of the 1929 
agreement. In 1958 the Sudan officially repudiated the 1929 the exchange of 
notes on the grounds that economic and technical development since 1929 
had rendered these provisions obsolescent (Fisseha, 1981: 187). In 1959 
Egypt and Sudan negotiated the agreement on the fiiU utilization of the Nile 
waters. It will not be out of contest to briefly explain the signing of the 1959 
agreement between Egypt and the Sudan. In the intervening 30 years the 
needs of Egypt and the Sudan for irrigations waters have grown dramatically. 
Seasonal storage facilities would not capture enough of the annual flood to 
meet the increased demands. After the military coup of 1952 Egypt advocated 
Aswan. High Dam as the solution to over year storage. Egypt in fact rejected 
for a time the century water scheme that had been elaborated by the British 
and would have played sfick storage facilities (Collins, 1990: 205). The 
Egyptian considered the British plan as a step to deprive her water needs and 
maximized their vulnerability. The Aswan high Dam was intended to ensure a 
regular supply of drinking and irrigation water all year-round, during flood 
and low water season, and every year, whether wet or dry. Egypt needed 
Sudanese agreement because the vast reservoir to be impounded by the Dam 
195 
would flood Sudanese territory. Less immediate but more important in the 
long term was the Egyptian desire to ensure that Sudan would not do any 
thing that would reduce the flow of the Nile into Egypt to an extent would 
jeopardize the operation of the High Dam. Negotiations dragged on for a 
number of years, the principal stumbling block being Sudanese unwilling 
ness to agree to the High Dam without a substantial increase in the pattny 4 
billion cubic meter of Nile water allocated to Sudan by the 1929 agreement. 
In 1954 which was broken off inconclusively (Collins, 1990: 200-205). The 
position of the two sides can be summerised as fallow: 
5.2: EGYPTIAN POSITION 
• Existing needs should take priority. These were described as being 51 
billion cubic meter for Egypt and four billion cubic meters for the 
Sudan, out of average flow of 80 billion cubic meters as measured at 
Aswan (Waterbury, 1970: 64). 
• Any remainder from development projects should divide as a 
percentage of each country's population after subtracting 10 billion 
cubic meters for evaporation losses. The respective population and 
growth rates led to an Egyptian formula for 22/30 of the remainder, or 
11 billion cubic meters for Egypt, and 8/30, or four billion cubic 
meters for the Sudan (Allanl993b: 78). 
• There should be one large storage facility, a High Dam at Aswan, 
• Total allocations would therefore be 62 billion cubic meters for Egypt 
and 8 billion cubic meters for the Sudan (TFDD, 2007: 3-19). 
5.3: THE SUDANESE POSITION 
• Sudan insisted on using the standard value of 84 billion cubic meters for 
average Nile discharge, and insisted that Egypt's acquired rights were for 
48 billion cubic meters, not 51 billion cubic meters that claimed. 
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• Sudjin also suggested that their population was actually 50 percent larger 
than Egypt had estimated, and that resulting population-based allocations 
should be adjusted accordingly, giving the Sudan at least one third of any 
additional water (Knott & Hewett, 1990: 4-74). 
• Storage facilities should be smaller and upstream, as envisioned in the 
Century Storage Scheme. Consequently, if Egypt insisted on one large 
project, with comparatively high evaporation losses, these losses should 
be deducted from Egypt's share (TFDD, 2007: 5-21). 
• Total allocations, therefore, should be approximately 59 billion cubic 
meter (69 BCM less evaporation) for Egypt and 15 billion cubic meters 
for the Sudan. (The Nile Basin Global perspective, (http://butler.cc.tut.fity-
asheesh/nile.htm). 
Table No-5.4 
Water Allocations from Nile Negotiations. 
Position 
Egyptian 
Sudanese 
Nile Water treaty (1959) 
Egypt (BCM/year) 
62.0 
59.0 
55.5 
Sudan (BCM/year) 
8.0 
15.0 
18.5 
Source: Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD, 2007) 
http ://www.transbpundarywaters .orst.edu/ 
1 The Egyptian position assumed an average flow of 80 billion cubic meters 
per year and divided approximately 10 billion cubic meters per year in 
evaporation losses equally. 
2 The Sudanese position assumed an average flow of 84 billion cubic 
meters per year and deducted evaporation from the Egyptian allocations. 
3 The Treaty allowed for an average flow of 84 billion cubic meters per 
year and divided evaporation losses equally. 
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Graph 5.6: Water Allocations from Nile Negotiations. 
Egypt (BCM/year) 
• ^yptian | 
I i 
mSudanese 
ID Nile Water treaty (1959) 
Sudan (BCM/year) 
In April 1955 negotiation against started regarding the revision of 1929 
treaty. However due to different positions of negotiating party's nothing 
could be agreed upon. Relations then threatened to degrade into military 
conformations in 1958 when Egypt sent an unsuccessful expedition into 
territory in disputes between the two countries in the summer of 1959 Sudan 
unilaterally raised Sennar Dam, affectively repudiating the 1929 agreement. 
Sudan also wanted to build a Dam at Roseires and needed international 
finance (Chesworth, 1990; 66-90). But this money was not likely to be 
forthcoming as long as Egypt raised objections to the project. The World 
Bank put a condition for singing a accords with Egypt. This was conveyed to 
the military regime in Sudan in March 1959 (Abdalla, 1971: 1-81). The 
military regime adopted a more conciliatory tone in the negotiations and 
finally on 8"^  November 1959 the agreement of full utilizafion of the Nile was 
signed between the Egypt and the Sudan. The following are the main, 
provisions of the 1959 agreement (Collins, 1990: 54-72). 
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5.4: PROVISIONS 
The Nile Water Treaty had the following provisions: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
The average flow of the river is considered to be 84 billion cubic meter 
per year. Evaporation and seepage were considered to be 10 billion 
cubic meter per year, leaving 74 billion cubic meters to be divided. 
Of this total, acquired rights have precedence, and are described as 
being 48 billion cubic meter for Egypt and 4 billion cubic meters for 
Sudan. The remaining benefits of approximately 22 billion cubic meter 
are divided by a ratio of 7/12 for Egypt (approx. 7.5 billion cubic meter 
per year) and 14 Vi for Sudan (approx. 14.5 billion cubic meter per 
year). These allocations total 55.5 billion cubic meters per year for 
Egypt and 18.5 billion cubic meters per year for the Sudan (Mahmoud, 
2003:7-6). 
If the average yield increases from these average figures, the increase 
would be divided equally. Significant decreases would be taken up by 
technical committee, described below. 
Since Sudan could not absorb that much water at the time, the treaty 
also provided for the Sudanese water "loan" to Egypt of 1,500 million 
cubic meters per year. 
Funding for any project which increases Nile flow (after the High 
Dam) would be provided evenly, and the resulting additional water 
would be split evenly. 
A Permanent Joint Technical Committee to resolve disputes and jointly 
review claims by any other riparian would be established. The 
Committee would also determine allocations in the event of 
exceptional low flows. 
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• Egypt agreed to pay Sudan E$15 million in compensation for flooding 
and relocations (Mahmoud, 2003: 7-6). 
The 1959 agreement was a success in permitting both Egypt and the 
Sudan to carry out projects that they regarded as vital to their development. 
The agreement also removed cause of tension that had soured relations 
between them for most of the 1950s. For Egypt in particular, the agreement 
provided the benefit of the enhance security of water supply (Collins, 1990: 
22). There are two elements which can be considered important to the signing 
countries. The first was the removal of Sudanese threat in that the maximum 
volume of water which could Sudan takes was defined. Thus, Egypt has got 
assurance of sufficient water supply. The second element provably more 
importamt was the agreement allowed the High Dam to go ahead. It also 
allows Egypt to store water on its own territories and there by to have 
complete control over the timing of it's realized. However Egypt and Sudan 
ignored the rights of the remaining basins states, the upstream states and they 
also agreed to cooperate in rejecting any future claims that these states might 
make (Holell et al., 1998: 46-48). Egypt and the Sudan also agreed to present 
a unified view in any other negotiations concerning the Nile waters. Egypt 
also reserved the right to unilaterally begin any the Nile related project 
without the consent of other riparian nations (Al-Ahram, June 11, 2004: 78). 
Although 1929 agreements served as a basis for principles of the Nile 
water allocations, modem governance of the Nile River Basin has relied 
primarily on the legal foundations set forth in a formal 1959 agreement 
between the Sudan and Egypt, and subsequent adhoc political compromises 
(Shapland, 1997: 84-85). While 1959 agreement affectively replaced 
allocations set forth in the 1929 agreements, the agreements together create a 
comprehensive regime. Of particular important is the fact that the 1929 
agreements explicitly bound upstream riparian states, while the 1959 
agreement simply polarized there interest with those of Egypt and the Sudan, 
despite the fact that only the two downstream nations were actually 
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signatories to the treaty (Carroll, 1999: 282). Even today the Nile waters 
agreements remain as the co-legal basis for International the Nile Water 
allocation and large scale governess. Allocating the Nile waters the states 
assumed that the 10 billion cubic meters would be lost due to evaporation 
from the Lake Nasser and seepage under the Aswan Dam. They agreed to 
jointly prevent losses of the Nile Basin Waters from the Sudanese Swamps. 
Despite the glaring inequities, the other basin nations have adhered to 
the allocations of the treaty until present date and no other riparian nations 
have exercise a legal claim to the water distributed under the 1959 tributaries 
(Hobbs, 15may,2004: 13). 
5.5: 1 HE ATTITUDES OF OTHER RIPARIAN STATES 
The great short coming of the 1959 agreements was that it was signed 
by only two of the states in the Nile Basins. However the other riparian 
nations have expressed dissatisfactions with the 1959 agreement (Nkrumah, 
Al-Arham, 11 June 2004: 32). There is no evidence that Ethiopia, the major 
contributor to Nile flow was invited to the negotiations of 1959 agreements 
(Okid, 1994: 333). Egypt and the Sudan estimated that the combined need of 
all other riparian nations would not exceed one or two billion cubic meter per 
year. Ethiopia one of the world poorest nations, accounts for more than 75 
percent of the water fallowing into the Nile River, but consumed less than 1 
percent of the Nile water (Joyce, 16 March, 2004: 18-52). Ethiopia served 
notice in 1957 that it would pursue unilateral development of the Nile 
resources within its territories and had announced plans to use the Nile waters 
for irrigation both within and outside of the Nile water sharing. In renouncing 
the treaties, Tanzanians Minister of water resources Edward Lowasa, 
explained it's in equitable underpinnings by saying "the treaties have been 
entered into without the consent of the people of the region. The British had 
no mandate to sign treaties with Egypt on our behalf (Nkrumah, Al-Aharam, 
11 June 2004: 67). As outrage spreads through Northern Africa, the east 
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African press printed editorials chronicling the injustice of the treaty as a 
Colonial relic (Davin, 13 April 2004: 63). Further since its independence the 
Kenyan government has stated publicly that it does not recognized the treaty. 
Uganda also announced its dissatisfactions regarding the allocations of water 
mentioned in 1959 agreement (All Africa.com, 12 January 2007). Despite 
such dissatisfactions the treaty has remained intact because Egypt has made it 
note that it will consider any attempt to violate the treaty as an act of War 
(Cathy, 18 March, 2004: 15). As an economic military power Egypt is 
superior to other region's nations among the countries of the region. The 
Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, Burundi, Rwandan have suffered from serious 
internal crises. Tanzania on the brinks of famine and Kenya in a continually 
volatile state are also politically unstable. Egypt has had a more stable history 
which however has not been fiiUy free of conflicts and violence. 
E'^ gypt's greater fear over the years has been that Ethiopia might under 
take development of its western, Blue Nile, watershed without obtaining 
Egyptians acquiescence. Geography would seem to make such developments 
inevitable at some times. 
In the 1970s and 1980s the upstream states' water requirements grew, 
and therefore the issue of allocating Nile water arose, as well as the old 
dispute concerning Colonial accords. In 1977 Ethiopian announced at a UN 
conference that it intended to utilize the water of the Blue Nile and made 
similar statements at the end of the 1970s and in 1981 at a UN conference on 
developing countries. These declarations mentioned the irrigation of 3.8-3.9 
million hectares in the Blue Nile basin, as well as several million more 
hectares in the basins of the Sobat, Akobo, and Umo tributaries (Waterbury, 
1979: 78). The equatorial states also stated their intention to utilize the Nile 
water. 
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Egypt was caught in a dilemma. On the one hand, it could not ignore 
the rights of all the riparian states to use the Nile water, and it wished to 
create a positive image as a cooperative country. 
Egypt's response to Ethiopia's statement of intent was therefore 
twofold. First, it threatened military action: in 1978 president Anwar Sadat 
said that the Egyptian army would attack any state that seized Egypt's water 
(Waterbury, 1979: 78). In 1990 Egypt again warned Ethiopia not to utilize the 
Nile water, and included Israel in its warning, stipulating that Israel should 
not aid Ethiopia in implementing its plans (Maariv, July 1, 1990: 74). On July 
7, 1991, the Egyptian Minister for Irrigation warned that if Ethiopia 
cooperated with Israel in diverting the Nile waters, Egypt would consider this 
a Casus Belli. On the other hand, Egypt was prepared to offer Ethiopia 2 
billion cubic meter of water during the drought, and to undertake that all 
waters added to the basin through development projects would be divided 
among Egypt, the Sudan, and Ethiopia (Shahin, 1986: 32). 
(G). THE SUDAN AND ETHOPIA 
The Nile water originates on the Ethiopian side of the boundary. One 
major reason for this must be the tendency to view the Nile Basin a consisting 
largely of the former British controlled or administered areas notably Egypt, 
the Sudan and Uganda. 'The Nile still means to many people primarily that 
part of the Nile which rises on the Lake Plateau of East Africa. However, 
from tlie point of view of the Nile water resources, the contribution made by 
Ethiopia is critical and so, therefore, are the relations between the Sudan and 
Ethiopia. 
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, the ancient Empire of 
Ethiopia was faced with Egyptian territorial designs along it western frontiers, 
however imprecisely defined (Abir, 1967: 60). In the last year of the century 
European Colonial expansion established general areas of influence, leaving 
Ethiopia with the Italian sphere, are making the- extinction of Ethiopia 
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apparently imminent (Brownlie, 1979: 855). For this reason the British, 
French and Italians made a series of arrangements between 1898-1907 which 
recognized the existence and territorial integrity of Ethiopia. At this stage, 
however, the Sudan-Ethiopia boundary was described as the eastern frontier 
of Egypt, for at that time Britain upheld the rights of Egypt in the Nile Valley, 
including what is now the Sudan. The Egypt and the Sudan, it was not until 
later that the Sudan acquired separate status and finally, in 1956, 
independence as the Republic of the Sudan. The main change to the territory 
of Ethiopia occurred a few year earlier, in 1952, when Eritrea, formerly an 
Italian colony, was transferred to Ethiopia by the United Nations (Brownlie, 
1979: 856; Hussein, 1977:29). 
ITie treating is that, based on the 1902 treaty, the boundary was 
demarcated by Gwynn, a British Boundary Commissioner in 1903 and is still 
know as the 'Gwynn Line'. Ethiopia and Sudan accepted in a joint 
Communique of 1967, but an agreement of 1972 allows for the rectification 
of the boundary to eradicate any problems arising in the Baro salient region. 
The exits from Ethiopia, of the Blue Nile and Sobat Rivers. In the 1902 
Agreement III refers specifically to the importance of these water resources: 
Ethiopia undertook 'not to construct, or allow to be constructed, any work 
across the Blue Nile, Lake Tana or the Sobat which would arrest the flow of 
their water into the Nile except in agreement with the governments of Britain 
and the Sudan (Brownline,1979: 857). 
5.6: THE SUDAN AND ETHIOPIAN AGREEMENT OF 1991 
At the time of Sudanese independence in 1956, the Ethiopian 
government set forth its position on the Blue Nile in term reflective of the 
Harmon Doctrine (Collins, 1990: 71-82), and reiterated that position in 1977 
at the Mardel Plata Water Conference (Waterbury, 1982: 78). On December 
23 1991, the new Ethiopian government drafted an accord of friendship and 
peace with the Sudan in which both sides affirmed their commitment to 
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equitable shares in tlie Nile waters and the avoidance of appreciable harm to 
one another. 
The agreement that Ethiopia and the Sudan signed in 1991 is 
committing the two countries to the principle of equitable utilization of the 
waters of the Blue Nile and Atbara Rivers. The two states established a 
Technical Joint Committee to exchange data and to explore co-operation 
(Dellapenna, 1997: 132-133). By so doing the Sudan has already moved away 
from the 'united front binds it with Egypt where the two countries in the 1959 
the Nile waters Agreement Committed themselves to act as a 'united front' 
with regsird to the upstream demands for waters. The alliance between the two 
countries was a serious one to the extent that it has led to the adoption of 
policies for economic and political integration (Dellapenna, 1997: 132; 
Collin, 1990). Analysts observe that the Sudan has ides of building an 
alliance with Ethiopia for mutually benefiting from water; and that this 
alliance should widen to include the states of east Africa (Owda, 1999: 58). 
Ethiopia declared its intention to become a fiill member in all 
organizations of the basin states with the objective of establishing a Nile 
Basin Organization. The two sides agreed to set up a Join Technical 
Committee for the exchange of data and to explore possible lines of 
cooperation. While this accord was not caused for alarm to Egypt, the 
statements of the Ethiopian Prime Minister of May 20, 1993, were. After a 
visit to Israel, he was quoted as saying that his government had advanced 
proposals to Egypt for a redistribution of the Nile water. Ethiopia would thus 
find itself in support of a demand voiced over the years by many the 
Sudanese (and provided for in the 1959 agreement) that the established 
allocation be re-negotiated. Any such renegotiation could only come at the 
expense of part of Egypt's existing share (Auda, 1993: 32). 
Given the fact that the Sudan has maintained this' united front' with 
Egypt for three decades without interruption, despite periods of serious 
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conflict between the two countries, the move could be considered the first 
significant diversion from the norms that govern the relationship between the 
two countries over the Nile waters. The conditions that gave rise to this move 
are harsh enough to jeopardize the historical alliance with Egypt. Observers 
believe that the major that the major development that has led to this move is 
the severity of drought and desertification and their repercussions in the 
Sudan in the 1980s and 1990s (Shapland, 1997: 82). 
The agreement that Ethiopia signed with the Sudan appears to concede 
more to Ethiopia's position, which appeals to equitable entitlement, as the 
guiding principle in international law of shared rivers. As for Egypt, the 
Sudan started to, partly, be similar to Ethiopia (the historical source of threat 
to the Nile flow) in Egypt's image and reaction and a tense atmosphere had 
taken place (Bleier, 1997: 116). 
(H). EGYPT AND ETHIOPIA 
5.7 FRAMEWORK FOR GENERAL COOPERATION, JULY, 1993 
By the late 1970s the exchange over the Nile between Ethiopia and 
Egypt were taking place against a background of hostility in other areas. Not 
only did the two countries have different superpower backers they gave 
support to each other's regional enemies. Ethiopia had drawn close to Libya, 
with which Egypt had fought a brief border war in July 1977, while Egypt 
had supported Somalia during its War with Ethiopia over the Ogaden region 
in 1977-78. 
The Egyptians seem to have feared that, with Soviet help, Ethiopia 
might use the Blue Nile 'for political ends'. In mid-1978, Sadat threatened 
strong counter measures, even if this led to war, if any step were taken to alter 
the course of the Blue Nile (Al-Ahram, 5 October, 1991: 17). 
In 1980, Egypt announced its intention to irrigate land in Sinai with 
Nile water, Ethiopia (probably at Soviet instigation) sent a memorandum to 
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the OAU accusing Egypt of misusing the waters of the Blue Nile and 
infringing the rights of other riparian states (on the ground that Sinai lay 
outside the Nile basin). The memorandum reserved Ethiopia's right to use the 
waters of the Blue Nile on its territory as it wished. Sadat responded with 
public threats of war, on one occasion advising an audience of army officers 
to prepare a plan to foil attempt by Ethiopia to impede the flow of the Nile 
(Guardian, 6 June, 1980:3). 
The case of Egypt highlights the variety of contextual features that help 
clarify whether, and to what degree, the depletion and /or degradation of a 
water supply may be considered a national security concern. These features 
include. 
• The quantity and quality of the resource endowment relative to 
(present and future) consumption demand; 
• The nature of resource dependence, that is, whether the state is 
dependent on one or more sources and whether the source (or sources) 
is shared, as in a transboundary river and; 
• In the case of transboundary Rivers, the number of riparian states 
involved, the nature of relations with the other riparian states, and 
finally, geographic position within the basin. 
For Egypt, aridity, high population grov^h, absolute dependence on 
one, shared body of water, downstream position, and the threat of important 
extractions upstream coalesce in a perception that water is indeed a security 
concern: Deleterious changes to the resource would threaten the country's 
welfare and would invite some centrally coordinated national response. There 
is, however, an important mitigating condition: Egypt's relative power in the 
basin, in terms of military force and economic and political power, is superior 
to the other riparian states, such that the latter are unlikely to engage in 
actions that could provoke a hostile response downstream (Lowi, 1999: 382). 
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Ethiopian and Egyptian statements on the division of the waters of the 
Nile have been less bellicose. President Mubarak, who succeeded Sadat after 
his assassination in 1981, has not repeated Sadat's threats. However Egyptian 
Ministers continued to allude to their country's vital interest. In 1985, 
Boutros-Ghali, then Minister of state for Foreign Affairs, told 'next war in 
our region will be over the water of the Nile, not politics. In October 1991, 
General Tantawi, the Minister of Defense, told that Egypt might use force to 
protect Egypt's supply of Nile water. He made clear, however, that this would 
be a last resort, should all other means fail: 'We are not ruling out the 
possibility of using some acts of deterrence after exhausting peacefiil means 
in case ;my party tries to control the River Nile (Abu-Zeid, 1992: 79). If these 
statements were intended as a warning to Ethiopia that what Tantawi called 
'Egypt's lifeline' could not be interrupted with impunity, it was a rather 
gentle one compared to Sadat's dramatic threats of over a decade before 
(Waterbury, 1991:64-67). 
irhe two sides specified that neither of them would do anything with 
the Nile that causes 'appreciable harm' to the other. The two countries went 
further to agreeing to consult and co-operate in projects of mutual advantages 
such as projects that would enhance the volume of flow and decrease the loss 
of water through a comprehensive and integrated development schemes 
(Shaplaind, 1997: 81). 
The agreement between Egypt and Ethiopia "safeguards Egypt's 
supply of the Nile from Ethiopia by giving prominence to the principle of the 
avoidance of appreciable harm: the Egyptians would almost certainly argue 
that any reduction of flow in the Blue Nile caused by works in Ethiopia 
would constitute such harm. The concomitant gain for Ethiopia is Egyptian 
cooperation in developing the Blue Nile Basin for Ethiopia's benefit as well 
as for Egypt's (Shapland, 1997: 81). 
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A rapprochement between Egypt and Ethiopia had begun after 
Mengistu's fall. In July 1993, the two states signed a 'Framework for General 
Cooperation' that included clauses relating to the Nile (Tabbia, 4 August, 
1994: 13). 
Both the 1991 declaration by Ethiopia and the Sudan and the 1993 
agreement between Ethiopia and Egypt were statements of general principles. 
The former appeared to concede more to Ethiopia's position than the latter, 
since Ethiopia had for some years argued that the guiding principle of the 
International Law of shared rivers was that of equitable entitlement. The 
wording of Ethiopia's agreement with Egypt, in making no explicit mention 
of equity, still allows the Egyptians to insist that the guiding legal principle 
should rather be the avoidance of appreciable harm (Tabbia, 4 August, 1994). 
In November 1993, Ethiopia reached a similar agreement in principal 
with Uganda, to the effect that usage of the Nile should be fair. None of these 
agreements gave any indication of what volume of water Ethiopia might use. 
The 1959 Agreement between Egypt and the Sudan remains the only accord 
which makes any apportionment of the waters of the Nile (Shapland, 1997: 
82). 
Although Egypt is the downstream state in this river system, and 
utterly dependent upon it, it is also the most powerful economic and military 
power in the basin. It cannot project that power easily throughout the basin, 
but no other riparian, including Ethiopia, can afford to ignore it. It is for that 
reason that Egypt may be described as quasi-hegemony. It carmot impose a 
solution, but it can coax and threaten its neighbors convincingly (Whittington 
& McClelland, 1992:43). 
(I). THE NILE BASIN INITIATIVE 
Recognizing the need for collective action, the Nile nations took a 
historic step by establishing the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) in February 1999. 
The programe was designed "to achieve sustainable socio-economic 
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development through the equitable utilization of, and benefit from, the 
common Nile basin water resources" (Nile Basin Initiative, January 28, 2007: 
17). The Nile basin Initiative created the Nile Council of Ministers ("Nile-
Corn"), comprising water ministers from all of the riparian countries, as its 
highest decision-making body (Davin, April 30, 2004: 15). 
Tlie Nile-COM released a statement declaring, we all be lived that by 
moving together to major joint development, we can look forward to peace 
and prosperity and not backwards to dispute and conflict. However, the NBI 
is only a transitional arrangement designed to foster communication until a 
permanent framework is in place (Nile Basin Initiative, January 28, 2007). 
While the NBI is a great step toward diplomacy, until a permanent water 
management program is created, conflict will continue to escalate (Davin, 
ApriBO, 2004: 13-25). 
A final alternative to an entirely renegotiated Nile treaty regime is the 
NBI, which was established in 1999. After the establishment, the NBI has 
provided the most promising framework for organization, development, and 
cooperation across riparian states and was formed by agreement between 
ministers of all ten the Nile Basin Nations. According to a recent Joint 
Statement of the Nile Basin Council of Ministers (the organization's chief 
operating body). 
Since 1999, the Nile Basin Initiative has built a temporary the Nile 
institution, with its Secretariat in Entebbe, Uganda; we have engaged in 
detailed discussions on a permanent cooperative institutional and legal 
framework; we have designed a program of eight Shared Vision Projects 
which bring all Nile countries together, building trust and capacity; and we 
have begun the preparation of major Joint Development Projects, which 
involve two or more countries, bringing direct benefits to our people (Nile 
Basin Initiative, March 18,2004:13-23). 
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The Nile Basin Initiative operates on a broad, "basin-wide" scale, 
serving as a central coordinating body, attracting investment and 
implementing large-scale multilateral development projects (Wiebe, 2001: 
751). It also aims to establish contact with nation-specific and localized needs 
and concerns, maintaining a technical coordinating body (the Nile Basin 
Initiative Technical Advisory Committee) composed of experts delegated by 
each basin state (Nile Basin Initiative, March 18, 2004: 25). 
Although the primary projects of the NBI-the eight Shared Vision 
Projects-function on a large-scale multinational basis, the organization 
attempts to decentralize the process as much as possible, providing training 
and implementation opportunities for basin communities (Nile Basin 
Initiative, February 15, 2006: 24). While the Nile Basin Initiative provides a 
significimt new basis for coordinating development and attracting investment, 
however, cooperation, political dialogue, and facilitation can only go so far. 
In order to provide a stable environment for regional and foreign investors 
and provide a foundation for resource preservation, dispute avoidance, and 
conflict resolution, there must be a permanent legal framework in place in the 
Nile Rjiver Basin. While the Nile Basin Initiative provides a model for 
centralized international governance and decentralized implementation, as 
well as a sound basis for future negotiation, it is not an end in itself The Nile 
Basin Initiative must be used as a starting point for a permanent renegotiated 
the Nile Waters Agreement—one that incorporates all basin nations, as the 
NBI has done, and binds all interested parties to a reliable international 
agreement. The distinct advantage of the Nile Basin Initiative over an open 
market for water or environment proposals, however, is that it has already 
organized broad political support and cooperation from all of the Nile Basin 
nations—an accomplishment that has never before been achieved (Nile Basin 
Initiative, February 15, 2006: 11-18). 
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(J), NA TURAL AND HISTORICAL RIGHTS CLAIM 
A similar approach is that of "natural rights," where a nation could lay 
claim to international waters on the grounds of hydrology and water 
catchment contribution, economic and social needs, and principles of 
"beneficial use" or "reasonable and equitable" distribution (Lake, 1957: 12-
111). This approach to transboundary water law, embodied primarily in the 
International Law Association's Helsinki Rules of 1967, would allow for 
claims by upstream nations on the basis of flow contribution or need, 
providing potential support for greatly increased claims by upper Nile 
riparian states (Helsinki Rules, 1967). In addition. International customary 
practices may establish a similarly increased right by upper basin nations to 
the Nile waters. Egypt, however, has historically denied such principles of 
international customary law or Natural Law claims, arguing instead strictly 
on the basis of positivist or historical and "prior use" principles (Caponera, 
1993: 660). 
Historical rights and the "prior use doctrine" have been central to the 
formation of the Nile water Agreements as well as to subsequent discussion, 
particularly as the Agreements relate to Egypt's use of the river. According to 
the prior use doctrine, a nation enjoys the right to waters that have been 
currently or historically used by that nation (Caponera, 1993: 660). Egypt 
continues to insist upon this approach, declaring that upstream riparian states 
are barred from using the Nile waters in a way that limits any established or 
historical use of the river within Egypt (Wiebe, 2001: 747). The 1959 
agreement codifies this approach, explicitly stating that "the amount of the 
Nile waters used by the United Arab Republic of Egypt until this Agreement 
is signed shall be her acquired right before obtaining the benefits of the post 
1959, Nile Control Projecf. 
The problem with the prior use doctrine in Nile River governance is 
that tliere is a significant disparity in developmental capacity between the 
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upper riparian states and Egypt. In additional to Egypt's historical control of 
the majority of the Nile Basin Resources, it access to the river's flow has 
compounded the capacity gap: As Egypt gained access to water, it was able to 
use the resource to increase capacity, which increased access even further. 
Even the modem example of Egypt's recent desert reclamation projects will 
likely impact future negotiations because they will expand Egypt's "prior 
use" of the water (Caponera, 1993: 661-662). In addition, the current trend in 
international watercourse law supports currently established "prior use" but 
denies any historical right to waters not presently in use. The Helsinki Rule of 
1967 and the 1997 United Nations Watercourse Convention, both nonbinding 
codifications of International Watercourse Law, adhere to the doctrine of 
"equitable and reasonable" uses, supporting established "prior uses" of the 
water, but only as long as such uses are reasonable as balanced against the 
interests of other basin states (Helsinki Rules, 1967). 
The Helsinki Rules state that "an existing reasonable use may continue 
in operation unless the factors justifying its continuance are outweighed by 
other factors leading to the conclusion that it be modified or terminated so as 
to accommodate a competing incompatible use". As such, the prior use 
doctrine in the Nile River Basin would be tempered by considerations of 
historical inequity and the potential for more reasonable future distribution 
among basin states. According to a scholarly critique, "Egypt's insistence 
upon the legal validity of the principle of acquired and historical rights is not 
supporl:able under the current International law of rivers" (Degefu, 11 June, 
2004). It must be noted, however, that these agreements— t^he Helsinki Rules 
and the watercourse Convention, among others—are generally nonbinding 
and have been ratified by few nations (Helsinki Rules 1 967). Egypt's 
insistence upon positivist approaches to international law will impact fiiture 
discussions of these frameworks, and the validity of the nation's historical 
claims to the river remains in question (Henkin, 1987: 56-60). 
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(K). CHALLENGES 
All countries of the basin have rapidly rising populations and some 
have problems, periodically extreme, in feeding burgeoning numbers. The 
demographic element of the food supply problem facing the Nile countries 
will continue to undermine the attempts of all governments to meet food 
demands. In the basin the rates of population growth are well above three per 
cent. The possibility of achieving a significant reduction in the rates of 
population growth in the next two decades is not high and the consequent 
economic burden will haunt the political leaderships of the Nile Basin 
countries (Abate, 1991: 112) 
E^^pt continues to feed its population but only by regularly importing 
a substantial proportion of its food staples. The Sudan has sufficient natural 
resources to feed its numbers but as recent history testifies natural and 
political events in parts of the vast country, mainly beyond the reach of the 
Nile water, have devastated food production systems so that emergency food 
has had to be imported on numerous occasions during the 1970s and the 
1980s. The countries which currently use significant volumes of Nile water 
for agriculture, Egypt and the Sudan, use just over 50 billion cubic meters per 
year, or about 60 percent of the total flow of the lower Nile system 
representing a volume close to the maximum utilizable for agricultural 
production. The other 40 percent of water is only available to a minor extent 
for economic use. 
The conflicting trends of increasing food demand and of reducing 
water availability for agriculture exacerbate the tension attending the 
evaluation of downstream water supplies (Smith, 1996: 85). 
The agreement reached between Egypt and the Sudan in 1959 was 
intended to secure Egypt's water for the foreseeable future and at least into 
the twenty first century in the agreement there was provision both for the 
security of the flow to Egypt through monitoring arrangements by Egyptian 
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engineers on the Blue Nile and elsewhere, as well as the construction of 
jointly funded structures such as the Jonglei Canal. 
The Sudan on the other hand will be able to increase agricultural 
production in so far as it will use its remaining 'share' of Nile waters 
according to its 1959 agreement with Egypt. The Sudan has adequate 
renewable natural resources to meet its current and future food demands but it 
will require dramatic changes in its economic and social infrastructures, as 
well as in its national security, if it is to fulfill its agricultural potential and 
thereby fted its population. 
The extent to which Nile water is essential to securing the future food 
supplies of the other seven states varies considerably both in scale and 
imminence. Ethiopia is the country which could use from the Blue Nile alone 
between six billion cubic meters (US Department of Interior, 1964) and 12 
billion cubic meter (Abate, 1991: 112) and while it is currently contemplating 
using the waters of the river known in the Sudan as the Sobat. The impact of 
water development in the other states of the basin is negligible, mainly 
because their withdrawals would take place at points in the catchment south 
of the Sudd of Sudan. From these marshes the depletion of the Nile water by 
evaporation and evapotranspiration is the greatest single 'consumer' of water 
after Egyptian use for agriculture. 
The major determinant of the Nile Basin Water balance remains the 
agricultural sector. The Nile provided the basin of agricultural development in 
Egypt and the Sudan since the start of agriculture, about 7,000 years ago, and 
for political reasons, most East African nations have adopted policies of self-
sufficiency when dealing with food supplies. The Nile Basin agriculture 
accounts for at least 80 person of all water consumption. Whereas a few liters 
of water per data are a basic minimum for human survival, at least a ton per 
day is required to produce the food needed for a reasonable diet for just one 
person. There are great losses of water in agriculture because this resource is 
not uses efficiently (Smith, 1996: 85). 
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An economic factor which will have a major impact on the rate at 
which food production on the Nile water will go ahead is the sheer cost of 
implementing land reclamation. It is impossible to generalize about the true 
'economic' cost of reclaiming a hectare of irrigated land throughout the basin 
as climate and other environmental factors vary so much (Allan, 1983: 247). 
The sheer cost of providing the adequate agricultural and social 
infrastructures requires the investment of well over US$25,000 per hectare on 
farm investment, suggesting levels of investment of US$ 1000 per hectares. 
Since countries are talking of reclaiming tracts of more than 500,000 to one 
million hectares, investments of US$12 bn to US$25 bn are implied. These 
sums would only cover local minor water distribution systems and on farm 
investments. In addition there will be substantial civil works to construct and 
the major engineering infrastructure for regional water distribution. No 
country of the region can from its own resources service such investment 
flows (Allan, 1983:247). 
The consequences are numerous in that the problem has its internal and 
external dimensions. Internally the pressure on scarce investment resources 
leads to conflict between spending agencies of governments. Choices have to 
be made between investment in agriculture expansion and other productive 
sectors as well as between such investment and investment in measures to 
improve the social infrastructure. Externally the problem is expressed in the 
relationships of the Nile countries with international agencies and in the 
myriad of multi-lateral and bilateral government relationships in the world of 
international assistance. All countries of the Nile Basin receive international 
aid and are substantial debtor economies owing large sums to or are deeply 
involved with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Allan, 
1983:247). 
Irrigated agriculture also continues to be a major activity in the basin. 
It is the largest user of the basin's surface water resources and a primary 
sector of economic growth in the downstream countries, Egypt and the Sudan. 
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In Egypt, irrigated agriculture is the dominant sector. Over 4 mn ha under 
irrigation, and there are plans to expand over an area of another 1 mn ha. In 
the Sudan, the irrigation sub sector contributes 65 per cent of the GNP and 
extends over an area of 1.5 million ha, with plans to expand over an area of 
another 1.5 million ha. 
The role of the irrigation sub sector diminishes as one move to the 
upper reaches of the river basin. Present irrigation in the Upper White Nile 
riparian areas is very limited. In Ethiopia, too, much of the irrigation is 
practiced by traditional farmers, and is not significant. According to a 1984 
FAO study, the potential identified in the Blue Nile basin includes 100,000 ha 
of perennial irrigation, requiring storage, and 165,000 ha of small-scale 
seasonal irrigation. The other riparian countries, Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire, 
have no potential for irrigation in the basin and depend almost completely on 
rainfed agriculture (UNDP fact-finding mission report). 
The expansion of irrigated agriculture in the years ahead will require 
basin-wide cooperation in the management of water resources to meet 
increasing demands and to face the environmental consequences associated 
with them. The downstream states have vast experience in this sector, which 
through cooperation, could be put at the disposal of the upstream countries. 
Meeting the increasing demands for irrigation will require careflil planning 
and development of control works and conservation techniques in the 
different reaches of the river in terms of storage and swamp reclamation to 
increase the river's yield. These pose major challenges, requiring basin-wide 
cooperation for sound environmental management of the basin's water 
resources. The hydro-power potential of the Nile basin also offers vast 
opportunities, particularly in the upper reaches of the Blue Nile and the White 
Nile, and the Main Nile in northern the Sudan and offers scope for basin-wide 
networks reaching arid regions. Along the river, there are no apparent 
conflicts between power and irrigation demands. On the contrary, the 
development of the power potential in the upper reaches of the basin will tend 
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to improve the dry season flows of the river to meet irrigation demands and 
will open up opportunities for basin-wide cooperation in this respect (Biswas, 
1994: 174-175). 
Through it is not certain, there is a fear that the changing trends in 
annual precipitation yields and patterns which have been witnessed in the 
Nile basin could be attributed to climate change. Increasing greenhouse gas 
concentrations could influence the discharge regime of the basin. This is 
another challenge that requires technical and scientific capabilities, with 
concerted cooperation within the basin. Persistent drought and the associated 
environmental degradation continue to hit many parts of the basin and are 
matters of great concern for the future integrity of the basin's resource base 
(Biswas, 1994: 175). 
Ethiopia's potential for hydropower development is enormous. A 
proposition of far-reaching potential importance to the future of the Nile 
water supplies would be the construction of a series of dams in Ethiopia. It is 
argued that Egypt's development is constrained more by lack of power than 
lack of water. Thus, a mutually beneficial arrangement would appear to be 
possible with respect to water and power, whereby Egypt would agree to a 
greater water allocation for Ethiopia and to the construction of Blue Nile 
Reservoirs on the condition that a certain percentage of the electricity, the 
Blue Nile Reservoirs may be more valuable for their hydroelectric power 
generation than for water regulation and storage. Reservoirs would also 
control Blue Nile floods, which could be particularly beneficial to the Sudan. 
Added upstream storage would facilitate expansion of Sudan's gravity-fed 
irrigated areas, which in turn would mean greater crop production. It could be 
possible to arrangement whereby Ethiopia would trade electricity to Egypt 
and the Sudan in return for agricultural and industrial products (Encylopaedi 
Britannica, 1998: 659) 
The countries of the Nile basin are all deficit economies facing difficult 
challenges with respect to economic development. Only Zaire and Uganda 
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have had positive balances in the last decade. The largest and most populous 
countries, Egypt, the Sudan, Ethiopia and Tanzania, have negative trade 
balances approaching, or in excess of, per cent. Meanwhile only Egypt has an 
economy of a sufficient size to finance major capital works such as are 
essential preliminaries to land reclamation and afterwards the additional 
expenditure needed to provide the engineering and social infrastructure to 
sustain a stable and self-sufficient rural community. Even so the land 
reclamation costs alone would be beyond the competence of the Egyptian 
economy, requiring an amount equivalent to over half the annual GNP of the 
late 1980s. Because the Egyptian economy does not have capacity to meet 
this level of investment Egypt has found it very difficult to escape 
dependence on international agencies and other bilateral sponsors to fund its 
land reclamation programme with all the attendant frustrations. Economies 
enjoying annual GNPs of more than ten times that of Egypt find it difficult to 
mobilize the levels of investment required to extend Egypt's irrigated area 
(Allan edal., 1994:306). 
(L). THE ASWAN HIGH DAM 
The plan to build a High Dam at Aswan had been envisaged by the 
Greek-Egyptian engineer Adrian Daninos in 1948, and this offered Nasser an 
opportunity to strengthen his domestic support after replacing Muhammad 
Naguib in 1954, and to bring legitimacy to his regime (Smith, 1986: 551-62), 
The decision to construct the Aswan High Dam was made after Nasser 
came to power in 1952. Some in Egypt objected to the plan, but Nasser 
prevailed (Littie, 1965: 56). The Aswan High Dam was intended to ensure a 
regulair supply of drinking and irrigation water all year-round, during flood 
season and low water season, and every year, whether wet or dry (Howell & 
Allan, 1994:91). 
The plan was also to use 300,000 hectares of farmland more efficiently 
in sector fi-om Aswan to Isna through irrigation during the Nile High water 
season (Collins, 1990:163). 
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In 1952 two German companies arrived in Egypt to plan the Dam. That 
year a reparations agreement was signed between Germany and Israel and 
German government, seeking a balance between aid to Israel and aid to Arab 
countries, gave the Egyptian government a grant to finance the work of these 
two companies. 
The United States, Britain and Germany offered to finance jointly the 
implementation of stage 1 of the Dam. But Nasser, wary of political 
dependence, asked that they finance both stage. In 1955-56, following the 
Czech-Egyptian arms deal, the nationalization of the Suez Canal, and the 
Suez wai", negotiations with the three Western Countries, which now refused 
to finance even stage 1 of the Dam, ceased and Egypt turned to the Eastern 
bloc(Badour, 1960:222). 
In 1956 the Soviet Union agreed to finance the two stager of the Dam. 
The Russian accepted the general lines of the German companies' plan, but 
required certain structural modification. In October 1958, after all the 
alternations were inserted, Egypt and the Soviet Union signed the final 
agreement (Waterbury, 1979; 1994: 112). 
The Aswan Law Dam was built in 1902 to save flood waters for dry 
season irrigation. The much larger Aswan High Dam took eleven years to 
build and required materials equal to seventeen Egyptian pyramids (Abu-
Zeid, 1983: 92-101). It is a rock fill dam that controls the majority of the 
Nile's flow through Egypt. The resulting reservoir. Lake Nasser, is the second 
largest manmade lake in the world, with a reservoir capacity of 169 billion 
cubic meters (The New Encyclopedia Britannica, 1998: 659). 
Meanwhile the Western powers were apprehensive about Nasser's 
strategy of 'non-alignment, and persuaded the World Bank to withdraw from 
its commitment to help Egypt funds this very expensive project. 
In retaliation, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company and 
approached the Soviet Union for the financial and technical assistance that 
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Nikita Klirushchev was more than willing to provide in order to find an ally 
in the region (Smith, 1986: 72-521). 
The Aswan High Dam was by then receiving the serious attention of 
Egyptian engineers. Moreover, it had also become something of a symbol of 
national aspirations under the Nasser regime. There seemed, even then, some 
prospect that it would supersede the Equatorial Nile project since full 
seasonal control would be achieved at Aswan within Egyptian territory 
(Morrice and Allan, 1958: 76). 
The Aswan Dam, six mile south of the existing dam, was selected 
because the igneous rocks there could bear the weight of the dam except in 
the event of earth quakes and tremors. An entire nation could be harmed by a 
flood if the Dam were destroyed, sank, or fractured (Waterbury, 1994: 36). 
Work started in 1960, and the dam that came into operation in 1971 
created one of the largest man-made lakes in the world (Smith 1986: 498-71). 
The building of the Aswan High Dam, itself and its connection to the two 
smaller Dams. At the same time twelve electricity generators were set up on 
the dam, each with a production capacity of 175,000 kilowatts. 
The Aswan High Dam completion of the dam the water level has never 
exceeded 567.5 Feet, that is, the lake has not held more than 110-111 billion 
cubic meters annually. This is the volume needed to obtain 55-60 billion 
cubic meter of usable water. The calculation of water available for use is the 
following: 1110-120 billion cubic meter minus 30 billion cubic meter; leaves 
80-90 billion cubic meter; 80-90 billion cubic meter minus 10 billion cubic 
meter leaves, 70-80 billion cubic meter, 70-80 billion cubic meter minus 18.5 
billion cubic meter, intended for Sudan according to the accord, leaves Egypt 
with 51.5-61.5 billion cubic meter (Waterbury, 1994; Whittington et al., 
1995: 68-79). 
The Aswan High Dam rises to a height of 360 feet, runs 2.38 miles in 
length, and is 3,200 feet across at the base on the river. Its lake is 280 miles 
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long and its average width is about 6 miles. The reservoir can retain about 
160 billion cubic meter of water, and when full it rises to 597 feet above sea 
level. Usually the lake is not completely filled, for several reasons. First, 
room must be left for water during unexpected floods, second, at a height of 
597 feet above sea level the lake attains maximum level, and evaporation and 
seepage also reach their maximum. The evaporation level was planned to 
reach 10 billion cubic meter of water annually, but at 597 feet above sea level 
it increase to reach 15-16 billion cubic meter annually. And third, at 597 feet 
the pressure on the dam and its foundations is enormous, to the point of 
endangering its stability (Waterbury, 1994; Whittington et al., 1995: 304-
342). 
In 1902 the first storage Dam was built in Egypt, the Old Aswan Dam. 
It was elevated for the first time in 1912, and again in 1933. The storage 
capacity of the dam rose from 1 billion cubic meter in 1902 to 5.7 billion 
cubic meter in 1933, after the construction of the Aswan High Dam the 
capacity increased to 6.3 billion cubic meter. In addition, two other dams 
were built outside of Egyptian territory, the Sennar Dam and the Jebel Awliya 
Dam. These were intended to prevent the outflow of the river water into the 
Mediterranean in the in the high summer season. The Sennar Dam was built 
in 1925 in Sudan on the Blue Nile. It has a carrying of 1 billion cubic meters 
and it serves the needs of Egypt and of the Sudan for irrigating the Jezira 
(Collins, 1990a: 248-249). Thus, the total water carrying capacity of Egypt 
Prior to the construction of the Aswan High Dam amounted to about 9 billion 
cubic meter and Egypt used about 48 billion cubic meter (Collins, 1990a; 
1990b; 1994: 109-136). 
In Egypt some circles are concerned by the degradation of the Nile 
channel and loss of soil fertility caused by arresting the silt behind the dam. 
Some other objections were politically motivated against the government at 
that time. In the Sudan the opposition took other directions, particularly from 
those directly affected by the submergence of their home. 
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The two country's reactions were of two types. First, the upstream 
riparian states expressed anger at the fact that the two downstream countries 
had divided all the water that reached Aswan between them selves, neglecting 
their neighbours legitimate rights on these waters. Thus created an 
atmosphere of passive conflict, which has prevailed to the present times. On 
the hand, international circles were partly about the threats to archaeological 
treasures, but mainly, as it proved, their reaction was a political one against 
the Egyptian revolution. 
The Aswan High Project proved that it was the only option available at 
that time to manage the conflict between the two main downstream countries, 
Egypt and the Sudan. It has proved its economic viability to Egypt and has 
been as an effective shield against the floods and droughts that have occurred 
since its implementation (Biswas, 1992: 67-69). 
(M). MAJOR IMPA CT OF THE HIGH DAM 
ThQ Aswan High Dam has been the subject of long running 
controversies because of its harmful side- effect downstream. These have 
been connected with the loss of the fertile sih which was previously deposited 
on Egy'ptian farmland by the annual flood, or fed the Sardines off the 
Mediterranean coast which sustained an important fishing industry. Because 
the river below Aswan is no longer burdened with a heavy load of sih, it 
flows faster, scouring its banks. Now that the coast-line of the Delta is no 
longer being built up by deposits of silt, erosion is causing it slowly to recede 
(Biswas, 1991: 61-65). Erosion of land in the river flow causes Egypt to lose 
thousands of acres of good agricultural land. The loss of topsoil has severely 
harmed agriculture, and sale of agricultural land for brick manufacture 
reduces its total area in Egypt (White, 1988: 11). 
The loss of soil the Nile now flows from Aswan Smoothly and quickly, 
which increases erosion of the riverbed and banks. The process is especially 
dangerous near the foundation of Dams, bridges, and dikes from north of 
Aswan to Cairo. The soil loss has also disturbed the balance between the 
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advance of the delta and the destruction of the coast by sea waves, and a 
serious problem of coastal erosion has developed (Guariso, 1983: 89). 
Tlhe impact of the Aswan High Dam is the loss of water to evaporation 
from the vast surface area of Lake Nasser. The certainly have international 
implication, because it 'consumes' water that could have been used elsewhere 
if storage had been provided in a cooler and more humid location. As the area 
in which the lake is situated is intensely hot and dry, surface evaporation is 
about 2,7 meters of depth a year one of the highest rate on the Earth's surface 
(Allan, 1993b: 85-134). 
Table No-5.5 
Aswan High Dam 
Lake Nasser storage evaporation and electricity production 
Water level 
185 
175 
164 
150.0 
147.0 
123.0 
Lake area 
(km2) 
7,174 
5,108 
3,454 
1,962 
1737 
540 
Volume of 
water (bm3) 
182.7 
126.5 
74.3 
34.3 
31.6 
6.8 
Evaporation 
(bm3) 
15.3-16 
14.0 
9.4 
5-7 
3-5 
1 
Electricity 
production 
(MW) 
1,750 
1750 
1200-1500 
850 
0 
0 
Sources: Waterbury, 1979; Gischler, 1979; Shahin, 1985 
Annual loss of water due to evaporation would be 10 billion cubic 
meters and to seepage and additional 2.0 billion cubic meters. 
The poor drainage system has increased soil salinity in Egypt. Salinity 
has also been caused by the rise in salinity of Lake Nasser water, through 
evaporation. Saline water penetrates the Nile delta and salinates the delta 
soils. According to estimates 35 percent of the land and 90 percent of 
Egyptian water is subject to salination. The problem of soil salination should 
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be eased some what in the drainage project is completed having been in 
progress in the delta (White, 1988: 10). 
The Aswan High Dam led to an eruption of the disease, which 
increased from five percent of the population in 1968 to 76 percent in 1993 
(David, 1998: 817-819). People are infected with it through contact with 
water infested with bilharzias larvae in one of their immature stages. The 
larvae penetrate the skin and pass to the liver where they mature; from the 
liver they enter the mesentery or the urinary tract. There they reproduce and 
lay their eggs, which return to the water in face or urine. In the water the eggs 
hatch and the larvae that emerge penetrate the bodies of certain snails, which 
are their intermediate hosts. The numbers of people infected with bilharzias 
likewise increased, both in the Nile valley and along the shores of Lake 
Nasser (White, 1988:10-15). 
(N), THE JONGLEI CANAL PROJECT 
In return for helping Jaafar Nimeiri former Sudanese President, to 
remain in power, Egypt obtained a number of concessions from the Sudan, 
notably permission to construct the Jonglei Canal in 1976. The first phase of 
the project was designed to divert part of the flow from the Bor to the mouth 
of the Sobat, another tributary of the White Nile, in order to decrese the loss 
of water that occurs, especially from evaporation, when the river passes 
through the Sudd swamps in southern the Sudan (Collins, 1990: 156). The 
proposed second phase, which included dams at Lake Victoria and Albert, 
and dirainage schemes for the Machar Marshes and Bahr el-Ghazal, as well as 
another and longer Jonglei Canal, could be described as Egypt's master water 
plan. It was expected to supplement the annual flow by 4.7 billion cubic 
meters of water, of which Lake Nasser's share was to reach 3.8 billion. 
The need for enhancing the supply to Aswan arose due to the 
noticeable decrease in the quantity of water flowing into Lake Nasser, which 
had been reduced since 1980 as a result of population growth and continuing 
225 
drought in the upstream areas. In accordance with the provisions of the 1959 
agreement, Egypt wanted to develop the White Nile waters in the Sudan and 
held a claim on the anticipated increased flow (Dinar & Wolf, 1994: 58). 
However, the planning and implementation of the Jonglei I Project, like the 
Aswan High Dam, received wide public scrutiny, and the water diversion 
issue became highly politicized within and outside the basin. The seasonally 
flooded areas of the Bor are a vital component of the Sudd, since the river-fed 
grasslans provide the grazing grounds for the animals in the area, (Howell; 
Michal & Stephen, 1988: 13-61) and it was claimed that the changes would 
have a damaging impact on the lives of some 40,000 pastoralists. It was also 
feared that the Jonglei Canal was bound to create communication problems in 
the region as well as adversely affecting the rainfall and climate by reducing 
the evaporation to the atmosphere (Sutcliffe & Parks, ed al., 1996: 147) it was 
widely believed that the project would bring benefits to the people of northern 
Sudan and Egypt at the expense of those who lived in the south. 
A French company began to construct the Jonglei Canal in 1978, but 
after 250 kilometer of the planned 360 kilometers had been completed, a 
series of attacks by the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) caused 
the work to be forcibly suspended in 1984 (Suliman, 1992: 21). Thus ended 
the first serious efforts to increase the yield of the Nile, and the incomplete 
canal became a dangerous ditch for the human beings and wildlife of that 
region (Collins, 1987: 25). 
The benefits that the Jonglei Canal would bring were listed as follows: 
• I would reduce the damaging effect of flooding from Bahr-el-Jebel in 
year of high discharge. Collins estimated that the floods of 1961-64 
caused disastrous flooding m the Sudd and that tens of thousands of 
people perished (Collins, 1990b: 168). 
• It would carry 20 million cubic meter of water per year or 4.67 billion 
cubic meters per annum, or 3.8 billion cubic meters as measured at 
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Aswan. In 1981 it was decided to increase the water flow in the canal 
to 25 million cubic meters per day. 
• It would improve river transport by shortening the navigational 
distance between Kosti and Juba by some 300 km. 
• It would improve road transport by providing an all-weather road 
along one of the canal embankments. 
• It would provide year-round water supplies along the line of the canal 
for the benefit of the local population (Hoewll; Lock & Cobb, 1988) 
(0). TECHNICAL AND LEGAL CAPABILITY OF NILE STATES TO 
DEAL WITH THE MANAGEMENT OF THE NILE 
Many Nile states do not have the technical and legal framework 
necessary for addressing domestic and international Nile problems. With the 
exception of Egypt, the technical and legal management of water resources in 
Nile countries is fragmented among sectors and institutions. Water and 
energy ministries are sometimes combined. In other cases, water and energy 
ministries are sometimes combined (Biswas ed.al, 1994: 76-175). In other 
cases, water and environment are dealt with in the same ministry 
(Mohammed & Bayoumi, 1994: 15-19). In the Nile region, the regulatory 
style of dealing with these topics and the structure of ministries are constantly 
changing. In order for states to come to an agreement on the use and 
management of the Nile, all of them must have a threshold technical and legal 
capability to negotiate and cooperate effectively. The states need not have the 
same type of domestic regulatory structure, but each must have a coordinated 
system for effectively handling the Nile issues. The current frameworks for 
dealing with water issues in Egypt, the Sudan, Ethiopia, and Uganda, which 
all will be major players in Nile water use in the twenty-first century, are 
assessed below (Carroll, 1999: 269). 
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5.8: EGYPT 
Egypt is the strongest state in the region in terms of technical and legal 
capacity to manage water resources, per capita GDP, and military strength. 
The Ministry of Public Works and Water Resources governs water resource 
issues (Mageed, 1994: 175). The Ministry has reformed the state's water 
policy several times since the 1970s. Recently, the Ministry of Public Work 
and Water Resources implemented demand management measures, such as 
abstraction of shallow groundwater, reuse of agricultural drainage, reuse of 
treated sewage, reduction of aquatic weeds through biological methods, 
introduction of water-saving domestic appliances, use of seawater for cooling 
in power generation plants, changes in industrial processes, and irrigation 
improvement (El-Shamy & Attia, 1999: 7-8). The Ministry has formulated an 
elaborate policy for the twenty-first century based on demand management, 
resources development, and environmental protection. The Ministry will 
continue crop pattern reform in order to reduce the cultivation of water-
intensive crops such as rice and sugar. The new policy also includes an 
irrigated agriculture sustainability program and efficiency measures water 
losses from evaporation and infiltration. 
In addition to the Ministry of Public Works and water Resources, a 
number of government offices handle water and environmental issues. The 
Water Research Centre encompasses eleven institutes, five of which directly 
relate to the Nile (Egypt's Water Policy, 1999: 2-11). The Ministry of State 
for Environmental Affairs also has jurisdiction over Nile pollution issues; the 
envirormiental ministry launched the Nile Pollution Prevention Program in 
1997 to curb industrial pollution of the Nile (Ebeid & Hamaz, 1999: 8). Even 
though several ministries and institutes handle Nile issues, Egypt has been 
successful in efficiently coordinating these groups. Egypt has a great depth of 
personnel trained and experienced in all aspects of water resources 
management Egypt, therefore, has the regulatory structure and technical staff 
necessary to handle Nile issues (Mageed, 1994:23-46). 
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5.9: THE SUDAN 
The Sudanese department of Irrigation was created in 1925. In 1956, it 
became the Ministry of Irrigation and Hydro-Power. Later, the hydro-power 
functions were transferred to the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources. 
In the 1970s, UNESCO helped the Ministry of Irrigation establish a hydraulic 
research station (Mageed, 1994: 153). The reorganized Ministry of Irrigation 
and water Resources one handles many Nile issues (Abbas, 1999: 15-19). 
Environmental ministries also have jurisdiction over water. The Sudan 
established a National Council for the Environment in 1992 and a Ministry 
for Environment and Tourism in 1994. The Ministry of health and the 
National Water Corporation, however, monitor water quality. In addition, the 
Sudan is enacting a National Environmental law with water components 
based on its existing national Water Resources Law, Environmental health 
Ordinance, water Pollution Control Act, and irrigation and drainage law. The 
water management strategies of the various Sudanese water and 
environmental ministries reflect water's status as a public good in the Sudan. 
Due to religious and cultural concerns, there are no private water rights in the 
Sudan {Abbas, 1999: 14). 
The Sudan currently monitors water at rainfall gauging stations, 
meterological stations, and suspended sediment sampling stations, state 
discharge measuring stations, and groundwater boreholes. The Sudan, 
however, needs to modernize water-monitoring techniques, rehabilitate 
gauging stations, and replace water discharge and sediment monitoring 
equipment (Abbas, 1999: 10). The Sudan struggles to secure the resources 
necessary to operate its water and environmental ministries and maintain 
water-monitoring facilities. 
5.10: ETHIOPIA 
Water resource management departments in Ethiopia have been 
reorganized several times in the last forty years. In 1958, the Ministry of 
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Public Works and Communications was given responsibility for water issues. 
That ministry was reorganized as the National Water Resources Commission 
in 1971. The Valley Agricultural Development Authority was added in 1977. 
The Ministry of Agriculture also became involved in water issues. The 
National water resources Commission were restructured to include the Water 
Resources Development Authority, Water Supply and Sewage Authority, 
Ethiopian waterworks Construction Authority, and national Meteorological 
Services Agency (Mageed, 1994: 176). The Ethiopian Valleys Development 
Studies Authority was created in 1987. Today, the Ministry of Water 
Resources handles water issues in Ethiopia. Ethiopia plans to draft a master 
plan in order to achieve efficient water use and self-sufficient food production 
and handle problems such as soil erosion, cleanliness of drinking water, and 
inability to effectively develop irrigate land. 
5.11: UGANDA 
Due to its geographic position as an upstream and downstream riparian 
state, Uganda is a critical participant in the management of the Nile. Uganda 
is downstream of Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, 
Tanzania, and Rwanda, and thus is directly impacted by their use of the Nile. 
As an upstream state, Uganda's use of the Nile directly affects the Sudan and 
Egypt. Because Uganda's water resources are not fully developed, it will play 
a key role in future Nile regional management arrangements. 
After 1979, Uganda's hydro meteorological network collapsed, 
resulting in large gaps in data collection (Dribidu, 1997: 24-27). Uganda also 
has incomplete data on groundwater quantity and water quality. This country 
also does not have an integrated institutional framework for handling water 
resoui'ce matters. 
Changes in government have led to many changes in water and 
environmental policies. In an effort to redefine water management at technical 
and legal levels, Uganda developed a Water Action Plan in 1994, which is 
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incori)orated in its 1995 Water Statute. The Action Plan outlines policy 
options and guidelines for the management and development of water 
resources in Uganda. In 1996, a draft National Water Policy was prepared and 
is now under review. In addition to water action plans and policies, Uganda's 
National Environment Action Plan and Management Policy of 1994 and the 
National Environment Statute of 1995 include provisions on water resource 
management and conservation. The Forests Act of 1964 and the Wildlife 
Statute of 1996 have watershed management provisions (Dribidu, 1997: 
2-10). 
The Water Statute and draft National Water Policy lay out a 
management structure for water resources. The Water Statute established a 
Water Policy Committee (WPC) comprised of Directors and Heads of 
Depairtments that relate to water resources management, representatives of 
selected district authorities, and major nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs). The Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Natural Resources 
serves as the chairman and the Director of water Development serves as the 
Secretary. Although the WPC serves as an advisory body to the Minister of 
Natural Resources, it has responsibility for identifying priorities, 
policymaking, and developing an international water resources policy. The 
Directorate of Water Resources and its four restructured departments (Water 
Resources Management, Urban and Institutional Water Supply, Rural Supply, 
and Inspection and Support Services) have responsibility for water supply and 
sanitaition and the issuance of wastewater and water extraction permits. They 
also play an important role in water monitoring. The National Environment 
Statute of 1995 established a National Environmental Management Authority 
that has responsibility for, among other things, management of biodiversity, 
wetlands, watersheds, and pollution control (Dribidu, 1997: 9-10). Despite the 
powers given to the National Environmental Management Authority, it has 
inadequate administrative and enforcement resources (Waiswa, 1999: 15-19). 
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The 1996 draft national water Policy also provides for the integrated 
management of water and environmental management at the district level. It 
recommends that District Councils establish District Environment and natural 
Resources Committees and a District Environment and Natural Resources 
Committees and a District Environment and natural Resources Committees 
and a District Environment and Natural Resources department comprised of 
water, environment, and forest officers. At the local level, village water user 
groups are responsible for managing, operating, and maintaining point 
sources for water. Given recent political changes, coordinating water 
resources and environmental management among the various agencies and the 
national, district, and local levels will be difficult. 
The Nile states do not have equivalent and technical capacities for 
addressing transboundary water resource issues. The regulatory systems of 
Egypt, the Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda provide examples of the existing 
dispairities in technical and legal capacity. Much of the disparity is due to the 
inability of governments to prioritize water issues because of more serious 
problems in their countries, such as war and political instability. Burundi and 
Rwanda, for example, also have suffered from these problems. In Uganda, the 
structure of water management has gone through dramatic changes in recent 
years due to the fall and rise of governments. 
In order for countries to move towards cooperation on Nile issues, they 
first must try to resolve their serious domestic issues and develop their 
technical and legal capacities to deal with water issues. With basin knowledge 
of the Nile's hydrological parameters and domestic regulatory frameworks for 
recognizing and elaborating domestic policy interests, positions, and goals, 
the Nile states will be in a better position to negotiate with each other. Once 
they are able to negotiate on a more comparable level, the regional 
cooperative system tliat they create and legal capacities. Nevertheless, efforts 
at national level are prerequisites to a regional agreement. 
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(P), RECENT COOPERA TIONAND CAPACITY—BUILDING 
Another prerequisite to the negotiation of a formal Nile agreement is 
the development of smaller more informal forums for regional cooperation 
that help built relationships and trust. In 1992, the Council of Ministers of the 
Nile Basin States (COM) launched a new initiative to promote cooperation 
and development in the Basin COM initiated the Nile 2002 conference series 
on the Comprehensive Water Resources Development of the Nile Basin (Nile 
Basin Initiative, 1998: 13-32). Nile state ministers meet in a different capitol 
ever}/ year for a conference to discuss common Nile problems and potential 
future cooperation. Recent themes included "to benefit all" in 1998 and 
"vision for the next century" in 1999. 
In December 1992, the Ministers responsible for water affairs in the 
Nile countries also formed the Technical Cooperation Committee for the 
Promotion of the Development and protection of the Nile Basin 
(TECCONILE), a transitional mechanism for Nile cooperation TECCONILE 
replaced the Hydromet framework for technical cooperation that was 
established in the 1960s. Egypt, Rwanda, the Sudan, Tazania, Uganda, and 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo are members of TECCONILE, but 
Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Kenya are only observers (Kirugo, 1999: 4-
72). In 1995, TECCONILE developed a Nile River Basin Action Plan with 
funding from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) (Nile 
Basin Initiative, 1994). The plan included a wish—list of a number of 
technical assistances projects. 
(Q). CREATIVE OUTCOMES RESULTING FROM RESOLUTION 
PROCESS 
Some financing arrangements were creative, with Egypt agreeing to 
finance water enhancement projects in Sudanese territory, in exchange for the 
water which would be made available. Provisions were made for Sudan to 
pick up responsibility for up to 50% of costs in exchange for up to 50% of the 
water, when their water needs required. 
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Table No-5.6 
Timeline 
1920 
1925 
7 May 1929 
1952 
Sep-Dec 1954 
1956 
8 Nov 1959 
1967-1992 
1993 
1993 
1995 
Nile Projects Commission formed, offers allocation scheme 
for Nile riparians. Findings were not acted upon. 
Century Storage Scheme put forward, emphasizing upstream, 
relatively small-scale projects. Plan is criticized by Egypt. 
New water commission is named. 
Commission study leads to Nile Waters Agreement between 
Egypt and Sudan. 
Aswan High Dam proposed by Egypt. Promise of additional 
water necessitates new agreement. 
First round of negotiations between Egypt and Sudan . 
Negotiations end inconclusively. 
Sudan gains independence. Egypt is more conciliatory with 
government after 1958 coup. 
Agreement for the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters (Nile 
Waters Treaty) signed between Egypt and Sudan. 
Launch of Hydromet regional project for collection and 
sharing of hydrometeorologic data, supported by UNDP. 
Formation of TECCONILE (Technical Cooperation 
Committee for the Promotion of the Development and 
Environmental Protection of the Nile Basin ) to address 
development agenda for the Nile basin. 
First of ten Nile 2002 Conferences for dialogue and 
discussions between riparians and international community, 
supported by CIDA (Canadian International Development 
Agency.) 
Nile River Basin action plan created within TECCONILE 
framework, supported by CIDA. 
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1997-2000 
1997 
1998 
May 1999 
May 2004 
Nile riparians create official forum for legal and institutional 
dialogue with UNDP support. Three representatives from 
each country (legal and water resource experts) and a panel 
of experts draft a "Cooperative Framework in 2000. 
Formation of Nile-COM, a council of the Ministers of Water 
from each of the riparian nations of the Nile Basin. 
First meeting of the Nile Technical Advisory Committee 
(Nile-TAC). 
Nile Basin Initiative established as a cooperative framework 
between all riparians (excluding Eritrea ) for the sustainable 
development and management of the Nile. 
First basin-wide project under NBI, the "Nile Transboundary 
Environmental Action Project," launched in Sudan. 
Sources: Nile Basin Initiative (NBI). See 
http://www.nilebasin.org/Documents/TACPolicv.html. 
(R). CONCLUSION 
The legal regime and geopolitical setting in the Nile's basin seriously 
limit the possibilities of integrated river basin planning of water utilization of 
the Nile. The past legal agreements for Nile water allocation were subject to 
Egyptian hegemony and its initial espousal of the doctrine of absolute 
territorial integrity which was later replaced by the doctrine of limited 
sovereignty. Egypt also insists upon prior use of the Nile as a legal right 
which entitles it to the greatest portion of the Nile's water. Ethiopia, on the 
one hand, and the Equatorial states, on the other, claims their own sovereign 
right to the utilization of water resources within their own territories. There is 
no single legal statement or agreement which acknowledges that all the co-
riparian states of the Nile have rights to its water resources or that these rights 
are limited in any way and guided by the principle of just and equitable water 
sharing. 
235 
The factors that determine the fair division of international river water 
are the geography of the drainage basin; its climate and hydrology; past and 
present use of basin water; economic and social needs of the basin riparian 
states; the degree of dependency on the river water; the cost of alternative 
projects for water use; the existence of resources other than water; the no 
wasteful use of basin water; and the possibility of providing compensation for 
damage caused. 
Egypt has historical rights to use Nile water since the start of human 
civilization. Sudan also has historical rights, less than Egypt but more than 
the upstream states, which began using Nile water only recently. Egypt and 
Sudan are the only users of the river water. The beginnings of a crisis have 
materialized along the Nile as well. Ethiopia, making movements toward state 
building for the first time in a generation following the overthrow of the 
Mengistu regime in 1991, has focused upon water distribution as an issue of 
paramount concern. The North African country, currently ravaged by conflict 
with Eritrea, possesses neither the economic stability nor the investor 
confidence to facilitate desalination efforts. Consequently, Ethiopia has 
increasingly objected to the water use of neighboring Egypt, claiming present 
allocation-regulated by a 1959 agreement over Nile and Sudan, Ethiopia has 
hinted it may resort to a unilateral exercise of sovereignty or a military 
confrontation with Egypt. 
All the basin states are dependent on agriculture, which is their 
principal source of income. Egypt is less dependent on agriculture than the 
others because it has other sources of income, but it is more dependent on 
river water than the other. All the countries in the region are considered to be 
developing states in socioeconomic terms. In all of them the natural growth 
rate is high and they cannot match it with agricultural development, and they 
all import a large part of their food. 
The accords signed by Ethiopia and Sudan in 1991 and by Ethiopia and 
Egypt in 1993 also suggest that discussion and negotiation are more likely 
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than war. Of course, there is a great distance to travel between these general 
declarations of intent and a new apportionment of the Nile waters that take 
Ethiopian requirements into account, let alone the cooperative management of 
the basin as a whole. The current hostility between Egypt and Sudan is a 
major obstacle to progress. 
The Aswan High Dam Agreement was written for the mutual benefit of 
Egypt and the Sudan but totally ignored the other co-riparian states' rights to 
equitable allocation based on the principles of geography, climate and 
hydrology. 
Linkage is the key to the analysis of Egyptian policy towards co-
riparian states, especially the Sudan. It is the Nile flow which determines 
Egyptian policies of pacification, on the one hand (in Sudan), or threats of 
war, on the other. 
The conflict in the Nile is a stakeholder conflict which is usually 
solved because of Egyptian domination of the Nile regional leader-a fact 
which assists in the amelioration of conflicts. 
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(A). THE NA TURE OF INTERNA TIONAL LA W 
The evolution of International River Laws has taken many centuries 
and the process still continues. A number of principles and treaties for 
management, sharing, utilization and conservation of International and 
conservation of International Water Resources have been codified during the 
past two centuries (Naff & Maston, 1984: 158). 
The success or not of the installation of water Law and International 
Water Law will depend on the social adaptive capacity of the players at the 
different levels of water allocation and management communal, national and 
international. At the turn of the twenty-first century addressing the politics 
of adoption is a more important priority than arguing the quality of the legal 
principles (Bulloch & Darwish, 1993: 232-295). 
Navigation monopolized all major waterways. Consequently, 
International Law concerning navigation rights is now well developed 
(Sevett, 1952: 22). But International Law relating to the economic uses of 
rivers for consumptive purposes is still in the process of development 
(United Nation, 1957: 15). 
In the case of International Law, water of common interest, the most 
helpful evidence of this practice is to be found in a number of bilateral 
treaties and certain multilateral treaties and conventions (Briggs, 1952: 274). 
In International Law, a distinction is normally drawn between 
National and International Rivers. A river, which passes through or along 
the territory of two or more states is described as International River and is 
governed by the rules of the International River Law (Kaeckeabeek, 
1962: 1). 
The utilization of the waters of an international drainage basin raises 
many problems with respect to both International relations and International 
law. Water rights have been the subject of state concern ever since the 
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earliest appearance of any from of state organization. In the light of the most 
recent research it may not even be going too far to organization (Hirsch, 
1959: 168-186). 
In the area of management of international water bodies, the 
geopolitical considerations and hydropolitical implications for the co-basin 
countries cannot be divorced from the technical, legal, economic and 
environmental issues. When water becomes scarce and is considered be a 
strategic national resource, hydropolitics needs to be taken into account for 
the national management of international water bodies (Biswas, 1993: 179). 
Law, an instrument which can be used to smooth resources, provides 
guidelines for ordering future conduct. Law can be determined by a court 
action v^hich may set a precedent that becomes a "guideline" for future cases 
but may also come from legislation by an administrative body, for example 
a government, which passes a statute when it sees a need. According to 
Barrow (1987), in many countries the state constitution affects water rights 
and water management because it binds legislation and common law or its 
equivalent (Barrow, 1987: 68). 
International rivers are of two general categories: those that flow 
between the land territories of two or more states, and those that flow from 
the territory of one state into the territory of another state. In the case of a 
successive river one state is in complete physical control of the river as it 
passes through its territory, while in the case of contiguous rivers, there is 
dual physical control of the waters. Even the geographic distinction between 
the two kinds of rivers can, in some cases, be more apparent than real, for a 
river may be both successive and contiguous (Garretson & Hayton, 1967: 
17). 
The states located uppermost in the drainage basin of an International 
river aj'e normally in a position to exercise its control over the waters first. 
Generally, there can be only one such "upper basin state" since all other 
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states within the drainage basin are "lower basin states" with respect to that 
state, although, in turn, some may be "upper composed of a tributary stream 
in addition to the principal river, there may be more than one upper basin 
state relative to all other co-basin states (Garretson & Hayton, 1967: 1). 
In general, the rights of any country with respect to a river pertain 
only to that section that lies within its territory and under its sovereignty. 
More precisely, the rights of the country pertain to the river bed rather than 
to the water, since it is limited by International Law in what it may do with 
the water; and what it can do with the water may be done only as long as the 
water is in that part of the river bed in that particular state's territory. A river 
that crosses the borders of a country remains under that country's 
jurisdiction only as far as the border of the next country, where the river 
becomes part of the territory of a different state (Hirsch, 1956a: 207). 
It is an assumption of international law that the allocation of scarce 
resources requires legal adjudication if conflict is to be avoided. 
International law recognizes the community of property among riparian 
states as a customary rule of law, that is, each of them is entitled to use a 
share of the river so long as unreasonable injury to another riparian does not 
ensue. Although this principle has been upheld in the courts, it contains an 
inherent weakness and has also been challenged by countervailing legal 
arguments. The flaw lies in the fact that customary rules tend to be highly 
unstable unless all involved parties have compatible interests, preferably 
guaranteed by formal agreement. International law has recognized that a 
river is the property of the community of all riparian states and this has been 
followed by recognition of the existence of certain limitations to territorial 
sovereignty in favour of the international community in general. However, 
the first step toward translation legal theory into institutional application is 
the production of political agreements. Such facts are essential to the 
creation of a broader array of legal instruments for solving international 
disputes over shared water resources (Naff & Matson, 1984: 5). 
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6.1: THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATER RESOURCES 
The International law Association, at its meeting in August 1956 in 
Dubrivnik, Yugoslavia, unanimously adopted a statement of principles "as a 
sound basis upon which to study further the development of rules of 
international law with respect to International River". The parties to 
international water disputes might go far towards advancing adjustment and 
agreement (United Nation, 1970: 34). 
There has been no attention paid towards a variety of issues such as 
topographic structure, hydroelectric potential, and the irrigation components, 
in addition to political, economic and sociological factors. However pending 
the establishment of an accepted international code, the Dubrovnik draft 
statement of principles potentially affords a sound basic philosophy for 
planning and executing a project for integrated river development in an 
international river basin. 
Of particular importance in the statement of principles adopted in 
Dubro\'nik in the fifth principle which is as follows: 
"The states upon an international river should in reaching 
agreemients, and states or tribunals in setting disputes, weigh the benefit to 
one stale against the injury done to another through a particular use of the 
water. The following factors should be taken into consideration: 
a) The right of each to reasonable use of the water 
b) The extent of the dependence of each state upon the waters of the 
river 
c) The comparative social and economic gains accruing to each and the 
to the entire river community 
d) Pre-existent agreements among the states concerned 
e) Pre- existent appropriation of water by one state" (United Nations, 
1970: 35). 
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The International Law Association also evolve certain general rules 
of international law applicable to the use of waters of an international 
drainage basin, in its fifty-second Conference in Helsinki in 1966. 
The Helsinki rules introduced the concept of international drainage 
basins as: "the aggregate of both surface and ground water within a given 
geographic area flowing into a common terminus". The rights of basin states 
are outlined by the Helsinki rules which also attempt to establish an attitude 
towards a variety of issues that the Dubrovnik draft avoided. The heart 
of the 37 article Helsinki rules is Article 5, whose recommendations contain 
the "relevant factors which are to be considered included, but are not 
limited to: 
a) The geography of the basin, including in particular the extent of the 
drainage area in the territory of each basin state; 
b) The hydrology of the basin, including in particular the contribution of 
water by each basin state; 
c) The climate affecting the basin; 
d) The past utilization of the water of the basin, including in particular 
existing utilization; 
e) The economic and social needs of each basin state; 
f) The population dependent on the waters of the basin in each basin 
state; 
g) The comparative costs of alternative means of satisfying the 
economic and social needs of each basin state; 
h) The availability of other resources; 
i) The avoidance of unnecessary water in the utilization of water of the 
basin; 
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j) The practicability of compensation to one or more of the co-basin 
states a means of adjusting conflict among users; 
k) The degree to which the needs of a basin state may be satisfied 
without causing substantial injury to a co-basin state. 
The weight to be given to each factor is to be determined by its 
importance in comparison with that of other relevant factor. In determining 
what is a reasonable and equitable share, all relevant factors are to be 
considered together and conclusions reached on the basis of the whole 
(Manner & Metsalampi, 1988: 22). 
In 1970, Finland introduced a resolution in the UN General Assembly 
on laws for international watercourses, which proposed that the Helsinki 
Rules be considered a model. While the UN Committee felt that the subject 
of international watercourse law was important, three reservations about the 
Helsinki rules surfaced. First, the rules were formulated by a professional 
organization which did not represent nation-states. Secondly, some countries 
such as Ethiopia argued that adoption of these rules as a model could 
preclude new considerations about this complex issue. The third was 
expressed in the fact that the Helsinki rules were based on a drainage basin 
approach that could be a potential threat to national sovereignty (Biswas, 
1993:172). 
The important case submitted before international arbitration was the 
case of Lake Lanu situated between France and Spain. The International 
court of Arbitration in its review of that case came out with certain relevant 
principles: 
a) The necessity of recognizing the right of sovereignty over its portion 
of the international river, of each riparian; 
b) This right, however, should be subservient to all other international 
obligations of that riparian state; 
243 
c) There is no rule in international law which prohibits a riparian from 
the utilization of water-force to generate electricity, but in accordance 
with the rule of good faith the upper river riparian should take into 
consideration, and on the same footing of equality, all the interests of 
all other riparian states; 
d) The necessity of consultation and the exchange of all relevant 
information among the riparian states about any projected 
constriction work on the international river. 
Other Federal Courts in other Federal Governments have reached a 
consensus about the following principles: 
a) International Law limits the freedom of action of the riparian states of 
an international river: every one of them should avoid causing any 
detriment to other riparian states; 
b) Equitable apportionment of the international river's water; 
c) Due respect to acquire rights of the riparian states; 
a) The illegality of diverting the set course of an international river 
Water Commissions in the Indian sub-continent, in their review of 
inter-state water disputes, have added yet another important principle, 
namely that barren infertile land have a priority over the waters of 
international rivers (Howell & Allan, 1990: 224-228). 
6.2; THE RIPARIAN APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 
From the theoretical point of view, an upper riparian state will 
initially claim "absolute territorial sovereignty" and this means claiming the 
right to do whatever it chooses with the water regardless of the effect of the 
activity upon other riparian states. Lower riparian states begin with a claim 
to the "absolute integrity" of the watercourse which means claiming that the 
upper riparian state can do nothing that affects the quantity or quality of 
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water that flows down to the lower riparian states (Dallapenna, 1993: 13). 
The quantity of water to which each state is entitled might be defined 
according to some more or less objective measure of need such as historic 
pattern of use, population, area, arable land or the United Nation's clear idea 
that each state is entitled to an "equitable share" of the river's water 
(Ergil,1991:55). 
The Articles of the 1997 Convention are afflicted by politically 
determined contradictions. The role of the principles of international water 
law in currency at the end of the twentieth century in the West Asia river 
basins has been to provide conflicting legal principles to serve the 
arguments of contending riparian states. First, the principles are 'prior use' 
and no harm; favour the long standing downstream user. Secondly, versions 
of'sovereignty', all of which have an intuitive appeal, are favoured by the 
upstream user and especially the new upstream user. Both sets of principle 
lend themselves to popular and very selective chauvinist advocacy. Thirdly 
the concept of 'equitable utilization', a consensus converging notion 
develojped by the International Law Association in Helsinki in 1966 has only 
gained support amongst legal professionals and some outsider scientists. The 
International Law Commission articles produced in May 1997 cannot be 
precisely defined or effectively operationalised. They lead to impasse rather 
than resolution. They are not considered as tools with which to achieve 
agreement. They are not yet viewed as a language to achieve mutual 
understanding, nor as a means of analyzing issues in contention, nor as a set 
of guidelines to structure negotiations (Wouters, 1999a: 217-297). 
The 1997 UN Convention defines an international water course as a 
system, of surface and ground water constituting a unitary whole by virtue of 
their physical relationship, parts of which are situated in different states and 
normally flowing into a common terminus. Riparian states are expected to 
utilize the water course in an equitable and reasonable manner, in particular, 
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with a view to attaining optimal and sustainable utilization. This requires 
taking into account: 
• 
• 
Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and 
other natural factors; 
Social and economic needs of the riparian states concerned; 
The population dependent on the watercourse; 
The effects of the uses of one riparian states on the others; 
Existing and potential uses; 
Conservation, protection, development and economy of use and the 
costs of relevant measures; 
• Availability of alternative. 
Riparian states shall, in utilizing an international water course in their 
territories, take all appropriate measures to prevent causing significant harm 
to the other riparian states. They should cooperate with each other and 
exchange data and information regularly. 
Background on the Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational uses 
of International Watercourses: 
The convention on the law of Non-navigational uses of International 
Water courses was adopted by the United National General Assembly on 
May 21, 1997. The International Law Commission (ILA) began codifying 
the Law of International Watercourses in 1971. The ILC presented Draft 
Articles on the law of International Watercourses to the U.N. General 
Assembly in 1994. The General Assembly established a working Group to 
transform the Draft Articles into a Convention, and the Working Group 
completed its revision of the text in 1997. 
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^ I^though the Convention is not specifically named "a fi-amework 
convention", some members of the Working Group envisioned it as a 
Convention that would serve as a basin for future regional agreements. The 
Convention sets forth the major principles of Watercourses Law. 
1. Major provisions of the Convention 
The Convention defines Watercourse as "a system of surface water 
and groundwater's constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a 
unitary whole and normally flowing into a common terminus (UN May, 21; 
1997). 
Article 3: Watercourse Agreements 
1. In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, nothing in the present 
Convention shall after the rights or obligations of a watercourse State arising 
from agreements in force for it on the date on which it became a party to the 
present Convention. 
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1, parties to agreements 
referred to in paragraph 1 may, where necessary, consider harmonizing such 
agreements with the basic principles of the present Convenfion. 
3. Watercourse State may enter into one or more agreements, 
hereinafter referred to as "watercourse agreements", which apply and adjust 
the provisions of the present Convention to the characteristics and uses of a 
particular watercourse or part thereof 
4. "^^ere a watercourse agreement is concluded two or more 
watercourse States, it shall define the waters to which it applies. Such as 
agreement may be entered into with respect to an entire international 
watercourse or any part thereof or a particular project programme or use 
except insofar as the agreement adversely affects, to a significant extent, the 
use by one or more other watercourse States of the waters of the 
watercourse, without their express consent. 
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5. Where a watercourse Sate considers that adjustment and applications 
of the provisions of the present convention is required because of the 
characteristics and uses of a particular international watercourse, 
watercourse States shall consult with a view to negotiating in good faith for 
the pur]30se of concluding a watercourse agreement or agreements. 
6. Where some but not all watercourse States to a particular 
international watercourse are parties to an agreement, nothing in such 
agreement shall affect the rights or obligations under the present Convention 
of watercourse States that are not parties to such an agreement. 
Article 4: Parties to Watercourse Agreements 
1. Every watercourse State id entitled to participate in the negotiation of 
and to become a party to any watercourse agreement that applies to the 
entire international watercourse, as well as to participate in any relevant 
consultations. 
2. A watercourse State whose use of an international watercourse may 
be affected to a significant extent by the implementation of a proposed 
watercourse agreement that applies only to a part of the watercourse or to a 
particular project, programme or use is entitled to participate in 
consultations on such an agreement and, where appropriate, in the 
negotiation thereof in good faith with a view to becoming a party thereto, to 
the extent that its use is thereby affected. 
PART IL GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
Article 5: Equitable and Reasonable Utilization and Participation 
1. Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilize an 
intemeitional watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. In 
particular, an international watercourse shall be used and developed by 
waterc;ourse States with a view to attaining optimal and sustainable 
utilization thereof and benefits there from, taking into account the interests 
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of the watercourse States concerned, consistent with adequate protection of 
the watercourse. 
2. Watercourse States shall participate in the use, development and 
protection of an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable 
manner. Such participation includes both the right to utilize the watercourse 
and the duty to cooperate in the protection and development thereof, as 
provided in the present Convention. 
Article 6: Factors Relevant to Equitable and Reasonable Utilization 
1. Utilization of an international watercourse in an equitable and 
reasonable manner within the meaning of article 5 requires taking into 
account all relevant factors and circumstances, including: 
(a) Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and 
other factors of a natural character; 
(b) ITie social and economic of the watercourse states concerned; 
(c) The population dependent on the watercourse in each Watercourse 
State; 
(d) The effects of the uses of the watercourses in one watercourse State 
on other watercourse states; 
(e) Existing and potential uses of the watercourse; 
(f) Conservation, protection, development and economy of use of the 
water resources of the watercourse and the costs of measures taken to 
that effect; 
(g) The availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a particular 
planned or existing use. 
2. In the application of articles 5 or paragraph 1 of this article, 
watercourse State concerned shall, when the need arises, enter into 
consultations in a spirit of cooperation. 
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3. The weight to be given to each factor is to be determined by its 
importance in comparison with that of other relevant factors. In determining 
what is a reasonable and equitable use, all relevant factors are to be 
considered together and a conclusion reached on the basis of the whole. 
Article 7: Obligation Not to Cause Significant Harm 
1. Watercourse State shall, in utilizing an international watercourse in 
their territories, take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of 
significant harm to other watercourse States. 
2. Where significant harm nevertheless is caused to another watercourse 
State, the States whose use causes such harm shall, in the absence of 
agreement to such use, take all appropriate measures, having due regard for 
the provisions of articles 5 and 6, in consultation with the affected State, to 
eliminate or mitigate such harm and, where appropriate, to discuss the 
quesfion of compensation. 
Article 8: General Obligation to Cooperate 
1. Watercourse States shall cooperate on the basis of sovereign equality, 
territorial integrity, mutual benefit and good faith in order to attain optimal 
utilization and adequate protection of an international watercourse. 
2. In determining the manner of such cooperation, watercourse States 
may consider the establishment of joint mechanisms or commissions, as 
deemed necessary by them, to facilitate cooperation in existing joint 
mechimisms and commissions in various regions. 
PART III. PLANNED MEASURES 
Article 11: Information Concerning Planned Measures 
Watercourse State shall exchange information and consult each other 
and, if necessary, negotiate on the possible effects of plarmed measures on 
the condition of an international watercourse. 
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Article 12: Notification Concerning Planned Measures with Possible 
Adverse Effects 
Before a watercourse state implements or permits the implementation 
of plannied measures which may have a significant adverse effect upon other 
watercourse States, it shall provide those States with timely notification 
thereof. Such notification shall be accompanied by available data and 
information, including the results of any environmental impact assessment, 
in order to enable the notified States to evaluate the possible effects of the 
plaimed measures. 
Article 13: Period for reply to Notification 
(a) A watercourse State providing a notification under article 12 shall 
allow the notified States a period of six months within to study and evaluate 
the possible effects of the planned measures and to communicate the finding 
to it; 
(b) This period shall, at the request of a notified State for which the 
evaluation of the planned measures poses special difficulty, be extended for 
a period of six months. 
Article 15: Reply to Notification 
The notification States shall communicate their findings to the 
notifying State as early as possible within the period applicable pursuant to 
article 13. If a notified state finds that implementation of the planned 
measures would be documented explanation setting forth the reasons for the 
finding. 
Article 17: Consultations and Negotiations Concerning Planned 
Measures 
1. If a communication is made under article 15 that implementation of 
the planned measures would be inconsistent with the provisions of articles 5 
or 7, Ihe notifying State and the State making the communication shall enter 
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into consultations and , if necessary negotiations with a view to arriving at 
an equitable resolution of the situation. 
PART IV. PROTECTION, PRESERVATION AND MANAGEMENT 
Article 20: Protection and preservation of Ecosystems 
Watercourse States shall, individually and where appropriate, jointly, 
protect and preserve the ecosystems of international watercourses. 
Article 21: Prevention, Reduction and Control of Pollution 
1. For the purpose of this article, "pollution of an international 
watercourse" means any detrimental alteration in the composition or quality 
of the waters of an international watercourse which results directly or 
indirectly from human conduct. 
Article 24: Management 
1. Watercourse States shall, at the request of any of them, enter into 
consultations concerning the management of an international watercourse, 
which may include the establishment of a joint management mechanism. 
2. For the purposes of this article, "management" refers, in particular, to: 
(a) Planning the sustainable development of an international watercourse 
jmd providing for the implementation of any plans adopted; and 
(b) Otherwise promoting the rational and optimal utilization, protection 
and control of the watercourse. 
(B). INTERNA TIONAL WA TER TREA TIES 
6.3: WATER TREATIES ON EUROPEAN CONTINENT 
Europe was the first continent which witnessed sharp differences 
over the sharing of waters of international rivers as the thrust for harnessing 
water for industrial and economic development in the 19* century gained 
momentum. In most case these disagreements were solved through 
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negotiations. The agreement between Turkey and Austria in 1619 over 
Danube River and between Germany and France in 1697 over Rhine were 
among the early landmarks in the making of modem International Law on 
navigation (Berghese, 1990: 307). Much later, in 19 century two 
commissions were setup-the European Commission on the Danube and the 
Central Commission on the Rhine-to regulate navigation on these two rivers 
(Basset, 1932: 628). The Rhine and Danube Commission were primarily 
administrative bodies related with navigation issues. 
In 1916, Holland, affronted with the final act of the Congress of 
Vienna, strived in the name of its sovereignty to render delusory the rights 
of the riparian states of the Rhine. Between 1816 and 1956, Germany 
concluded approximately twenty water treaties with its neighbours. The 
principle that was recognized in all these treaties was that no state may take 
measures on its own territory concerning an international water course 
which will affect the flow of water in the territory of another state to the 
disadvantage of the latter. This rule has come to be recognized in 
International Law (Berber, 1959: 140). For instance, article 21 of the treaty 
between Germany and Czechoslovakia regarding frontier waters stated that 
if an installation is likely to cause any considerable or permanent change in 
the flow of a frontier water course or stream intersected by the frontier, each 
of the two states shall take account of the legitimate claims of the intersected 
parties in the other state (League of Nation Treaty, Vol 109: 219). Similar 
provisions are to be found in the treaties between Germany and France, and 
the Grand duchy of Luxembourg, relating the Upper Rhine and the Moselle 
respectively (Berber, 1959: 75). Similar principles came into the Berne 
Convention of October 4, 1913, between France and Switzerland. Article 4 
provides that the dam to be constructed would operate in accordance with "a 
set of rules agreed between the two government with a view to avoiding any 
risk of floods and any damage to the plant upstream, and so far as possible, 
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mitigating down stream the detriment wliich may result from the changes in 
the water flow" (Smith, 1931: 178). 
The Principle of limited territorial sovereignty is to be found in the 
convention between France and Italy of December 17, 1914. In Articles 1, 
and 3 of that treaty, both parties declare that they will avoid using or 
allowing the exploitation of the Raya river and its tributaries in the sections 
only under their jurisdiction unless prior concurrence in given. 
From the foregoing analysis of some of the European water treaties 
are important principle becomes apparent i.e., each state possesses rights of 
sovereijgnty. However this right is limited by a second consideration which 
is the duty not to injure the rights of the co-riparian state (British & Foreign 
State paper. Vol. 108:487). 
6.4: THE AMERICAN CONTINENT 
The American Continent too witnessed sharp disagreement over the 
sharing of river waters in the 18* and 19 centuries. The treaties signed on 
the European Continent at times provided the basis for cooperative action 
with regard to allocation of river waters. However in some cases the 
situation demanded a completely new set of ideas and rules which had to 
take into account the particularities of a specific situation. 
For instance, the Jay treaty of 1794, concluded between Great Britain 
and the United States in connection with navigation of boundary waters is an 
important landmark in the evolution of international rules regarding water 
rights. It was mutually agreed, that "both parties living on both side of the 
boundary should be free at all times to pass and repass by land or inland 
navigation into respective territory of each country; to navigative all the 
lakes, rivers, and water thereof, and freely to carry on trade on trade and 
commierce with each other (Bloomfield and Fitzgerald, 1958:2-3). A return 
to the North American scan shows united attempts to develop machinery for 
the settlements of boundary water problems. 
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Another milestone in the evolution of International River Law is the 
treaty of Washington signed between United States and Mexico in 1906. In 
1894 a dispute started as a result of the change in the course of the Rio-
Grande in the United States to the detriment of Mexico's interest in the 
river. The Mexican Government protested against the injury caused to its 
existing interest claiming that, the principles of International law would 
from a sufficient basis for the rights of the Mexican inhabitants of the bank 
of the Rio-Grande (Griffith L. William, 1959:3). During the late 19* century 
and the early 20* century demands upon the waters of the Rio-Grande were 
increasing and friction between the United State and Mexico over the 
control of the river waters gathered momentum (United States treaty Series, 
No.455: 23). 
Negotiations between US and Mexico ultimately culminated the 
treaty of water. The United States renounced de-facto, if not demure the 
principle of absolute sovereignties (Sevett, 1952: 114). The convention of 
May 21, 1906 provided that Mexico would receive a limited a quantity of 
water from the Rio-Grande. Article 4 of this treaty makes it clear, however 
that the supply of water to Mexico "should not be construed as recognition 
by the United States of any claim on the part of Mexico to the said waters" 
(Saliba, 1968: 52). 
The US shares waters and shares longer boundaries related to water 
with Canadian. The two were at loggerhead for some time over the issue of 
water rights. In most case, the United State, being the riparian state, 
defended its case by invoking the principle of absolute territorial 
sovereignty, although Canada as the lower riparian state, upheld the 
principal of territorial integrity, where by restriction are placed on another 
states right to change the natural flow of international waterway without 
perior occurrence. As a matter of fact, Canada explained the United States 
attitude as contrary to international law (Chacko, 1932: 74-75; Gibbans, 
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1929: 8-9). An important boundary waters treaty was signed between them 
in 1889. The treaty defines boundary water in its preliminary article as: 
"The waters from main shore to main shore of the lakes and rivers 
and connecting waterways, or the portion thereof along which the 
International boundary between the United States and the Dominion of 
Canada passes including all bays, arms and inlets thereof, but not including 
tributaiy water which in their natural channels would flow into such lakes, 
rivers and waterways, or water rivers flowing across the boundary" 
(Bloomfield,1958:17). 
An International Joint Commission (IJC) was set up in 1909 under 
the provisions of this treaty to resolve disputes relating to both boundary and 
transboundary waters. The boundary water treaty and IJC dealt the matter on 
diversion of flows for irrigation purposes and power generation as well as, 
reduction of municipal and industrial waste discharge, sharing water costs 
and benefits concerning the water issues (Mackay, 1928: 293). 
The Columbia River, with originates in Canada and which flows into 
the United States, has been the scene of large scale of hydroelectric 
generation and irrigation development. The International Joint Commission 
established technical studies and on the basis of this was able to draw up 
plans for the development of the river on cooperative basins. The 
commission also, at the request of the two governments, submitted a report 
relating to the principles to be applied in determining the allocations of 
benefit and the distribution of costs which would result from co-operative 
development of the Columbia basin. The Columbia River treaty is an 
example of an effective use of the federal approach in context of 
International basin development and settlement of water dispute. Under the 
federal approach crucial and divisive problems can be solved with mutually 
satisfactory results (Martin, 1963: 71). 
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6.5: AFRO-ASIAN CONTINENT 
International water treaties in the Afro-Asian continent are of 
relatively recent origin and the earliest treaty that was concluded in this part 
of the world was signed in 1929 between Egypt and United Kingdom. This 
treaty \^ 'as in connection with the diversion of the waters of the Nile River in 
equal proportion. The British Government suggested that it should be based 
on following considerations: the legal principle is that the waters of Nile 
river, the combined flow of white and Blue Nile and their branches should 
be accepted as a single unit, planned for the use of people inhabiting their 
banks according to their needs and capacity to benefit from the Nile (Saliba, 
1968: 56-57). 
In November 1956 an agreement was signed between United Arab 
Republic and Sudan in the context of the Nile river waters. The main 
intention of this treaty was that water must be used according to actual need 
and for the purpose of development. The treaty assigned an estimated 
555,000 million cubic meter of waters per year to Egypt and 18,500 million 
cubic meter to the Sudan. The treaty also provides for the creation of a 
Permanent Joint technical Commission for the planning of Nile River as 
single hydrological unit to be developed on the basis of mutual benefit for 
all ripajrian states. At present, the 1959 Nile agreement will continue to be 
the principal regulatory instrument for managing waters of Nile river (Naff 
& Maston: 149). 
6.6: THE INDUS RIVER BASIN AGREEMENT 
In 1939 a controversy arose between the province of Sind and 
province of Punjab as result of the diversions of the Indus River. Sir Bengal 
Rao headed a commission which was established to look into and to make 
recommendation towards its settlement. 
Just after the partition of India, a conflict arose between India and 
Pakistan regarding the water allocation of Indus basin. A treaty was 
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concluded between these two counties on May 4, 1948 for the utilization of 
waters of Indus basin. This treaty which was signed with the aid and advice 
of the international Bank of Reconstruction and Development laid down the 
following rules. 
The Western river Indus, Jhelum and Cheneb and its waters area 
exclusively useful for the development Pakistani territory, except the 
Jhelum's flow in Kashmir which is significant for the development of 
Kashmir. 
In the case of the eastern rivers Rabi Beas, and Sutlej India would 
utilize their waters except for a specified transition period during which 
India would partially supply waters to Pakistan. Each country would 
construct the works located on its own territories which are planned for the 
development of supplies (United Nations Treaty, 1942: 54). 
The cost of such works would be bom by the country to be benefited 
thereby. An appropriate procedure would be established for adjusting or 
arbitrating dispute related to allocation of cost under this principle (Quoted 
in Berber: 106). Per management Indus Commission was set up to settle the 
dispute over water as the provisions of the treaty. 
6.7: THE GANGES WATER AGREEMENT 
The Ganges water Agreement was signed on November 5, 1977 over 
the sharing of Ganges waters at Farakka. Its aim was also to find a long term 
solution for augmentation of the dry season flows of Ganges. Bangladesh 
and India visualized divergent solution as to how to increase the dry season 
flow of Ganges River. The proposal of India was transfer of water from the 
Brahmaputra River in Assam tiirough a long canal passing through 
Bangladesh. On the other hand Bangladesh proposed storage dams in the 
upper reaches of the Ganges River in Nepal and India that would store wet 
season flow for release during the low flow period. Bangladesh was 
unwilling to permit the country's second major river to fall under the 
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physical control of India, which the diversion structures at Jhogighopa and 
the outfall at Farakka would involve. Official, Bangladesh has rejected the 
link canal proposal as technically and economically unfeasible and 
ecologically ruinous. The Ganges water agreement of 1977, nevertheless, 
has provided a solid foundation for a durable settlement to be reached. 
Pending a permanent settlement the agreement of 1977 can be beneficial for 
the existing dry season flows (Falkenmark, 1986: 93-94). 
(C). INTERNA TIONAL WA TER TREA TIES IN WEST ASIA 
In the West Asia today, five elements of water legislation are 
discernible and they are based upon: 
1) Local customs, based in part on legal principles perhaps dating back 
to earlier antiquity, which may still dominate the water relationships in 
many parts of the areas. 
2) Principles of religious law often provide a theoretical super-structure 
which has an independent legal existence overshadowed by ancient customs, 
on the one hand, and more recent legislation on the other. 
3) Ottoman law which has survived in many parts of the West Asia and 
remains an important factor for water laws. 
4) The Independent states of the region which have also passed more 
recent legislation, some of it enacted after these states attained independence 
(Hirsch, 1956: 147). 
According to Ergil (1991), Arab countries do not like to be dependent 
on another power, especially about water which appears to be very 
important from a socio-psychological point of view. Turkey's Southern 
neighbours both see the Euphrates-Tigris as the waters of a common basin 
and, as countries of this basin, they wish to use these waters and share them 
according to their needs. Current international law given the right of 
ownership of waters flowing within the borders of a country to that country 
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but, v/hile implementing this, it adds a principle that one should not cause 
any loss to create a disadvantageous situation for another country. In this 
case, the country of origin, Turkey, has certain advantages and international 
law gives certain rights to the first country in the chain as owner of the water 
(Ergii, 1991: 52). Both Syria and Iraq, thus are demanding extra water from 
Turkey, but are not renovating their irrigation systems, improving watering 
techniques nor adopting water saving methods. It is therefore not reasonable 
for Turkey to respond to their southern neighbours demands which could be 
interf)reted as "we need this much water therefore turkey ought to share it 
with us according to our needs alone". 
The Turkish government insists that its southern neighbours use 
available water with minimum waste and then come forth with realistic 
demands for more water if it is needed (Ergil, 1991: 55). 
The Euphrates and Tigris are not international waters, and nobody 
had any claims on resources within Turkish boundaries" (Tekeli, 1990: 211). 
According to Ferruk Amik, the Turkish director general of the state 
Hydraulic Works (DSI): "Syria and Iraq insist on their right to share the 
wateir. We reject this term of 'share'. It is a Turkish river so we are not 
required to share any of the water" (Frankel, 1991: 292). 
Turkey differentiates between the notions of "International Waters" 
and "transboundary flows" declaring GAP Rivers as "transboundary". This 
Turkish approach is based on two assumptions; 
1) Turkey distinguishes between "International and transboundary" 
watercourse in the following ways. An international watercourse has its 
opposing banks under sovereignty of different countries and such waters are 
shared by the riparian states through the "median line", while a 
transboundary watercourses crosses common political borders. 
2) The Euphrates-Tigris rivers must be considered as one transboundary 
watercourse system, since they are linked by the Tharthaz canal before 
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merging as Shatt al-Arab, allowing the substitution Tigris waters for 
demands from the Euphrates (Tekeli, 1990: 213). 
Another Turkish argument, according to Inan, is based on the length 
of the Euphrates River in each basin state, the area of the drainage basin and 
the contribution of water. Turkey contributes 89 percent of the annual flow 
of the Euphrates and Syria contributes only 11 percent of this flow. Since 
1987 Turkey has delivered 500mV sec which are more than 50 percent of 
the water. In other words, Turkey has agreed to leave more water for the 
down stream states than they contribute to the system. On the other hand 
when this whole project came into force, Turkey left two thirds of the annual 
flow of the Euphrates and Tigris waters which was sufficient for both Syria 
and Iiraq. These rivers have to be considered as falling from a single basin. 
Prior to the Gulf crisis Iraq was selling some of this water to Kuwait. By 
1992 Turkey consumed only 1.5 percent the flow but when the GAP project 
is completed, Turkey will consume about one third of the whole 
consumption. Turkey's contribution to both rivers is 19 billion cubic meter 
per year from the Euphrates basin, which amounts to 49 billion cubic meter 
per year. Turkey is going to consume one third of this 18 billion cubic meter 
per year, 36 billion cubic meter per year of water will be allocated to the 
lower riparian states, but only if they accept the equitable principles which 
were requested in the draft articles of the International Law Commissions. 
"The Turkish principle of equity relates to actual needs. Syria 
indicaites a need of 13 billion cubic meters per year. According to European 
publications its actual need is only 8 billion m^ Iraq demands 26 billion 
cubic meters of waters and this means that it is claiming more than it needs. 
If modem techniques are used, Iranians Syrian demands for water will 
decrease. Turkey insists on considering both the Euphrates-Tigris basins as a 
whole. They both originate from Turkey which makes the greatest 
contribution to them. The water from the Euphrates-Tigris should be more 
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than sufficient for Iraqi especially after constructing the Tharthar project 
which links Euphrates-Tigris river" (Inan, 1992: 30). 
Treaties regarding international rivers in West Asia have been 
patterned on the lines of American and European water treaties. The earliest 
treaty on West Asian water resources was concluded in December 1920 
between France and Britain involving the Euphrates-Tigris, Jordan and the 
Yarmuk rivers. The treaty the practice where the vested as well as reserved 
rights of riparian states were protected. Under Article 3 of the treaty two 
contracting parties would agree to nominate a commission to examine a plan 
of irrigation organized by the government of the French mandatory, territory 
the execution of which would be of a nature to diminish in any considerable 
degree of the Tigris and Euphrates water at the point where they enter the 
British mandate in Mesopotamia" (Saliba, 1968: 60). Article 8 of the same 
treaty ftirther has become essential for the agreement that a second 
commission was to be appointed to invigilate uncommon the employment, 
for the irrigation purposes and the production of hydroelectric power, of the 
waters of the upper Jordan and the Yarmuk and its tributaries, after 
satisfaction of the needs of the territory under the French mandatory power. 
In 1921, the Treaty of Friendship was concluded between Persia and 
Russia. The two countries state that "they shall have equal rights of usage 
over the Atrak River and other fi-ontier river and Waterways" (United 
Nations Treaty, vol.9:401). An important West Asia treaty was signed 
between the United Kingdom and France on February 3, 1922 in connection 
with the utilization of the Yarmuk waters proportionately. This treaty 
recommended that the "inhabitants of Syria and Lebanon shall have the 
same fishing and navigation rights on Lake Huleh and Tiberias and the river 
Jordan as the people of Palestine ((United Nations Treaty, Vol.9:401). 
The Final protocol of the Franco-Turkish delimitation commission. 
May 3, 1930, recommended that: "where as its neighborhood on the Tigris 
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imposes on the riparian states specific obligations, it becomes necessary to 
establish rules in connection with the rights of each sovereign state in its 
context with the other". All questions, for example-navigation, fishing, 
industrial and agricultural utilization of the waters, and the policing of the 
river shall, be solved on the lines of complete equality ((United Nations 
Treaty, Vol.37: 207-291). Internationally the general rule for Boundary 
River is that the boundary follows the thatweg. It is considered to assure 
access to navigation to both countries. In the case of the Shatt, however, Iraq 
can make a compelling appeal to equitable considerations of the sort often in 
deciding marine boundaries (Naff &Maston, 1990: 178). 
On March 29, 1946 the Treaty of Friendship and Good neighbourly 
Relation was concluded between Iraq and Turkey. It declared that both 
countries have importance of conservation works on the Tigris and 
Euphrates with it branches, in order to insure that flow of the two rivers with 
a view to avoid the danger of floods during the annual periods of high water 
((United Nations Treaty, Vol.84: 24). The treaty has significance for 
cooperation on the part of both countries on matters in the light of the 
excheinge of information on the water-flow records and other data of the two 
rivers. Turkey moreover, agreed to grant Iraq the right to construct dams and 
other similar works on sites which are located in Turkish territory with the 
stipulation that Iraq will defray the cost of the constructions. Article 4 of the 
treaty stated that the above mentioned work shall be the subject of a separate 
agreement in respect of its site, cost operation and maintenance, and its use 
by Turkey for purposes of irrigation and power production. Under Article 5, 
turkey agreed to keep Iraq informed of plans for the construction of 
conservation works on either of the two rivers or tributaries. On June 4, 
1953, Syria and Jordan signed a treaty concerning the joint development and 
utilizaition of the Yarmuk River (Saliba, 1968: 61). On July 6, 1987 an 
agreement was signed on economic cooperation between Turkey and Syria. 
Turkey was infavour of ad-hoc bilateral joint ventures in water and energy 
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development and was prepared to cooperate on data management 
(Beschomer, 1992-93: 273). 
Following, in Chronological order, is a review of the international 
instruments governing the uses and the sharing of Nile waters. They are 
eight all in all, but are important at the outset to shed some light and make a 
few points of clarification as to the signatories and the nature of those 
treaties. 
The first six agreements, ending with the 1929 Agreement, have to do 
with the territorial status of the contracting parties. It is an agreed principle 
of international law that such territorial status agreements constitute an 
obligation and a limitation on the contracting parties' territory, unaffected 
by a change of sovereignty. 
The following treaties and instruments which govern and regulate the 
juridical status of an international river, the Nile, do not contain any 
exceptional or illegal principle. Rather, they merely confirm the principles 
already accepted by international jurisprudence and international norms, as 
well as the historical acquired rights which Egypt or some other country, my 
have attained over many thousand years of dependence on the Nile as its 
sole life. 
1) The protocol between Great Britain and Italy of 1891, for the demarcation 
of their respective spheres of influence in eastern Africa. In its third article, 
the protocol stipulates that Italy pledges not to construct on the Atbara River 
any irrigation work which might significantly affect the Atbara's flow into 
the Nile. 
2) Treaties between Great Britain and Ethiopia; and between the first and 
Ethiopia and Italy, relative to the fi-ontiers between the Anglo-Egyptian 
Sudan, Ethiopia and Erthria, signed in Addis Ababa on May fifteenth 1902. 
in the third article of these treaties. Emperor Menelek second, King of 
Ethiopia engages himself towards great Britain not to contract or to allow to 
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be constructed any work across the Blue Nile, Lake Tana or the Sobat River, 
which could arrest the flow from their waters into the Nile, except in 
agreement with the GovemmeSnt of Great Britain and the Government of 
the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. 
3) Agreement between Great Britain and the Congo free state (now Zaire) 
signed in London on may ninth 1906 bringing modification to the Brussels 
agreement of may 12* 1894. in its third article the 1906 Agreement the 
Government of the Congo free state undertake not to construct or allow to 
be constructed any work on or near the Simliki or Isango rivers, which 
might reduce the volume of waters flowing into Lake Albert except in 
agreement with the government of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. 
4) Exchange of Notes between the United Kingdom and Italy in December 
1925, wherein the Italian Government recognize the previously acquired 
hydrolic rights of Egypt and the Sudan in the waters of the Blue and White 
Niles, and engage themselves towards the other contracting parties not to 
constmct on the head waters of the Blue Nile or the White Nile or their 
tributaries and affluent, any work which might substantially modify their 
flow into the main river. 
5) Agreement between Egypt and Great Britain signed in 1929. this treaty 
stipulates that no work of any kind may be undertaken on the Nile, its 
tributiiries or on the lakes which from its source, without Egypt's consent; 
and in particular if these works are related to irrigation or power generation, 
or if they affect the volume of waters which reach Egypt, or in any other 
way be detrimental to Egypt. 
6) Exchange of notes between Egypt and Great Britain the period from July 
1952 to January 1953, regarding Egypt's participation in the construction of 
the Owen dam for the generation of hydro-electric power in Uganda. It was 
agreed to heighten the Owen dam so as to raise the water level in Lake 
Victoria, Compensations were agreed upon for Uganda whose lands would 
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be detrimentally affected by the rise of the water level in Lake Victoria 
(Howell & Allan, 1990: 224-230). 
Nile states may have different views of what constitutes utilization in 
an "equitable and reasonable manner". For example, Egypt, which uses the 
greatest amount of Nile water, may consider its utilization equitable because 
it has no other source of water. In fact, Egypt argued during the Working 
Group negotiations that availability of other water sources should be a factor 
for determiniSng e3quitable utilization under article 6 (McCaffrey, 1996: 
100). Although the Working Group did not entirely accept Egypt's 
suggestion, it did include "the availability of alternatives, of comparable 
value, to a particular planned and existing use" as a factor in Article 6. 
Egypt also might consider its use equitable because it was the first to make 
use of the Nile waters. It could use the "existing or potential use" factor to 
support that argument. In addition, Egypt might argue that "the population 
dependent on the watercourse" factor weighs in favor of protecting uses that 
its population has been dependent on over time. Finally, it could argue that it 
is using water equitably because it has advanced systems for "conservation" 
and "economy of use" (UN Watercourses Convention, May 1997Art. 6: 31). 
Ethiopia, on the other, may have a different view of what constitutes 
equitable use. Because its territory contributes eighty-four percent of the 
Nile flow, Ethiopia may believe that it is entitled to a greater share of Nile 
waters. The contribution of water from each watercourse state, however, is 
not a relevant factor for determining equitable utilization under Article 6 of 
the Convention. At the Working Group level, India sought to include this as 
a factor in the Convention, but the Working group declined to include it in 
Article 6 ((McCaffrey, 1996: 100). Ethiopia, however, could argue under 
Article 6(a) that its significant contribution must be considered as a 
"relevant" "hydrographic" or "hydrological" factor. In addition, other 
Article 6 factors weigh in Ethiopia's favor. Ethiopia could argue that it is 
entitled to an amount of water equitable for "the population dependent on 
266 
the watercourse". In addition, the second Article 6 factor, "the social and 
economic needs of the watercourse states concerned," is favorable to 
Ethiopia and all Nile states that have a lower per capita income than Egypt; 
(U.N.Wtercourses Convention, May, 1997: 67) half of the Nile states are 
among the ten poorest countries in the world (Nile Basin Initiative,, 1998: 2-
10). Due to aridity, Ethiopia, just like Egypt, experiences a lack of 
"availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a particular plarmed or 
existing use". In addition, Ethiopia could argue under Article 6(d) that "the 
effects" of Egypt's "use" on the amount of water that Ethiopia may use is 
inequitable. Thus, Egypt and Ethiopia could use the Article 6 factors to 
come to different results on equitable utilization. 
i\rticle 6(g) also implies that the uses of different countries must be 
compared to determine equitable use. Thus, the "availability of alternatives, 
of comparable value" to water-intensive Egyptian agricultural projects near 
the Red Sea could be compared to the "availability of alternatives" to 
withdrawal for Ethiopian drinking w2ater needs. This factor seems to weigh 
in favor of Ethiopia with respect to equity. "Comparable value," however, is 
an ambiguous term, and thus Egypt could argue that it has no other projects 
available of "comparable value". The Convention does not specify how this 
term should be used. Thus, as with the other Article 6 factors, the same 
factor easily can be formulated to support either side in the same debate. 
Disputes over the application of Article 5 and 6 are supposed to be answered 
under the Convention's dispute settlement provisions, but such a process 
could be cumbersome. Because it is so difficult to determine how to apply 
the factor of Article6, they should just be used as considerations in the 
negotiation of a Nile agreement, but not as a particular test for equitable 
utilization by Nile states (U.N. Watercourses Convention, May, 1997: 34). 
It is obvious that International water treaties in West Asia are few 
even tiie one's that have been signed are of a general nature. Many questions 
still remain unanswerable and there seems to very little effort to deal with 
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contentious issues. Do upstream state within which a river originates, have 
priority over down stream states? Do population growth and other needs in 
one riparian state it priority over another? Should a riparian state be 
demanded to consume water in more economical ways? Should it be 
demanded if one riparian state to use only certain sources of waters and 
leave specific sources for supplying the needs of other? These and related 
question are as yet unanswered in the region and there is very little by way 
of international water treaties to serve as a guide. The lack of political 
understanding and intense competition for regional influence is an important 
factor hindering the evolution of mutually acceptable water treaties in the 
region. Coupled with this is fact the subject of water raises unique emotions. 
The result is that each country prefers to go it alone and all pragmatic 
solution has been sacrificed at altar of populist and sometimes grandiose 
schemes. It is only in the 1990's that the states in the region have shown 
some degree of willingness to eschew unilateral action and work out 
solution on a cooperative basis in the light of existing international laws and 
conventions (Beschomer, 1992-93: 273). 
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(A). SUGGESTION AND SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF 
WA TER SHORTA GES IN WEST ASIA 
In the foregoing chapter we have seen that all the international rivers 
in West Asia are being intensively exploited by the residents of the region. 
The Jordan and the Yarmuk are used mostly by Jordan, Israel, and the Syria; 
the Nile is reaching the maximum in term of its use, and it is most likely 
that all of the plans to increase the flow of the river by development projects 
will not be executed in the near future for social, political, and geopolitical 
reasons. As for the Tigris and Euphrates, their discharge has until recently 
satisfied their riparian countries' needs, but owing to intensive development 
in Turkey and Syria it seems that within ten to fifteen years a regional water 
shortage will arise. Such is the case with the Orontes basin too and 
essentially with all the water sources in the region, including internal rivers 
and groundwater. The conclusion is clear: West Asia, whose population is 
increasing at rates higher than the global average (3 percent natural increase 
annually as compared with the rest of the third World, which is 2.5 percent, 
or doubling in 23 years), will encounter a water shortage if the irrigation 
methods and the present plantations continue to the employed. However, 
because the states of the region seem unable to accomplish this within the 
next Iwo decades, they will have to search for sources of water. The danger 
facing the peoples of the region is that if additional water is not found their 
fate is liable to be famine, drought, disease, and even migration. This was 
the faite of Ethiopia, Somalia, the Sudan, and the Sahal sates in the 1980s, 
At the end of the twentieth century human society has various means 
of tackling the water problem. Some of these are traditional and others are 
innovation. Among the former are trapping of flood water, economical 
irrigation methods, and saving water through choice of crops. This group 
may also include war and the destruction of water-holding devices in 
neighiboring countries as a way of acquiring sources of water. The 
inno^ a^tive methods are cloud seeding, desalination transfer of water to 
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remote places, and transportation of water in large containers, as is done 
with oil. Recycling of sewage water for irrigation of crops is also a new way 
of obtaining water, as well as preventing pollution of groundwater. 
The problem of water shortage may be approached by way of 
economics, which regards water as a product for which a real price must be 
paid. Such an approach will lead to a reduction in water use for agriculture 
and the transition of inhabitants from agriculture to other sectors, such as 
tourism, industry, and services. 
A further option much discussed in international forums should be 
studied: cooperation among the countries of the region. Could such 
cooperation lead to a solution to the water problems? 
Some of the above method to increase the supply of water for 
example, trapping of food water, cloud seeding, desalination, import of 
water, recycling of sewage water, war-or its alternative, international 
cooperation, while some reduce demand saving in water use, substitution of 
economic sector. 
7.1: WATER IMPORT 
Water may be imported in pipes from a place where it is plentiful to 
a place where it is lacking. In the United States, for example, the water of 
the Colorado River is carried by the Colorado River Aqueduct to the Los 
Angeles area and by the Coachella and the All-American Canal to the 
Imperial Valley and Los Angeles area. 
Water may also be imported by sea in containers, like oil. In the 
following we shall examine the possibilities of implementing these methods 
in the West Asia. 
7.2: IMPORTING WATER IN PIPES 
The idea of transferring water from one country to another in the 
West Asia has been posited on several occasions, chiefly in the 1980s and 
1990s. There were proposals to carry Nile water to the Sinai Desert, and 
270 
thence to the Gaza Strip and Israel. Following the signing of the peace 
agreement between Egypt and Israel in 1979, leaders of the two states 
considered the notion. Subsequently, several specialists tried to translate it 
into an economic plan (Kally, 1986; Ben Shachar et al., 1989). Hardly was 
the ini: dry on the peace documents than opposition to the ides was voiced 
by Ethiopia, arguing that before Nile water was removed to a different 
drainage basin its rights had to be considered. In Egypt, too, objections were 
raised to the transfer of Nile water to the Jews. In Israel there were some 
who ajrgued that Israel must not be dependent on Egypt in respect of such an 
important resource, while others gave the pollution of Nile water as a reason 
not bring it to Israel. Transport of Euphrates water to Amman (Kally, 1986; 
al Maged, Feb, 23, 1995) and of Litani water to Israel also were considered. 
The latter idea was rejected several times by the Lebanese government. 
7.3: THE TURKISH "PEACE PIPELINE" PLAN 
The idea that won the most headlines was that of the Turkish peace 
pipeline. In 1986 Turkey announced its peace pipeline proposal, which was 
based on carrying about 6 million cubic meter of water per day about 2.2 
billion cubic meters annually from Turkey to the arid states of the West 
Asia (Irbec, 1993; Duna, 1988 : 14-65 ). 
The project was conceived by the Centre for International and 
Strategic Studies in Washington, D.C. (MEED, Mar. 26, 1988: 30). The 
Centre asserts that the water shortage problem will be the most serious in 
the region by end of the twentieth century and will lead to international 
conflicts. 
The American company that will undertake the project claims that 
the price of water brought by the peace pipeline will be cheaper than the 
price of desalinated water in the Persian Gulf; the cost of 1 cubic meter of 
desalinated water in the Persian Gulf is about $5, whereas the price of a 
cubic meter of water brought by the peace pipeline will be only about $1.07. 
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The pipeline will carry the surplus water from the Seyan and Ceyan 
Rivers, and others in the same area, that empty into the delta at whose 
centre Use the city of Adana. The discharge of the two rivers, which flow 
down from the Taurus Mountains, is 39.17 million cubic meters daily, of 
which about 23 million cubic meter are used. The remainder, about 16 
million cubic meters, is being offered by Turkey to West Asian region. 
According to the plan, the water will be carried to the Aleppo plateau 
in a 9.5-12.5 mile tunnel under the Nur Mountains (Nur Dogloru) that rise 
between the Adana plain and the valley of the Orontes. From the Aleppo 
plateau the pipeline will run to the twon of Homs, where it will divide into 
two branches. One will continue to Damascus and Amman. Both these cities 
are 2,296 feet above sea level, but between them the pipeline must traverse 
the Irbid heights, which are lower. From Amman, the line will proceed to 
Madina and Mecca, and thence to the coastal towns of Jedda and Yanbu. 
This branch will be 1,656 miles long, and will carry 3.5 million cubic 
meters per day. Eleven huge pumps, requiring 500 megawatts of electricity, 
will propel the water. 
The other branch will run from Hama southeast, cross the Syrian 
desert highlands in Syria and Jordan, and continue parallel to the Tapline oil 
pipeline, passing through Saudi Arabia, Abu Dubai, and Ras al Khayma, 
ending in Muscat in Oman. Along the way secondary arms will fork off: 
one to Kuwait City, one to the Saudi oil cities another to the town of 
Manama in Bahrain, and a third to the town of Doha in Qatar. This branch 
will be 2,438 miles long and will transport 2.5 million cubic meter of water 
daily. Five massive pumps, consuming 600 megawatts of electricity, will 
move the water. 
The original plan envisaged that the first branch line would cross 
from l^ yria to Israel and the West bank, and thence to Jordan and Saudi 
Arabia. But a revised plan by the eight states due to participate in the 
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enterjjrise excluded Israel on the grounds that the Palestinian- Israeli 
conflict was not yet settled, nor was there peace between Israel and its 
neighbours. 
Owing to the dispute with regard to Israel, the Turkish government 
decided that when it embarked on the construction of the pipeline it would 
begin with the eastern branch running to the Persian Gulf. This work would 
take £ibout ten years. Turkey's profits, if the price of a cubic meter of water 
is $1, would be about $2 billion a year. However, due to different foreign 
policy orientation of the states the proposed water pipelines could not be 
materialized. 
7.4: IMPORTING WATER BY SEA 
Another way to solve the water shortage in the region is to import 
water from-rich countries nearby, just as countries import wheat or oil. 
The idea is not new, and in the 1970s agreements were signed among 
the Gulf States, for example, and the Philippines, on transporting oil from 
the Gulf to the Philippines and transporting water from the Philippines to 
the Gulf in tankers on the way back. 
The idea arose in Israel in the 1980s, when importing water from 
southern Turkey was the main focus. Dozens of rivers flow from the Taurus 
Mountains and empty into the sea, and Turkey does not utilize their water 
owing to topographical factors. Former Yugoslavia, Italy, and France also 
have abundant water close to their coastlines, but they are further from 
Israel. The idea is to transport water from a river in Turkey with a large 
discharge— t^he Manavgat River opposite Cyprus— t^o an Israeli port in 
special containers built for this purpose. These containers, known as 
"jellyfish," are 1,968 feet long and made out of a plastic material with 
double; walls. Each container can carry about 2 million cubic meter of water 
when it is sunk in the sea and is towed by a tugboat (Pope,- 1990; 
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Libiszewski, 1995: 56-57; Schiller, 1996). Another idea is a floating "water 
snake," which its inventors believe is less costly than the "jellyfish" (Ha'ir, 
Feb. 11, 1994). 
Importing water raises several difficulties, economic and geopolitical. 
To reduce the cost of the water and its transportation, a suitable terminal 
must be built at the port of exit, which will include water containers and 
pumps to transfer the water from the river to the containers or directly into 
the jellyfish. In addition, a special port or installation for docking the 
tugboat and its containers must be built in both the exporting and importing 
countries and in the latter a system to direct the water from the containers to 
the national water system. A fleet of tugboats and jellyfish will be necessary 
for transporting the water. According to an initial estimate, an investment of 
about $200 million will be necessary: about $50 million for a terminal in the 
exporting country, about $100 million for a terminal in the importing 
country, and about $50 million for the fleet. 
In sum, the idea of importing water is not feasible at present, either 
because there are more accessible altemative in most states of the region or 
because of real and imaginary geopolitical fears (Gleick, 1993). 
7.5: DESALINATION 
Desalination of seawater may answer the water shortage in arid and 
semiarid regions in the world generally and the in the West Asia 
specifically. This is an unlimited source: the oceans or abundant brackish 
water is arid regions. The know-how for desalination also exists, and today 
it is already possible to desalinate all kinds of existing water, albeit at a 
relatively high price (Gleick, 1993:45). 
Of all the desalinated water in the world, about 54 percent was 
treated in west Asia: about 26.8 percent in Saudi Arabia, about 10.5 percent 
in Kuwait, and about 10 percent in the United Arab Emirates (water 
Intemaitional Symposium, 1990; Glick, 1993: 56). 
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In the remaining states of the region there are hardly any desalination 
plants except at Eilat and Aqaba, where water is desalinated for tourists and 
the urban population's needs. Israel also has experimental desalination 
plants in the Negev, altogether about 18.2 million cubic meters per year, or 
1 perc;ent of the country's total supply. Egypt has desalination plants in 
small oases and tourist sites in Sinai, for example, at Sharm al Sheikh, 
Dhahab, and Nuweiba (Earle, 1992: 65). In the Gulf States the cost of 
desalinated water is worthwhile economically. But in the other states, Syria, 
Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian entity, oil is not so cheap and the cost of 
water will be very expensive. 
According to Israeli water Commissioner Zaslavsky, an initial 
investment of $600-700 million will be necessary to desalinate 250 million 
cubic meters per year for a period of about fifteen years. In addition, an 
investment of about $250 million will be required as operating expenses for 
the same period. Over fifteen years, therefore, about $1 billion will be 
necessiiry. For two installations, which will desalinate 500 million cubic 
meter of water for Jordanian, Israeli, West Bank, and Gaza needs, about $2 
billion will be necessary, including $1.2-$ 1.4 billion of initial investment 
(Glickstem, 1996: 2). Hence, we also obtain figures for the price of 
desalinating a cubic meter of water: they generally vary in the rang of 
$0.75-1.00 (Eckstein el., 1994:333; Glickstem, 1996:5). The questions 
arising are how the no oil states in the West Asia will obtain fiinds for such 
project, and what purposes they will serve. 
Yet the principal problem is not the know-how for desalination, but 
the ability of desalination to solve the water shortage in the region. In the 
Gulf States; water is only for the domestic use of the urban residents, and 
the total amount of desalinated water in the Persian Gulf in 1990 is enough 
to satisfy Egypt's needs for two week only. In Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and 
Israel, the water is used principally for agriculture, and for this need 
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desalinated water is not enough. Syria needs another2 billion cubic meter of 
water to satisfy its requirements for one year and Egypt must have another 
5-10 billion cubic meter of water to satisfy its yearly needs in this decade. 
No desalination plants can satisfy such great needs. In Egypt and Syria such 
plants will not solve the chief problem. 
The requirements of Israel, Jordan, the West Bank, and the Gaza 
Strip are smaller. Jordan lacks 400 million cubic meters annually. In the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip there will be an annual shortfall of 200-400 
million cubic meters. A similar quantity is lacking in Israel, not including 
the deficit from the groundwater aquifer. The total shortage is about 1 
billion cubic meter of water annually, and this can possibly be supplied by 
desalination (Rogers, 1994: 306-307). 
7.6: TRAPPING FLOOD WATER 
This method was applied in the past and is in use at present in all the 
states of the West Asia. Historical examples of this method are the 
Nabate;an water installation near Shivta, Avedat, Nitzana, and Mamshit, and 
the Roman water works at Tadmor (in Syria), in the Arava, the Jerusalem 
Hills and many other places. Among contemporary examples, in Israel for 
decades trapping flood water has been applied in the Judean Mountains and 
in the northern and central Negev (the Nahal Shikma and Yeruham Dams, 
and many other small Dams throughout the Negev). In Jordan attempts to 
trap flood water have been made in the Wadi Rum area and on the Jordan 
tributaries. The Syrian traps flood water all along the Yarmuk basin. 
Trapping flood water in arid zones in problematic as it is impossible to 
forecast the times or quantities of the flood. Similarly, a large part of the 
water seeps into the earth and some of it evaporates. Therefore, the amount 
of water that will be available to potential settlers in the area cannot be 
detennined with certainty. 
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7.7: CLOUD SEEDING 
The cloud seeding method was devised after World War II when it 
was realized that certain chemical substances such as silver iodide could act 
as catalysts for cloud accumulation. The invention seemed to herald a 
solution to the water shortage in arid zones. In northern Israel improvements 
of 10-15 percent in mean yearly precipitation have been measured, but in 
the southern parts of the country the methods have not shown evident gains. 
It is also clear that cloud seeding cannot cause rainfall when there are no 
clouds (GHck, 1993: 414; Ohlsson, 1995: 64). 
Seeding has created international tensions with the claim that 
improvements in the amount of precipitation in one area are at the expense 
of the amount of precipitation in the neighbouring area. According to this 
argument it is possible, for example, that seeding clouds on the Israeli coast 
harms the amount of rainfall in southern Syria or northern Jordan. However, 
this claim has not been proven. 
In sum. West Asia cannot rely on this method as a solution to its 
water problems. 
7.8: RECYCLED WATER 
As the urban population grows larger, so does the quantity of water 
used for demestic purpose. In 1995 about half the population of the West 
Asia, 100 million people, living in cities or their environs. Average annual 
per capita water consumption was about 50 cubic meters. A simple 
calculation shows that the urban population of the West Asia produces 
about 5 billion cubic meter of sewage water. This is a considerable amount 
of water, and it is likely to double in about ten years on account of expected 
populaition increase and the never ending migration to the towns. 
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In the West Asia, sewage water can solve the water shortage for 
agriculture. Purification is in any case necessary to prevent pollution of 
groundwater and of rivers. The only problem here is the social, religious, 
and psychological barrier. The solution will be the gradual introduction of 
the use of recycled water: first for watering lawns and ornamental plants, 
and ultimately for agriculture. Water used for urban and industrial purposes 
may be retaken almost entirely and with the correct treatment may be 
brought up to a purity level close to that of drinking water. Recycled water 
may be used in agriculture for irrigating industrial crops. High-quality 
recycled water may also serve for irrigating citrus groves and other orchards 
(Mekorot, 1991; 1996). 
The big crowded cities of West Asia and the settlements on the bank 
of rivers must also engage urgently in treatment of sewage water. Failure to 
do so will result in continued penetration of sewage into rivers, polluting 
them and endangering all inhabitants lower down the river. In Israel, in 
1990 about 270 million cubic meter of sewage water were recycled, of 
which about 190 million cubic meters were used. The forecast for the year 
2020 is for reuse of half a billion cubic meters of sewage water. In Jordan in 
1991 about 45 million cubic meters were recycled. The outlook for 2015 
envisages recycling 110 million cubic meters (Shatanwi and al jayousi, 
1995: 92). In Egypt, in 1995 about 3 billion cubic meters were recycled. 
The government's plan hopes to achieve recycling of 7-8 billion cubic meter 
of sewage water by 2020. 
7.9: CONSERVATION OF WATER 
Many ways exist for saving water, and this issue has great 
importance throughout the world and in the West Asia particularly. One of 
these ways is to reduce agriculture and to import food. For example, 
bananas may be imported from South America. Rice, wheat, and other 
cereals may be imported from other places, and thus water presently used to 
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irrigaite crops in the arid West Asia would be saved and to the direct use of 
the population. 
Obviously, it is possible to introduce efficient and economical 
irrigation methods. In the large river valleys and many places in the West 
Asia, irrigation by flooding the fields is still practiced. This method is 
wastefiil in the extreme, and also contributed to the considerable salinization 
of the land, which in turn harms the crops. This irrigation method should be 
stopped and replaced by more effective method such as bubble, drip, or 
micro spray irrigation, controlled showering, and underground watering. 
Growing plants in greenhouses also cuts down water loss by evaporation. 
Billions of cubic meters of water may be saving by these systems (Allan, 
1994: 88-89). 
Correct transportation too can save large amounts of water. Today in 
many places water is moved to open earth canals. This method results in a 
large loss of water by evaporation, seepage, and the growth of wild plants 
that use up water. The transition should be made to transportation of water 
in concrete canals or pipes. This step too, like the previous one noted, 
requires an investment of billions of dollars. But it can be carried out 
rapidly as it does not depend on the farmers themselves. 
A further mode of saving is avoidance of growing water-excessive 
crops, such as cotton, bananas, sugar beet, rice, and citrus, and 
concentration on water-saving crops. The former type of crops may 
continue to be grown only if recycled water is available for their irrigation. 
If West Asia states (the Sudan, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Turkey) make 
an effort to save water in the ways outlined above it should be possible to 
save a total of 50-60 billion cubic meter. Egypt will save one-third of the 
amount of water it uses, namely, about 20 billion cubic meters; a similar 
quantity will be solved in Iraq. In Turkey, following completion of the GAP 
project, it will be possible to save about 10 billion cubic meters, in Syria 2-3 
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billion cubic meter, in Sudan 4-10 billion cubic meter, and in Jordan smaller 
amounts. By these methods it will be possible to solve the problem of water 
throughout the West Asia, at least for another two three decades (Allan, 
1994: 88-89; Eckestein, 1995: 400-467). 
The steady reduction of agriculture and the number of those engaged 
in it, reduction of agriculture on marginal land unsuitable for irrigation, and 
a shift to the industry and service branches. Such a transformation is likely 
to lead to a significant drop in the amount of water used in the West Asia, 
principally water for irrigation. 
Not only may irrigation water be saved, but also domestic water. This 
is possible, among other things, by the repair of urban water supply systems 
that {ire corroded and leaking. But it must be borne in mind that the 
quantities saved in this way are dwarfed by those saved from irrigation 
(Peres, 1993). 
(B). CONCLUSION 
Water is the most precious and limited natural resource in West Asia. 
West Asia is a developing region and water scarcity is not a new 
phenomenon in the arid region. While the demand for water is increasing 
rapidly the supply of fresh water in West Asia is limited. As a result, the 
situation in the region is getting worse and the shortage of water is 
approaching crisis level. The major rivers of the region are Jordan, 
Euphrates-Tigris, and the Nile. 
The region may be divided into two separate units. The northern 
mountain zone, overlying the states of Turkey, northern Iraq, Syria and Iran 
which consists of lofty mountain ranges and plateaus. The Southern zone 
consists of plains and desert. A characteristic feature of the region is that 
plateaus are situated in between most of the mountains. The plateaus have 
an important place in the physical features of the region. The central plateau 
of Iran is occupied by a series of closed basin with no outward drainage of 
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any sort. Plains and deserts are the significant Physical features of the 
Southern region of West Asia. 
In most of the West Asian states climate is harsh and arid with scanty 
rainfall and very high potential of evaporation except in the coastal and 
mountainous regions. Cyclones come from the West, cross over the 
Mediterranean Sea and enter West Asia. The winter is mild, summers are 
warm and rainfall occurs during the winter season. Throughout the region 
there is an acute scarcity of water. 
Most of West Asia is semi-arid or arid except the high attitude areas 
of the north with the location of major cities determined by access to water 
from rivers often flowing from mountains in remote parts of the region and 
even outside it. In addition agriculture and animal husbandry have 
traditionally been the region's basic economic activities, and population 
growth has been generally high. These auspects increase the pressure on 
limited water supply of the region. Under such conditions, socio-economic 
significance of water becomes inevitable. Moreover because of mistrust and 
suspicion peaceful management of such a vital commodity i.e. water is 
difficult to achieve, resulting the conflict or crisis. Western influence and 
international intervention are still strong and these have often been seen as 
the primary strategic factor behind political and military maneuvering in the 
region. As the water problem becomes more acute, it will surface as a 
domestic political issue and this domestic conflict will probably affect other 
issues. The surplus water of northern region is transported through very 
great distances into areas experiencing water scarcity by river systems and 
ground water reservoirs. For example, the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers 
trans])ort the surplus water to the intensively arid regions of southern Iraq. 
The most important characteristics of West Asia is, undoubtedly, the 
small amount of precipitation, and this is the limiting factor for the 
agricultural development of the region. Throughout most of the region 
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rainfall occurs, mostly in the winter. Northern parts of Turkey and Iran 
receive precipitation round the year. In the Arabian Peninsula, southern 
Iran, Iraq and Egypt, the annual precipitation is less than 100 mm. West 
Asia become entirely dependent upon imported food, a situation from which 
they would prefer to be freed by means of planned agricultural 
development. Although agriculture continues to be the largest single user of 
water, the growth of domestic and industrial water consumption has 
increased sharply. 
The move towards industrialization has enjoyed high priority in 
government planned expenditure in the West Asia. The problem is further 
exacerbated by the fact that most of the rivers of West Asia are transnational 
that CTOSses or spans an international border. Disputes over the distribution 
of the waters of international rivers are a frequent phenomenon and stem 
from efforts by riparian countries to control the natural flow of water with 
the help of modem technology. 
The problem of water sharing arises when an upstream state claims 
the maximum use of water within its borders as its sovereign right. The 
water right assertion and attitude of an upstream state, in fact deeply 
influences the bilateral relations and mutual trust. 
Politics and water are closely interconnected. Invariably the final 
decision to develop water resources schemes is very much part of a 
domestic political process. Hence, very few conflicts arise between political 
subdivisions, and if such conflicts occur, especially regarding natural 
resources like water, quick and convincing decisions can be made centrally. 
Such international conflicts over shared water resources will continue 
to increase, especially since some writers have already suggested that water, 
rather than land, will be the major constraint or the critical factor for 
incre i^sing world food production during the coming decades. 
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The issue of sharing of river water and problem of water shortage has 
become acute in the West Asia region. These problems are likely to become 
critical unless urgent and immediate action is taken both to increase and to 
conserve existing supplies of water crisis. It has arid or semi-arid climate 
with average annual rainfall levels of less than 250 MM/Y. 
The water in West Asia dispute in West Asia relates to the sharing of 
the surface water of the Trans national rivers basins. The history of these 
disputes involves, not surprisingly, both armed conflict and peaceful 
negotiation. The scarcity of water in the region is aggravated due to the 
rapid growing population. There are number of rivers in this region that 
traverse international boundaries that have become a focus of interstate 
tensions. Among them, Jordan River Basin is the most inflammable basin 
that has been cause for several water conflicts till date. 
The competition to control the Jordan River is intense as this is the 
major source of water in a water-scarce region. On the one side is Israel and 
on the others is number of Arab State. The political hostility between Israel 
and the Arab state has spilled over to the issue of sharing water so much to 
that Avaters of the Jordan have become embroiled in controversy since the 
establishment of the Jewish state. 
The Jordan River is the third largest perennial river in West Asia. It is 
a multinational river. It has four riparian states: Israel, Jordan, Syria and 
Lebanon. The length of Jordan is 253 kilometers of which 118 kilometer is 
under Israeli occupied territory and the remainder in Syria, Lebanon and 
Jordan. 
The Jordan River is a zone in the West Asia which has two kinds of 
very different climatic characteristics. 
1. The environment shared by the riparian countries of the Jordan River 
experiences a sharply varying seasonal rainfall two distinct seasons 
predominate in the basin, a rainy period from November through March, 
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2. There is a marked spatial disparity in the distribution of precipitation 
over the basin annual precipitation ranges from less then 25mm per year in 
the Southern part of Israel, 1400 mm per year in the mountainous area of 
Lebanon and Syria. 
The Jordan River consists of four principal tributaries originating in 
four countries. The Yarmuk is the Jordan's main tributary, its flow coming 
from a watershed divided between Syria and the Kingdom of Jordan, with 
four-fifths in Syria. The rainfall throughout the Jordan valley region is 
meager and highly irregular in distribution. 
Facing acute water scarcity, the state of Israel ever since its 
establishment, has sought to acquire a major part of the water of the Jordan. 
Having faced perpetual hostility from its Arab states, Israel considers the 
control over water supply as a strategic instrument and defensive technique 
that greatly affects regional balance of power. Israel has persisted in her 
plans to divert the Jordan River out of the water and area to the Negev 
desert. This was the major feature of the National Water carrier Project, The 
first stage started almost immediately after the Armistice Agreement of 
1949 and it gave partial access to the headwaters of the Jordan. After the 
creation of the state of Israel, the Israel government began the elaboration of 
a national water plan, along the lines of schemes drawn up during the 
Mandate. 
The effect of Arab-Israeli politics on the Jordan River dispute 
explains only in part some of the reasons for Arab rejection of any 
cooperation with Israel in developing the Jordan waters. Equally important 
is the role played by inter-Arab politics and rivalries and the relation of the 
Arab refugees to the problem. 
The Johnston Plan was the first attempt at drawing up a developmeni 
plan for all of the Jordan River basin. Israel, Jordan and Lebanon approved 
of it, but Syria did not, which in turn hindered Jordan and Lebanon from 
284 
endorsing it. Although the Johnston Plan was never fully implemented, 
owing to political disagreements the proposed allocation has served as a 
guideline for the affected states and, in fact, many of the principles 
stipulated in the plan have been followed by Israel as well as the Arab 
States. 
The first military action of the Palestinian National Liberation 
Movement targeted the Israeli National Water Carrier. The project, decided 
in 1964, was part of a broader anti-Israeli campaign which had been 
provoked by Israel's announcement that the beginning of pumping into the 
National Water Carrier was imminent. 
Israel's control of the West Bank was the most important new 
element introduced by the war of June 1967 into the Arab-Israel hydro-
political equation. Immediately after the end of the 1967 War, Israel 
destroyed 140 Palestinian water pumps in the Jordan valley and made it 
difficult to obtain permits for new wells. After this destruction, the Israeli 
army declared the area in the West Bank near the Jordan River a military-
security zone and thus prevented many Palestinians to get to their farm land. 
Lebanon is currently diverting water from the Jordan River basin via 
the Wazzani springs between Lebanon and Israel. Lebanon claim that it is 
entitled to continue pumping water from the springs under international law, 
and that the diversion supplies from the Wazzani springs adversely impacts 
Israel's water supply, and in 2002, Israeli prime Minister Ariel Sharon 
announced that the Lebanon's diversion represented a Cause Belli. Needless 
to say, tensions are high over these waters. 
The disparity between the water allocations to Jewish and Arab 
settlements on the West Bank is enormous. The average aggregate percapita 
consumption for the Jewish settlements ranges between 90-120 cubic 
meters, where as for Arab settlements the consumption is only 25-35 cubic 
meters. The frequent attempt by Israeli forces to deprive Palestinians to 
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procure groundwater from West Bank and making attempt to empoison the 
water resource, has become bone of contention between them which can 
thwart the West Asia Peace Process in coming future. 
No compressive agreement have been reached over an equitable 
allocation of the Jordan-Yarmuk waters, although water was vital and 
sometimes overriding factor in the Peace Process of the early 1990's 
particularly in the Declaration of principles of the Oslo Agreement of 1993. 
October 1994, peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, which was only 
formalized after the last and most contentious issue shared water-resources 
was agreed to, included an agreement for a Joint Water Committee to 
develop water resources, including two new dams, one each on the Yarmuk 
and the Jordan. 
The bilateral talks have reached different stages as far as water is 
concerned. Jordan and Israel have signed a fiiUy fledged peace treaty that 
contains a detailed apportionment of shared sources of water. 
The United States acts as the gavel-holder for this working group, 
with the European Union and Japan serving as co-organizers. The group has 
met seven times, most recent in a 'clustered meeting with the working group 
on the environment in Amman in June 1995 Although all the parties have 
recognized that levels of water wastage in the region are high, that the 
supply of water does not match the ever-increasing demand and that water 
quality has been deteriorating, the concrete results arising from the activities 
of this working group have been limited. 
The working group has adopted a comprehensive plan for the 
training of professional water personnel in the region. By June 1995, eight 
of the fourteen training course identified by this programme had been 
completed. The United Nations also organized a seminar in Geneva in 
December 1993 which assessed the various models for regional cooperation 
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and management, while the United States hosted a workshop in April 1994 
on weather forecasting. 
Implementation proved to be slow and difficult. Still, over time, a 
number of the provisions of the agreement were implemented. The Joint 
Water Committee was set up in 1994 and started to meet regularly. In July 
1995, Jordan started to store winter flows m Lake Tiberian. In May 1997, 
Israel agreed to provide an additional 25-30 million cubic meter per year, 
apparently as part of the 50 million cubic meter per year. In December 
1999, the new diversion dam at Adassiya became operational. 
Having noted the problematic aspects of the implementation process, 
it is also important to discuss the positive aspects. For example, the canal for 
storage of Yarmuk water from Jordan in Lake Tiberias was built quickly and 
was LQaugurated by King Hussein at the beginning of July 1995. A part from 
the problems of 1999 when Israel did not want to supply Jordan with what 
was stipulated; there has been no problem in the transfer of water from 
Israel to Jordan. 
The indigenous Arab population of Palestine protested this massive 
influx of foreigners and several times this protest this degenerated into 
violence. However, Arab protest had little if any impact on Jewish 
immigration which continued unabated. After the Second World War, 
Britain, unable to handle the explosive situation in Palestine decided to 
terminate its mandate and handover Palestine to the United Nation. The UN 
decided that partition of Palestine into an Arab and Jewish State was the 
only logical solution to the problem of Palestine. Thus State of Israel was 
created by the UN in June 1948. 
Israel considers the control over water supply a strategic instrument 
and defensive technique that greatly affects regional balance of power. 
Predictably, Israel's policy has generated a lot of tension as the riparian 
states have opposed Israel's attempts to control the water of the river Jordan. 
287 
After its failure to acquire water of the Jordan in cooperation with the Arab 
State, it's embarked on its National Water Carrier project. A major feature 
of Israeli water project was in connection with irrigation of the Negev and 
its articulated water policy. The National Water Carrier Project was started 
after the armistice agreements of 1949. 
In the West Asian region, the Euphrates-Tigris river basin conflict 
involving Turkey Syria and Iraq is considered one of the major water 
conflicts in the region. The Euphrates river system, where the problems of 
water use are at an advanced stage, exemplifies many such problems, and is 
a case of a resource conflict over fresh water with many associated 
economic and political factors involved. A dispute over fi-esh water resource 
may, for instance, spill over to political conflict or economic factors and 
disputes may cause the sharpening of the water conflict. 
The Euphrates River is the longest river in the south western Asia 
with 27,000 Kilometers, and its actual volume is 35.9 Billion cubic meters. 
The Euphrates is fond in Turkey by two major tributaries, Murat and 
Karasu. These two streams join around the city of Elazig, and the river 
Euphrates follows southern eastern route to enter Syria at Karakamis. The 
semi-ai'id Mediterraen type zone includes those areas where there is a small 
winter water surplus. Such areas can be described as where there is small 
winter water surplus. 
The diplomatic relation between Turkey and Iraq are fashioned by 
three principles factors: 
1. The sharing of Euphrates River water. 
2. Security issues problems with Kurdish minority in Northern Iraq and 
south eastern Turkey 
3. Close commercial including a safe, continental conduit for Iraqi Oil 
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Of all its Muslim neighbour Syria is the one with which Turkey has 
coldest and tensest diplomatic relations. The main area of contention 
between the two states for several decades was the fate of the Alexandretta 
territory which was annexed to Turkey in 1931 with France's consent. Since 
the seventies, whoever, the issues of sharing the water of the Euphrates and 
the Syrian assistance to the radical anti-Turkish movements has dominated 
the relationship between the two states? During the middle of the eighties it 
was already possible to talk about a network of relations based upon water 
for security. Syria's support for Greek-Cyprus, did not make matter easier 
for the relations between the states. 
Although Syria and Turkey co-operate against Iraq during the Gulf 
war and it appears that this co-operation reduced the mutual distrust 
between the states, one cannot yet identify and significant change in their 
relations. On the other hand a future forecast suggests Syria will need to 
come out of its political and economic isolation and therefore will improve 
its netv/ork relations. 
Examining Syria and Iraq's complicated relations we can observe that 
although the issue of sharing the water of Euphrates brought the two states 
at the brinic of war in 1975 it appeasers that since then both states have 
avoided conflict over the water. Syria did not exploit its position as an 
upstream state to harm Iraq and, ever more the same subject caused Syria 
and Iraq to co-operate in 1990 against Turkey's development plans. 
Iraq and Syria reached a crisis level over economic interests, 
involving such questions as the pipeline from Iraq to the Mediterranean and 
the division of the water from the Euphrates, and this led to the massing of 
militaiy forces on the Iraqi- Syrian border. Ever after the loss of its Gulf 
ports at the Iran-Iraq war Iraq was able to use both the Turkish War. 
Syria and Iraq fear that Turkey's use of the Euphrates waters will 
disrupt both their current consumption patterns and future development 
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plans. Tlie GAP project created anxiety among its downstream neighbours 
even before starting to have any kind of adverse effect. After the first crisis 
between Syria and Iraq in 1990, when Turkey finished construction of the 
Ataturk dam, the largest of the twenty-two dams proposed for the Grand 
Anatolia project, and interrupted the flow of the Euphrates for a month 
partly to fill the reservoir, the second crisis occurred. Despite an advanced 
warning from Turkey as well as being given more water before and after 
temporary cutoff river waters, created high tension over the down-stream. 
Syria and Iraq both protested that Turkey now possessed a water weapon 
that could be used against them. For one month Turkey held back the main 
flow of the Euphrates River, which cut the downstream flow in Syria to 
about a quarter of its normal rate. Syria is already desperately short of 
water, and much of the water for its towns, industries, and farms comes 
from tlie Euphrates. Beyond this dependence, the country has been 
chronically vulnerable to drought, Furthermore, Syria's population grov^h 
rate; at 3.7 percent per year is one of the highest in the world, constantly 
adding to the scale of Syria's demand for water. Turkey and Syria have 
exchanged angry threats arising from this situation. Syria has been giving 
sanctuairy to guerilla separatists of the Kurdish workers party (the PKK), a 
movement that has been waging a war of insurgency against the Turkish 
government in eastern Anatolia. 
The diplomatic meetings have been taking place among the three 
countries. In 1980, the Turkish-Iraqi mixed Economic commission agreed 
upon the formation of a joint Technical committee (JTC) to study matters 
relating to regional waters, in particular the Euphrates river basin. In 1983, 
Syria Joined the meetings and from then on the JTC convened its sessions 
on a trilateral basis. But after sixteen technical and two ministerial meetings, 
the JTC tale reached a deadlock having failed even to produce an ouflme 
that might serve as a basis for a report. However, bilateral talks continued 
and ftirther initiatives were put forward. In 1987, two protocols were signed 
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simultaneously between Syria and Turkey in Damascus. The first was an 
agreement on economic cooperation, Article 6 of which contained 
commitment by Turkey to release minimum annual average of 500 cum/s 
from the Euphrates waters " until the ultimate allocation" of the river's 
waters between the three countries could be agreed upon,. The second 
protocol was an agreement on security cooperation. The contents of the 
protocol were an using the outgrowth of Turkeys pressure on Syria to end 
its support for PKK operations. Syria was allegedly using the PKK as a way 
to induce Turkey to release additional waters. Nevertheless, in October 
1989, late Prime Minister Turgut Ozal indicated that Turkey might impound 
the river's water if Syria failed to restrain the PKK from operating within its 
territory'. Although Ozal later withdrew this threat, the underlying tensions 
have been resolved, and there are currently no significant high-level talks on 
water sharing. 
The issue of Euphrates water is also entwined with concerns about 
territorial integrity and relations with ethnic minorities within these 
countries. Consequently, although water scarcity is a source of serious 
tension between Syria and Turkey, and may trigger interstate violence in the 
future, the dispute is not a pure example of a simple-scarcity conflict. Syrian 
officials argue that Turkey has already used its power over the headwaters 
of the Euphrates for political goals and could do so again. On its part, 
Turkey is blaming Syria for lending support to the PKK against Turkey's 
national security and unity. 
The ability of Turkey to shut off the flow of the Euphrates, even 
temporarily, was noted by political and military strategists at the beginning 
of the Gulf conflict. In the early days of the conflict during the crisis 
preceding the war, there were behind-the-scenes discussions at the United 
Nations about using Turkish dams on the Euphrates River to deprive Iraq of 
a significant fraction of its fresh water supply in response to its invasion of 
Kuwait. While no such action was ever taken, the threat of the "water 
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weapon" was again a part of the diplomatic setting. Turkey has never yet 
used water as means of political pressure and it declined to do so during the 
Gulf War. 
There is a link between the West Asia Peace agreement and the 
tension between Syria and Turkey with regard to the Euphrates River. If 
Syria is obliged to give up water resources on Golan, and then it will be 
more than ever dependent on water from the Euphrates, and might 
reasonably claim additional amounts. 
l^ urkey's late president Turgut Ozal championed the concept of a 
"peace pipeline" that would transport water from two western Turkish 
rivers, the Seyhan and Ceyhan, southward to Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, 
and the other Gulf States. At the same time the "Peace Pipeline" project has 
been trumpeted by the Turkish government as one of the best hopes for 
lasting peace in the Middle East region because if fully implemented, it 
could effectively end regional states' competition and anxiety over this 
scarce. 
In 1995, a new storm over water supplies has broken out as a result 
of the finalization of a credit agreement for the new Birecik Dam on the 
Euphrates River. The dispute has led Syria to start lobbying against Turkey, 
not only in the Arab League, but also in Western countries. The latest 
broadside in the bitter war of words over Middle East water resources has 
come from an unlikely cross-border alliance: Two states that have had no 
diplomatic relations for 15 years, Syria and Iraq. These are governments in 
which their respective leaders hold each other in mutual contempt and the 
enemy of one is a close ally of the other. Nevertheless, as is not so unusual 
in international relations, they have somehow managed a common stand. 
Syria and Iraq agree absolutely only on one thing ~ the threat to their future 
that is being posed by Turkish action to harness the resources of the Tigris 
and the Euphrates under the predominant control of Ankara. 
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As the positions of the three countries have remained essentially 
unchanged for years, the Turkish press assumes that the latest diplomatic 
fuss over the water is linked to the latest round of peace talks between Israel 
and Syria. The former Israeli Prime Minister, Shimon Peres, had proposed 
that Syria obtain water from Turkey, thereby allowing Israel to keep all the 
water sources that are currently under its authority today, Ankara insists 
categorically that the waters of the Euphrates have nothing to do with the 
West Asia peace process. Indeed, the 1996 agreement between Turkey and 
Israel represents one further aspect of the search for a new balance in the 
region against other neighboring countries. 
In September 1998, the latest crisis between Syria and Turkey was 
the most serious one to date. Turkish leaders have adopted a new, harsh tone 
with Syria. Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz accused Syria of being "the 
headquarters of terrorism in the Middle East" and reportedly warned 
Damascus that the Turkish Army is on standby, "awaiting orders' to attack. 
Ten thousand Turkish troops were moved to the Syrian border and have 
been prohibited from taking leave. The Turkish air force was put on red 
alert, and remains so at this time. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarek has 
spent the week of shuttling between Ankara and Damascus. Finally, the 
agreement reached between Syria and Turkey. Unlike previous talks 
between the two countries, omits the water issue from the commitments 
undert;aking. This tendency indicates that Turkey is clearly differentiating 
these two issues as a matter of diplomacy, and seems successful at this 
point. 
The Nile River is the world's longest river and the lifeblood of 
Eastern Africa, providing sustenance and power for hundreds of thousands 
of people in this politically volatile region. The Nile River is 6,825 km long, 
the Blue Nile flows out Lake Tana in Ethiopia, while Nile spills out of Lake 
Victoria over the Ripon Falls. These two rivers unite at Khartoum in the 
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Sudan, and flow as the main Nile to Egypt and the Mediterranean Sea. The 
Nile has the largest number of riparian state in the developing world and 
flows through some of the youngest sovereign states in the developing 
worlds. A considerable section of the river's course lies in Egypt and Sudan, 
compared with other states, such as Ethiopia. Yet Egypt and the Sudan, 
contribute nothing to the river water while other states, principally Ethiopia, 
contribute most. The Egyptian climate is arid, and the Sudan is arid and 
characterized by savannahs. In the other states, by contrast, the climate is 
tropical or Savannah and they enjoy ample rainfall. In northern Ethiopia 
there is a monsoon climate, but in recent years the climatic there has also 
become arid. The Sudan and Egypt, and recently even Ethiopia, are 
therefore more dependent than the others on river water. 
Egypt has historical rights to use Nile water since the start of human 
civilization. The Sudan also has historical rights, less than Egypt but more 
than the upstream states, which began using Nile water only recently. The 
entire basin states are dependent on agriculture, which is their principal 
source of income. Egypt is less dependent on agriculture than the others 
because it has other sources of income, but it is more dependent on river 
water than the other. 
The sharing of scarce waters is always likely to be difficult for the 
riparian countries concerned, especially in the Nile basin, where over 80 
percent of the populations are engaged in agricultural production, and where 
the catchments areas suffer from periodic droughts. For example, during 
1984-85 the water being stored at Lake Nasser was only 24 billion cubic 
meters, i.e. less than one-fifth of the reservoir's capacity. Although the 
situation has improved due to good rainfall since 1988, the Nile's runoff 
patterns have reportedly exhibited low-flow periods at the beginning of each 
century. 
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Given Egypt's almost total dependence on the Nile's water, any and 
all developments likely to affect the river are matters of high foreign policy 
concern. However, in recent years, its political domination in the basin 
region has been increasingly challenged by the Sudan, particularly since the 
advent in 1989 of the National Islamic Front. 
In the Colonial period, Great Britain effectively controlled the entire 
Nile through its military dominance in Africa and its political control of 
Egypt, Sudan and the three upper riparian states on the White Nile. 
Colonial-era tensions carried over into the post Colonial period creating a 
regime in the Nile basin that was, until recently, properly characterized as 
one of open conflict. 
Although the Nile waters Agreement reached in 1929 consisted only 
of an exchange of notes between the British High Commission in Cairo and 
the Egyptian Government, it provided for the regulation of the river until the 
Nile Agreement 1959. The year 1956-58 witnessed a serious dispute 
between Egypt and Sudan over their share of the Nile waters, and Egypt 
withdrew from a previous undertaking to help the Sudanese to build a 
reservoir at Roseires on the Blue Nile, because of their continuing 
objections to the construction of what became known as the Aswan High 
Dam. 
The 1959 agreement between Egypt and the Sudan supersede that of 
1929, and modified the sharing ratio. In the intervening 30 years the needs 
of Egypt and the Sudan for irrigation water had grown dramatically. The 
result was the Agreement for the Full utilization of the Nile Waters, signed 
on 8 November 1959. Egypt and Sudan agreed on the construction of a 
High Dam at Aswan in order to harness the river's water. Sudan was also to 
contract the Reseires Dam on the Blue Nile. 
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The 1959 Agreement was a success in permitting both Egypt and 
Sudan to carry out projects that they regarded as vital to their development, 
and in removing a cause of tension that had soured relations between them. 
Egypt has received, although perhaps not used, more than its 
allotment. Nonetheless, Egypt needs more water if it is to expand its 
irrigated surface. If has plans to bring some 1-2 million hectares of new 
lands into cultivation within a decade. After the Egypt-Sudanese accord of 
July 1975, Egypt hoped that part of those needs would be met through the 
construction of the Jonglei Canal, designed to channel Nile water and 
reduce its evaporative losses as it passes through the Sudd Swamps of the 
southern Sudan. The additional water available to Egypt, with a similar 
amount realized for the Sudan would be 2 billion cubic meter. Civil War in 
the Southern the Sudan, however, forced the suspension of the project. 
Egypt's relations with the Sudan deteriorated considerably after 
Nimeiri's outer in 1985, with Egypt strongly opposing growing demands for 
the 1959 agreement to be revised in order to increase the Sudan's share of 
Nile waters. 
Ethiopia is one of the world's poorest nations and accounts for more 
than 75 percent of the water flowing into the Nile, but consumes less then 1 
percent of the Nile's water. In 1970, when Ethiopia proposed a dam on Lake 
Tana to preserve some of the Blue Nile headwaters for itself, Egyptian 
president Anwar Sadat threatened war. 
Perhaps because of their lack of progress in staking a claim to the 
waters of the Nile by building dams, the Ethiopians continued to make 
verbal assertions of their rights. At a major UN conference on water in 
1977, Ethiopia stated that its policy was to seek international agreement on 
the use of shared rivers, a position that represented some evolution with 
respect to that of 1956. 
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Tensions increased between Egypt and Ethiopia, particularly after 
the Israel-Egypt peace treaty had been signed in Washington in March 1979 
even though Sadat decided not to proceed with his 'water for peace' project 
with Israel. But the Dergue even objected to proposed transfer of water to 
the so-i^ alled 'new land' in the western comer of the Nile Delta, where 
Egypt had been hoping since 1978 to reclaim 1.26 million hectares. As a 
start, northern Sinai would receive 3 billion cubic meters of Nile water per 
year. 
In 1980, Egypt announced its intention to irrigate land in Sinai with 
Nile water. In 1984 to resettle 1.5 million Ethiopians along the tributaries of 
the Nile failed due to the inadequate planning, as well as lack of economic 
and organizational capacities. Since them, Ethiopian and Egyptian 
statements on the division of the waters of the Nile have been less bellicose. 
President Mubarak who succeeded Sadat after his assassination in 1981, has 
not repeated Sadat's threats. However Egyptian Ministers continued to 
allude to their country's vital interest. 
A rapprochement between Egypt and Ethiopia had begun after 
Mengistu's fall. In July 1993, the two states signed a 'Framework for 
General Cooperation' that included clauses relating to the Nile. The 
agreemient safeguards Egypt's supply of Nile waters fi-om Ethiopia by 
giving prominence to the principle of the avoidance of appreciable harm. 
The concomitant gain to Ethiopia is Egyptian cooperation in developing the 
Blue Nile basin for Ethiopia's benefit. 
A number of treaties for management, sharing, utilization and 
conserv'ation of international water resources have been codified during the 
past tv/o centuries. At the turn of the twenty-first century addressing the 
politics of adoption is a more important priority than arguing the quality of 
the legal principles. International law relating to the economic uses of rivers 
for consumptive purposes is still in the process of development. 
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Law, an instrument which can be used to smooth resources, provides 
guidelines for ordering future conduct. Law can be determined by a court 
action which may set a precedent that becomes a "guideline" for future 
cases but many also come from legislation by an administrative body. 
The Helsinki Rules and the International Law Commission draft on 
surface water flows places constraints on the scope of any analysis of real 
water using situations and especially on circumstances where waters are 
shared. That the Helsinki Rules and the International Law Commission drafl 
have not been the basis of any agreement is a reflection of the lack of fit 
between what they address and what is important to individual riparian. 
International law is helpful in disputes over territory, and also in regulating 
procedures in areas of commerce. 
In 1970, UN General Assembly on laws for international 
watercourses, which proposed that the Helsinki Rule be considered a model. 
While the UN Committee felt that the subject of international water course 
law v^ as important, three reservations about the Helsinki Rule surfaced. 
First, the rules were formulated by a professional organization which did 
not represent nation-states. Secondly, some countries such as Ethiopia 
argued that adoption of these rules as a model could preclude new 
considerations about this complex issue. The third was expressed in the fact 
that the Helsinki Rule was based on a drainage basin approach that could be 
potential threat to national sovereignty. 
The lower riparian states begin with a claim to the "absolute 
intejp*ity" of the water course which means claiming that the upper riparian 
state can do nothing that affects the quantity or quality of water that flows 
down to the lower riparian states. The quantity of water to which each state 
is entitled might be defined according to some more or less objective 
measure of need such as historic pattern of use, population, area, arable land 
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or the United nation's clear that each state is entitled to an 'equitable share' 
ofthe river's water. 
International Law in connection with the sharing of river water 
resources is still in a status quo stage and a full fledged international legal 
regime pertaining to this can develop only with the cooperation of all 
riparian states. The development of water resources on a regional basis must 
involve relevant legislation and subsequent institutions to control that 
development. 
The Articles of the 1997 convention are afflicted by politically 
determined contradictions. The role of the principles of international water 
law in currency at the end of the twentieth century in the West Asia river 
basins has been to provide conflicting legal principles are 'prior use and no 
harm', favour the long standing downstream user. Secondly, versions of 
'sovereignty', all of which have an intuitive appeal, are favored by the 
upstream user and especially the new upstream user. Both sets of principle 
lend themselves to popular and very selective chauvinist advocacy. Thirdly 
the concept of 'equitable utilization', a consensus converging notion 
developed by the International law Association in Helsinki in 1966 has only 
gained support among set legal professionals and some outsider scientists. 
The concept was refined by those meeting at the three decade long 
deliberations of the United Nations International law commission. The ILC 
convention articles produced in May 1997 cannot be precisely defined no 
effectively operationalised. 
The 1997 UN Convention defines an international water course as a 
system of surface and ground water constituting a unitary whole by virtue of 
their physical relationship, parts of which are situated in different states and 
normally flowing into a common terminus. Riparian states are expected to 
utilize the water course in an equitable and reasonable maimer, in particular, 
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with a view to attaining optimal and sustainable utilization. This requires 
taking into account: 
• 
• 
Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and 
other natural factors; 
Social and economic needs of the riparian states concerned; 
The population dependent on the watercourse; 
The effects of the uses of one riparian states on the others; 
Existing and potential uses; 
Conservation, protection, development and economy of use and the 
costs of relevant measures; 
• Availability of alternative. 
Riparian states shall, in utilizing an international water course in their 
territories, take all appropriate measures to prevent causing significant harm 
to the other riparian states. They should cooperate with each other and 
exchange data and information regularly. 
International water treaties on the Afro-Asian Continent are of 
relatively recent origin and the earliest treaty that was concluded in this part 
of the world was signed in 1929 between Egypt and the United Kingdom. 
The treaty was regarding the diversion of the waters of the Nile in equal 
proportion. The subsequent 1959 agreement continues to be the principal 
regulating instrument for managing waters of Nile River. 
The agreement between Turkey and Austria in 1619 over Danube 
River and between Germany and France in 1697 over Rhine was among the 
early landmarks in the making of modem International law on navigation. 
In the foregoing analysis of some of the European waier treaties one 
important principle becomes apparent i.e., each state possesses rights of 
sovereignty. 
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An International Joint Commission (IJC) was set up in 1909 under 
the provisions of this treaty to resolve disputes relating to both boundary 
and transboundary waters. The boundary water treaty and IJC deah the 
matter on diversion of flows for irrigation purposes and power generation as 
well as, reduction of municipal and industrial waste discharge, sharing 
water costs and benefits concerning the water issues. Treaties related to 
international rivers in West Asia have been patterned in the light of 
European and American water treaties. 
Arab countries do not like to be dependent on another power, 
especially about water which appears to be very important from a socio-
Psychological point of view. Turkey's Southern neighbours both Egypt Iraq 
see the Euphrates and the Tigris as the waters of a common basin and, as 
countries of this basin, they wish to use these waters and share them 
according to their needs. Current international law given the right of 
ownership pf waters flowing within the borders of a country to that country 
but, while implementing this, it adds a principle that one should not cause 
any loss to create a disadvantageous situation for another country. In this 
case, the country of origin Turkey has certain advantages and international 
law gives certain rights to the first country in the chain as owner of the 
water. 
The earliest treaty on West Asia water resources was concluded in 
December 1920 between France and Britain involving the Tigris, Euphrates, 
Jordan and the Yarmuk Rivers. 
In 1921, the Treaty of friendship was concluded between Persia and 
Russia. The two countries state that they shall have equal rights of usage 
over the Atrak River and other frontier river and waterways. 
On March 29, 1946 the Treaty of Friendship and Good neighbourly 
Relation was concluded between Iraq and Turkey. The treaty has 
significance for cooperation on the part of both countries on matters in the 
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light of the exchange of information on the water flow records and other 
data of the two rivers. 
The International Law Commission (ILC 1997), not recognizes ILC 
principles that contradict its interests. It has no enthusiasm for any version 
of water rights that compromises the principle of prior use. Its lack of 
enthusiasm for the constructive concept of 'equitable utilization' is 
overwhelming. West Asia hydro political hegemony and non-influential 
West Asian states both selectively reject the well meaning principles of 
international water law developed by the end of the twentieth century. The 
rapidly developing hegemony in the Tigris-Euphrates basin, Turkey is the 
most ti'enchant in its rejection, Egypt, the hegemony in the Nile basin, is 
also very cool indeed on the subject of the adoption of ILC principles. 
Israel, alone in the region, with the economic capacity to adjust to any 
impacts that the 1997 ILC convention might bring abstained at the General 
assembly vote on 21 May 1997. 
When International relations reach a stage of sufficient strength, 
reciprocal regard and mutually understood dependence between two or 
more riparian it will be possible to develop institutions that will establish 
rules, agreed sanctions, implementing bodies, courts and all the formal 
instruments required for the administration of international water law. 
International Law regarding the sharing of river water resources is 
still in a nascent stage and a full fledged international legal regime 
pertaining to this issue can develop only with the cooperation of all riparian 
states. The development of water resources on a regional basis or state must 
involve relevant legislation and subsequent institutions to control that 
development in International Law. A distinction is drawn between national 
and International River. If a river passes through or along the territory of 
two or more states it is know as International River and governed by the 
rules of the international river law. If a river flows completely within 
territory of a single state then it is a national river. 
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International water treaties in the Afro-Asian continent are of relating 
recent origin and the earliest treaty that was concluded in this part of the 
world v/as concluded in 1929 between Egypt and the United Kingdom. This 
treaty was in the context of the diversion of the waters of the Nile river 
proportion lately among riparian states. The British Government suggested 
that it should be based of following consideration. The legal principle is that 
the waters of Nile river, the combined flow of the white and blue Nile and 
their branches should be accepted as a single unite, designed for the use of 
people inhabiting their banks according to their needs and capacity to 
benefit from the Nile. 
Treaties regarding International River in West Asia have been 
patterned on the lines of European and American water treaties. The earliest 
treaty in this connection was following: the Franco-British convention 
concluded in December 1920 involving the Euphrates-Tigris, Jordan and 
the Yarmuk rivers: it reflects the practice where the vested as well as 
reserved rights of riparian states were protected. During the mandate, 
Britain and France adopted several agreements to regulate of International 
Rivers under their jurisdiction to develop upstream consumptive uses in 
Syria and Lebanon. They agreed to permit Palestine authorities to do work 
in Syria for the benefit of down stream users. The mandatory system 
provided legal machinery for resolving conflicts over water through 
bilateral consultations. In 1921 the treaty of "shall have equal rights of 
usage over the Atrak river frontier river and water ways". An important 
West Asian water treaty was signed between the United Kingdom and 
France on 3 February 1922 in connection with the utilization of the Yarmuk 
water in equal proportion. The Final Protocol of the Franco-Turkish 
delimitation commission. May 3, 1930 recom.mended that: "whereas its 
neigliborhood on the Tigris imposes on the riparian specific obligations, it 
becomes necessary to establish rule regarding the rights of each sovereign 
states in its contexts with other water purpose". 
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In June 1953, Syria and Jordan signed a treaty concerning the joint 
development and utilization of the Yarmuk river waters. In July 1987 an 
economic cooperation agreement was signed between Turkey and Syria. 
Turkey was infavour of adhoc bilateral joint ventures in water and energy 
development and was prepared to cooperate on data management. It is 
obvious that; International water treaties in West Asia are few and even the 
covers tliat have been signed is of a general natural. Many questions still 
remain unanswered and these seem to be very little effort to deal with 
contentious issues. Do upstream states within which a river originates, 
leaves specific, have priority over down stream states? Do population 
growth and other needs in are riparian state gave it priority over another? 
Should a riparian state be demanded to consume water in more economical 
ways? Should be demanded of one riparian state to use only certain sources 
of water and leave specific sources for supplying the needs of other ? These 
and related questions are as yet unanswered in the region and there is very 
little by way of international water treaties regime to serve as a guide. The 
result is that each country prefers to go it alone and all practical 
considerations and pragmatics solutions have been sacrificed at aher of 
populist and sometimes grandiose schemes. It is only in the 1990's that the 
states in the region have shown some degree of willingness to eschew 
unilateral action and workout solutions on a cooperative basis in the light of 
existing unilateral laws and conventions. 
From the foregoing analysis it is apparent that the instead of 
exploiting the river on a regional basis, each of these states has preferred to 
go it alone on whatever portion of the river that happens to lie within or 
along it borders. The result of this approach has been tragic, not only 
because such an approach is insufficient and uneconomical, but also and 
perhaps more importantly, such action has the potential of precipitation war 
among the sharing states of West Asia. 
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Water, however, has often been seen as the primary strategic factor 
behind the pohtical and miUtary maneuvering in region. Under such tensed 
conditions issues that might over wise be managed peacefully can always 
trigger extreme responses. Water conflict in West Asia has been zero sum 
water for one user means lack of water for the other. Factors of ideology 
and nationalism prevent West Asian states from cooperating with each other 
to alleviate the problem of water scarcity. However, in the present scenario 
the only remedy lies in taking a regional approach to the problem. That is, 
water from certain countries could be diverted to other, according to the 
needs. Tliis implies tacit recognition of the legitimacy of various demands. 
Thus factors like population growth and other needs in one riparian should 
be given priority over another. At the same time a riparian should be asked 
to consume water in more economical ways. It should also be demanded of 
one riparian to use only certain sources of water leave a specific source for 
supplying the needs of other. Conservation measures such a reduction of 
water in irrigation, phasing out of water intensive crops and price increases 
towards real value should be taken up an endangering basis. Neither time, 
money nor hope should be wasted on regional water development projects. 
Care must to taken, however, to avoid plans that are grandiose or impossible 
part water development projects like the 1950's plan of Eric Johnston failed 
to anticipated the level of hostilities in the region. In order to avoid past 
mistakes future project could be financed by the international monetary 
fund on the condition that the granting of money depended an unanimous 
agreement among the all riparian states. 
Each state in the West Asia is aware of a growing mismatch between 
population and resources, especially water. The water deficit can be 
attributed to a number of causes, but most frequently to misdistribution, 
inappropriate allocation and wastage. Existing or prospective water 
shortages can be seen as a threat to internal political stability of water is 
determined to a significant extent by government policy towards specific 
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interest groups, particularly the agricultural sector and rural populations, 
and militJiry or family client groups. Water distribution is also determined 
by the extent to which water-planning decisions are influenced by specific 
government agencies or private contractors or targeted against regime 
opponents. The solution to water-supply constraints depends on the ability 
of governments to implement such policies as water pricing and the 
reduction of subsidies on water, staple foods and agricultural inputs. These 
policies clearly have a direct impact on population needs and living 
standards. Adverse economic consequences of such measures which may 
prompt internal unrest, to varying degrees, can be mitigated depending on 
the scale and timing of implementation and on the extent and form of 
compensation. These considerations also modify competition between states 
and their negotiating positions. 
Water-resource management is demonstrably used as an instrument 
of foreign policy, but it must be emphasized that water-related disputes are a 
consequence of, rather than a catalyst for, deteriorating relations between 
states. No states in the West Asia want to go to war over water, but there are 
real concerns over the equitability of distribution. The proximate cause of 
actual conflict over water would be the unilateral appropriation or diversion 
of a shared water course by an upstream riparian without consultation. Yet 
this is too simplistic a scenario and does not take into account the complex 
political and economic interrelationships between riparian states. Whilst 
militaiy intervention can never be ruled out completely, cost is a deterring 
factor and there are no guarantees of achieving such objectives as the 
distribution of hydraulic installation and related infrastructure without 
serious domestic economic consequences. 
Control over shared water resources will continue to be used to exert 
political pressure and the water factor is a useful reminder of dependency. 
Israel, Turkey and Egypt, however efficiently managed their national water 
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policy, will continue to dictate the regional water agenda for the reasons 
states. They have little incentive to concede what they regard as a strategic 
asset, nanriely priority usage. Whatever negotiations take place, it is unlikely 
that this strategic advantage will be significantly modified. Willingness to 
negotiate does, however, influence decisions on international backing for 
specific projects. 
The long-term cooperative development of international water 
resources in the West Asia thus presents the greatest challenge to policy-
makers within and outside the region. There has been a significant trend 
towards collaboration, even though this is largely confined to technical 
matters: cooperation on the exchange of hydrological data, flood 
forecasting, and joint HEP and water-recovery ventures, for example. It is 
these small-scale confidence-building measures, combined with a re-
evaluation of national water allocation, which are of interest to and indeed 
are encouraged by international financial and development institutions, 
possible aid donors or investors. These policies can dampen regional tension 
and contribute to stability. In the long term they might be extended to 
wider-ranging fluvial commissions or international conventions to include 
discussion on legal issues and possible joint ventures. These are objectives 
which are widely considered desirable, but they are only practicable so long 
as the >vater issue is not separated from its wider political context. 
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APPENDIX-A 
HELSINKI RULES ON THE USES OF THE WATERS OF 
INTERNATIONAL RIVERS 
Adopted by the International Law Association at its Fifty-second Conference 
held at Helsinki in 1966 
GENERAL 
Article I 
The general rules of international law as set forth in these chapters are applicable 
to th.Q use of the waters of an international drainage basin except as may be 
provided otherwise by convention, agreement or bindingcustom among the basin 
States. 
Article II 
An international drainage basin is a geographical area extending over two or more 
States determined by the watershed limits of the system of waters, including 
surface and underground waters, flowing into a common terminus. 
Article III 
A"biasin State" is a state the territory of which includes a portion of an 
international drainage basin. 
EQUITABLE UTILIZATION OF THE WATERS OF AN INTERNATIONAL 
DRi«iJNAGE BASIN 
Article IV 
Each Basin State is entitled to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial 
uses of the waters of an international drainage basin. 
Article V 
(1) What is a reasonable and equitable share within the meaning of Article I is to 
be determined in the light of all the relevant factors in each particular case. 
(2) Relevant factors which are to be considered include, but are not limited to: 
(a) Tlie geography of the basin including in particular the extent of the drainage 
area m the territory of each basin State; 
(b) The hydrology of the basin, including in particular the contribution of water by 
each basin State; 
(c) The climate affecting the basin; 
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(d) The past utilization of the waters of the basin, including in particular existing 
utilization; 
(e) The economic and social needs of each basin State; 
(f) The population dependent on the waters of the basin in each basin State; 
(g) The comparative costs of alternative means of satisfying the economic and 
social needs of each basin State; 
(h) The availability of other resources; 
(i) The avoidance of unnecessary waste in the utilization of waters of the basin; 
(i) The practicability of compensation to one of more of the co-basin States as a 
means of adjusting conflicts among uses; and 
(k) The degree to which the needs of a basin State may be satisfied, without 
causing substantial injury to a co-basin State. 
(3) The weight to be given to each factor is to be determined by its importance in 
comparison with that of other relevant factors. In determining what is a reasonable 
ajid equitable share, all relevant factors are to be considered together and a 
conclusion reached on the basis of the whole. 
Article VI 
A use or category of uses is not entitled to any inherent preference over any other 
use or category of uses. 
Article VII 
A basin State may not be denied the present reasonable use of the waters of an 
international drainage basin to reserve for a co-basin State a future use of such 
waters. 
Article VIII 
1. An existing reasonable use may continue in operation unless the factors 
justifying its continuance are outweighed by other factors leading to the con 
elusion that it be modified or terminated so as to accommodate a competing 
incompatible use. 
2. (a) A use that is in fact operational is deemed to have been an existing use from 
the time of the initiation of construction directly related to the use or, where such 
construction is not required, the undertaking of comparable acts of actual 
implementation. 
(b) Such a use continues to be an existing use until such time as it is discontinued 
with the intention that it be abandoned. 
3. A use will not be deemed an existing use if at the time of becoming operational 
it is incompatible with an already existing reasonable use. 
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NAVIGATION 
Article XII 
1. This Chapter refers to those rivers and lakes portions of which are both 
navigable and separate or traverse the territories of two or more States. 
2. Rivers or lakes are "navigable" if in their natural or canalized state they are 
currently used for commercial navigation or are capable by reason of their natural 
condition of being so used. 
3. In this Chapter the term "riparian State" refers to a State through or along which 
the navigable portion of a river flows or a lake lies. 
Article XIII 
Subject to any limitations or qualifications referred to in these Chapters, each 
riparian State is entitled to enjoy rights of free navigation on the entire course of a 
river or lake. 
Article IX 
"Free navigation", as the term is used in this Chapter, includes the following 
freedom for vessels of a riparian State on a basis of equality: 
(a) Freedom of movement on the entire navigable course of the river or lake; 
(b) Freedom to enter ports and to make use of plants and docks; and 
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(c) Freedom to transport goods and passengers, either directly or through trans-
shipment, between the territory of one riparian State and the territory of another 
ripcirian State and between the territory of a riparian State and the open sea. 
Article XVk 
riparian State may exercise rights of police, including but not limited to the 
protection of public safety and health, over that portion of a river or lake subject to 
its jurisdiction, provided the exercise of such rights does not unreasonably interfere 
witli the enjoyment of the rights of free navigation defined in Articles Xllland 
^ \ Article XVI Each riparian State may restrict or prohibit the loading by vessels 
of a foreign State of goods and passengers in its territory for discharge in such 
territory. 
Article XVII 
A riparian state may grant rights of navigation to non-riparian States on rivers or 
lakes within its territory. 
Article XVIII 
Each riparian State is, to the extent of the means available or made available to it, 
required to maintain in good order that portion of the navigable course of a river or 
lake within its jurisdiction. 
Article XIX 
The rules stated in this Chapter are not applicable to the navigation of vessels of 
war or of vessels performing police or administrative functions, or, in general, 
exercising any other form of public authority. 
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Article XX 
111 time of war, other armed conflict, or public emergency constituting a threat to 
the life of the State, a riparian State may take measures derogating from its 
obligations under this Chapter to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of 
the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other 
obligations under international law. The riparian States shall in any case facilitate 
navigation for humanitarian purposes. 
Article XXI 
The floating of timber on a watercourse which flows through or between the 
teiTitories of two or more States is governed by the following Articles except in 
cases in which floating is governed by rules of navigation according to applicable 
law or custom binding upon the riparians. 
Article XXII 
The States riparian to an international watercourse utilized for navigation may 
determine by common consent whether and under what conditions timber floating 
may be permitted upon the watercourse. 
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Article XIII 
1. It is recommended that each State riparian to an international watercourse not 
used for navigation should, with due regard to other uses of the watercourse, 
authorize the co-riparian States to use the watercourse and its banks within the 
territory of each riparian State for the floating of timber. 
2. This authorization should extend to all necessary work along the banks by the 
floating crew and to the installation of such facilities as may be required for the 
timber floating. 
Article XXIV 
If a riparian State requires permanent installations for floating inside a territory of a 
co-riparian State or if it is necessary to regulate the flow of the watercourse, all 
questions connected with these installations and measures should be determined by 
agreement between the States concerned. 
Article XXV 
Co-riparian states of a watercourse which is or is to be used for floating timber 
should negotiate in order to come to an agreement governing the administrative 
regime of floating, and if necessary to establish a joint agency or commission in 
order to facilitate the regulation of floating in all aspects. 
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PROCEDURES FOR THE PREVENTION AND SETTLEMENT OF 
DISPUTES 
Article XXVI 
This chapter relates to procedures for the prevention and settlement of international 
disputes as to the legal rights or other interests of basin States and of other States in 
the waters of an international drainage basin. 
Article XXVI 
1. Consistently with the Charter of the United Nations, States are under an 
obligation to settleintemational disputes as to their legal rights or other interests by 
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice 
are not endangered. 
2. It is recommended that States resort progressively to the means of prevention 
and settlement of disputes stipulated in Articles XXIX to XXXIV. 
Article XXVIII 
1. States are under a primary obligation to resort to means of prevention and 
settlement of disputes stipulated in the applicable treaties binding upon them. 
2. States are limited to the means of prevention and settlement of disputes 
stipulated in treaties binding upon them only to the extent provided by the 
applicable treaties. 
Article XXIX 
1. With a view to preventing disputes from arising between basin States as to their 
legal rights or otherinterests, it is recommended that each basin State furnish 
relevant and reasonably available information to the other basin States concerning 
the waters of a drainage basin within its territory and its use of, and activities with 
respect to, such waters. 
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2. A State, regardless of its location in a drainage basin, should in particular furnish 
to any other basin State, the interests of which may be substantially affected, notice 
of any proposed construction or installation which would alter the regime of the 
basin in a way which might give rise to a dispute as defmedin Article XXVI. The 
notice should include such essential facts as will permit the recipientto make an 
assessment of the probable effect of the proposed alteration. 
3. A State providing the notice referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article should 
afford to the recipient a reasonable period of time to make an assessment of the 
probable effect of the proposed construction or installation and to submit its views 
thereon to the State furnishing the notice. 
4. If a State has failed to give the notice referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article, 
the alteration by the State in the regime of the drainage basin shall not be given the 
weight normally accorded to temporal priority to use in the event of a 
detemimation of what is a reasonable and equitable share of the waters of the 
basin. 
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Article XXX 
In case of a dispute between States as to their legal rights or other interests, as 
defined in Article XXVI, they should seek a solution by negotiation. 
Article XXXI 
1. If a question or dispute arises which relates to the present or future utilization of 
the waters of an international drainage basin, it is recommended that the basin 
States refer the question or dispute to a joint agency and that they request the 
agency to survey the international drainage basin and to formulate plans or 
recommendations for the fullest and most efficient use thereof in the interests of all 
such states. 
2. It is recommended that the joint agency be instructed to submit reports on all 
matters within its competence to the appropriate authorities of the member States 
concerned. 
3. It is recommended that the member States of the joint agency in appropriate 
cases invite non-basin States which by treaty enjoy a right in the use of the waters 
of an international drainage basin to associate themselves with the work of the joint 
agency or that they be permitted to appear before the agency. 
Article XXXII 
If a question or a dispute is one which is considered by the States concerned to be 
incapable of resolution in the manner set forth in Article VI, it is recommended 
that they seek the good offices, or jointly request the mediation of a third State, of 
a qualified international organization or of a qualified person. 
Article XXXIII 
1. If the States concerned have not been able to resolve their dispute through 
negotiation or have been unable to agree on the measures described in Articles 
XXXI and XXXII, it is recommended that they form a commission of inquiry or an 
ad hoc conciliation commission, which shall endeavour to find a solution, likely to 
be accepted by the States concerned, of any dispute as to their legal rights. 
2. It is recommended that the conciliation commission be constituted in the manner 
set forth in the Armex. 
Article XXXIV 
It is recommended that the States concerned agree to submit their legal disputes to 
an ad hoc arbitral tribunal, to a permanent arbitral tribunal or to the International 
Couil of Justice if 
(a) A commission has not been formed as provided in Article XXXIII, or 
(b) The commission has not been able to find a solution to be recommended, or 
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(c) A solution recommended has not been accepted by the States concerned, and 
(d) An agreement has not been otherwise arrived at. 
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Article XXXV 
It is recommended that in the event of arbitration the States concerned have 
recourse to the Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure prepared by the International 
Law Commission of the United Nations at its tenthsession in 1958. 
Article XXXVI 
Recourse to arbitration implies the undertaking by the States concerned to consider 
the award to be given as final and to submit in good faith to its execution. 
Article XXXVII 
The means of settlement referred to in the preceding Articles of this Chapter are 
without prejudice to the utilization of means of settlement recommended to, or 
required of, members of regional arrangements or agencies and of other 
international organizations. 
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APPENDIX-B 
ISRAEL-JORDAN PEACE TREATY 
Water and Related Matters 
Pursuant to Article 6 of the Treaty, Israel and Jordan agreed on the following 
/irticles on water related matters: 
Article I: Allocation 
1, Water from the Yarmouk River 
a. Summer period - 15th May to 15th October of each year. Israel pumps 
(12) MCM and Jordan gets the rest of the flow. 
b. Winter period - 16th October to 14th May of each year. Israel pimips 
(13) MCM and Jordan is entitled to the rest of the flow subject to 
provisions outlined hereinbelow: Jordan concedes to Israel pumping an 
additional (20) MCM from the Yarmouk in winter in return for Israel 
conceding to transferring to Jordan during the summer period the 
quantity specified in paragraphs (2.a) below from the Jordan River. 
c. In order that waste of water will be minimized, Israel and Jordan may 
use, downstream of point 121/Adassiya Diversion, excess flood water 
that is not usable and will evidently go to waste unused. 
2. Water from the Jordan River 
a. Summer period - 15th May to 15th October of each year. In return for 
the additional water that Jordan concedes to Israel in winter in 
accordance with paragraph (l.b) above, Israel concedes to transfer to 
Jordan in the summer period (20) MCM from the Jordan River dkectly 
upstream from Deganya gates on the river. Jordan shall pay the 
operation and maintenance cost of such transfer through existing 
systems (not including capital cost) and shall bear the total cost of any 
new transmission system. A separate protocol shall regulate this 
transfer. 
b. Winter period - 16th October to 14th May of each year. Jordan is 
entitled to store for its use a minimum average of (20) MCM of the 
floods in the Jordan River south of its confluence with the Yarmouk (as 
outlined in Article II below). Excess floods that are not usable and that 
will otherwise be wasted can be utilised for the benefit of the two 
Parties including pumped storage off the course of the river. 
c. In addition to the above, Israel is entitled to maintain its current uses of 
the Jordan River waters between its confluence with the Yarmouk and 
its confluence with Tirat Zvi/Wadi Yabis. Jordan is entitled to an 
annual quantity equivalent to that of Israel, provided however, that 
Jordan's use will not harm the quantity or quality of the above Israeli 
uses. The Joint Water Committee (outlined in Article VII below) will 
survey existing uses for documentation and prevention of appreciable 
hann. 
d. Jordan is entitled to an annual quantity of (10) MCM of desalinated 
water from the desalination of about (20) MCM of saline springs now 
diverted to the Jordan River. Israel will explore the possibility of 
financing the operation and maintenance cost of the supply to Jordan of 
this desalinated water (not including capital cost). Until the desalination 
facilities are operational, and upon the entry into force of the Treaty, 
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Israel will supply Jordan (10) MCM of Jordan River water from the 
same location as in (2.a) above, outside the summer period and during 
dates Jordan selects, subject to the maximum capacity of transmission. 
3. Additional Water 
Israel and Jordan shall cooperate in finding sources for the supply to Jordan 
of an additional quantity of (50) MCM/year of water of drinkable 
standards. To this end, the Joint Water Committee will develop, within one 
year from the entry into force of the Treaty, a plan for the supply to Jordan 
of the abovementioned additional water. This plan will be forwarded to the 
respective governments for discussion and decision. 
4. Operation and Maintenance 
a. Operation and maintenance of the systems on Israeli territory that 
supply Jordan with water, and their electricity supply, shall be Israel's 
responsibility. The operation and maintenance of the new systems that 
serve only Jordan will be contracted at Jordan's expense to authorities 
or companies selected by Jordan. 
b. Israel will guarantee easy unhindered access of personnel and 
equipment to such new systems for operation and maintenance. This 
subject will be further detailed in the agreements to be signed between 
Israel and the authorities or companies selected by Jordan. 
Article II: Storage 
1. Israel and Jordan shall cooperate to build a diversion/storage dam on the 
Yarmouk River directly downstream of the point 121/Adassiya Diversion. 
The purpose is to improve the diversion efficiency into the King Abdullah 
Canal of the water allocation of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and 
possibly for the diversion of Israel's allocation of the river water. Other 
purposes can be mutually agreed. 
2. Israel and Jordan shall cooperate to build a system of water storage on the 
Jordan River, along their common boundary, between its confluence with 
the Yarmouk River and its confluence with Tirat Zvi/ Wadi Yabis, in order 
to implement the provision of paragraph (2.b) of Article I above. The 
storage system can also be made to accommodate more floods; Israel may 
use up to (3) MCM/year of added storage capacity. 
3. Other storage reservoirs can be discussed and agreed upon mutually. 
Article III: Water Quality and Protection 
1. Israel and Jordan each undertake to protect, within their own jurisdiction, 
the shared waters of the Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers, and Arava/Araba 
groundwater, against any pollution, contamination, harm or unauthorized 
withdrawals of each other's allocations. 
2. For this purpose, Israel and Jordan will jointly monitor the quality of water 
along their boundary, by use of jointly established monitoring stations to be 
operated under the guidance of the Joint Water Committee. 
3. Israel and Jordan will each prohibit the disposal of municipal and industrial 
wastewater into the course of the Yarmouk or the Jordan Rivers before they 
are treated to standards allowing their unrestricted agricultural use. 
Implementation of this prohibition shall be completed within three years 
from the entry into force of the Treaty. 
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4. The quality of water supplied from one country to the other at any given 
location shall be equivalent to the quality of the water used from the same 
location by the supplying country. 
5. Saline springs currently diverted to the Jordan River are earmarked for 
desalination within four years. Both countries shall cooperate to ensure that 
the resulting brine will not be disposed of in the Jordan River or in any of 
its tributaries. 
6. Israel and Jordan will each protect water systems in its own territory, 
supplying water to the other, against any pollution, contamination, harm or 
unauthorised withdrawal of each other's allocations. 
Article IV: Groundwater in Emek Ha'arava/WadiAraba 
1. In accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, some wells drilled and 
used by Israel along with their associated systems fall on the Jordanian side 
of the borders. These wells and systems are under Jordan's sovereignty. 
Israel shall retain the use of these wells and systems in the quantity and 
quality detailed an Appendix to this Annex, that shall be jointly prepared by 
31st December, 1994. Neither country shall take, nor cause to be taken, any 
measure that may appreciably reduce the yields of quality of these wells 
and systems. 
2. Throughout the period of Israel's use of these wells and systems, 
replacement of any well that may fail among them shall be licensed by 
Jordan in accordance with the laws and regulations then in effect. For this 
purpose, the failed well shall be treated as though it was drilled under 
license from the competent Jordanian authority at the time of its drilling. 
Israel shall supply Jordan with the log of each of the wells and the technical 
information about it to be kept on record. The replacement well shall be 
connected to the Israeli electricity and water systems. 
3. Israel may increase the abstraction rate from wells and systems in Jordan 
by up to (10) MCM/year above the yields referred to in paragraph 1 above, 
subject to a determination by the Joint Water Committee that this 
undertaking is hydrogeologically feasible and does not harm existing 
Jordanian uses. Such increase is to be carried out within five years from the 
entry into force of the Treaty. 
4. Operation and Maintenance 
a. Operation and maintenance of the wells and systems on Jordanian 
territory that supply Israel with water, and their electricity supply 
shall be Jordan's responsibility. The operation and maintenance of 
these wells and systems will be contracted at Israel's expense to 
authorities or companies selected by Israel. 
b. Jordan will guarantee easy unhindered access of personnel and 
equipment to such wells and systems for operation and 
maintenance. This subject will be further detailed in the agreements 
to be signed between Jordan and the authorities or companies 
selected by Israel. 
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Article V: Notification and Agreement 
1. Artificial changes in or of the course of the Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers can 
only be made by mutual agreement. 
2. Each country undertakes to notify the other, six months ahead of time, of 
any intended projects which are likely to change the flow of either of the 
above rivers along their common boundary, or the quality of such flow. The 
subject will be discussed in the Joint Water Committee with the aim of 
preventing harm and mitigating adverse impacts such projects may cause. 
Article VI: Co-operation 
1. Israel and Jordan undertake to exchange relevant data on water resources 
through the Joint Water Committee. 
2. Israel and Jordan shall co-operate in developing plans for purposes of 
increasing water supplies and improving water use efficiency, within the 
context of bilateral, regional or intemational cooperation. 
Article VII: Joint Water Committee 
1. For the purpose of the implementation of this Annex, the Parties will 
establish a Joint Water Committee comprised of three members from each 
country. 
2. The Joint Water Committee will, with the approval of the respective 
governments, specify its work procedures, the frequency of its meetings, 
and the details of its scope of work. The Committee may invite experts 
and/or advisors as may be required. 
3. The Committee may form, as it deems necessary, a number of specialized 
sub-committees and assign them technical tasks. In this context, it is agreed 
that these sub-committees will include a northern sub- committee and a 
southern sub-committee, for the management on the ground of the mutual 
water resources in these sectors. 
-61 
APPENDIX-C 
UN CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE NON-
NAVIGATIONAL USES OF INTERNATIONAL 
WATERCOURSES 
Adopted by the UN General Assembly in resolution 51/229 of 21 May 1997 
(See UN Press Release on the adoption of the Convention) 
(See Status of the Convention) 
Official text also available in: Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian, and 
Spanish 
The Parties to the present Convention, 
Conscious of the importance of international watercourses and the non-
navigational uses thereof in many regions of the world, 
Having in mind Article 13, paragraph 1 (a), of the Charter of the United 
Nations, which provides that the General Assembly shall initiate studies and make 
recommendations for the purpose of encouraging the progressive development of 
international law and its codification. 
Considering that successful codification and progressive development of 
rules of international law regarding non-navigational uses of international 
watercourses would assist in promoting and implementing the purposes and 
principles set forth in Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, 
Taking into account the problems affecting many international watercourses 
resulting from, among other things, increasing demands and pollution. 
Expressing the conviction that a framework convention will ensure the 
utilization, development, conservation, management and protection of international 
watercourses and the promotion of the optimal and sustainable utilization thereof 
for present and future generations 
Affirming the importance of international cooperation and good 
neighbourliness in this field, 
Aware of the special situation and needs of developing countries, 
Recalling the principles and recommendations adopted by the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development of 1992 in the Rio Declaration and 
Agenda 21, 
Recallmg also the existing bilateral and multilateral agreements regarding the 
non-navigational uses of international watercourses, 
Mindfiil of the valuable contribution of international organizations, both 
gove:mmental and non-governmental, to the codification and progressive 
development of international law in this field, 
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Appreciative of the work carried out by the International Law Commission 
on the law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses, 
Bearing in mind United Nations General Assembly resolution 49/52 of 9 
De-cember 1994, 
Have agreed as follows: 
PARTI. INTRODUCTION 
Aiiicle I: Scope of the present Convention 
1. The present Convention applies to uses of international watercourses and of 
their waters for purposes other than navigation and to measures of protection, 
preservation and management related to the uses of those watercourses and their 
waters. 
2. The uses of international watercourses for navigation is not within the 
scope of the present Convention except insofar as other uses affect navigation or 
are affected by navigation. 
Article 2: Use of Terms 
For the purposes of the present Convention: 
(a) "Watercourse" means a system of surface waters and groundwaters 
constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole and normally 
flowing into a common terminus; 
(b) "International watercourse" means a watercourse, parts of which are 
situated in different States; 
(c) "Watercourse State" means a State Party to the present Convention in 
whose territory part of an international watercourse is situated, or a Party that is a 
regional economic integration organization, in the territory of one or more of 
whose Member States part of an international watercourse is situated; 
(d) "Regional economic integration organization" means an organization 
constituted by sovereign States of a given region, to which its member States have 
transferred competence in respect of matters governed by this Convention and 
which has been duly authorized in accordance with its internal procedures, to sign, 
ratify, accept, approve or accede to it. 
Article 3: Watercourse Agreements 
1. In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, nothing in the present 
Convention shall affect the rights or obligations of a watercourse State arising 
from agreements in force for it on the date on which it became a party to the 
present Convention. 
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1, parties to agreements 
referred to in paragraph 1 may, where necessary, consider harmonizing such 
agreements with the basic principles of the present Convention. 
3. Watercourse States may enter into one or more agreements, hereinafter 
referred to as "watercourse agreements", which apply and adjust the provisions of 
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the present Convention to the characteristics and uses of a particular international 
watercourse or part thereof. 
4. Where a watercourse agreement is concluded between two or more 
watercourse States, it shall define the waters to which it applies. Such an 
agreement may be entered into with respect to an entire international watercourse 
or any part thereof or a particular project programme or use except insofar as the 
agreement adversely affects, to a significant extent, the use by one or more other 
WEitercourse States of the waters of the watercourse, without their express consent. 
5. Where a watercourse State considers that adjustment and application of the 
provisions of the present Convention is required because of the characteristics and 
uses of a particular international watercourse, watercourse States shall consult with 
a view to negotiating in good faith for the purpose of concluding a watercourse 
agreement or agreements. 
6. Where some but not all watercourse States to a particular international 
watercourse are parties to an agreement, nothing in such agreement shall affect the 
riglits or obligations under the present Convention of watercourse States that are 
not parties to such an agreement. 
Article 4: Parties to Watercourse Agreements 
1. Every watercourse State is entitled to participate in the negotiation of and 
to become a party to any watercourse agreement that applies to the entire 
international watercourse, as well as to participate in any relevant consultations. 
2. A watercourse State whose use of an international watercourse may be 
affected to a significant extent by the implementation of a proposed watercourse 
agreement that applies only to a part of the watercourse or to a particular project, 
programme or use is entitled to participate in consultations on such an agreement 
and, where appropriate, in the negotiation thereof in good faith with a view to 
becoming a party thereto, to the extent that its use is thereby affected. 
PART 11. GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
Article 5: Equitable and Reasonable Utilization and Participation 
1. Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilize an 
international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. In particular, an 
international watercourse shall be used and developed by watercourse States with a 
view to attaining optimal and sustainable utilization thereof and benefits there 
fi'om,, taking into account the interests of the watercourse States concerned, 
consistent with adequate protection of the watercourse. 
2. Watercourse States shall participate in the use, development and protection 
of an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. Such 
participation includes both the right to utilize the watercourse and the duty to 
cooperate in the protection and development thereof, as provided in the present 
Convention. 
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Article 6: Factors Relevant to Equitable and Reasonable Utilization 
1. Utilization of an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable 
maimer within the meaning of article 5 requires taking into account all relevant 
factors and circumstances, including: 
(a) Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other 
factors of a natural character; 
(b) The social and economic needs of the watercourse States concerned; 
(c) The population dependent on the watercourse in each watercourse State; 
(d) The effects of the use or uses of the watercourses in one watercourse State 
on other watercourse States; 
(e) Existing and potential uses of the watercourse; 
(f) Conservation, protection, development and economy of use of the water 
resources of the watercourse and the costs of measures taken to that effect; 
(g) The availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a particular 
planned or existing use. 
2. In the application of article 5 or paragraph I of this article, watercourse 
States concerned shall, when the need arises, enter into consultations in a spirit of 
cooperation. 
3. The weight to be given to each factor is to be determined by its importance 
in comparison with that of other relevant factors. In determining what is a 
reasonable and equitable use, all relevant factors are to be considered together and 
a conclusion reached on the basis of the whole. 
Article 7: Obligation Not to Cause Significant Harm 
1. Watercourse States shall, in utilizing an international watercourse in their 
territories, take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm 
to other watercourse States. 
2. Where significant harm nevertheless is caused to another watercourse 
State, the States whose use causes such harm shall, in the absence of agreement to 
such use, take all appropriate measures, having due regard for the provisions of 
articles 5 and 6, in consultation with the affected State, to eliminate or mitigate 
such harm and, where appropriate, to discuss the question of compensation. 
Article 8: General Obligation to Cooperate 
1. Watercourse States shall cooperate on the basis of sovereign equality, 
territorial integrity, mutual benefit and good faith in order to attain optimal 
utilization and adequate protection of an international watercourse. 
2. In determining the manner of such cooperation, watercourse States may 
consider the establishment of joint mechanisms or commissions, as deemed 
necessary by them, to facilitate cooperation on relevant measures and procedures 
in the light of experience gained through cooperation in existing joint mechanisms 
and commissions in various regions. 
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Article 9: Regular Exchange of Data and Information 
1. Pursuant to article 8, watercourse States shall on a regular basis exchange 
readily available data and information on the condition of the watercourse, in 
pailicular that of a hydrological, meteorological, hydrogeological and ecological 
nature and related to the water quality as well as related forecasts. 
2. If a watercourse State is requested by another watercourse State to provide 
data or information that is not readily available, it shall employ its best efforts to 
comply with the request but may condition its compliance upon payment by the 
requesting State of the reasonable costs of collecting and, where appropriate, 
processing such data or information. 
3. Watercourse States shall employ their best efforts to collect and, where 
appropriate, to process data and information in a manner which facilitates its 
utilization by the other watercourse States to which it is communicated. 
Article 10: Relationship Between Different Kinds of Uses 
1. In the absence of agreement or custom to the contrary, no use of an 
international watercourse enjoys inherent priority over other uses. 
2. In the event of a conflict between uses of an international watercourse, it 
shall be resolved with reference to articles 5 to 7, with special regard being given 
to the requirements of vital human needs. 
PART III PLANNED MEASURES 
Article 11: Information Concerning Planned Measures 
Watercourse States shall exchange information and consult each other and, if 
necessary, negotiate on the possible effects of planned measures on the condition 
of £in international watercourse. 
Article 12: Notification Concerning Planned Measures with Possible Adverse 
Effects 
Before a watercourse State implements or permits the implementation of 
planned measures which may have a significant adverse effect upon other 
watercourse States, it shall provide those States with timely notification thereof 
Such notification shall be accompanied by available technical data and 
information, including the results of any environmental impact assessment, in 
order to enable the notified States to evaluate the possible effects of the planned 
measures. 
Article 13: Period for Reply to Notification 
Unless otherwise agreed: 
(a) A watercourse State providing a notification under article 12 shall allow the 
notified States a period of six months within which to study and evaluate the 
possible effects of the planned measures and to communicate the findings to it; 
(b) This period shall, at the request of a notified State for which the evaluation 
of tlie planned measures poses special difficulty, be extended for a period of six 
months. 
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Article 14: Obligations of the Notifying State During the Period for Reply 
During the period referred to in article 13, the notifying State: 
(a) Shall cooperate with the notified States by providing them, on request, with 
any additional data and information that is available and necessary for an accurate 
evaluation; and 
(b) Shall not implement or permit the implementation of the planned measures 
wiithout the consent of the notified States. 
Article 15: Reply to Notification 
The notified States shall communicate their findings to the notifying State 
as early as possible within the period applicable pursuant to article 13. If a notified 
State finds that implementation of the planned measures would be inconsistent 
with the provisions of articles 5 or 7, it shall attach to its finding a documented 
explanation setting forth the reasons for the finding. 
Article 16: Absence of Reply to Notification 
1. If, within the period applicable pursuant to article 13, the notifying State 
receives no communication under article 15, it may, subject to its obligations under 
articles 5 and 7, proceed with the implementation of the planned measures, in 
accordance with the notification and any other data and information provided to 
the notified States. 
2. Any claim to compensation by a notified State which has failed to reply 
witliin the period applicable pursuant to article 13 may be offset by the costs 
incurred by the notifying State for action undertaken after the expiration of the 
time for a reply which would not have been undertaken if the notified State had 
objected within that period. 
Article 17: Consultations and Negotiations Concerning Planned Measures 
1. If a communication is made under article 15 that implementation of the 
planned measures would be inconsistent with the provisions of articles 5 or 7, the 
notifying State and the State making the communication shall enter into 
consultations and, if necessary, negotiations with a view to arriving at an equitable 
resolution of the situation. 
2. The consultations and negotiations shall be conducted on the basis that 
each State must in good faith pay reasonable regard to the rights and legitimate 
interests of the other State. 
3. During the course of the consultations and negotiations, the notifying State 
shall, if so requested by the notified State at the time it makes the communication, 
refrain from implementing or permitting the implementation of the planned 
measures for a period of six months unless otherwise agreed. 
Article 18: Procedures in the Absence of Notification 
1. If a watercourse State has reasonable grounds to believe that another 
watercourse State is planning measures that may have a significant adverse effect 
upon it, the former State may request the latter to apply the provisions of article 12. 
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The request shall be accompanied by a documented explanation setting forth its 
grounds. 
2. In the event that the State planning the measures nevertheless finds that it is 
not under an obligation to provide a notification under article 12, it shall so inform 
the other State, providing a documented explanation setting forth the reasons for 
such finding. If tliis finding does not satisfy the other State, the two States shall, at 
the request of that other State, promptly enter into consultations and negotiations in 
the manner indicated m paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 17. 
3. During tJie course of the consultations and negotiations, the State planning 
the measures shall, if so requested by the other State at the time it requests the 
initiation of consultations and negotiations, refrain from implementing or 
permitting the implementation of those measures for a period of six months unless 
otherwise agreed. 
Article 19: Urgent Implementation of Planned Measures 
1. In the event that the implementation of planned measures is of the utmost 
urgency in order to protect public health, public safety or otiier equally important 
interests, the State planning the measures may, subject to articles 5 and 7, 
immediately proceed to implementation, notwithstanding the provisions of article 
14 and paragraph 3 of article 17. 
2. In such case, a formal declaration of the urgency of the measures shall be 
communicated without delay to the other watercourse States referred to in article 
12 together with the relevant data and information. 
3. The State planning the measures shall, at the request of any of the States 
referred to in paragraph 2, promptiy enter into consultations and negotiations with 
it in the manner indicated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 17. 
PART IV. PROTECTION, PRESERVATION AND MANAGEMENT 
Article 20: Protection and Preservation of Ecosystems 
Watercourse States shall, individually and, where appropriate, jointiy, 
protect and preserve the ecosystems of international watercourses. 
Article 21: Prevention, Reduction and Control of Pollution 
1. For the purpose of this article, "pollution of an international watercourse" 
means any detrimental alteration in the composition or quality of the waters of an 
international watercourse which results directiy or indirectly from human conduct. 
2. Watercourse States shall, individually and, where appropriate, jointiy, 
prevent, reduce and control the pollution of an international watercourse that may 
cause significant harm to other watercourse States or to their environment, 
including harm to human health or safety, to the use of tiie waters for any 
beneficial purpose or to the living resources of the watercourse. Watercourse 
States shall take steps to harmonize their policies in this connection. 
3. Watercourse States shall, at the request of any of them, consult witii a view 
to aniving at mutiially agreeable measures and methods to prevent, reduce and 
control pollution-of an international watercourse, such as: 
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(a) Settingjoint water quality objectives and criteria; 
(b) Establishing techniques and practices to address pollution from point and 
non-point sources; 
(c) Establishing lists of substances the introduction of which into the waters of 
an international watercourse is to be prohibited, limited, investigated or monitored. 
Article 22: Introduction of Alien or New Species 
Watercourse States shall take all measures necessary to prevent the 
introduction of species, alien or new, into an international watercourse which may 
have effects detrimental to the ecosystem of the watercourse resulting in 
significant harm to other watercourse States. 
Article 23: Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment 
Watercourse States shall, individually and, where appropriate, in 
cooperation with other States, take all measures with respect to an international 
watercourse that are necessary to protect and preserve the marine environment, 
including estuaries, taking into account generally accepted international rules and 
standards. 
Article 24: Management 
1. Watercourse States shall, at the request of any of them, enter into 
consultations concerning the management of an international watercourse, which 
may include the establishment of a joint management mechanism. 
2. For the purposes of this article, "management" refers, in particular, to: 
(a) Planning the sustainable development of an international watercourse and 
providing for the implementation of any plans adopted; and 
(b) Otherwise promoting the rational and optimal utilization, protection and 
control of the watercourse. 
Article 25: Regulation 
1. Watercourse States shall cooperate, where appropriate, to respond to needs 
or opportimities for regulation of the flow of the waters of an international 
watercourse. 
2. Unless otherwise agreed, watercourse States shall participate on an 
equitable basis in the construction and maintenance or defrayal of the costs of such 
regulation works as they may have agreed to undertake. 
3. For the purposes of this article, "regulation" means the use of hydraulic 
works or any other continuing measure to alter, vary or otherwise control the flow 
of thie waters of an international watercourse. 
Article 26: Installations 
1. Watercourse States shall, within their respective territories, employ their 
best efforts to maintain and protect installations, facilities and other works related 
to an international watercourse. 
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2. Watercourse States shall, at the request of any of them which has 
reasonable grounds to believe that it may suffer significant adverse effects, enter 
into consultations with regard to: 
(a) The safe operation and maintenance of installations, facilities or other 
works related to an international watercourse; and 
(b) The protection of installations, facilities or other works from willful or 
negligent acts or the forces of nature. 
PART V. HARMFUL CONDITIONS AND EMERGENCY SITUATIONS 
Article 27: Prevention and mitigation of harmful conditions 
Watercourse States shall, individually and, where appropriate, jointly, take 
all appropriate measures to prevent or mitigate conditions related to an 
international watercourse that may be harmful to other watercourse States, whether 
resulting from natural causes or human conduct, such as flood or ice conditions, 
water-borne diseases, siltation, erosion, salt-water intrusion, drought or 
desertification. 
Article 28: Emergency situations 
1. For the purposes of this article, "emergency" means a situation that causes, 
or poses an imminent threat of causing, serious harm to watercourse States or other 
States and that results suddenly from natural causes, such as floods, the breaking 
up of ice, landslides or earthquakes, or fi-om human conduct, such as industrial 
accidents. 
2. A watercourse State shall, without delay and by the most expeditious 
means available, notify other potentially affected States and competent 
international organizations of any emergency originating within its territory. 
3. A watercourse State within whose territory an emergency originates shall, 
in cooperation with potentially affected States and, where appropriate, competent 
international organizations, immediately take all practicable measures necessitated 
by the circumstances to prevent, mitigate and eliminate harmful effects of the 
emergency. 
4. When necessary, watercourse States shall jointly develop contingency 
plans for responding to emergencies, in cooperation, where appropriate, with other 
potentially affected States and competent international organizations. 
PART VI. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
Article 29: International watercourses and installations in time of armed conflict 
International watercourses and related installations, facilities and other 
works shall enjoy the protection accorded by the principles and rules of 
international law applicable in international and non-international armed conflict 
and shall not be used in violation of those principles and rules. 
Article 30: Indirect Procedures 
In cases where there are serious obstacles to direct contacts between 
watercourse States, the States concerned shall fulfill their obligations of 
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cooperation provided for in the present Convention, including exchange of data 
and infonriation, notification, communication, consultations and negotiations, 
through an}^  indirect procedure accepted by them. 
Article 31: Data and Information Vital to National Defence or Security 
Nothing in the present Convention obliges a watercourse State to provide 
data or information vital to its national defence or security. Nevertheless, that State 
shall cooperate in good faith with the other watercourse States with a view to 
providing as much information as possible under the circumstances 
Article 32: Non-discrimination 
Unless the watercourse States concerned have agreed otherwise for the 
protection of the interests of persons, natural or juridical, who have suffered or are 
under a serious threat of suffering significant transboundary harm as a result of 
activities related to an international watercourse, a watercourse State shall not 
discriminate on the basis of nationality or residence or place where the injury 
occurred,, in granting to such persons, in accordance with its legal system, access to 
judicial or other procedures, or a right to claim compensation or other relief in 
respect of significant harm caused by such activities carried on in its territory. 
Article 33: Settlement of disputes 
1. In the event of a dispute between two or more Parties concerning the 
interpretation or application of the present Convention, the Parties concerned shall, 
in the absence of an applicable agreement between them, seek a settlement of the 
dispute by peaceful means in accordance with the following provisions. 
2. If the Parties concerned cannot reach agreement by negotiation requested 
by one of them, they may jointly seek the good offices of, or request mediation or 
conciliation by, a third party, or make use, as appropriate, of any joint watercourse 
institutions that may have been established by them or agree to submit the dispute 
to arbitration or to the International Court of Justice. 
3. Subject to the operation of paragraph 10, if after six months fi-om the time 
of the request for negotiations referred to in paragraph 2, the Parties concerned 
have not been able to settle their dispute through negotiation or any other means 
referred to in paragraph 2, the dispute shall be submitted, at the request of any of 
the parties to the dispute, to impartial fact-finding in accordance with paragraphs 4 
to 9, imless the Parties otherwise agree. 
4. Fact-finding Commission shall be established, composed of one member 
nominated by each Party concerned and in addition a member not having the 
nationality of any of the Parties concerned chosen by the nominated members who 
shall serve as Chairman. 
5. If the members nominated by the Parties are imable to agree on a Chairman 
withm three months of the request for the establishment of the Commission, any 
Vdx\y concerned may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to 
appoint the Chairman who shall not have the nationality of any of the parties to the 
dispute or of any riparian State of the watercourse concerned. If one of the Parties 
fails to nominate a member within three months of tiie initial request pursuant to 
paragraph 3, any other Party concerned may request the Secretary-General of the 
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United Nations to appoint a person who shall not have the nationality of any of the 
parties to the dispute or of any riparian State of the watercourse concerned. The 
person so appointed shall constitute a single-member Commission. 
6. The Commission shall determine its own procedure. 
7. The Parties concerned have the obligation to provide the Commission with 
such information as it may require and, on request, to permit the Commission to 
ha\'e access to their respective territory and to inspect any facilities, plant, 
equipment, construction or natural feature relevant for the purpose of its inquiry. 
8. The Commission shall adopt its report by a majority vote, unless it is a 
single-member Commission, and shall submit that report to the Parties concerned 
settling forth its findings and the reasons therefore and such recommendations as it 
deems appropriate for an equitable solution of the dispute, which the Parties 
concerned shall consider in good faith. 
9. The expenses of the Commission shall be borne equally by the Parties 
concerned 
10. When ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to the present 
Convention, or at any time thereafter, a Party which is not a regional economic 
integration organization may declare in a written instrument submitted to the 
Depositary that, in respect of any dispute not resolved in accordance with 
paragraph 2, it recognizes as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement 
in relation to any Party accepting the same obligation: 
(a) Submission of the dispute to the International Court of Justice; and/or 
(b) Arbitration by an arbitral tribunal established and operating, 'imless the 
parties to the dispute otherwise agreed, in accordance with the procedure laid down 
in the annex to the present Convention. 
A Party which is a regional economic integration organization may make a 
declaration with like effect in relation to arbitration in accordance with 
subparagraph (b). 
PART VIL FINAL CLAUSES 
Article 34: Signature 
The present Convention shall be open for signature by all States and by 
regional economic integration organizations from 21 May 1997 until 20 May 2000 
at United Nations Headquarters in New York. 
Article 35: Ratification, Acceptance, Approval or Accession 
1. The present Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession by States and by regional economic integration organizations. The 
insitruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited 
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
2. Any regional economic integration organization which becomes a Party to 
this Convention without any of its member States being a Party shall be bound by 
all the obligations under the Convention. In the case of such organizations, one or 
more of whose member States is a Party to tiiis Convention, tiie orgaiuzation and 
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its member States shall decide on their respective responsibihties for the 
performance of their obHgations under the Convention. In such cases, the 
organization and the member States shall not be entitled to exercise rights under 
the Convention concurrently. 
3. In their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, the 
regional economic integration organizations shall declare the extent of their 
competence with respect to the matters governed by the Convention, These 
organizations shall also inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of any 
substantial modification in the extent of their competence. 
Article 36: Entry into Force 
1. The present Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day 
following the date of deposit of the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession with the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations. 
2. For each State or regional economic integration organization that ratifies, 
accepts or approves the Convention or accedes thereto after the deposit of the 
thirt},^ -fifth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, the 
Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the deposit by such 
State or regional economic integration organization of its instrument of ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession. 
3. For the purposes of paragraphs I and 2, any instrument deposited by a 
regional economic integration organization shall not be counted as additional those 
deposited by States. 
Article 37: Authentic Texts 
The original of the present Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, 
English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be 
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned plenipotentiaries, being duly 
authorized thereto, have signed this Convention. 
DONE at New York, this day of one thousand nine hundred and ninety-
seven. 
ANNEX 
ARBITRATION 
Article 1 
Unless the parties to the dispute otherwise agree, the arbitration pursuant to 
article 33 of the Convention shall take place in accordance with articles 2 to 14 of 
the present annex. 
Article 2 
The claimant party shall notify the respondent party that it is referring a 
dispute to arbitration pursuant to article 33 of the Convention. The notification 
shall state the subject matter of arbitration and include, in particular, the articles of 
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the Convention, the interpretation or application of which are at issue. If the parties 
do not agree on the subject matter of the dispute, the arbitral tribunal shall 
deteirmine the subject matter. 
Article 3 
1. In disputes between two parties, the arbitral tribunal shall consist of three 
members. Each of the parties to the dispute shall appoint an arbitrator and the two 
arbitators so appointed shall designate by common agreement the third arbitrator, 
who shall be the Chairman of the tribunal. The latter shall not' be a national of one 
of tlie parties to the dispute or of any riparian State of the watercourse concerned, 
nor have his or her usual place of residence in the territory of one of these parties 
or such riparian State, nor have dealt with the case in any other capacity. 
2. In disputes between more than two parties, parties in the same interest shall 
appoint one arbitrator jointly by agreement. 
3. Any vacancy shall be filled in the manner prescribed for the initial 
appointment. 
Article 4 
1. If the Chairman of the arbitral tribunal has not been designated within two 
months of the appointment of the second arbitrator, the President of the 
International Court of Justice shall, at the request of a party, designate the 
Chairman within a further two-month period. 
2. If one of the parties to the dispute does not appoint an arbitrator within two 
months of receipt of the request, the other party may inform the President of the 
International Court of Justice, who shall make the designation within a fiirther two-
month period. 
Article 5 
The arbitral tribunal shall render its decisions in accordance with the 
provisions of this Convention and international law. 
Article 6 
Unless the parties to the dispute otherwise agree, the arbitral tribimal shall 
determine its own rules of procedure. 
Article 7 
The arbitral tribunal may, at the request of one of the Parties, recommend 
essential interim measures of protection. 
Article 8 
1. The parties to the dispute shall facilitate the work of the arbitral tribunal 
and, in particular, using all means at their disposal, shall: 
(a) Provide it with all relevant documents, information and facilities; and 
(b) Enable it', when necessary, to call witnesses or experts and receive their 
evidence. 
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2. ITie parties and the arbitrators are under an obligation to protect the 
confidentiality of any information they receive in confidence during the 
proceedings of the arbitral tribunal. 
Article 9 
Unless the arbitral tribunal determines otherwise because of the particular 
circumstances of the case, the costs of the tribunal shall be borne by the parties to 
the dispute in equal shares. The tribunal shall keep a record of all its costs, and 
shall furnish a final statement thereof to the parties. 
Article 10 
Any Party that has an interest of a legal nature in the subject matter of the 
dispute which may be affected by the decision in the case, may intervene in the 
proceedings with the consent of the tribunal. 
Article 11 
The tribunal may hear and determine coimterciaims arising directly out of 
the subject matter of the dispute. 
Article 12 
Decisions both on procedure and substance of the arbitral tribunal shall be 
taken by a majority vote of its members. 
Article 13 
If one of the parties to the dispute does not appear before the arbitral 
tribunal or fails to defend its case, the other party may request the tribimal to 
continue the proceedings and to make its award. Absence of a party or a failure of 
a party to defend its case shall not constitute a bar to the proceedmgs. Before 
rendering its final decision, the arbitral tribunal must satisfy itself that the claim is 
well founded in fact and law. 
Article 14 
1. The tribunal shall render its final decision within five months of the date on 
which it is fully constituted unless it finds it necessary to extend the time limit for 
a period which should not exceed five more months. 
2. The final decision of the arbitral tribunal shall be confined to the subject 
matter of the dispute and shall state the reasons on which it is based'. It shall 
contain the names of the members who have participated and the date of the final 
decision. Any member of the tribunal may attach a separate or dissenting opinion 
to the final decision. 
3. The award shall be binding on the parties to the dispute. It shall be without 
appeal imless the parties to the dispute have agreed in advance to an appellate 
procedure. 
4. Any controversy which may arise between the parties to the dispute as 
regards the interpretation or manner of implementation of the final decision may 
be submitted by either party for decision to the arbitral tribunal which rendered it. 
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APPENDIX-D 
ARCHIVAL MATERIAL 
Public Record Office, London 
The classes and series listed below are those that contain documents of direct 
relevance to the Nile issue. The given covering data are in general adapted to the 
topic of the book (e.g. 1912-89 will be 1912-56). 
CAB 37: Cabinet Office: Photographic Copies of Cabinet Papers. 1880-1916. 
Consists of a collection of photographic copies of memoranda circulated to the 
Cabinet to the end of 1916. 162 volumes. Some of the documents deal with the 
Sudan issue. 
Archives at Windsor, written by prime Ministers to the Sovereign to report 
proceedings at Cabinet Meetings. Relevant subject headings: Abyssinia, Sudan, 
Egypt and Uganda. 
CAB 78: Consists of minutes and papers of various Cabinet committees in the 
Miscellaneous and General Series. 1941-47. 39 volumes. Includes subject headings 
on policies in regard to Ethiopia, Egypt and the Middle East in general. 
CAB 128: Cabinet meetings. Consists of minutes and papers of a variety of 
committees and sub- committees on the Middle East and Africa. 1939-45. 49 files, 
microforms and volumes. Deals with the Middle East, Egypt and the Sudan. 
CO 537; Colonial Office and predecessors: Confidential General and Condential 
Original Correspondence. 1945-56. Sub- series on Uganda. This also contains 
documents related to Lake Albert and Lake Victoria in the late 1940s. 
FO 78: Foreign office and predecessors: Political and Other Departments: General 
Correspondence before 1906. 1780-1905. 5491 volumes. Contains general 
correspondence relating to the Ottoman Empire. 
FO 115: Records of the British Embassy in Washington 
FO 141: Foreign Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Embassy and 
Consulates, Egypt: General Correspondence. 1815-1971. 1482 volumes. Contains 
general correspondence of the British Embassy and consulates in Egypt. Papers 
dealing with British and American policies in the Middle East. Correspondence 
described in the register. 
FO 368: Foreign Office, General Commercial Correspondence. 1906-19. Includes 
correspondence on Abyssinia, Egypt and the Sudan for all the years. 
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F0369 Foreign Office: Consular Department. Includes general correspondence 
from 1906 on Egypt, Ethiopia and the Sudan for all relevant years. 
F0371: Foreign Office: Political Departments: General correspondence 1906-66. 
Sub-series on Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia. A very rich collection of relevant 
sources. Separate index to general correspondence for all the relevant years. 
Documents under the following headings: Egypt, Sudan, Abyssinia/ Ethiopia, 
Irrigation, Tsana, Jonglei, Nile projects, Aswan 
FO407: Coni'idential Print Egypt and the Sudan. 1839-1958.237 volumes. 
Organised chronologically. 
F0633. Cromer's correspondence.! 13 files and volumes. This series contains 
private and official correspondence and papers of EvelUyn Baring, 1*' Earl of 
Cromer, mainly dealing with his career as Commissioner of the Egyptian public 
Debt and later Minister plenipotentiary in Egypt (18883-1907). Organized 
chronologically. Details of correspondence explained in the register. Contains a 
great nimiber of letters dealing with irrigation, dams and Nile control. 
FO800: Foreign Office, Private Offices: Various Ministries' and Officials' Papers. 
1824-1968, 986 volumes. Consists of the Private Office papers of most Secretaries 
of State 1900-56 and of many Under-Secretaries of State from 1886 to 
1948(Belvin, Curzon, Eden, Eric Drummond, Selwyn Lloyd and Roger Makins). 
Many of the files deal with Egypt, Abyssinia and thus the Nile issue. 
F0921: War Cabinet: Office of the Minister of State Resident in the Middle East: 
Registered files. 1942-46. 384 files. Contains sources from the Office of the 
Minister of State, Resident in Cairo. He had Cabinet rank and his main fiinction 
was operations in the Middle East. Sub-series on Ethiopia, Egypt, North Afiica 
General, Cairo Conference. 
F0954: Foreign Office: Private Office Papers of Sir Anthony Eden. Photocopies of 
private office papers of Anthony Eden as secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
1936-38 !md 1940-45. Few papers from 1935 and 1946. 34 volumes. 
PREM8: Prime Ministers' Office: Correspondence and papers, 1945-51. The 
records in this series cover Attlee's Labour administration of 1945-51. 
PREM 11: Prime Ministers' Office: Correspondence and papers, 1951-64. Contains 
the general correspondence and papers of the conservative administration 1951-54. 
PRO 30/57: Kitchener papers. Within the first category of this huge collection of 
private papers there are many papers that deal with the conquest of the Sudan and 
the High Commissionership in Egypt. 
Arab Leage, Technical Committee, The Arab Plan for the Development of water 
Resoui'ces in the Jordan Valley (Cairo: March, 1954). 
Great Britain, British and Foreign State Papers. Vols. 56,108. 
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Palestine Partition Commission Report. Cmd. 5854 (1938). 
Report of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of 
Palestine and Transjordan (1936-1939). 
The Unified Development of the Water Resources of the Jordan Valley Region 
(Prepared for UNRWA by charles T. Main, Inc.), 1953. 
United Nations Treaty Series, Vols. 3, 5, 23,27,49, 54,109,184. 
United Nation Treaty Series, Nos. 455 and 548. 
Abate, Zewdie. 1992. observed context of environment and development in 
Ethiopia: Ai approach that needs development. Occasional paper No.7. London: 
School of African and Oriental Studies, Centre of Middle Eastern Studies. 
Abate, Z. (1990). "The Integrated Development of the Nile Basin Waters," in The 
Nile, P.P. Howell and J.A.Allan (eds.). London: SOAS, 137-152. 
Ahmed, S. (1990). "Context and Precedents with Respect of the Development, 
Division and Management of Nile Water," in The London: SOAS, 225-238. 
Allan,J.A.(1989)."Natural Resource: Not So Natural for Ease of Development," in 
Libya: State and Regional, J.A.Allan et al. (eds.) London: SOAS, 63-72 
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